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This is an odd book with an odd history. Grant and I began working 
on it in about 2007, but we didn’t know who the other one was until 
2010. For me, it started when I was at Tulane University shortly after 
I completed an article called “A Dilemma for Libertarianism,” which 
examines the Lockean attempt to justify private property rights by 
telling a story of “original appropriation.” My argument was that if 
you tell a slightly different appropriation story, the same principles 
justify a monarch or a democratic assembly owning all the property. 
Thus, Lockean principles don’t say anything at all about whether 
property should be private or public. When I explained this argu-
ment to a prominent libertarian (or “propertarian,” to use this book’s 
term), he responded, “What a colossal counterfactual!”
I thought that was the worst possible response a propertarian could 
give because their appropriation story is a fanciful tale about rugged 
individuals who go into “the state of nature” to clear land and bring it 
into cultivation. Do propertarians actually think this story is true? After 
thinking over their arguments I realized to some extent the answer is 
yes. They think at least that there is truth in it, that “private” “property 
rights” are somehow more natural than public or communal “territo-
rial claims.” So, I set out to read a little bit of anthropology and write 
a short 4,000-word article disproving that utterly ridiculous claim. But 
over the following nine years that 4,000-word article has grown to a 
research project involving at least two books, two spinoff articles, an 
online appendix, and maybe more after that. The original subject of that 
original article is now one of the topics planned for the second book.
As I read a little more anthropology, I realized that the sources 
I had started with were not a broad representation of the relevant 
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anthropological thought. So, I read some more and began to think 
about other dubious anthropological claims fl oating around modern 
political philosophy. I spent most of the academic year 2007–8 and 
much of the next (both years at the University of Reading in the 
United Kingdom) reading anthropology, archaeology, and history—
not quite sure what I was looking for, but able to relate most of what 
I was learning to political philosophy in my fi eld. I probably should 
have been publishing more articles and trying to get a job, but it was 
fabulously interesting, telling me stuff about history and about pre-
history that I’ve always wanted to know and that is left out of most 
history books.
Eventually I settled on a half dozen prominent claims that I 
thought could be falsifi ed in a long article, or maybe a two-part 
article: the contractarian claim that everyone is better off in a state 
society, the propertarian claim that everyone is better off in a soci-
ety with privatized land, a popular claim that inequality is natural 
and inevitable, the propertarian claim capitalism delivers greater 
negative freedom than any other system, and the claim that started 
me off: the widespread belief that the appropriation story somehow 
explains something about why some people own all the resources 
and other people don’t. 
By 2010, I was working at Georgetown University’s campus in 
Qatar and married to Elizabeth Smith Widerquist, whom I hadn’t 
even met when I started working on this project. She works at Xavier-
Louisiana, which is a long way from Qatar. So, she arranged for me 
to present my “article” at her university. Two anthropologists from 
Tulane University sat poker-faced in the front row throughout the pre-
sentation. One of them was Grant S. McCall, and it turned out that 
he had also been working for several years on debunking commonly 
held misconceptions about prehistory. We eventually decided to com-
bine our efforts and write a book. Our partnership gave me the hope, 
which you can judge whether we have realized, that this book would 
not be a philosopher dabbling in anthropology or an anthropologist 
dabbling in philosophy, but a cross-disciplinary work equally well-
informed of the relevant research on both sides.
When I presented this work to philosophers, I found that it split an 
audience. One side essentially agreed: the evidence we present falsifi es 
important empirical claims in the relevant theories. The other side 
didn’t disagree that our empirical evidence falsifi es the claims; they 
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disagreed that the theories in question actually rely on these claims or 
sometimes that these theories rely on any empirical claims at all.
This split made me realize that this book needs to criticize a clar-
ity issue as much as it needs to criticize a factual issue. Not only 
does contractarianism rely on questionable claims, most versions of 
the theory are not entirely clear what those claims are or whether 
the theory needs them or not. This sent us much more deeply into 
the history of social contract theory to show that so-and-so’s version 
requires this claim too. I spent more than half of the 2014 calendar 
year and part of the next reading through political theory pinning 
down various theorists’ positions on the issues we were investigating. 
The result is fi ve chapters on contractarian and propertarian theory 
in the following book and an additional 20,000 words or so in an 
online appendix. Together, we hope this writing demonstrates that 
despite some equivocation, contractarian theory does require claims 
of the kind we address.
After this expansion of the project, Grant and I realized we had 
enough material for two books. And so, for the fi rst book, we concen-
trated on one issue that combines the contractarian and propertarian 
claims about the state of nature I had been working on with some of 
the issues of violence and warfare that Grant was working on. This 
effort resulted in the book that follows, and we had so much material 
from the history of political thought that we had to move more than 
20,000 words into an online appendix.
We have three claims left to examine in our follow-up book, tenta-
tively titled, The Prehistory of Private Property: And What It Means 
for Contemporary Capitalism. We hope these two books can con-
tribute both to a better-informed empirical debate and to a clearer 
normative debate of the theories we address. It’s been fun reading all 
these books and writing what we think about them. I hope you fi nd 
it worth reading.
GRANT S. McCALL
Writing this book has been the most diffi cult project of my career. This 
is funny because, when I met Karl now the better part of a decade 
ago and we decided to collaborate, it seemed as if this would be a 
relatively simple matter of debunking the worst of the early modern 
period misconceptions about indigenous peoples, as well as somewhat 
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later misunderstandings of human prehistory. After so many years of 
work on this book and a second book in the works to cover the topics 
left out of this book (not to mention a number of journal articles on 
related topics), it would be an understatement to say that this project 
was more complex than either of us ever anticipated.
The reasons for this, however, are perhaps illustrative of some 
important lessons that I have learned and that I hope readers will take 
away from this book. As an anthropologist, a good deal of the com-
plexity of writing this book lay in the reconciliation of two rather dif-
ferent ways of looking at human social diversity between the fi elds of 
political philosophy and my own discipline. As a scientist, I am inter-
ested in documenting and understanding all of the incredible variabil-
ity in terms of how human societies have organized themselves over 
the vastness of time and space and the evolutionary processes that 
have brought these lifeways into being. The value of the anthropo-
logical information presented in this book is its relevance to historical 
efforts to justify the state and private property. Some anthropologists 
may complain—and some have already—that this project is, there-
fore, an inherently fl awed exercised in comparing apples and oranges; 
that using anthropological perspectives on human diversity to develop 
political policy is somehow a doomed effort in fundamental violation 
of the principles of cultural relativism that have constituted the heart 
of the discipline for more than a century. To the reader, I assure you 
that we have spent many long hours thinking about these issues.
Despite our best efforts to present the consensus of the various 
fi elds of social science discussed in this book, we are happy to admit 
that it is not perfect. There will be those in both of our fi elds that 
will object to the ways in which we have chosen to tackle the issues 
examined here. However, just because an intellectual project is hard 
and just because one’s results may not be perfect does not mean that 
the project is not worth doing. This is especially true when the goal 
of a project is as important as the one discussed in this book. Philo-
sophical justifi cations of the state and private property are profoundly 
important and they have consequences for every person alive on earth 
today. Recognizing the racist and colonialist biases at the founda-
tions of modern political institutions offers crucial insights on how to 
improve these institutions and the lives of the least advantaged people 
in our affl uent societies.
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Thus, while some of my fellow anthropologists may have objec-
tions to the approaches and tactics we take in this book, I hope they 
will appreciate the huge importance of the problem. Likewise, I hope 
that philosophers will (if nothing else) take away from this the inescap-
able fact that empirical information about human diversity is instru-
mental to better thinking about a wide range of knowledge. In spite 
of debates within my fi eld, we can and do know things about both 
contemporary human variability and the lifeways of our evolutionary 
ancestors in the deep past. We have learned a lot in researching and 
writing this book, and we are certain that those who follow us down 
this interdisciplinary path will likewise be rewarded.




After working on this book on and off for nine years, I’ve started 
to wish I’d taken notes on everybody who discussed it with me. I’ve 
presented bits and piece of it at a lot of seminars and conferences. 
Close colleagues and people I barely know have given me important 
feedback over these years, and I wish I could thank them all by name, 
but most of them will go unnamed. Thank you.
Thanks to all of my Facebook friends who listened to my thoughts 
on this book for nearly a decade. 
The people that I can remember to thank by name include espe-
cially my wife Elizabeth and Grant’s wife Sarah, who were both very 
encouraging and willing to make sacrifi ces to make this work possible. 
The Preface mentioned that Elizabeth arranged the seminar where 
Grant and I met, and now I need to thank her for that. She also let me 
bounce ideas off her even though it sometimes involved tedious expla-
nations. Thanks to my parents, my sister, and especially my brother, 
who became my business partner and built our business in less time 
than it took to write this book.
Some of my colleagues from Oxford and Reading when I was 
there in the mid to late 2000s gave me useful advice and encourage-
ment when I was just getting started. These include Sara Ababneh, 
Chris Brooke, Dan Butt, Ian Carroll, Paula Casal, John Filling, 
Beatrice Heuser, Rob Jubb, Clare Haywood, Omar Khan, Kieran 
Oberman, Miriam Ronzoni, Ben Saunders, Stuart White, Andrew 
Williams, Steve Winter, and many others. About that time, while 
discussing another project, Michael W. Howard of the University of 
Maine, helped me understand that my perspective confl icts as much 
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with contractarianism as it does with propertarianism. That discus-
sion certainly affected how I read anthropology.
I’ve been working at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign 
Service in Qatar since 2009, and although I’m one of only two phi-
losophers on staff, the entire faculty has been great about treating me 
like a colleague who does valuable research. I’d like to thank everyone 
there, especially Jeremy Koons (the other philosopher) and Sharif S. 
Elmusa (who arranged for me to give a public lecture on this project).
Mehran Kamrava, the director of Georgetown’s Center for Inter-
national and Regional Studies, found funding for a conference on this 
book, and arranged for philosophers from around Europe and the 
Middle East to come and discuss it. I think I can name everyone this 
time: James Alexander, Renaud Fabbri, Bashshar Haydar, Carl Knight, 
David Lea, Enzo Rossi, Assaf Sharon, Anthony Squires, Lars Vinx, 
and Raya M. Wolfsun. Each of these people read a 100,000-word 
manuscript and talked about this project all day. Their feedback was 
so massive and so useful that it contributed to this project’s becoming 
a two-book series. 
I am a member of the Economic Ethics Network (EEN), a group of 
a few dozen philosophers and political theorists who specialize in the 
ethical issues of economic policy. I’ve presented several pieces of this 
project at the EEN’s annual conference, and the feedback has been 
great. Thank you all.
Recently my New Orleans colleagues, Drew Chastain and Jason 
Bernsten, have given me useful feedback, as did all the attendees at 
Tulane’s symposium, Articulating Political Philosophy and Anthropo-
logical Theory, Method, and Evidence.
A partial list of people who have read and given me comments on 
chapters but haven’t been named elsewhere includes Jurgen De Wispe-
laere, Andrew Dittmer, Joerg Drescher, Alice El-Wakil, Anca Gheaus, 
Jason Hickel, Gillian Ice, Stephen Kershnar, Sean Mitchell, Ben Mord, 
Viggo Nightbay, Gaura Rader, Brent Renalli, Mark Walker, and many 
more whose names I should have written down.
I would like to thank Anton Leist, the editor of Analyse & Kritik, 
whose critical comments on our précis of this book greatly improved 
our clarity. Also, an anonymous referee from that journal who gave 
us the single best review I’ve ever received or ever expect to receive in 
my life and helped me to understand the signifi cance of our refutation 
of what we call “the violence hypothesis.”
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And a special apology to everyone else I should have named but 
haven’t.
GRANT S. McCALL
There are many people that need thanking for their help on this proj-
ect; more than I will be able thank here, I’m afraid. Above all, my 
wife, Sarah McCall, has suffered my distraction in working on this 
book, and my other forms of foolery, with a smile (mostly). Next, my 
parents, George McCall and Nancy Shields, have loved and supported 
me in all of my work over the years. In addition, you will fi nd both of 
them featured prominently in literature cited in this book. Their infl u-
ence is never far from what I do and that is as true here as anywhere.
There have also been many colleagues with whom I have had 
important conversations about the work presented here. Among my 
Tulane colleagues that have helped me on this project are Marcello 
Canuto, Trent Holliday, Tatsuya Murakami, Jason Nesbitt, and Chris 
Rodning. I’m especially grateful to Mary Townsend, who joined me in 
organizing the Articulating Political Philosophy and Anthropological 
Theory, Method, and Evidence symposium, as well as the other par-
ticipants, Drew Chastain, Osman Nemli, and Christopher Quintana. 
Discussion among all of the participants in this symposium helped 
me sharpen my thinking on subjects discussed in this book. Finally, 
to echo what Karl has said above, there are innumerable people with 
whom I’ve discussed this project in conversations that I can’t recall 
now. For all such anonymous help, I’m enormously grateful and sad 
that I can’t thank everyone by name.




Does it matter whether you’re better off than your ancestors were 
12,000 years ago (before the rise of sovereign states and the private 
property system)? Does it matter whether all of your fellow citizens 
are better off than the few peoples who still remain outside the author-
ity of governments and landlords? Thousands of years ago, powerful 
people began imposing government and property institutions in parts 
of the world. The reach of these institutions has gradually expanded. 
Today they have authority over almost all of earth’s land area and, 
therefore, also over almost all people. These institutions benefi t many 
of us, maybe even most of us, but does it matter whether they benefi t 
all of us? Does the justness of these institutions come into question, 
if—as currently constituted—they harm some of us? Would justice 
require reform of these institutions?
We all would like to think that this question is moot, because we’d 
like to think that everyone is better off. It might be tempting to think 
that everyone is obviously better off in contemporary capitalist states 
with their doubled life expectancy, their incredible productivity, their 
legal systems, and so on. But consider what you would have to know 
to verify that these achievements benefi t everyone. You would need a 
deep understanding of how the most disadvantaged people in state soci-
ety live. What is it really like to be the child of homeless people in the 
United States, to grow up in a shantytown in Brazil, or to work in a 
sweatshop in Southeast Asia? You would need a deep understanding of 
the life of people in small-scale stateless indigenous communities both 
of the modern era and of the distant past. What was it like to be a mem-
ber of the Ju/’hoansi in the Kalahari in 1950 ce, the Inuit in the Arctic in 
1500 ce, or the Clovis culture on the Great Plains in 12,000 bce? This 
comparison cannot be obvious because it involves groups far from the 
everyday experience of most people who are likely to read this book.
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Later chapters of this book present evidence that this seemingly 
obvious impression is mistaken. The least advantaged people in state 
society today are worse off than they could reasonably expect to be 
in a society with neither a state nor private resource ownership, not 
because life in stateless societies is great. Life in most observed state-
less societies is extremely diffi cult. Yet, at least some people today are 
worse off because they bear most of the capitalist state’s disadvantages 
and share few of its advantages. 
Does it matter? 
It mattered to Thomas Paine, who wrote:
the fi rst principle of civilization ought to have been, and ought 
still to be, that the condition of every person born into the 
world, after a state of civilization commences, ought not to 
be worse than if he had been born before that period. (Paine 
2000: 82)
It also mattered to Robert Nozick, who—building on the work of 
John Locke (1960)—coined the phrase, “the Lockean proviso,” and 
defi ned his “weak” version of it almost identically to Paine’s fi rst prin-
ciple of civilization. Nozick wrote:
[because] the process of civilization had deprived the members 
of society of certain liberties (to gather, pasture, engage in the 
chase) . . . compensation would be due those persons, if any, for 
whom the process of civilization was a net loss. (Nozick 1974: 
178–9n)
By the process of “civilization,” Paine and Nozick meant primarily 
the establishment, spread, and maintenance of these two institutions. 
Paine used essentially what we defi ne below as a “contractarian” 
approach to the justifi cation of the state and Nozick used what we 
defi ne below as a “propertarian” approach to the justifi cation of the 
private property system. These two approaches are very different, but 
as David Gauthier (1986: 205, 208) defi nes it, “the Lockean proviso” 
is an essential premise in both. Paine and Nozick disagreed about 
whether the proviso was fulfi lled, but they agreed that this proviso 
matters and that, if it is unfulfi lled, the people who benefi t from these 
institutions owe compensation to anyone they harm.
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The Lockean proviso is a mutual advantage principle, and it is 
undeniably important to contemporary political thought. Rex Martin 
writes:
we can point to a single, common, underlying idea of economic 
justice . . . which can be found in Locke, in Adam Smith, in 
Marx and in much recent contractarian theory . . . the arrange-
ment of economic institutions requires, if it is to be just, that all 
contributors benefi t or, at least, that none are to be left worse 
off. (Martin 1998: 150)
This principle is so important and so widely used that any ambiguity 
about what it is or what it implies is inexcusable. 
Yet, for centuries, some of the most infl uential political philoso-
phers and political theorists1 have stated or implied that this prin-
ciple is fulfi lled without unequivocally explaining what that means. 
It would seem that anyone using a mutual advantage principle to jus-
tify any existing institution has little choice but to assert that mutual 
advantage is achieved—as a matter of empirical fact. What room 
exists for equivocation?
Equivocation is possible if the theory is less than clear about what 
proviso it uses to determine mutual advantage. Propertarians tend to 
have less of a problem with equivocation. Like Nozick, most proper-
tarians clearly assert the weak proviso or something similar. Contrac-
tarians usually defi ne their proviso as a comparison to “the state of 
nature”—a time and place in which people live without the authority 
of a sovereign government. But contractarians are often less than clear 
whether their conception of the state of nature includes empirically 
real stateless societies. Maybe it does; maybe it only includes one pos-
sible stateless scenario, such as a civil war; or maybe it is a purely 
theoretical construct with no relation to observable reality. 
A less-than-clear proviso allows theorists to equivocate between 
two very different answers to our question: (1) the Lockean proviso 
matters, and it’s obviously fulfi lled, or (2) it does not matter either way. 
Equivocation is sloppy philosophy, but it has rhetorical power. On 
one hand, by implying that the state of nature includes all empirically 
real stateless societies, contractarianism credits the state for fulfi lling 
Paine’s fi rst principle and avoids the need to argue that this admit-
tedly weak proviso is too strong. Theorists avoid having to make the 
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uncomfortable admission that their theory fully justifi es a state even if 
it forces some to live worse than people in real stateless societies. On 
the other hand, by implying that the state of nature does not include 
empirically real stateless societies, they avoid the need to provide evi-
dence that the state benefi ts everyone or to consider what remedy is 
required if it harms anyone. Perhaps the lack of clarity about what 
the empirical content of the claim is—or even whether it has empirical 
content—has helped it survive, passing from generation to generation 
with ambiguity intact.
Because of the clarity problem, this book includes a lot of tex-
tual analysis to show how this proviso appears in social contract and 
property rights theory. It argues that any successful use of mutual 
advantage in the justifi cation of the state or private property rights 
must at minimum satisfy the weak version of the Lockean proviso. A 
stronger proviso might be in order, but the book argues that a proviso 
any weaker than the weak version moves out of the realm of mutual 
advantage. Some contractarians state this criterion explicitly, some 
only tacitly. But few argue against it, and no one we have been able 
to fi nd puts forth a successful mutual advantage-based justifi cation of 
the state or private property with a clearly extra-weak proviso.
This book shows that although the claim that the weak proviso is 
fulfi lled has been a major feature of contractarian and propertarian 
literature since Thomas Hobbes (1962 [1651]: 100) published Levia-
than in 1651, it has so far received very little attention or scrutiny. The 
few critics, such as Paine, have been easily ignored. It has even escaped 
receiving a name, and so we dub it “the Hobbesian hypothesis.” Most 
simply, it is the claim that the Lockean proviso is fulfi lled. We defi ne 
the weak version of the Lockean proviso as: an institution (such as the 
state or the property rights system) can justly be imposed on people 
providing everyone living under its authority is better off than they 
could reasonably expect to be in a society without such authority. The 
corresponding weak version of the Hobbesian hypothesis is: everyone 
is better off or at least as well-off under the authority of a sovereign 
state (and/or under the authority of the private property system) than 
they could reasonably expect to be living in a society outside of any 
such authority. 
The function of the Hobbesian hypothesis is clear and obvious, as 
Samuel Pufendorf explained in 1672: “the complaint of the masses 
about the burdens and drawbacks of civil states could be met in no 
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better way than by picturing to their eyes the drawbacks of a state of 
nature” (Hardin 2003: 43). The Hobbesian hypothesis is a reason to 
silence the complaints of disadvantaged people, whether those com-
plaints are against the government or powerful private interests. 
The philosopher’s job is to question claims like this to see if they 
are based on clear reasoning and good evidence. Yet, the stunning 
feature of contractarian and propertarian literature reviewed below 
is how quickly most theorists have gone from normative proviso to 
empirical hypothesis. They dedicate extensive argumentation to estab-
lish the normative need for the Lockean proviso (by whatever name). 
Then, with little or often no argument, they simply ask readers to 
presume the Hobbesian hypothesis, often without specifying exactly 
what the claim of fulfi llment means empirically, much less undergoing 
an empirical investigation. While propertarians have stated the claim 
more clearly than contractarians, they are no better at supporting it.
The correct word for an unverifi ed empirical claim is a hypothesis. 
Hence we are unapologetic about attributing this term to Hobbes 
and other theorists making similar claims although few of them use 
that word. The correct word for an unverifi ed empirical claim that 
is accepted without scrutiny and gains credibility from centuries of 
repetition is a myth. 
This book’s most important points all relate to this claim:
• The Hobbesian hypothesis is an empirical claim.
• Despite some ambiguity or equivocation, most contractarian 
and propertarian theories from Hobbes and Locke to the pres-
ent use it as an essential premise.
• It includes claims about the relative welfare of disadvantaged 
people in state society and of people in small-scale indigenous 
stateless societies.
• Contractarians or propertarians have provided little evidence 
for it.
• It is false. 
This book is not a criticism of contractarian or propertarian ethi-
cal theory. It is only a criticism of the empirical application of these 
theories. Contractarians and propertarians who use the weak proviso 
almost always assert that their theory applied in the current empirical 
setting justifi es the state and/or the property rights system: they satisfy 
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the criterion the two theories require of justifi cation. Our argument is 
that their theory applied in the current empirical setting rejects both of 
these institutions: they fail to meet the criterion. We have reservations 
about whether the weak proviso is strong enough, but those reserva-
tions are irrelevant to the argument in this book, which accepts the 
proviso along with the basic moral framework of these two theories. 
This book shows that the Hobbesian hypothesis became founda-
tional in political theory when colonial prejudices convinced Western 
theorists that all “civilized men” were all clearly better off than all 
“savages.” Although the claim has outlived the popularity of the colo-
nial prejudices that generated it, even today, misinformation makes up 
a good part of what people think they know about small-scale state-
less societies, virtually all of which are prehistoric or (more descrip-
tively) “non-literate” in the sense that they have no records of their 
own. Without a recorded history, small-scale societies have become 
the subject of myth-making much more easily than societies with writ-
ten records. Prehistory remains the setting for morality tales offered as 
something more than fi ction. 
Along with the Hobbesian hypothesis, this book addresses several 
closely associated false beliefs about prehistory. These include the belief 
that stateless societies are inherently violent, that stateless peoples live 
in destitution, that their days are taken up with an all-consuming food 
quest, that there is a dichotomy between “natural man” and “civilized 
man,” and that human societies necessarily progress from a uniform 
primitive base through a series of inevitable stages of development to 
the highpoint of civilization with a fl owering of diverse culture (Maine 
1861: 114–15; Hampsher-Monk 1992: 2, 117–19; Kuper 1994: 7–8; 
Kelly 1995: 6–9). 
Some of these beliefs are still common today; others aren’t, but they 
are all part of an unfortunate pattern in the treatment of prehistoric 
and small-scale societies by philosophers and social scientists, who 
still routinely discuss prehistory as if it were the stuff of myth, pass-
ing on centuries-old stories that change little or not at all as empirical 
researchers uncover evidence. Many philosophers pass on stories set in 
prehistory without clarifying whether they illustrate important empiri-
cal premises or whether they are pure metaphor. They seldom clarify 
what those premises might be or what the metaphor might stand for.
This book is part of a wider research project aiming to show that 
misconceptions about prehistory are embedded in many infl uential 
theories in modern political philosophy and social science. This book’s 
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sequel will address the claim that private rights to property can or do 
develop naturally while collective or government rights to property 
cannot or do not, the claim that capitalism better respects negative 
freedom than any other form of socio-political organization, and the 
claim that equality is either impossible altogether or incompatible 
with freedom. Some of these claims are universal and some are spe-
cifi c to prehistory, but the second book will argue that all of them can 
be falsifi ed with evidence from prehistoric and small-scale societies.
Both the lack of clarity about the empirical nature of a claim 
and the failure to provide evidence to support the empirical claims 
are signifi cant failings in any serious argument. Although empirical 
research is not the normative philosopher’s occupation, philosophers 
are not usually lax about specifying and verifying empirical claims. 
For example, the debates over medical ethics and the ethics of cli-
mate change are well-informed by the latest scientifi c fi ndings in those 
fi elds. But when discussing prehistory and human nature, political 
theorists and philosophers still feel free to make ambiguous allusions 
to unsupported empirical claims. This problem is especially surprising 
because clarity of argument is the philosopher’s occupation. Even if 
our empirical fi ndings or our argument for their moral relevance are 
both wrong, philosophers need to address the lack of clarity in the use 
of prehistoric and universal claims.
It might be useful to speculate why the large amount of evidence 
contradicting the Hobbesian hypothesis has failed to correct the wide-
spread (and apparently unexamined) acceptance of it. Consider six 
possible reasons: fi rst, claims gain credibility with repetition. A com-
monly held belief is easily mistaken for a commonly known fact. If 
enough people assert something, one might assume someone must 
have verifi ed it. Second, the power of the unargued, not clearly iden-
tifi ed premise is that it fades into the background, unnamed, unno-
ticed, and unquestioned because it is obvious and obvious because it is 
unquestioned. The discussion also shows that ambiguity in the presen-
tation of the hypothesis has increased over time. Third, most people 
want to believe. With all the unfairness in society, we would all like to 
think that society benefi ts everyone, even if it doesn’t share its benefi t 
as fairly as it should. Fourth, people who assert the hypothesis might 
suffer from self-serving bias. Fifth, the fallacy of composition can mis-
lead people into assuming benefi ts are more widely shared than they 
actually are. This fallacy is the belief that what is true about the whole 
is true for every part. Because capitalist states are so much wealthier 
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than stateless societies, we are tempted to assume that capitalist states 
make everyone wealthier and meet everyone’s needs better. Sixth, the 
fallacy of unwarranted extrapolation misleads people into thinking 
they know much more about history and prehistory than they actu-
ally do. We recognize a trend and extrapolate to the end (1, 2, 3, . . . 
infi nity). The increase in living standards and life expectancies over 
the last 150–200 years tempts one to assume that these variables have 
always increased even if earlier trends might have been very different. 
The fallacy of a false dichotomy is the mistaken belief that there are 
only two possible alternatives, when three or more alternatives are 
possible. For example, either everyone is better off in state society or 
everyone is better off in stateless society. Awareness of these issues will 
enlighten the discussion below as they come up.
This book proceeds by the following plan: Chapter 2 discusses some 
background about political philosophy and anthropology. Chapter 3 
shows how Hobbes introduced the Hobbesian hypothesis into modern 
social contract theory. Chapter 4 discusses how Locke introduced basi-
cally the same hypothesis into his infl uential theory of natural property 
rights. Chapters 5, 6, and 7 show that many philosophers have asserted 
the Hobbesian hypothesis from 1700 to the present. Chapter 8 dis-
cusses the role of the Hobbesian hypothesis in anthropology. Although 
it was initially infl uential, it gradually received greatly increased scru-
tiny and was fi nally abandoned by anthropologists in the latter half of 
the twentieth century. Chapter 9 presents evidence to refute a key piece 
of support for the Hobbesian hypothesis we call “the strong violence 
hypothesis”—Hobbes’s claim that intolerable violence is an inherent 
feature of any stateless environment. Chapter 10 examines the Hobbes-
ian hypothesis itself, using evidence from anthropology, archaeology, 
and other fi elds to show that it is dubious at best. Chapter 11 discusses 
the ramifi cations of these fi ndings for contractarianism and propertari-
anism, concluding that the state and the property rights system remain 
unjust in both propertarian and contractarian terms unless and until 
people who benefi t from those institutions reduce the harm they do to 
disadvantaged people. The online appendix to this book contains more 
information about many of the historical fi gures it addresses and some 
of the empirical arguments it makes.
Note
 1 This book treats political theory and political philosophy as synonyms.
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Chapter 2
MODERN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY AND 
PREHISTORIC ANTHROPOLOGY: 
SOME PRELIMINARY ISSUES
Because this book involves two very different academic disciplines, 
political philosophy and anthropology, some background about the 
relevant topics in each one is helpful. In this chapter, Section 1 intro-
duces the relevant political theory. Section 2 discusses some of the 
anthropological methods and conceptual issues involved in the exam-
ination of the evidence relevant to these philosophical arguments. 
Section 3 discusses how the state and the state of nature are defi ned in 
relation to each other. Section 4 addresses some responses this book 
is likely to receive. Section 5 discusses the relationship between this 
book and modern indigenous peoples.
1. THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE STATE AND THE 
PROPERTY RIGHTS SYSTEM
Normative political philosophy (which we use synonymously with 
normative political theory) addresses questions such as, what princi-
ples of justice should guide political policy, and what those principles 
imply for the world today. This section discusses a little bit about the 
methodology of political philosophy in general. We also discuss two 
prominent schools of thought that play large roles in this discussion 
and show that this book presents a similar criticism of both schools of 
thought. Finally, this section shows how these two schools of thought 
make similar comparisons between contemporary society and the 
state of nature.
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A. How Do You Do Political Philosophy?
The methodology of normative political philosophy is simple: the con-
struction of argument, informed by past argument, with reference to 
empirical evidence only as needed. All arguments begin with prem-
ises—unsupported claims that the author asks readers to accept as 
given. Any effective argument employs premises readers have good 
reason to believe in the effort to convince them of a conclusion they 
might otherwise doubt. Doubtful premises have little or no ability to 
make a conclusion less doubtful (Cohen 1995: 112).
The need for unsupported assumptions is not a weakness of the 
discipline. All arguments in all fi elds on all issues begin with premises. 
Each philosopher cites previous work on the same issue to further it, 
to criticize it, and/or to avoid reiterating it. Theorists who start with 
obviously weak premises are attacked or ignored. Over time, premises 
that are recognized to be weak must eventually be supported by bet-
ter evidence or they fall out of the discussion. Either way, hopefully, 
through this approach the philosophical debate gets stronger and 
more meaningful over time (Leopold and Stears 2008; McDermott 
2008; Cohen 2011b).
Philosophy’s reliance on each philosopher to challenge the others is 
a weakness. Conventional prejudices can keep individuals from recog-
nizing and challenging weak premises. Many of the claims we address 
in this project are universal claims that are supposed to be true for all 
people in all societies. Most researchers don’t usually look far afi eld 
to verify or falsify claims—even if they are meant to be universal. 
Thus universal claims containing claims about stateless societies can 
be passed on and passed over without either side of the debate seri-
ously considering that relevance or looking in that area for evidence.
One aspect of political philosophy that makes it vulnerable to the 
problems discussed in this book is its reliance on illustrative examples, 
thought experiments, or conjectural histories. These are common and 
indispensable methods in normative political theory. A well-chosen 
example can show how a principle applies in a particular case that 
abstracts from the complications of the world as a whole. The exam-
ple then makes it easier to see that such a shared principle applies 
in a class of situations. Philosophers tell stories about runaway trol-
lies, dying violinists, lifeboats that can save some but not others from 
drowning, a person who can either take care of an ill relative or join 
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the resistance to the Nazis. All of these examples have important uses. 
But illustrative examples can add ambiguity if it is not clear exactly 
what claims about the real world they illustrate. Does a particular 
example illustrate only normative claims or does it illustrate empirical 
claims as well; what are they? 
One of the central claims of this book is that contractarians have 
been unclear whether and what empirical claims the state of nature 
example is used to illustrate. Carole Pateman and Charles Mills (2007: 
54) write, “Theorists of an original contract used the idea of the state 
of nature both as a thought experiment and as descriptive of an actual 
stage of historical development. They draw on each element as needed 
in their arguments.”
This book argues that most contractarians equivocate between 
two versions of the contractarian justifi cation of the state: an a pri-
ori version that is not logically coherent (the Hobbesian hypothesis 
doesn’t matter) and an empirical argument based on a false premise 
(the hypothesis matters, but it’s obviously true). In the fi rst the state of 
nature illustrates only normative claims; in the second it illustrates an 
important empirical claim about the world that can be examined with 
empirical evidence. Most contractarians have not had a strong incen-
tive to probe for this equivocation, perhaps because they share the 
belief that both the empirical and the a priori versions of the argument 
work. We suspect they are unaware of their equivocation between two 
different arguments as they focus attention on the stronger aspects of 
each one.
B. Contractarianism
“Contractarianism”—also called “social contract theory,” “consent 
theory,” or “voluntarism”—is the most widely accepted justifi cation 
of state authority and political obligation. Although many political 
philosophers reject contractarianism, it has hegemonic infl uence over 
the discussion of this issue (Kavka 1986: 385; Baren 1987: 1; Pate-
man 1988: 1; Gilbert 2006: vii; D’Agostino et al. 2011). Patrick Riley 
(1973: 543) writes, “Political philosophy since the seventeenth century 
has been characterized . . . above all by voluntarism, by an emphasis 
on the assent of individuals as the standard of political legitimacy.” 
Carole Pateman and Charles Mills (2007: 1) write, “The simplicity 
and attractiveness of the idea of a ‘social contract’ have made it an 
5200_Widerquist.indd   11 25/11/16   10:32 AM
12 Prehistoric Myths in Modern Political Philosophy
immensely powerful, infl uential, and long-enduring political concept, 
with an impact far beyond political theory; even public fi gures some-
times refer to a social contract.” This book discusses many different 
versions of contractarianism, because, as Bruce Haddock (1994: 149) 
argues, “Social contract theory is . . . a hydra-headed monster. . . . spe-
cifi c objections will not be equally telling against each formulation.”
Contractarianism begins with the question, why does any person 
or institution have authority over other individuals? Particularly, why 
does the state have ultimate authority? Some theorists frame the ques-
tion as one of whether individuals have an ethical obligation to obey 
the law. Obviously individuals within a territory run the risk of pun-
ishment if they do not obey the laws that are enforced in that territory, 
but do they also have moral reason to obey the laws? The question 
can also be framed from the perspective of government authority: if 
humans are equal, what gives any human-created authority the right 
to force other humans to do anything? 
Most versions of contractarianism think of the state as an artifi cial 
entity created by agreement, and “The logic of mutual advantage the-
ories is that everyone must gain from the agreement” (Moore 1994: 
211). Chapter 1 defi ned the benefi t principle as the Lockean proviso 
and explained that that benefi t has to be measured against the absence 
of the state, usually called “the state of nature.” When the Lockean 
proviso is fulfi lled (that is, when the Hobbesian hypothesis is true), 
state society is like a contract at least in the sense that everyone gives 
up something (such as freedom from authority) and gets something 
they have reason to value more (such as greater security and higher 
welfare). The central criticism of this book is that most contractarians 
mistakenly claim that the Hobbesian hypothesis is true.
Not every theory involving a contract is vulnerable to this book’s 
criticism. John Rawls’s (1971; 1993; 2001) “justice as fairness” does 
not use the state of nature as a special starting point. It endorses the 
goal of ensuring that the least advantaged group of people are better 
off than they could be under any other feasible system—whether state-
less or not. Rawlsian theory’s lack of a starting point is not the central 
reason it is invulnerable to this book’s criticism. If one wanted to ask 
whether a state was more than just a stateless society, one would still 
have to ask if the least advantaged person was better off under the 
state. The reason it is invulnerable is that Rawls doesn’t ask people 
to assume his principle is fulfi lled. While Hobbesian theory justifi es 
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inaction by assuming that an empirical question has been answered, 
Rawlsian theory treats an empirical question as a problem to be inves-
tigated and acted on.
C. Propertarianism
Property rights theory takes many different forms. The exact char-
acteristics of each form are not centrally important to this book. We 
are interested only in a side constraint, the Lockean proviso, which 
appears in many of the very different justifi cations of property rights. 
The most extensive discussion of the proviso is found in a school of 
thought variously called “libertarianism,” “right-libertarianism,” or 
our preferred term “propertarianism.” This group holds that private 
property rights are justifi ed independently of the state as a natural 
right that governments have a strong moral obligation to respect. This 
book focuses on propertarianism not because its application is lim-
ited to this school, but because propertarians discuss the proviso and 
its ramifi cations more explicitly than most other property theorists 
using the weak proviso. Chapter 4 introduces the roles of the Lockean 
proviso and the Hobbesian hypothesis in modern property theory by 
examining John Locke’s Two Treatises of Government.
D. A Similar Criticism
Although contractarianism and propertarianism are very different 
theories, they share a few broad features that allow this book to exam-
ine them together. As we will show, they are both mutual advantage 
theories that attempt to justify the authority of an institution. Both of 
them employ their version of the Lockean proviso and its correspond-
ing Hobbesian hypothesis.
If this book shows that both schools of thought use the Hobbesian 
hypothesis as a premise, then we will have demonstrated that they 
have taken on the burden of proof. As argued above, dubious prem-
ises provide dubious support for any conclusion. Although the evi-
dence gives clear grounds to reject the Hobbesian hypothesis, all we 
need to do is to raise doubt to show that the two theories have not 
successfully justifi ed the state or the property rights system in their 
current form. Even if we cannot disprove the claim that all humans are 
better off in states rather than stateless societies, as long as we present 
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strong reason to doubt it, we will have shown that it is useless as an 
empirical premise.
We need to explain three things we are not trying to prove. First, 
by saying that the Hobbesian hypothesis is false, we are not trying to 
prove its opposite. This basic principle is worth stating because even 
academics sometimes confuse the negation of a term with its opposite. 
The Hobbesian hypothesis is the claim that everyone is better off in 
a capitalist state than anyone is in a stateless society with a common 
property regime. The negation of the Hobbesian hypothesis is the 
claim that not everyone is better off. The opposite of the Hobbesian 
hypothesis is the claim that no one is better off. Confusing the oppo-
site with the negation is one way to create a false dichotomy.
Second, we are not trying to prove that the average person is bet-
ter off in a stateless society. The fulfi llment of the Lockean proviso 
requires not simply that the average person is better off but that every-
one can be shown to be better off in some meaningful way. 
Third, although we argue that the Lockean proviso is currently 
unfulfi lled, we do not argue that it is impossible to fulfi ll. In this case, 
we do argue the opposite: the proviso can easily be fulfi lled with the 
right policies. While the empirical premise underlying the Hobbesian 
justifi cation of the state and the Lockean justifi cation of private prop-
erty is currently untrue, it need not always be so. In the conclusion of 
this book, we will make the case that a few simple and relatively mod-
est reforms of these institutions would go a long way toward fulfi lling 
the Lockean proviso. In short, we will argue for policies to raise the 
standards of living for those worst off in capitalist states. 
Although our criticism is empirical, it is different than the most 
common empirical criticisms of contractarianism, propertarianism, or 
normative philosophy in general. The most common empirical criti-
cisms of contractarianism involve Hobbes’s story about how the state 
developed from the state of nature by an act of expressed consent. We 
argue that such criticisms are irrelevant. Most versions of contractari-
anism require only one empirical claim: the state is better for everyone 
than statelessness.
The most common empirical criticisms of propertarianism address 
the connection between current property owners and Locke’s story 
of the origin of property rights in the state of nature. Although this 
question is relevant, it is not our focus. We discuss only whether the 
Lockean proviso is fulfi lled.
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The most prominent empirical criticism of normative philosophy 
in general is the outright rejection of a priori methodology, which 
examines ethical principles and some of their ramifi cations in pure 
theory with little or no references to the facts of the world. By con-
trast, the empirical method examines how the world works as a 
way to discover what ethical principles are important. G. A. Cohen 
defends the a priori method partly based on Hume’s contention that 
it is impossible to derive an “ought” from an “is.” An argument with 
a normative conclusion must have at least one normative premise. 
Cohen (2003) argues, therefore, that any fact-dependent normative 
principle (derived from empirical reason) must refl ect some deeper 
fact-independent normative principle that can be justifi ed only with 
pure a priori reasoning.
The debate over a priori and empirical methodologies is so promi-
nent that philosophers who read this book need to be warned against 
mistaking our argument for a contribution to that debate. We must 
emphasize that this book does not participate in that debate. Useful 
a priori reasoning can be done with no empirical reference as long 
as the researchers confi ne themselves to normative and analytical 
claims. We offer no criticism of the large amount of theoretical work 
that does so. But any argument that includes even one empirical claim 
is no longer a priori. It is at least partly empirical. Declaring oneself 
an a priori theorist does not, ipso facto, cleanse one’s theory of all 
empirical claims. Being a mostly a priori theorist does not free one’s 
theory from the responsibility of providing support for the empirical 
claims in it.
This book offers no criticism of the fact-independent normative 
principles in contractarianism or propertarianism or the arguments 
for them. It criticizes only their empirical application. Just as any nor-
mative argument requires at least one normative premise, any applied 
normative argument requires at least one empirical premise (Miller 
2008: 30; Swift and White 2008: 49, 56). 
The Lockean proviso is a normative claim: the state is justifi ed, if it 
does X. The Hobbesian hypothesis (Chapter 3 argues) is an empirical 
claim: the state does X. Both the proviso and the hypothesis are neces-
sary for the argument to support the conclusion that the state is justi-
fi ed. The theoretical chapters of this book argue that the Hobbesian 
hypothesis makes sense only as an empirical claim and that the most 
prominent contractarian and propertarian theories use it as such. Our 
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complaint is not with a priori theories in general. It is with theories 
that use empirical premises that don’t happen to be true.
E. A Similar Comparison
Contractarianism and propertarianism both use the state of nature as 
a starting point. They both justify existing institutions with reference 
to the situation before those institutions existed and/or with refer-
ence to a real or hypothetical situation in which those institutions are 
absent regardless of whether that situation came fi rst. Contractarian-
ism justifi es the state against statelessness. Propertarianism justifi es 
the private property rights regime against a common property regime, 
which is closer to collective non-ownership than to either public or 
private ownership. In a commons, anyone can use the land but no one 
can take ownership of it (or at least no one has).
As the online appendix to this book argues, stateless societies 
with common property regimes predate the fi rst governmental and 
landownership systems by tens of thousands of years, and they pre-
ceded societies with either of these institutions on almost all of the 
earth’s surface. 
Our use of the term “capitalist state” follows a familiar defi ni-
tion, but the way we use it might be unfamiliar. People are probably 
used to contrasting the “capitalist state” with the “socialist state,” 
the “feudal state,” or some other kind of state, but non-capitalist 
states of any kind play little or no part in the discussion. The oppo-
site of the capitalist state for our purposes is a “stateless society with 
a common property regime.” The contemporary states that can’t be 
described as “capitalist” probably don’t do any better at fulfi lling the 
proviso than capitalist states, but there are so few of them that we 
can safely ignore them. 
2. THE ANTHROPOLOGY AND ARCHAEOLOGY 
OF STATELESS SOCIETIES
This book’s empirical evidence comes primarily from two branches of 
anthropology—socio-cultural anthropology and archaeology. 
The main method employed by socio-cultural anthropologists is 
ethnography, which usually involves participant observation (often 
on a long-term basis), as well as other approaches involving the 
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interviewing of ethnographic informants. Researchers often live with 
the subject group for weeks, months, or years—sometimes on and 
off for a lifetime. The advantage of ethnography is that it enables 
a better understanding of the cultural lifeways of various modern 
peoples than any other set of approaches. Only a person immersed 
in a culture has the possibility of understanding it deeply (McCall 
and Simmons 1969).
Ethnography is not without its problems, however. For the bet-
ter part of the last century, the fi eld of anthropology has engaged in 
various forms of self-criticism, often in fairly radical ways, when it 
comes to its methods. Objections have included all of the following 
issues: (1) inherent biases on the part of ethnographers having to do 
with gender, race, and class, (2) imbalances of power between affl uent 
researchers and indigenous subjects, (3) the essentialization of indi-
vidual agencies into normative accounts of collective “cultures”, and 
(4) the question of whether complex phenomena of the sort studied 
by ethnographers are even knowable through scientifi c research at all 
(Clifford and Marcus 1986). In addition, of more relevance to issues 
examined in this book, there are the related problems of time depth 
and globalization. It is unquestionably true that all people living on 
earth today are instrumentally involved in global economic and politi-
cal systems, whether they live in Manhattan or Vanuatu. Thus, asking 
ethnographic questions about stateless societies is problematic when 
every person on earth today at least lives within the political boundar-
ies of a state. Finally, even when ethnographers spend years at time in 
the fi eld doing research, their observations constitute merely the blink 
of an eye relative to many of the questions for which we would seek 
answers through participant observation.
Archaeology, on the other hand, is the attempt to make inferences 
about the past based on arrangements of material objects that survive 
to the present. Archaeologists use deductive reasoning to build scien-
tifi c frameworks to make inferences about the nature of human cul-
tural lifeways in the past, as well as the ecological contexts in which 
past human societies lived. Obviously, archaeology is also not without 
its limitations. It is not uncommon to hear someone in the media talk 
about how some new discovery radically reshapes the way we think 
about the past. Archaeologists like to think that this is an exaggera-
tion, and perhaps it sometimes is. It does, however, stem from the fact 
that our knowledge about the past is based on a tiny sample of the 
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material patterning left behind by past peoples, and therefore even 
a single new discovery can dramatically overhaul what we think we 
know about the past. Unfortunately, there are simply many things 
about our past we may never understand in detail (Johnson 1927; 
Rigaud and Simek 1987).
Because of the diffi culties and inherent ambiguities of archaeo-
logical research, many people have been tempted to treat modern 
small-scale societies as if they were analogs of prehistoric societies 
in the distant past. This assumption might seem like common sense: 
small-scale societies, which rely on foraging, herding, and/or subsis-
tence farming with simple technologies, have (at a minimum) many 
elements of their material culture in common with the archaeologi-
cal record of past societies. Yet, as we discuss below, this belief has 
serious logical and evidentiary fl aws. Modern small-scale societies are 
separated from prehistoric societies by just as many generations as the 
rest of us and are not remnants of past patterns or “living fossils.” 
Small-scale societies have undergone the same dynamics of histori-
cal interaction and adaptation to shifting environmental and demo-
graphic contexts as any other modern group and, therefore, cannot 
be taken as somehow more closely related to the past. Unfortunately, 
the view of small-scale societies as primitive remnants of past human 
lifeways remains frustratingly prevalent, even among trained social 
scientists (Binford 2001).
Can modern peoples, then, provide any information at all about 
the past? Any answer to this question is bound to be controversial 
(Schrire 1984; Headland et al. 1989; Wilmsen 1989; Lee 1992), yet 
there are clear logical reasons why our knowledge of the past must be 
partially based on observations of modern peoples. It is perhaps a bit 
paradoxical that, while archaeologists wish to understand the past, 
the only available bodies of knowledge with which to make infer-
ences about the past must come from the present—because we live in 
the present. Ethnoarchaeology is the fi eld of anthropology designed 
to study modern peoples in order to learn about the past. It would 
be absurd to suppose no similarities exist between the cultural prac-
tices of modern peoples and those of the past, and even our deep 
evolutionary past. For example, the fi eld of Paleolithic archaeology is 
concerned with hunter-gatherers who lived in the Pleistocene. How-
ever, we feel confi dent in saying that no Paleolithic archaeologists are 
themselves hunter-gatherers. For this reason, none of them have any 
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personal qualifi cations for understanding the various forms of mate-
rial patterning left behind by hunter-gatherer peoples in the deep past 
and, without some direct knowledge of forager lifeways, any inference 
about the past would be bald speculation (or worse). One approach to 
solving this problem is for anthropologists to consult with and observe 
modern hunter-gatherers, who are themselves familiar with the eco-
nomic problems, practices, and technologies employed by peoples in 
the past, and also with the forms of material patterning these solutions 
might leave behind.
The modern fi eld of ethnoarchaeology also recognizes that we can 
learn about the past by studying how modern people confront vari-
ous challenges, such as foraging and/or farming under particular set 
of conditions. While no modern society is an analog for our ancestors 
living in the past, modern peoples do face many economic situations 
in ways that may help us make sense of the past. If particular solu-
tions to problems tend to work well under similar conditions, past 
and modern peoples confronted by similar environmental, economic, 
and social situations are likely to respond in similar ways (Kelly 1995; 
Binford 2001). Finally, rather than focusing on single modern soci-
eties as potential analogs for archaeological cases, ethnoarchaeology 
focuses on explaining the diversity or variability documented among 
modern societies as a method for contextualizing the activities of peo-
ples in the past (Kirch and Green 2001: 42).
3. THE STATE AND STATELESSNESS IN POLITICAL 
THEORY AND ANTHROPOLOGY
The now-standard defi nition of the state in political theory makes sov-
ereignty its essential feature:
[A] state is a human community that (successfully) claims the 
monopoly of the legitimate [i.e. considered to be legitimate] use 
of physical force within a given territory. . . . the right to use 
physical force is ascribed to other institutions or to individuals 
only to the extent to which the state permits it. (Weber 2004: 33)
We do not take this defi nition to mean that only legitimate govern-
ments are states. We take it to mean that the sovereign has a monop-
oly on power enough to legitimize force. It is so strong that everyone 
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needs to know what uses of force it deems “legitimate” or “criminal,” 
and they do not need to know what any competing institution (such 
as a paramilitary organization) might deem legitimate. To monopolize 
this power, the state has to be able to make a decision, make it known, 
and enforce it. Whether the state is an absolute monarchy or a democ-
racy with divided power, the sovereign entity—as a whole—is able to 
make and enforce a fi nal decision on any issue.
Political theorists simply defi ne the state of nature as the absence of 
a state. Hobbes (1962 [1651]: 100), who actually called it the “Natu-
ral Condition of Mankind,” defi ned it as “the time men live without 
a common power to keep them in awe.” That is, the time without 
sovereignty. The Hobbesian writer, J. R. Lucas (1966: 65), writes that, 
under the state, “confl icts [are] settled by some method, the results of 
which are binding, and can be enforced.” Outside the state, confl icts 
are settled “any old how” (Lucas 1966: 62). As Chapter 8 explains, 
some small-scale societies do settle confl icts “any old how.” 
Anthropological defi nitions of the state tend to be very different, 
focusing more on the presence of discrete structural features rather 
than the relationship between government power and governed peo-
ple. Perhaps the most famous early defi nition of the state, and one 
which continues to hold considerable currency today, is that of V. 
Gordon Childe (1950; 1957). Linking the origin of states with the so-
called “urban revolution,” Childe made the presence of true cities syn-
onymous with the presence of a state, and argued that the state-level 
civilizations were characterized by the presence of ten features related 
to the production of an agricultural food surplus, or what Childe calls 
a “social surplus.” These features include craft specialization, class 
differentiation, the presence of a ruling elite, a bureaucratic system of 
government control, monumental public architecture, long-distance 
trade in exotic “foreign” goods, and a written record-keeping system. 
Critics of Childe’s (1950; 1957) defi nition have argued that the 
equation of urbanism with the presence of states refl ects the historical 
developments of Europe and the Near East, and not necessarily early 
states in other regions (such as Connah 2001). Yet, this defi nition has 
been remarkably persistent through the history of the fi eld of anthro-
pology and it has also been particularly useful in approaching ques-
tions of statehood in the archaeological record.
The enormous difference between anthropology’s and political 
theory’s defi nitions of the state causes fewer problems for us than 
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one might suspect, because the strength and centralization of political 
authority are highly correlated with scale. Virtually all observed soci-
eties large enough to support cities also have a sovereign government, 
and virtually all of the smallest-scale societies—those that can’t be 
described as anything more than a village—do not. This leaves some 
in-between-scale societies that do not meet the anthropologists’ defi ni-
tion of statehood but might (or might not) meet the political theorists’ 
defi nition. As much as possible, our discussion leaves them out (see 
Chapter 8).
Although humans have existed since Homo sapiens appeared 
around 200,000 years ago, the fi rst states (by the anthropological def-
inition) probably appeared about 5,100 years ago in Mesopotamia. 
States have appeared with little or no infl uence on each other in at 
least six other places around the globe, including China, India, Egypt, 
Sub-Saharan Africa, Central America, and South America (Childe 
1950; Trigger 2003). In a few thousand years—a blink of an eye com-
pared with the vast prehistory of human societies—state-level societ-
ies have expanded from those seven bases to establish authority over 
almost all the earth’s land and people.
4. THE NOBLE SAVAGE ALLEGATION
By questioning whether contemporary states are better for everyone 
than statelessness, we inevitably attract the allegation that we are 
“romanticizing” the “noble savage.” This term was brought into the 
academic debate in the 1850s by John Crawfurd and several other 
anthropologists who did not think their profession was racist enough. 
They applied it primarily and (as later chapters show) inaccurately to 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, but it has been used ever since both to dis-
credit people who write even partly favorable accounts of indigenous 
peoples and to give everyone writing about indigenous peoples a cau-
tionary reason to err on the side of negativity (Ellingson 2001).
The term was meant to be an oxymoron. The idea was to paint 
even slightly positive depictions of indigenous peoples as romanti-
cization of people who were assumed to be truly savage. A “noble” 
had obtained the highest qualities of civilization. A “savage” lacked 
all those qualities. Any civilized writer who could think a savage as 
in any way noble must have clouded thinking (Ellingson 2001). The 
term intentionally created a false dichotomy: if you don’t believe 
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stateless peoples are miserable and warlike, you must be romanticiz-
ing the noble savage. More than 150 years later, it is still diffi cult to 
debunk one side of this belief without people thinking you are pro-
moting the other. 
Crawfurd leveled the noble savage allegation at Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau even though he never used the term, and his views of indig-
enous peoples were nearly as negative as those of most other Europeans 
of his time (Ellingson 2001). Crawfurd’s overtly racist school of anthro-
pology has disappeared, but the term “noble savage” continues to work 
as intended. Wholly positive depictions of indigenous peoples are hard 
to fi nd in Western academic literature, and researchers who say anything 
positive about indigenous groups often feel like they have to show how 
they aren’t going too far (Ellingson 2001). 
No similar allegation exists that is commonly leveled at people 
researching any other group. Imagine people discussing modern 
Swedes being accused of romanticizing the “polite Viking,” or people 
discussing modern Ireland being accused of romanticizing the “sober 
Irishman.” Any such allegation would bias the discussion toward the 
negative—as the noble savage allegation does so effectively. The best 
evidence about small-scale societies shows that they are neither nobles 
nor savages, just reasonable people dealing with the particulars of 
often-diffi cult environments.
The noble savage allegation needs to be dropped from serious 
discourse. In addition to the biases it creates in academic litera-
ture, it creates an impossible standard for indigenous peoples: if 
they aren’t in every way “noble,” then the term implies they are just 
“savages.” 
Researchers can adopt an infl ated view of distant societies, but 
genuine examples of it are comparatively rare. Ethnocentrism—an 
infl ated view of one’s own culture—is far more common. Perhaps, the 
allegation should go the other way: ethnocentrists romanticize their 
own culture. Consider two claims: (1) Obviously everyone in state 
society today is better off than everyone in any stateless society in the 
last 200,000 years. (2) Evidence indicates that some people in state 
societies today are so desperately poor that they are no better off than 
people in the diffi cult environments of observed stateless societies. We 
suggest readers evaluate our evidence and consider whether the fi rst 
statement might be more romantic than the second.
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5. DOES THIS BOOK HAVE ANYTHING TO CONTRIBUTE 
TO THE INDIGENOUS RIGHTS MOVEMENTS?
This book is not directly about indigenous peoples. It is about a few 
selected mistaken beliefs embedded in Western political thought. 
However, the pigeonholing of indigenous peoples to fi t preconceived 
imperialist notions is a concern of the indigenous rights movement, 
and therefore, it is worth considering what this book might be able to 
contribute to this discussion. One of the common examples of pigeon-
holing is the mistaken belief that all indigenous peoples have some 
close connection to stateless societies. The majority of indigenous 
peoples lived in state societies long before the Western colonization. 
Primarily this book offers indigenous readers the same thing it 
offers everyone else: a better understanding of the false beliefs about 
stateless societies that remain infl uential in contemporary political 
theory. But indigenous readers might be able to make different use 
of that understanding. The book shows how those erroneous beliefs 
grew out of the colonial process and were used to justify it. To the 
extent that the theories discussed in this book are still being used to 
justify encroachment of indigenous peoples’ rights, this book might 
prove useful in understanding how to push back. The online appendix 
to Chapter 2 has more on the relationship of this book and the indig-
enous rights movement.
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Chapter 3
THE HOBBESIAN HYPOTHESIS: HOW A 
COLONIAL PREJUDICE BECAME AN ESSENTIAL 
PREMISE IN THE MOST POPULAR JUSTIFICATION 
OF GOVERNMENT
The “Hobbesian hypothesis” is far older than Hobbes. The effort 
to justify the social arrangements by saying that they are somehow 
like a contract is at least as old as Plato (2013). The fi rst Chinese 
Emperor asserted the hypothesis even earlier: “There is not one who 
did not benefi t [from the emperor’s rule]. Every man is safe under his 
own roof” (Harari 2015). We call it “the Hobbesian hypothesis” but 
because Hobbes (1962 [1651]) did so much to make it important to 
political philosophy. Few if any contemporary philosophers accept the 
whole of Hobbes’s justifi cation of the state. Diverse variations of con-
tractarianism have appeared over the three and a half centuries since 
Leviathan. Because some elements of Hobbesian theory are infl uential 
over all of them, this chapter introduces the role of the Hobbesian 
hypothesis in contractarianism in general by discussing Hobbes’s use 
of it in particular.
1. HOBBES’S THREE ARGUMENTS FOR THE STATE
Scholars disagree about exactly what justifi cations of the state Hobbes 
intended to present in Leviathan. We consider three popular interpre-
tations based on literal consent, prudential advice, and yield to supe-
rior force. Although our best understanding is that Hobbes intended 
all three as parallel arguments for the state, our central goal is not to 
determine his exact intentions, but to look for the ideas that have been 
most infl uential over subsequent theory. Although Hobbes’s idea of lit-
eral consent has been dropped, many elements from the literal-consent 
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version of his theory are highly infl uential over contemporary justifi ca-
tions of the state based on hypothetical consent. The most infl uential 
and lasting ideas, we argue, are the Lockean proviso and the Hobbes-
ian hypothesis.
A. The Literal-Consent Version
Hobbes (1962 [1651]: 100) justifi ed the state by comparison to its 
absence: the “state of nature,” or as he calls it, “the natural condition 
of mankind.” The state of nature needs no justifi cation in contractar-
ian theory. It is the natural default position against which all other 
social arrangements must be justifi ed. Hobbes portrayed the state as 
an artifi cial human creation that can only be justifi ed by unanimous 
consent of the people. Thus, he set up the basic justifi catory problem 
for that state: it has to obtain consent, which it can do by achieving 
mutual advantage relative to the state of nature.
Hobbes’s (1962 [1651]: 99–100) description of the state of nature 
was complex, but his defi nition of it was simple: “the natural condi-
tion of mankind” is “the time men live without a common power 
to keep them in awe” or any time in which people live “out of civil 
states.” In other words, “the state of nature” is the absence of a sov-
ereign government and can be used interchangeably with “anarchy” 
and “statelessness.” The state of nature is not itself a myth; stateless 
societies have existed for long periods of time in many places around 
the world. The myths we address are prejudices about life in stateless 
societies.
The term “state of nature” is largely an artifact of that belief in 
a dichotomy between natural and civilized people. This belief was 
popular in the early modern period and remained so through much of 
the twentieth century. Supposedly people began in humanity’s natural, 
animalistic state, and were uplifted to a higher existence by socializa-
tion, civilization, religion, and/or the stabilizing force of government 
authority. Reversion to the natural, savage state, so the idea went, was 
a constant danger. William Golding’s (2012) novel, Lord of the Flies, 
illustrated the belief in this dichotomy well. Proper English school-
boys, with all the advantages of an upbringing at the highest levels 
of civilization, are separated from all authority. They quickly become 
sadistic, superstitious, and miserable in ways that resemble the most 
cartoonish depictions of naked, painted savages.
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The equation of lost schoolboys with indigenous people (as per-
ceived by Western colonialists) refl ects the belief that humans stemmed 
from a natural, primitive, and uniform root to an outpouring of 
diverse civilizations. Not everyone assumed this root to be savage; 
some portrayed it as idyllic; but either side in that debate is consis-
tent with the belief in a uniform primitive root to human nature to 
which indigenous peoples were supposedly the closest approximation. 
To study people outside state authority was believed to be a way to 
study “natural man,” free from society and socialization. Carried to 
an extreme, this position essentially recognizes Western feral children, 
the “Wild Men of Borneo,” the tribes of “Darkest Africa,” a “Pack of 
Wild Indians,” and many other real or imagined groups as all in some 
way representing this single category of “natural man.” Colonial-era 
philosophers and social scientists might not have believed that indig-
enous peoples lacked all civilizing infl uence, but many believed that 
the earliest societies were the most “natural” because they were the 
closest to human origins and had the fewest civilizing infl uences.
Hobbes, at least, did not believe that “civilized man” and “natural 
man” had fundamentally different characters. His justifi cation of the 
state required that the violent aspects of human nature would sur-
face in even the most “civilized” people if they found themselves in 
the state of nature (Macpherson 1962: 19–25). Hobbes did not reject 
the dichotomy; he simply gave most of the credit for the progress of 
“civilized man” relative to “savage man” to institutions rather than to 
breeding, socialization, or anything else. 
The idea of a uniform root was badly mistaken. Small-scale societ-
ies are extremely diverse. We will make generalizations about them, 
but we also make generalizations about state societies that include 
polities as diverse as ancient Sumer and modern Australia. So, clearly 
any generalizations we make should not give the impression that soci-
eties at a given scale are uniform. 
Today most social scientists believe that all societies are equally 
“natural,” because if we can say anything about human nature, it is 
that people naturally come up with different ways to live together. 
People in the distant past came up with ways to live together; so do 
people today; so will people in the future. Similarly, the application of 
the word “primitive” to a people is pejorative, and it has little mean-
ing once this idea of a uniform root to all forms of social organization 
is dropped. One can speak of an evolutionarily primitive life form or a 
primitive technology, but not a primitive socio-political organization. 
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The concepts “natural man” or “primitive peoples” have nearly dis-
appeared from the social science literature. And so, for the most part, 
the “state of nature” becomes simply “statelessness.”
However, the word “nature” in “state of nature” is relevant in at 
least two senses: fi rst, even contractarians who do not subscribe to 
the dichotomy between “natural” and “civilized man” portray their 
description of the state of nature as the inevitable result of the absence 
of state sovereignty (Hobbes 1962 [1651]: 100; Gauthier 1986: 81–5). 
Even if no one today believes that people revert to some primitive 
nature without state authority, it is reasonable to believe that anarchy 
has inherent diffi culties that make it possible for social arrangements 
to resemble a contract aimed at improving everyone’s position relative 
to the state of nature. 
Second, anarchy is the natural point of comparison for the versions 
of contractarianism we focus on in this book. The basic justifi cations 
of sovereignty usually take one of two forms: state authority is justi-
fi ed (1) if and when it benefi ts the people living under that authority 
relative to how well-off they would be in the state of nature, or (2) if 
and when people would consent to it given the comparison with the 
state of nature. According to Gregory S. Kavka (1986: 402), the low 
baseline of the state of nature is useful for theories “about the minimal 
conditions of political obligation, not the principles of morality, social 
justice, or the ideal society.” For contractarianism, the state of nature 
is the default position. It needs no justifi cation, though the imposition 
of government authority does. Many versions of contractarianism do 
not require states to be justifi ed relative to other possible states; only 
relative to the state of nature. 
Hobbes (1962 [1651]: 100) defi ned the state of nature as the 
absence of the state, and described it as also lacking morality and 
society, but these characteristics are not part of the defi nition of the 
state of nature relevant in the context of the justifi cation of the state. 
Hobbes argued that these characteristics were inherent to anarchy, but 
his argument could be good or bad.
His argument that morality doesn’t exist in the state of nature 
follows by pure analytical reasoning from his defi nition of morality. 
Morality, to Hobbes (1962 [1651]: 113), is no more or less than the 
fulfi llment of an enforceable contract. Hobbes’s use of this defi ni-
tion allows him to demonstrate that morality necessarily comes into 
existence with a social contract to obey sovereignty. Contracts are 
unenforceable in the state of nature, and so by defi nition, there is no 
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morality or immorality in the state of nature. Morality comes into 
existence only when people make an enforceable agreement to obey 
the sovereign.
We largely ignore Hobbes’s defi nition of morality, because his justi-
fi cation of the state doesn’t need it, and because it is extremely unpopu-
lar. Philosophers—including contractarians—have consistently rejected 
it, starting as early as Locke. One reason to reject it is that it gives the 
fulfi llment of promises a bizarre moral priority, overriding principles 
that strike almost everyone as more basic. Most people would tell 
someone not to commit murder because murder is immoral. A strict 
Hobbesian, however, would have to say that, although murder is natu-
rally permissible, it is immoral for you, because like everyone else, you 
have tacitly contracted to obey a sovereign who happens to have arbi-
trarily outlawed murder, and breaking that contract is immoral.
Hobbes’s (1962 [1651]: 100) description of the state of nature as 
the absence of society relies on a more complex argument for what 
we call the “violence hypothesis”: the belief that without sovereignty, 
society inherently degenerates into a war of “everyone against every-
one.” This war makes society impossible. Section 2 examines the vio-
lence hypothesis.
Philosophers put the contract device to many uses, not all of 
which are related to the discussion here. This book uses the word 
“contractarianism” narrowly to mean theories justifying government 
sovereignty with a contract device involving a comparison between 
the state and the state of nature. Therefore, not everything in the 
philosophical literature written about either the state of nature or 
the social contract is relevant to this research project, and we need to 
clear up potential confusion that might arise from two similar uses of 
contractual reasoning.
Government, society, and morality all involve individuals making 
sacrifi ces to live with one another, and therefore, a contract device can 
be used to model or justify any of them—together or separately. Some 
philosophers use contract theory to model morality or society without 
involving government. A contractarian theory of morality defi nes the 
state of nature as the absence of morality instead of the absence of gov-
ernment. A contractarian theory of society defi nes the state of nature 
as the absence of society. What pertains to a state of nature defi ned as 
the absence of morality or society does not necessarily pertain to the 
state of nature defi ned as the absence of sovereign government and vice 
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versa. The potential for confusion is important because, if the three do 
not always go together, a claim can be right for a state of nature defi ned 
one way and wrong for it defi ned another way.
Hobbes credited the state with the establishment of society and 
morality. Alasdair MacIntyre (1998: 86) calls this error “the oddest 
of Hobbes’ confusions, that he appears not to distinguish the state 
and society.” The government cannot take credit for society. Although 
full states have existed for only the last 5,000 or so of the 200,000 
years of the existence of the human species, no human populations 
have ever lived without a society or without a conception of moral-
ity. Humans are an obligatorily gregarious species, meaning that they 
need other people to survive through the course of a normal life (de 
Waal 2006: 4–5). Although the state of nature defi ned as the absence 
of morality or the absence of society is purely imaginary, the state 
of nature defi ned as the absence of government sovereignty is real. 
Descriptions of anarchy as necessarily entailing the absence of society 
or the absence of (a conception of) morality are not imaginary; they 
are simply wrong.
The observation that people naturally create society does not 
contradict the idea that societies are artifi cial creations in the most 
important sense used by contractarianism. Although people need 
other people, no one needs any particular group of other people or 
any specifi c set of rules for interaction. Unlike most species, people 
are capable of thinking about what kind of community they want, to 
negotiate and change their community, and to leave one society they 
don’t like. Therefore, although all humans live in communities, each 
community is an artifi cial human creation. It can be useful to view 
those creations as the product of an agreement, if for no other reason 
than to provide an ideal for the community to live up to. That much 
at least, the contractarians got right. 
Hobbes (1962 [1651]: 98–102) describes the state of nature as a 
horrible situation. Using both theory and observation, Hobbes (1962 
[1651]: 100) argues that it is a war of all-against-all and concludes that 
life in the state of nature is “solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short.” 
If his theory correctly predicts how humans behave in the absence of 
sovereign authority, statelessness is intolerable for all people who fi nd 
themselves in it. Hobbes argues that only a sovereign state sustained 
by the commitment of its citizens can save people from this intolerable 
situation. Therefore, the state benefi ts everyone.
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Based on Hobbes’s description of the state of nature and his use 
of it in his argument, we characterize the “Hobbesian hypothesis” 
as follows. Everyone under a sovereign government is better off (or 
no worse off) than they could reasonably expect to be outside of that 
authority. Hobbes supports his hypothesis both with theory and with 
observational evidence. Section 2 discusses his support for the hypoth-
esis. This section discusses his use of it.
Scholars of Hobbes disagree about the nature of his social contract. 
The literal-consent version interprets it as a tacit but real agreement. 
Everyone knows that the Hobbesian hypothesis is true and that their 
commitment is necessary to establish safety. They all prefer any sov-
ereign government that relieves the fear inherent in all stateless societ-
ies, and they all make a permanent, enforceable commitment to obey 
virtually any government that provides basic security, which means 
virtually any government that successfully establishes sovereignty. The 
moment the state fails to provide people with that basic freedom from 
fear, Hobbes relieves them of their moral obligation to obey (returning 
them to the moral free-for-all of his state of nature). 
The Hobbesian hypothesis plays a pivotal role in this argument. The 
ablest people in the state of nature live in so much fear and misery that 
they gladly consent to the state. The least advantaged people in state 
society live so much better than they would in the state of nature that 
they also gladly consent. We might object to some of the state’s actions, 
but as long as it continues to relieve us from the imminent fear of death, 
none of us ever really wants the state to disappear. People willingly 
accept all the things they do not like about the state because any disobe-
dience to it invites a return to the state of nature, and (supposedly) that 
situation is so miserable that tradeoff is not worthwhile.
This version of Hobbes’s social contract is not between a citizen 
and the sovereign but between one citizen and another. It is a peace 
treaty among people who would otherwise be engaged in a war of 
all-against-all. They promise each other to obey the sovereign and 
to accept its enforcement of the contract, but they do not make any 
promises to the sovereign, and it makes no promises in return.
The sovereign logically must remain outside the agreement, 
because there is no higher power to enforce any contract between the 
sovereign and its subjects. And according to Hobbes (1962 [1651]: 
132, 157), unenforceable contracts are not morally binding. All 
enforceable agreements require an outside force with the power to 
enforce the agreement. Therefore, some person or institution must 
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remain in the state of nature. The sovereigns of the world remain 
in the state of nature with relation to each other and to the citi-
zens. They make no agreement and nothing they do can be moral or 
immoral. The people’s moral obligation to obey the sovereign comes 
from the agreement with other people. They do not betray the gov-
ernment when they disobey it, because they have no agreement with 
the sovereign. They betray their fellow citizens by subverting a peace 
treaty between individuals who would otherwise necessarily sink into 
a cycle of destructive confl ict. 
Hobbes uses an illustrative story to make most of these points. He 
asks readers to imagine that people begin in the state of nature and 
get out by agreeing to give full sovereign authority to one person or 
to an assembly. In the story, sovereignty begins with explicit consent, 
but Hobbes knows that this is not a history of the origin of states. He 
is aware that the origin of the state is victory in war. What matters for 
the argument is that the state—however it was founded—produces the 
same results as the hypothetical original state. It protects people from 
the chaotic state of nature that naturally exists between people outside 
of state authority. It thereby makes them better off, obtaining their 
consent by its effects rather than by its origins. As Dudley Knowles 
(2009: 101) explains, “one has good reason to accept a sovereign with 
the powers ascribed by Hobbes . . . whether or not that sovereign was 
instituted by the people in an original contract.” Even if the state came 
into being by violent conquest, it keeps the peace between individuals 
that would turn to war of everyone against everyone, providing safety 
where otherwise there would be danger.
We summarize this justifi cation of the state as follows:1
P1: Everyone is better off under the authority of a sovereign 
state than they could reasonably expect to be outside it [the 
Hobbesian hypothesis].
P2: Everyone who (suffi ciently) benefi ts from the state consents 
to it.
C1: (From P1 and P2): everyone who lives under government 
sovereignty consents to it. 
P3: Government sovereignty is justifi ed if everyone consents.
C2: (From C1 and P3): government sovereignty is justifi ed. 
As we understand it, this argument has two ethical claims (P3 and 
C2) and three empirical claims (P1, P2, and C1), but we discuss the 
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empirical nature of these claims later in this chapter. We could add 
many more details, such as the argument Hobbes uses to support P1, 
but it is actually more useful to simplify it even further. 
P1 is the Hobbesian hypothesis. The Lockean proviso, as defi ned in 
Chapter 1, doesn’t appear in this argument in so many words. Strictly 
speaking, Hobbes’s justifi catory condition is one of consent rather than 
benefi t. But P2 essentially makes the claim of consent synonymous with 
the claim of benefi t, and the connection of benefi t with (at least hypo-
thetical) consent has been extremely popular in subsequent contractar-
ian literature. This allows us to simplify Hobbes’s argument:
P1: Lockean proviso: the state is justifi ed if it benefi ts people so 
much that they all consent to it.
P2: Hobbesian hypothesis: the state does in fact benefi t people 
that much.
C: The state is justifi ed.
Framing Hobbes’s criterion in terms of both benefi t and consent 
allows us to think of it as a version of the Lockean proviso. It also 
allows us to see two very simple ideas at the heart of contractarian or 
mutual advantage theory: a moral claim asserting mutual advantage 
as an ethical criterion (the proviso) and an empirical claim asserting 
that mutual advantage has been achieved (the hypothesis). The outline 
above is a specifi cation of the more general form we give to mutual 
advantage theories:
P1: Lockean proviso: an institution can justly be imposed pro-
viding everyone is better off under its authority than they 
could reasonably expect to be outside its authority.
P2: Hobbesian hypothesis: everyone is better off under the 
authority of this institution than they could reasonably 
expect outside its authority.
C: This institution is justifi ed.
Additional premises could be added, but some form of this syllogism 
plays a part in all arguments that claim to justify an institution with 
reference to mutual advantage. Most contractarians don’t use the 
term “Lockean proviso” in this way, but following Gauthier (1986: 
205, 208), we use it as a simple name of this important criterion. 
Gauthier (1986: 208) writes, “For us the proviso plays a wider and 
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more basic role. We treat it as a general constraint, by which we may 
move from a Hobbesian state of nature . . . to the initial position for 
social interaction.”
Literal, unanimous consent is simultaneously a strength and a 
weakness of the theory, as Alan Ryan explains:
Of all the routes to obligation, contract is at once the most and 
the least attractive. It is the most attractive because the most con-
clusive argument for claiming that someone has an obligation of 
some kind is to show them that they imposed it on themselves 
by some sort of contract-like procedure. . . . It is unattractive for 
the same reason; few of us can recall having promised to obey 
our rulers for the very good reason that few of us have done so. 
(Ryan 1996: 228–9)
If unanimous agreement is empirically unachievable, it is hard to 
believe it is normatively necessary (Frankfurt 1969). 
Hobbes has a potential response to Ryan’s observation. He could 
say that we, the people, are dishonest to ourselves if we deny our com-
mitment. We know in our hearts how we and our neighbors would 
behave if we were freed from state authority. We know how that 
behavior would inevitably lead to violence and misery for everyone. 
We simply cannot will it to be so. Although no contract has ever been 
signed, knowing that the state needs our commitment to save us from 
the state of nature, we all consent—silently but truthfully—to state 
authority. Deep down, despite what we might say or do, the state 
really does have unanimous support—or so a thoroughgoing literal-
consent theorist might believe.
Whether or not this construction correctly interprets Hobbes, few 
theorists have found it or any other theory involving literal, unani-
mous consent plausible enough to justify sovereignty. The most popu-
lar alternative reframes the proviso in terms of hypothetical consent. 
Section 3 discusses that version. 
B. The Prudential-Advice Version
Hobbes is not necessarily committed to defending the claim of literal 
consent against criticisms like Ryan’s. As Iain Hampsher-Monk (1992: 
40), Leslie Stephen (1904: 209–10), and others suggest, Hobbes might 
not have tried to justify state authority at all. He might have merely 
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given people advice to obey it. People should sign on to the social 
contract and morally bind themselves to obedience, because it is the 
prudent thing to do. This version simplifi es Hobbes’s argument:
P1: If the Hobbesian hypothesis is true, consent to the sovereign 
is the prudent choice.
P2: The Hobbesian hypothesis (is true).
C: Consent to the sovereign is the prudent choice.
Morality is involved in this argument. To the extent that people are 
wise and bind themselves to the state, justice for them becomes obedi-
ence to its laws. They obtain the same moral obligations as those in 
the literal-consent version. But this argument is not necessarily a justi-
fi cation of the state, because there will be people who do not take the 
advice for whom the state is not justifi ed.
Some of Ryan’s analysis can be construed as support for the pru-
dential-advice version: 
Hobbes’s science of politics is a form of blueprint making . . . 
The blueprint sets out what rational individuals must do if they 
are to form a political society; it does not predict what they will 
do. Far from offering a disconfi rmable predication of what they 
will in fact do, Hobbes’s politics relies for its rhetorical power 
on the fact that men have so often failed to do what the blue-
print dictates and have thus caused themselves appalling misery. 
(Ryan 1996: 213–14)
We are not sure that this argument effectively supports the pruden-
tial-advice version. Although people do not always accept benefi cial 
agreements, they also do not always fulfi ll the agreements they make. 
Hobbes might have believed his advice was so obvious that all people 
do commit at some point in their lives, making disobedience both 
imprudent and immoral.
The advice version used alone is more realistic in the sense that it 
does not involve any claim of unanimous consent. People who object 
make a mistake, but some people will make that mistake. That realism 
comes at a high price because it raises the question of how to treat these 
imprudent objectors. Hobbes’s defi nition of morality as nothing more 
than obedience to the contract allows him to suppose the state is nei-
ther moral nor immoral to treat them as cruelly as the sovereign might 
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desire. Without that view of morality, it is unclear what this argument 
implies about the treatment of objectors. The popular response is to 
employ hypothetical consent, but then the prudential-advice version 
plays no role in the justifi cation of the state.
The difference between the literal-consent and the prudential-
advice versions of Hobbes’s argument are inconsequential for this 
inquiry because they both rely on the same Hobbesian hypothesis. We 
focus on the more infl uential consent-based versions, but our empiri-
cal fi ndings are equally relevant to advice-based versions.
C. The Yield-to-Superior-Force Version
Hobbes’s (1962 [1651]: 145) third argument does not involve claims 
about stateless societies, but it relies heavily on his idiosyncratic defi -
nition of morality. A conquering government with de facto power 
but without any agreement has the right to kill any individual it 
wants. Because everyone knows it will kill anyone who does not 
accept its rule, everyone makes a binding agreement of lifetime obe-
dience. This agreement takes a form that was impossible in the situ-
ation above: it is between each individual and the sovereign rather 
than among the individuals. It is possible in this case because the 
sovereign fulfi lls its side of the bargain instantaneously by refrain-
ing from killing the subject. The sovereign makes no promise about 
later behavior, and so no higher power is needed over the sovereign 
(Kavka 1986: 392–8). 
This justifi cation is free from any reference to the Hobbesian 
hypothesis, but its empirical plausibility comes at the price of norma-
tive implausibility. Few, if any, philosophers, and even those who con-
sider themselves Hobbesians, believe that yielding to superior force 
constitutes an ethically binding commitment. We mention only two 
criticisms of it and then ignore it. First, the state-of-nature-based ver-
sion of Hobbes’s theory does not necessarily require Hobbes’s unpop-
ular defi nition of morality, but this version cannot do without it. 
Second, according to Hampsher-Monk (1992: 38), “Hobbes wants to 
distinguish slaves, who have no duty of obedience . . . from servants, 
who are obliged.” This version is incapable of making that distinc-
tion because slaveholders can extort the same promise. For additional 
criticism of this argument, see Kavka (1986: 392–8), who concludes 
that this line of reasoning “is a dismal failure. It does not solve the 
voluntariness problem.”
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Some philosophers argue that this version is the right interpreta-
tion of Hobbes, that it is the most important justifi cation of the state 
to him. Even so, this version is immaterial to our inquiry, because it 
has little infl uence over subsequent political theory.
2. HOBBES’S SUPPORT FOR HIS HYPOTHESIS
The primary reason Hobbes gave to support the Hobbesian hypoth-
esis was another hypothesis supposing that the state of nature was 
inherently and intolerably violent. We call this claim “the violence 
hypothesis.” It is closely connected to the long-repeated claim that 
human nature is naturally violent or warlike, which further connects 
it to the supposed dichotomy between “natural man” and “civilized 
man.” The violence hypothesis does not necessarily require a warlike-
nature hypothesis. According to Gauthier (1991: 17), it “is based, 
not on innate hostility, but on hostility derived from the ever-possible 
confl ict between men’s powers of self-maintenance. War is the conse-
quence of natural insecurity.” Hobbes argues that stateless situations 
are so insecure that people don’t need a strong predilection to violence 
to fall into endless confl ict. However, the warlike-nature hypothesis 
has come and gone throughout the history of political thought. It was 
undoubtedly infl uential over Hobbes and other contractarians, and so 
we will not ignore it in our empirical discussion.
Hobbes (1962 [1651]: 98–102) supported his violence hypothesis 
with a theoretical model about how humans behave in the absence 
of state authority. Without an authority to enforce promises, no one 
could trust anyone. People, being suffi ciently equal in strength, would 
attack each other for three reasons: gain, fear, and reputation (“com-
petition,” “diffi dence,” and “glory”). That is, one attacks another to 
take what the other has, to preempt the other from attacking fi rst, 
and to earn a reputation as a formidable opponent who should not 
be attacked. Therefore, Hobbes concludes, whenever there is no sov-
ereign power to mediate disputes and enforce the resolution, human 
nature leads inevitably to a “war of everyone against everyone” in 
which no one is safe. 
Kavka (1983: 292–3) argues that Hobbes actually needs fi ve 
assumptions to make his logical model produce a war of all-against-all 
whenever sovereignty is absent. The last two are implied if not explic-
itly stated by Hobbes: (1) natural equality, (2) confl icting desires, (3) 
forward-looking people, (4) advantage to the attacker in confl ict, and 
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(5) limited altruism. If these assumptions hold, and Hobbes’s reason-
ing is correct, “the state of nature is what we may call an active war of 
all against all” (Kavka 1983: 92). That is, “a state of nature is a condi-
tion in which the will of each to fi ght others is known, fi ghting is not 
infrequent, and each correctly perceives that his life and well-being are 
in constant danger” (Kavka 1983: 295).
In Hobbes’s theory, the impossibility of peace outside of state 
authority is both the most important direct source of misery and 
the causal force creating many other sources of misery, because 
during a war of all-against-all, none of the benefi ts of human coop-
eration are possible. Based almost entirely on the violence hypoth-
esis, Hobbes famously elaborated on what his theory implies for 
life under anarchy:
Out of civil states, there is always war of every one against every 
one. . . . during the time men live without a common power to 
keep them in awe, they are in that condition which is called war; 
and such a war, as is of every man against every man. . . . [with] 
no Knowledge of the face of the Earth; no account of Time; no 
Arts; no Letters; no Society; and which is worst of all, continuall 
feare, and danger of violent death; And the life of man, solitary, 
poore, nasty, brutish, and short. (Hobbes 1962 [1651]: 100)
Hobbes apparently believed he had logically proven that stateless situ-
ations always develop such a war. Therefore, he thought he had logi-
cally proven the Hobbesian hypothesis. 
Hobbes offered two pieces of empirical evidence to confi rm his 
theoretical fi ndings. First, he discussed the horrors of a civil war as an 
illustration of the breakdown of sovereignty. This issue was extremely 
important throughout Leviathan and all of Hobbes’s political writ-
ings. Second, Hobbes cited what was to him the most readily available 
example of people living in stateless societies—Native Americans:
It may peradventure be thought, there was never such a time, 
nor condition of war as this; and I believe it was never gener-
ally so, over all the world; but there are many places where they 
live so now. For the savage people in many places of America, 
except the government of small families, the concord whereof 
dependeth on natural lust, have no government at all; and live 
at this day in that brutish manner. (Hobbes 1962 [1651]: 101) 
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This passage explicitly presents small-scale stateless societies as an 
empirical example of the state of nature in an effort to confi rm the 
Hobbesian hypothesis by observation.
Colonialist accounts of peoples in small-scale societies had a clear 
impact on Hobbes’s thinking. Kinch Hoekstra wrote:
Some elements of Hobbes’s description of the natural condi-
tion can be traced back to early anthropological accounts of the 
Americas. . . . his famous litany of what that condition lacks . . . 
is an adaptation of a hyperbolic trope, characterizing uncivi-
lized peoples by a negative list, which became conventional in 
the century after Columbus landed. (Hoekstra 2007: 113)
Therefore, Hobbes’s brutish view of small-scale societies was infl uenced 
by his settler contemporaries who held highly prejudiced beliefs about 
native peoples at least partly as a convenient reason for wiping out or 
displacing the peoples in newly colonized lands. The cover of Hobbes’s 
book De Cive makes reference to the presumed misery of Native Ameri-
cans (Hoekstra 2007: 113). He clearly believed observations of indige-
nous people confi rmed both the violence hypothesis and the Hobbesian 
hypothesis. Ryan explains the empirical claim in plain language:
Like many of his contemporaries, Hobbes thought that the Indi-
ans of North America were still living in the state of nature. 
More important, the inhabitants of Britain had been in that con-
dition during the Civil War; so not only was the state of nature 
a historical fact but relapse into it was a standing danger. (Ryan 
1996: 218)
Hobbes needs his hypothesis to be true for any stateless societies, 
whether indigenous or not, because otherwise they would falsify his 
claim that sovereignty is inherently superior to statelessness.
We defi ne the “violence hypothesis” as the claim that stateless situ-
ations inherently have intolerable levels of violence. We also call it the 
“strong violence hypothesis” to distinguish it from a “weak violence 
hypothesis,” in which stateless societies have greater but not neces-
sarily intolerable violence. Hobbes relies heavily on the strong vio-
lence hypothesis to support the belief that he has deductively proven 
the Hobbesian hypothesis. If you weaken the violence hypothesis to 
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one about relatively higher but not intolerable levels, violence alone 
cannot conclusively prove the Hobbesian hypothesis. Violence levels 
would become just one of many factors jointly determining whether 
everyone is better off.
Of course, an argument for the Hobbesian hypothesis doesn’t 
necessarily require the strong violence hypothesis or any hypothesis 
about violence at all. One could say that, for some other reason, such 
as the inability to enforce contracts or to organize large-scale coopera-
tion (Gauthier 1986; Hampton 1988: 247, 268), the welfare level of 
people in stateless society is so low that everyone prefers state society. 
Whatever the welfare level is in stateless societies and whatever the 
reason, the contractarian argument is that sovereign governments do 
better. We summarize Hobbes’s argument as follows:
P1: Without a sovereign to enforce rules, people attack each 
other for gain.
P2: Without a sovereign to keep the peace, people attack each 
other out of fear.
P3: Without a sovereign to settle disputes, people attack each 
other for reputation.
C1: (From P1, P2, and P3) [the violence hypothesis]: the state of 
nature is intolerably violent to the point at which they have 
imminent fear of death.
P4: When levels of violence are intolerable, other advantages of 
civilization are unobtainable.
P5: The state of nature as observed among “savage people in 
many places of America” has intolerable violence and lacks 
advantages of civilization.
P6: The state of nature as observed among European states dur-
ing civil wars has intolerable violence and lacks many advan-
tages of civilization.
C2:  (From C1, P4, P5, and P6) [the Hobbesian hypothesis]: 
everyone is better off under the authority of a sovereign state 
than in the state of nature.
Although this outline includes subjective ideas, it seems obviously to 
be an empirical argument. It is not built purely from defi nitions or 
from fi rst-best normative principles. We discuss the empirical nature 
of this argument further below.
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3. CONTEMPORARY JUSTIFICATIONS OF THE STATE
Contemporary contractarianism is extremely diverse, but we can say 
that most contemporary contractarians believe Hobbes’s version has 
one empirically implausible claim—literally everyone consents. But 
few contractarians seem to see any implausibility in the theory’s other 
empirical claim—that literally everyone benefi ts. This section consid-
ers three versions of contemporary contractarianism. Each of them 
softens the claim of unanimous consent but leaves the claim of univer-
sal benefi t intact. It then considers one version that does not explicitly 
appear in the literature but that could potentially do without the claim 
of universal benefi t.
A. The Hypothetical-Consent Version
As Chapters 5 and 7 discuss, contemporary contractarianism gets 
out of the need to claim universal consent by relying on a claim of 
hypothetical consent inspired by Kant (Gauthier 1991: 50; Moore 
1994: 211; Martin 1998: 150; Scanlon 1998: 4, 187; D’Agostino 
et al. 2011). This strategy replaces the claim that literally everyone 
consents with the claim that social arrangements are suffi ciently 
desirable that everyone would agree if they were rational, reasonable, 
and suffi ciently well-informed.
Many contemporary philosophers describe this sort of reasoning as 
an effort to justify rules to the people who are restrained by them. In 
Thomas Scanlon’s words:
According to the version of contractualism that I am advancing 
here our thinking about right and wrong is structured by . . . the 
aim of fi nding principles that others, insofar as they too have this 
aim, could not reasonably reject. This gives us a direct reason to 
be concerned with other people’s points of view . . . to fi nd prin-
ciples that they, as well as we, have reason to accept. (Scanlon 
1998: 191)
Some people can and will reject these principles, but if the social agree-
ment is properly constructed, their objections are unreasonable in the 
sense that they do not share the aim of fi nding principles neither side 
can reject. Society does not have to bring them into agreement because 
that is impossible, and because, as Kavka (1986: 411) argues, literal 
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consent would “suggest that ignorance, even self-deceptive and self-
serving ignorance, exempts one from contributing one’s fair share to 
a mutually benefi cial scheme of interaction.”
This understanding of contractarianism has become so popular 
that The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy’s entries on “Contem-
porary Approaches to the Social Contract” and “Contractarianism” 
drop literal agreement in favor of hypothetical agreement (D’Agostino 
et al. 2011; Cudd 2013). Hypothetical consent makes the proviso 
nearly synonymous with mutual advantage. Kavka (1986: 409–15) 
connects the “receipt of benefi ts” relative to the state-of-nature base-
line not only with contractarianism but also with justifi cations of the 
state based on social utility, fair play, and gratitude. Mutual benefi t 
also seems to underlie Nozickian “invisible hand” justifi cations of the 
state (Nozick 1974: 88–119). The mutual advantage principle at least 
partly underlies the literal-consent version of contract theory as well, 
because usually one agrees to something because one believes it is ben-
efi cial. One reason to require consent to any contract is to help ensure 
that arrangements are benefi cial to all parties. 
Some philosophers are skeptical about the ethical usefulness of 
hypothetical contracts. Ronald Dworkin (1973: 501), for exam-
ple, argues, “A hypothetical contract is not simply a pale form of 
an actual contract; it is no contract at all.” This objection is not 
necessarily fatal; it just means that whatever makes a hypothetical 
contract morally binding is not the principle that makes a literal con-
tract binding. Different contractarians provide different arguments 
for what makes the hypothetical contract (or pure mutual advan-
tage) ethically binding. Those differences are unimportant for this 
narrowly focused inquiry. 
Our concern is that the various hypothetical-consent versions 
claim that mutual advantage relative to the state of nature has been 
obtained. Few deny the need for mutual advantage. Few designate 
any group for whom mutual advantage need not apply. Few argue for 
a conception of mutual advantage that rules out the need to provide 
benefi ts relative to statelessness. So, the need for such a Hobbesian 
hypothesis is as important to the hypothetical-consent version as it 
was for Hobbes’s literal-consent version.
This empirical hypothesis is required, because although unreason-
able objections do not count, reasonable objections do. To say that 
the state has achieved the goal of justifying duties to the people on 
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whom they are imposed, one does not have to show that they all 
acknowledged that justifi cation, but one does have to show that their 
objections are unreasonable or irrational according to some impartial 
standard. Usually that standard is the Lockean proviso (whether weak 
or strong), and so the claim that there are no reasonable objections is 
the assertion of the relevant version of the Hobbesian hypothesis. 
This strategy essentially replaces the claim of literal consent from 
Hobbes’s theory with the claim of hypothetical consent, leaving the 
rest unchanged, to make an argument of the following form: 
P1: Lockean proviso: the state is justifi ed if it benefi ts people so 
much that they would consent to it if they were all rational, 
reasonable, and suffi ciently well-informed.
P2: Hobbesian hypothesis: the state does in fact benefi t people 
that much.
C: The state is justifi ed.
The arguments for moving away from literal consent are compelling, but 
contractarians seldom acknowledge that hypothetical consent is a two-
way street and a much more complex issue. If there can be unreasonable 
objections, there can also be unreasonable submission. Therefore, the 
literal consent of disadvantaged people might not be enough to justify 
the state if they are poorly informed about statelessness. The distinction 
between reasonable and unreasonable objections creates two questions 
where the literal-consent version has only one. Does the person consent? 
Do they have a reasonable objection? Consider a two-by-two matrix of 
possible responses to the two questions:
Consent Object
No reasonable objection Willing participant Intransigent
Reasonable objection Silent dissenter Dissenter
We have given names to the groups of people represented by each cell 
of the matrix. A “willing participant” consents with good reason. 
An “intransigent” objects without a rational and reasonable basis. 
They might unreasonably hold out for special privileges for them-
selves at the expense of everyone else. They might refuse because they 
lack the information necessary to know that social arrangements have 
been suffi ciently justifi ed. Or they might irrationally believe that a 
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better agreement is possible when it is not. The hypothetical-consent 
version of contractarianism relies on the moral judgment that intran-
sigents should be counted as parties to the social contract. If no one 
else objects, the agreement is effectively unanimous. It has been impar-
tially justifi ed to everyone, even if some people are too unreasonable 
to admit it or too irrational or ill-informed to understand it. 
A “dissenter” has a rational, reasonable, well-informed objection 
to the social system. They believe correctly that the state and its cur-
rent social arrangements are harmful to them. The proviso remains 
unfulfi lled for them, and therefore, they have good reason to wish not 
to be party to the social contract.
If contractarians drop the assumption that everyone who objects 
has a good reason, they have to drop the assumption that everyone 
who accepts has a good reason. A “silent dissenter” consents despite 
having no good reason to do so. They might be deceived into think-
ing they benefi t from the social contract when they don’t (perhaps 
because philosophers exaggerate the dangers of statelessness). They 
might keep silent despite being aware of their reasonable objections, 
possibly because they are unfree to voice objections, because they are 
incentivized to be silent, or because no one listens (perhaps because 
dissenters are dismissed as intransigents).
The goal of the hypothetical-consent version of social contract 
theory is to construct social arrangements that ensure no one falls 
into the bottom row. As later chapters show, the consensus view is 
that if the criterion is the weak proviso, all reasonable objections have 
been eliminated because the proviso is obviously fulfi lled. In other 
words, hypothetical-consent versions of contractarianism have got-
ten rid of all empirical claims in the theory except for the Hobbesian 
hypothesis. This justifi cation places great confi dence in the empirical 
truth of the Hobbesian hypothesis. The possibilities of intransigents 
are well-discussed in the literature, but the possibilities of dissenters 
(whether silent or vocal) are largely or entirely ignored by contempo-
rary contractarians. The absence of discussion implies confi dence that 
reasonable objections are obviously eliminated.
B. Versions with Additional Criteria
Hobbes had only one criterion to justify the social contract. Although we 
call this criterion the Lockean proviso, it was Locke who began requir-
ing additional criteria for the justifi cation of the social contract. Usually, 
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the government not only has to make people better off; it also has to 
respect their natural rights and have some democratic institutions. The 
fulfi llment of additional criteria is inconsequential to the discussion in 
this book. As long as the proviso is one of the moral criteria, one has to 
assert the Hobbesian hypothesis to say that the state is justifi ed.
C. Strong-Proviso Versions
Many contemporary philosophers reject the weak Lockean proviso 
in favor of a stronger version, usually asserting that this proviso has 
not been fulfi lled, and therefore, that current social arrangements are 
not justifi ed. We have no criticism of this position. However, people 
who take this position often concede that the weak proviso is fulfi lled. 
Thus the Hobbesian hypothesis is widely accepted even by many who 
reject its moral relevance.
D. Is There an Extra-Weak Version?
The most obvious way to eliminate the need to assert the Hobbesian 
hypothesis would be to straightforwardly deny the moral relevance 
of the weak proviso, either by proposing an extra-weak proviso or by 
asserting that the contractarianism requires no empirical claims at all. 
Sections 4–6 argue that contractarianism—despite the counterfactual 
nature of some of its reasoning—requires at least one empirical claim 
about the fulfi llment of some version of the proviso. However, there are 
at least two ways to argue for an extra-weak proviso that does not rely 
on claims about real stateless societies. The state of nature could be a 
purely synthetic device, meant to illustrate the criteria needed to justify 
the state but not meant to say anything at all about statelessness. Or 
the state of nature could refer to some but not all stateless situations. 
Even if small-scale stateless societies are real and observable, one might 
“bracket” them by arguing that the only relevant alternative to the state 
is a failed state or a civil war. Section 7 argues that contractarianism as 
usually stated doesn’t easily incorporate bracketing, but the possibility 
of an extra-weak proviso remains relevant throughout the book. 
4. THE HOBBESIAN HYPOTHESIS IS A COUNTERFACTUAL CLAIM
The Hobbesian hypothesis is a counterfactual claim—a claim about 
an event that is not happening. Most people today have never lived 
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outside state authority, and probably most of them never will. To make 
a claim about how people now living in states would live outside state 
authority is to make a claim about a situation that does not exist and 
that is not likely to exist.
Although counterfactuals are contrary to fact, they have empiri-
cal truth-value (Fearon 1991; Nolan 2013). Consider these two 
statements: (1) If you go outside without heavy clothing in subzero 
weather, you will be cold. (2) If you go outside without heavy cloth-
ing in subzero weather, you will be so light that you will fl oat to the 
moon. Statement 1 is true. Statement 2 is false. No amount of evidence 
that you are not and might never go outside without heavy clothing 
in subzero weather will change the truth-value of statements 1 and 2.
Counterfactuals are important claims, without which no one could 
understand causation. Arguments about the relative causes of events 
are arguments about the relative likelihood of counterfactuals (Fearon 
1991: 178). Counterfactual scenarios need not even be possible for a 
counterfactual claim to be true. Consider the following statements: 
(1) If a fl ea lifted a 1,000-kilogram weight, the moon would not be 
appreciably affected. (2) If a fl ea lifted a 1,000-kilogram weight, the 
moon would crash to earth. Although fl eas can’t lift a 1,000-kilogram 
weight, statement 1 is true, and statement 2 is false.
Let’s call a counterfactual claim about an impossible or nearly 
impossible situation a “pure counterfactual.” Let’s call a counterfac-
tual claim about a situation that could reasonably happen a “contin-
gent counterfactual.” Some philosophers treat the state of nature as a 
pure counterfactual and others treat it as a contingent counterfactual. 
The state of nature Hobbes describes is so terrible that people would 
not tolerate it for long. And so, some theorists do not expect to see 
people ever living in a state of nature. If people got close to it, they 
would reestablish sovereignty. Hampsher-Monk expresses this idea:
Just as we may never have a perfect vacuum, perhaps we can 
never have a situation where there are no vestiges of the restraints 
that sovereignty provides, but inasmuch as sovereignty is absent, 
to that extent men will begin to exhibit behaviour typical of the 
state of nature. (Hampsher-Monk 1992: 27) 
It would be wrong to assume simply because the state of nature does 
not or cannot exist, that no claims about it have any truth-value or 
that a theorist can make up whatever claims they want about it and 
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expect that they be accepted as true. If the state of nature is a pure 
counterfactual, claims about it cannot be verifi ed by direct observa-
tion, but they can still be true or false, and verifi cation is possible. The 
well-demonstrated theory of gravity confi rms the effect that a fl ea lift-
ing a 1,000-kilogram weight would have on the moon. We will argue 
that the state of nature in any plausible justifi cation of the state is a 
contingent counterfactual. It is something that does not exist, but it is 
something that can and does exist in the world.
Counterfactuals have empirical truth-value. Even if the state of 
nature is so horrible that no one would allow it to exist for very long, 
as society approaches the state of nature, things will start to approach 
Hobbesian horribleness, and that horribleness will be attributable to 
the weakness of sovereignty. A dispassionate researcher has to remain 
open to the possibility that the Hobbesian description of the state of 
nature is wrong. Life outside of sovereign authority might be tolerable 
enough that people would allow it to exist. Stateless societies fully fi t-
ting the contractarian defi nition of the state of nature might or might 
not exist without conforming to the Hobbesian description of it. If so, 
the Hobbesian hypothesis is not a pure counterfactual even if Hobbes 
or any other contractarian theorist thought it was.
5. THE HOBBESIAN HYPOTHESIS IS AN EMPIRICAL CLAIM
The philosophical literature contains virtually no debate over whether 
contractarianism requires empirical claims, what those empirical 
claims are, or how we know whether they are true. Nevertheless, when 
we present ideas from this book, a controversy nearly absent from 
the literature appears. Philosophers are usually split on the issue of 
whether contractarianism requires an empirical Hobbesian hypothesis 
or whether it justifi es the state on a purely a priori basis. If experts can 
be so split on such a fundamental issue, they need to discuss and resolve 
the question. This section and the next contribute to that discussion, 
arguing that whether a contractarian theory uses a strong, weak, or 
extra-weak proviso, it requires an empirical claim of fulfi llment.
A. Isn’t It Obvious?
To us, the Hobbesian hypothesis is obviously empirical. There seems 
to be no controversy that the statement literally everyone consents 
is both empirical and implausible. Even if there is controversy on 
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whether the statement literally everyone benefi ts is more plausible, 
we don’t see why there should be any controversy that it is any less 
empirical. If the statement X is better for everyone than not X is true, 
an empirical investigation fi nding people living in condition not X will 
fi nd them to be worse off than people in condition X. How could it be 
otherwise if the statement is true? To put it another way, if one says 
the state must do X to be justifi ed, and one wants to argue that the 
state is justifi ed, one has little choice but to include the premise that 
the state as a matter of empirical fact does X. It simply is empirical. If 
you’re convinced that the Hobbesian hypothesis is obviously empiri-
cal, skip to Section 7. If not, read on.
B. Hobbes Treated His Hypothesis as an Empirical Claim
Hobbes praised a priori methodology and denigrated historical 
observation and empirical methodologies (Kavka 1986: 4–9; Schuh-
mann 2012). Tom Sorell (2012: xi) argues that Hobbes believed 
that “Histories were extraordinarily unsuitable sources of political 
wisdom, and were not even indispensable as records of instructive 
political experience. A much better source of experiences relevant to 
gaining political wisdom was introspection taken together with gen-
uine political science.” This observation does not imply that Hobbes 
rejected all empirical claims, only that he rejected historical obser-
vation as accurate evidence of empirical truth. Despite Hobbes’s 
preference for a priori methodology, we intend to show, he was less 
guilty of a lack of clarity on this issue than most subsequent contrac-
tarians. He treated the Lockean proviso as a moral requirement for 
an empirical criterion and offered empirical support for the Hobbes-
ian hypothesis.
Kavka (1983: 4–10) suggests that Hobbes had a failed aspiration 
to be a pure a priori theorist. He attempted to create a scientifi c theory 
of politics, which, like geometry, would be built up from defi nitions by 
pure analytical reasoning. Kavka writes:
This aspiration is unfortunately grounded in a mass of method-
ological confusions. Most fundamentally, Hobbes fails to dis-
tinguish properly between logical and empirical relations. . . . It 
was only by confl ating logical deduction and causal reasoning 
that Hobbes could have dreamed of a purely deductive politics 
derived solely from defi nition. (Kavka 1983: 8) 
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Hobbes’s actual method, according to Kavka (1983: 4), was “logi-
cal and conceptual analysis combined with empirical observation and 
probabilistic reasoning.”
Hobbes might not have been this unaware of his own method. 
According to Hampsher-Monk (1992: 26), although Hobbes believed 
that science is established by introspective reasoning, Hobbes recog-
nized that it “requires an experiential check on the validity of the 
results achieved.” 
Even extremely analytical disciplines make empirical claims. Math-
ematicians have built incredibly rich theories based purely on defi ni-
tions and on analytical reasoning. For example, geometric theory can 
prove that the three angles of any triangle always sum to 180 degrees 
without actually showing any triangles. Yet the statement is empirical 
in two ways. First, if one wants to apply it to objects in the world, one 
has to claim that they suffi ciently approximate the defi nition of a tri-
angle to make the theory applicable. Second, all good a priori proofs are 
consistent with observation. People do observe objects very similar to 
triangles, and the sums of their angles have been remarkably consistent 
at 180 degrees. If they did not, we would know that something was 
wrong with the proof, even if we didn’t know what it was. The same is 
true for Hobbesian theory. If it is a good theory, and if there are situa-
tions in the world that meet his defi nitions of the state and of the state 
of nature, his theory will make accurate predictions about them. If not, 
either the observations or his theory must be inaccurate.
Regardless of Hobbes’s level of self-awareness, his supporting 
arguments for the Hobbesian hypothesis (discussed above) treat it as 
an empirical claim. As mentioned above, he does present confi rming 
examples. He couldn’t make the references to civil wars and Native 
Americans without acknowledging that his hypothesis has the poten-
tial to be confi rmed by observational evidence. A statement that, if 
true, has potential to be confi rmed by observational evidence, it also 
must, if false, have potential to be refuted by observational evidence.
Even Hobbes’s more abstract arguments treat the hypothesis as 
an empirical claim. His argument for the war of all-against-all is a 
priori only in the sense that it doesn’t refer to empirical support for 
its claims, but it is empirical in the sense that it relies on claims about 
the world: claims about human nature and about how that nature 
plays out under different circumstances. Either his claims refl ect how 
humans behave, or they do not. Either people in the circumstances he 
describes experience the consequences he describes, or they do not. 
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Hobbes apparently believed his introspective claims and his logical 
reasoning were so strong that he needed little support from observa-
tion, but he did not imply that his argument was fact-independent. 
C. Diffi culties of Conceptualizing and Measuring Wellbeing
Wellbeing is diffi cult to measure—some people say immeasurable. And 
it can be a normatively laden term. But an argument for the immeasur-
ability of wellbeing is a criticism of contractarianism. No defense of 
contractarianism can rest on the claim that welfare is immeasurable. 
If there is no way to know whether any institution benefi ts people, we 
cannot justify institutions on the grounds that they benefi t people. If 
the reader doubts that people can be determined to be better off in one 
situation than another, the reader has to reject any argument based 
on a premise that everyone is better off in one situation than another. 
That is, they have to reject contractarianism outright, regardless of 
the issues discussed here. Measurement diffi culties do not allow theo-
rists to say whatever they want about wellbeing and have it taken as 
a truth capable of supporting an otherwise doubtful conclusion. We 
give contractarianism and propertarianism the benefi t of the doubt 
on the possibility of making a meaningful welfare comparison and 
consider whether there is good reason to believe their claims about it.
The possibility that some or all conceptions of wellbeing are nor-
matively laden cannot free the contractarian argument from empiri-
cal claims. One could simply defi ne “better off” as being part of a 
state and the Hobbesian hypothesis would be true by defi nition, but 
it would make the argument tautological. This is clearly not what 
Hobbes or any other contractarians have been trying to do. 
A normatively laden defi nition of welfare can be used in a justifi ca-
tion of the state, if it is suffi ciently different from the defi nition of the 
state to free the argument from tautology and suffi ciently measurable 
to make claims about it meaningful. But claims about welfare by any 
such defi nition lend themselves to empirical investigation. Does the 
state actually provide greater welfare so defi ned?
D. Most Empirical Discussion of Hobbes Focuses on Other Claims
One source of confusion about the nature of the empirical claims in 
Hobbesian contract theory comes from the story Hobbes tells of the 
origin of the state. In the story, humanity begins in the state of nature. 
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People fi nd a way out when they agree to appoint an individual to act 
as sovereign. This story is clearly for the purpose of illustration, but it 
has defl ected much of the empirical attention. 
Misdirected empirical criticism has confused the debate. Empirical 
criticism has often focused on irrelevant issues of whether the state 
of nature preceded the fi rst states and whether the fi rst states began 
with an act of people coming together to appoint a sovereign. Con-
tractarians seem to believe that if they demonstrate the irrelevance 
of this empirical criticism, they have demonstrated the irrelevance of 
all empirical criticism, ignoring completely the need for a Hobbesian 
hypothesis. Although that hypothesis is empirical, it has nothing to do 
with Hobbes’s story about the origin of the state.
Many contemporary contractarians have clarifi ed that social con-
tract theory has nothing to do with any claims about the historical 
origin of the state. C. B. Macpherson (1962: 20) might appear to make 
a claim that the state of nature contains no empirical claims, writing, 
“Hobbes’s state of nature, as is generally recognized, is a logical not 
an historical hypothesis,” but to say that the state of nature is a logi-
cal hypothesis is not to say that it lacks any empirical truth-value. He 
means simply, “The sovereign by acquisition has the same rights . . . as 
the sovereign by institution” (Macpherson 1962: 21). People still make 
the irrelevant criticisms implying the justifi cation of the state depends 
on how it was instituted (Binmore 2005: 169), but the uselessness of 
such reasoning is increasingly obvious (Knowles 2009: 101–3).
Hampsher-Monk (1992: 26) argues that Hobbes’s description of 
the state of nature was an “inference, made from the Passions” or “a 
logical deduction from the situation and properties of natural man.” 
But statements about “the passions” and “the properties of natural 
man” are not fact-independent normative principles. They are empiri-
cal claims. Inferences about the passions and properties of human 
beings can be right or wrong. Macintyre (1998: 87) writes, “Hobbes 
does in passing refer to the American Indians, but his whole argu-
ment is based on a method that makes him independent of histori-
cal evidence. He is resolving timeless human nature into its timeless 
elements, not recounting an evolutionary progress.” That is, empiri-
cal claims about historical origins do not matter but empirical claims 
about human nature do. As Leslie Stephen argued a hundred years 
ago, the comparative claim is relevant even though the historical claim 
is not:
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The hypothesis that States were deliberately contrived and made 
by a bargain between the separate atoms is, of course, absurd 
historically, but is also irrelevant to Hobbes. The essential point 
is simply that settled order is so much more favourable to self-
preservation than anarchy that every one has a suffi cient interest 
in maintaining it. Peace, as he tells us, means all the arts and 
sciences that distinguish Europeans from Choctaws. (Stephen 
1904: 209–10)
Tom Sorell (2012: 8) writes, “Hobbes’s politics was supposed to be 
a science. It was supposed to offer sure principles of submission and 
sovereignty that might be applied universally.” If Hobbes successfully 
developed a universal and timeless theory, then all observed people—
people near or far, recent or long past—in the circumstances Hobbes 
describes behave in the way he predicts. Thus, evidence from the Pleis-
tocene, from precolonial North America, from contemporary failed 
states, and from contemporary stateless societies is equally relevant.
Macintyre (1998: 86) argues that empirical claims are involved in 
Hobbes’s theory, “They are thus factual statements which may be true 
or false; . . . the desires named in the antecedent clauses are the desires 
which all men do, as a matter of contingent fact, have.” Whether these 
desires lead to the outcome Hobbes supposes whenever people lack a 
sovereign power to keep them in awe is not a claim about the histori-
cal origin of the state, but it is an empirical claim that has not been 
suffi ciently subject to investigation. If human need for the state to cre-
ate a settled order is a timeless truth, it must be as true for Stephen’s 
Choctaws as it is for anyone else. 
E. Contemporary Scholars Recognize Hobbes’s 
Use of Empirical Claim(s)
Despite the controversy, this section shows that a great deal of recent 
literature argues that Hobbesian theories require at least some empiri-
cal premise(s) and that few published works consistently defend the 
position that contractarian theory successfully justifi es the state with-
out empirical premises. Hampsher-Monk (1992: 26) makes a clear 
empirical statement of the hypothesis, writing, “inasmuch as sover-
eignty is absent, to that extent men will begin to exhibit behaviour 
typical of the state of nature.” Macpherson writes:
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The state of nature depicts the way in which men, being what 
they are, would necessarily behave if there were no authority 
to enforce law or contract. Given the appetites and deliberative 
nature of man . . . this is the way they would necessarily behave 
if law-enforcement and contract-enforcement were entirely 
removed. (Macpherson 1962: 19)
If so, any people found living without such authority will necessar-
ily be found to behave in this manner. An empirical investigation is 
relevant and needed to determine whether this logical hypothesis is 
applicable in the world we inhabit.
Lucas (1966: 62) appears to defend a purely a priori version of 
Hobbesianism, writing, “The state of nature is, paradoxically, an arti-
fi cial concept.” But on elaboration, it becomes apparent that Lucas 
defends “the state of nature” as the absence of society rather than as 
the absence of sovereignty. He goes on:
Philosophers imagine what life would be like if certain features 
of civil society were absent. But since men are social animals, 
they cannot live completely unsociably, and we cannot picture 
human life with all features of human society removed. . . . we 
cannot think of human beings who are never members of any 
community, and therefore cannot make them the starting point 
of our enquiry. (Lucas 1966: 62) 
This quote confl ates Hobbes’s description of the state of nature 
with his defi nition of it. Whether the absence of the state implies the 
absence of community depends on whether Hobbes was right about 
the impossibility of maintaining society without sovereignty, and that 
is an empirical claim in need of verifi cation.
Lucas (1966: 65–6) implies that a priori reasoning can demonstrate 
that statelessness is inherently violent, writing, “We then are faced 
with the logically exclusive alternatives” of the “coercive machinery 
of State” and “the haphazard arbitrament of force.” Lucas appears 
to believe that he has proven the exclusivity of the two terms by a 
priori reasoning. Even if his argument were to be completely a priori, 
it would not be invulnerable to an empirical check. Observation of a 
polity settling disputes “any old how” (in the words of Lucas 1966: 
62) without degenerating into the arbitrary force would falsify his 
conclusion. The observation would not show exactly what is wrong 
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with the argument, but any argument for a demonstrably false conclu-
sion is necessarily unsound. 
And Lucas’s (1966: 65–6) argument turns out to be straightfor-
wardly empirical after all. This aspect becomes clear when he argues 
that a higher coercive power is not necessary to keep the peace among 
states even though it is supposedly necessary to keep the peace among 
individuals. The difference, supposedly, is the obviously empirical 
claim that among individuals, the advantage is always to the attacker, 
but among nations, the advantage is sometimes often to the defender. 
Hoekstra (2007: 118) fi nds this same kind of empirical reasoning in 
Hobbes’s discussion of states: “Hobbes is explicit that the aggressive 
stance of sovereigns toward one another is for the good of their sub-
jects, and that ‘there does not follow from it that misery which accom-
panies the liberty of particular men.’”
The reliance on empirical arguments to separate the behavior of 
individuals in the state of nature from the behavior of sovereigns who 
have a state-of-nature relationship is not trivial. Contractarians expect 
everyone to know that sovereigns can at least sometimes live together 
in a state-of-nature relationship without levels of violence becoming 
intolerable. They also expect everyone to be able to tell with little 
observational evidence—much less direct experience—that people 
living in stateless societies can never live together in peace. Those 
premises are a lot to accept on the basis of introspective reasoning 
without empirical confi rmation.
Richard Tuck explains the importance of the empirical nature of 
the Hobbesian hypothesis in the editor’s introduction to the Cam-
bridge edition of Leviathan, writing:
[Hobbes] envisaged the kind of confl ict which constituted the 
state of nature as something which could straightforwardly 
arise in practice, and which had frequently done so. Indeed, its 
heuristic power was precisely that it represented a real threat, 
which civil society was designed to pre-empt. (Tuck 1996: xxx)
Gauthier, one of the most prominent contemporary Hobbesians, 
makes clear the empirical nature of the hypothesis:
the evils of civil society must be set against the evils of the state 
of nature. And if the state of nature is truly intolerable, then 
civil society must be preferred. The question is not whether civil 
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society is unpleasant, but whether it is less pleasant than some 
possible alternative. Thus the only effective objection must be 
to show either that the state of nature is not a state of war of all 
against all, or that the rights and powers of the sovereign can be 
limited without sacrifi cing the advantages of civil society. And 
both of these, Hobbes could claim, are ruled out by the nature 
of man. If there is an objection it is not to the political theory, 
but to the psychology. (Gauthier 1969: 164)
Chapter 9’s response follows Gauthier’s suggestion and shows that 
the state of nature as Hobbes defi ned it is not a war of all-against-all.
George Klosko (2004: 5, 8) also recognizes the empirical nature 
of the issue, writing, “Assessment of conditions under which people 
are and are not able to provide indispensible benefi ts without state 
assistance raises complex empirical questions. . . . Empirical aspects of 
political obligations are not always recognized.” Other contemporary 
theorists recognizing the importance of this empirical claim include 
Kavka (1986: 4, 7–8, 24, 402–3), Hardin (2003: 42–3), and Hoekstra 
(2007: 113). For example, Hoekstra writes in The Cambridge Com-
panion to Hobbes’s Leviathan:
Does Hobbes think that the natural condition of war of all 
against all ever did or could exist? His readers have long denied 
it; but if the scenario is unreal, it is hard to see how it is supposed 
to be pertinent, and more particularly how it can tell us anything 
about the nature of our obligations. (Hoekstra 2007: 117)
These widely respected scholars of Hobbes agree that he uses empirical 
claims for a good reason. As the following section argues, he needs one.
6. CONTRACTARIANISM’S NEED FOR AN EMPIRICAL CLAIM
People who want to categorize Hobbes as a pure a priori theorist might 
be tempted to say that the state of nature is merely a heuristic or an 
ontological assumption, but one must be careful about what claims can 
be interpreted as such without robbing the argument of its meaning. 
The story of the original contract certainly can be interpreted as such, 
but this section argues that a purely fi ctional characterization of all 
claims about the state of nature would make the comparison irrelevant 
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to the question of whether the state secures mutual advantage, appar-
ently rendering the state of nature useless for any justifi cation of the 
state based on mutual advantage.
To see the need for an empirical claim, compare the state of nature 
with the myth of Narcissus, which tells the story of a man so self-
centered that he cannot look away from the beauty of his own refl ection 
in a pond. He eventually turns into a fl ower commonly seen hanging 
over ponds. This myth warns people to be less self-centered or risk 
becoming dangerously self-obsessed. Most of the empirical claims in 
the story are merely heuristics. The story is still good if there never was 
a Narcissus and if humans can’t really turn into plants. But if the story 
is to say anything about the human condition, one claim needs to be 
empirically true: overly self-centered behavior is self-destructive. If that 
claim were untrue, the story would be meaningless entertainment. 
Hobbesians don’t need to do social history. They don’t need to say 
that the state of nature is more natural than the state; that it preceded 
the state, or that humanity got out via a voluntary compact. They only 
need to talk about our world and what is in it today, but they have to 
say something factual about it to justify existing states against existing 
alternatives. 
Certainly the following is a very bad argument—the Giant Chicken 
justifi cation of the state:
P1: I can tell a story, in which a Giant Chicken pecks everyone on 
earth to death whenever the state is absent. 
P2: This story is pure fi ction with no empirical analog.
C: This story explains why the state is justifi ed in imposing 
authority on unwilling people even if the authority is harm-
ful to them in reality.
This is the kind of argument one would be left with if the Hobbes-
ian hypothesis were interpreted as being entirely without empirical 
content. 
We concede that the state-of-nature justifi cation of sovereignty is 
more plausible than the Giant Chicken justifi cation, but we can only 
think of two reasons why: it contains no premise equivalent to P2 
in the Giant Chicken justifi cation, and its empirical claim is at least 
prima facie plausible. The Giant Chicken presents a dilemma for any-
one wishing to argue that social contract theory can justify anything 
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without empirical premises. Either they need to accept that the Giant 
Chicken justifi cation is just as good as the state-of-nature justifi ca-
tion, or they need to come up with some argument for state-of-nature 
theory’s superiority without relying on its greater empirical plausibil-
ity. With no such argument readily apparent, we believe we have dem-
onstrated that the Hobbesian hypothesis is and must be an empirical 
claim and a necessary premise in the contractarian justifi cation of state 
sovereignty. The logical need for contractarianism’s central empirical 
premise (the Hobbesian hypothesis) is dictated by its central norma-
tive premise (the Lockean proviso). Theories not relying on a Lockean 
proviso might not need the Hobbesian hypothesis, but contractarian-
ism as usually stated has little left in its justifi cation without it.
The synthetic state of nature, which merely illustrates the criteria 
that the state has to pass to be justifi ed, is possible, because any pro-
viso, any state of nature story, any justifi catory criterion is about what 
alternatives people are allowed to imagine when considering whether 
social arrangements are justifi ed to them. But even then, the ques-
tion of whether the state fulfi lls the criteria is empirical. Does state X 
meet criteria Y or not? Hobbes seemed to believe he had proven that 
the nature of the state ensured the fulfi llment of the proviso in the 
way that the nature of a triangle ensures that its angles sum to 180 
degrees, but Hobbes’s can be good or bad and its conclusion can be 
true or false. The only way to remove the empirical claim of fulfi ll-
ment would be to argue that the state doesn’t have to meet any criteria 
to be justifi ed, and that would be equivalent to denying the state needs 
justifi cation. Therefore, the question is not and cannot be whether 
contractarianism can justify the state without any empirical claims. It 
cannot. The question is whether it can justify the state without claims 
about stateless societies.
7. THE HOBBESIAN HYPOTHESIS IS A CLAIM 
ABOUT PREHISTORIC AND SMALL-SCALE 
STATELESS SOCIETIES
We have established that the Hobbesian hypothesis is an empirical 
claim and an essential premise in the Hobbesian justifi cation of the 
state. We have admitted to the conceptual possibility of an extra-weak 
hypothesis, but this section establishes that the Hobbesian hypothesis 
as usually stated and used is a claim about prehistoric and/or mod-
ern small-scale stateless societies. This is so, not only because Hobbes 
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mentions stateless societies several times, but also because the hypoth-
esis, as Hobbes and many other contractarians use it, is a claim about 
all situations in which people are together with no sovereign authority 
over them. Supposedly people have an inherent need for the state. If 
so, there must be a dichotomy: either there is a state, or life is so poor 
that everyone has good reason to desire a state even if they can expect 
to be in the least advantaged group of people in that state.
If the state of nature is not fact, then it is fi ction, and the compari-
son with the fi ctional state of nature would say nothing about whether 
there is or is not an inherent need for the state. A synthetic state of 
nature is unable to do what contractarianism is supposed to do: justify 
the state against the alternatives to it. If you consider buying a car, you 
would probably compare it with the alterative of not buying a car. If 
somebody told you that you are morally obliged to buy a car because 
it’s better than a fi ctional war of all-against-all, you’d probably expect 
a very thorough and convincing argument why the fi ctional story was 
more relevant than the comparison between real alternatives.
Yet such arguments are missing from contractarianism. If the 
Hobbesian state of nature is fi ction, it is fi ction specifi cally chosen 
to be the worst imaginable scenario. Why choose this of all possible 
fi ctions? To avoid the appearance of being no more than an excuse 
to justify just about any state, a fi ctional worst-case state of nature 
would require a good argument for moral relevance. 
Instead, since Hobbes, contractarians have stressed the reality of 
the state’s protective role in preventing the violence and/or poverty 
that necessarily prevail in its absence. Macpherson writes:
Hobbes’s point, of course, is to show that this condition would 
necessarily thwart every man’s desire for “commodious living” 
and for avoidance of violent death, that therefore every reason-
able man should do whatever must be done to guard against this 
condition. (Macpherson 1962: 19)
People do not need to guard against fi ctional dangers. To give up the 
claim that the state protects people from real dangers in favor of an 
illustrative interpretation gives up the justifi cational force in the the-
ory as stated. George Klosko (2004: 5) argues, “to establish politi-
cal obligations, the benefi ts in question must be indispensable in two 
ways. Not only must (1) the subject require them for an acceptable 
life, but (2) he must require them from the state.” Jean Hampton goes 
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further, arguing that we have to have a natural need for those benefi ts. 
That is, our need for these benefi ts exists whether or not a state has 
ever existed, otherwise, “our choice is essentially ‘rigged’ by a political 
society that creates in us the very reason we use to choose it and that 
appears to justify its existence” (Hampton 1988: 271). One cannot say 
that people require the state to provide indispensable benefi ts without 
making the counterfactual claim that they would lack indispensable 
benefi ts if they lived in a stateless society. This argument must rest on 
the empirical truth of the Hobbesian hypothesis.
To confi rm that statelessness is inherently inferior to the state 
requires verifying that all stateless environments are inferior to the 
state. Falsifi cation of the Hobbesian hypothesis requires only one 
example of a stateless society that conforms to Hobbes’s defi nition 
but confl icts with his description of the state of nature. Critics can 
focus on one alternative to the state; supporters have to address all 
alternatives. 
The other option to justify an extra-weak proviso is to cast civil 
war as the only relevant alternative to the state, bracketing any dis-
cussion of stateless societies without going to an entirely synthetic 
state of nature. This strategy—even if successful—drops one of the 
central claims of contractarians: that there is an inherent need for the 
state. The justifi cation of the state would become contingent on what-
ever factors cause the civil war to become the only alternative to the 
state today. Chapter 11 considers the civil war alternative as a pos-
sible response to our fi ndings, and reveals that any such argument has 
greater diffi culties than might at fi rst appear. But our literature review 
in Chapters 4–7 fi nds no such argument. The contractarian argument 
as stated and used is that a well-constructed state is inherently bet-
ter than statelessness. We fi nd no contingent justifi cation of the state 
based on the particulars of the current political setting. Therefore, 
until Chapter 11, we examine the Hobbesian hypothesis as most com-
monly used: the claim that everyone is better off in state society than 
they could be in any stateless society.
8. THE “WEAK” HOBBESIAN HYPOTHESIS IS A STRONG CLAIM
This chapter has argued that contractarians have freed social contract 
theory from relying on the empirical claim that literally everyone con-
sents by relying heavily on the empirical claim that literally everyone 
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benefi ts. But this hypothesis—even in its weak version—is a strong 
claim in the sense of a far-reaching claim (not in the sense of a well-
supported claim). It is weak in the way that the claim, “everybody dis-
likes Chris” is weaker than the claim “everybody hates Chris,” but it 
is strong in the way that “everybody hates Chris,” is stronger than “a 
large majority of people hate Chris.” Literally speaking, the Hobbes-
ian hypothesis implies that the worst-placed person in state society is 
better off than the best-placed person in any stateless situation. It is 
far stronger than other claims that could conceivably be used to justify 
the state, such as that the majority or the average person benefi ts.
The weak proviso is so strong that it could not be used to compare 
two states. One could not say that everyone is better off in contem-
porary Norway than everyone was in ancient Rome. If the emperor 
wouldn’t want to give up being worshiped as a living god for all those 
Norwegian luxuries, an ancient Roman proviso would be forever 
unfulfi llable. But as Chapters 9 and 10 argue, the smallest-scale state-
less societies have no particularly privileged people, and virtually no 
opportunities for anyone to live signifi cantly better than the average 
person. Neither skills nor ruthlessness are highly rewarded. There-
fore, they provide a uniformly low base for comparison, making it at 
least conceivable that everyone could be better off in state society. The 
violence hypothesis made literally universal benefi t highly plausible 
by supposing that the state relieves everyone from the imminent fear 
of death. If the violence hypothesis turns out to be false, a universal 
benefi t does not become impossible, but it does become more diffi cult 
to sustain. Therefore, it is worth considering whether contractarian-
ism can soften it.
One might soften the claim that everyone benefi ts either with a less-
than-literal meaning of “everyone” or with a less-than-literal meaning 
of “benefi t.” We consider each in turn.
A. Less-than-Literal Understandings of “Everyone,” the Issue of 
Distribution, and the Problem of Dissenters
It might seem simple to say that the word “everyone” in the phrase, 
“the state benefi ts everyone,” actually means merely most people. But 
this section argues that this approach is not promising for contractar-
ians, not least because if “everyone” doesn’t literally mean everyone, 
then a “mutual advantage theory” literally isn’t a theory of mutual 
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advantage. It would become a theory of advantage for some at the 
expense of others. The receipt of benefi t has been the whole thrust of 
the contractarian justifi cation of the state extending back as far as the 
proto-contractarianism that Plato (2013) attributed to Socrates. Crit-
ics of contractarianism argue that actual states have incentive to leave 
some people out of the agreement (Pateman 1988; Pateman and Mills 
2007), but contractarians usually insist the state has authority over 
you because it benefi ts you.
The goal of contract theory is supposed to justify state authority 
to all the people on whom it binds. Presumably, it is most important 
to justify that authority to the people on whom that authority is most 
onerous, but the non-literal reading of “everyone” singles out exactly 
that group as the one that can be ignored. Hypothetical agreement 
eliminates the problem that not everyone actually agrees by attribut-
ing withheld consent to the irrational or unreasonable intransigence 
of people who deny the benefi ts they do in fact receive rather than 
the reasonable dissent of people intentionally not considered part of 
“everyone.”
The debate over contractarianism has not always suffi ciently 
stressed the connection between the mutual advantage criterion and 
distributional issues. Someone always benefi ts from the state. It is 
probably even relatively easy for contemporary states to benefi t the 
majority relative to statelessness. The only candidates for whom 
such a weak proviso might remain unsatisfi ed are people with sig-
nifi cant social, political, and economic disadvantages: the poor and 
the disconnected. Therefore, an argument for a non-literal meaning of 
“everyone” would be an argument that the proviso does not have to 
apply to the poorest and most disadvantaged people in society. Why? 
Any argument against applying the proviso to this group would seem 
to be an argument against the proviso itself—against the principle that 
forms the whole contractarian justifi cation for the state. Dropping the 
claim that literally everyone benefi ts would seem to rob the hypotheti-
cal contract of its last remaining similarity to a contract. 
What reasons consistent with contractarian theory can one give for 
leaving anyone out of the circle of benefi t if it is possible to include 
them? None: if social arrangements are mutually advantageous only 
to a subset of the population, mutual advantage theory has nothing 
to say to those outside that subset. Mutual advantage might be able 
to justify the state to a large majority of people, but not to dissenters. 
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Contractarians would have to accept the permanent presence of dis-
senters—both vocal and silent—and they would require a theory of 
how to treat them. 
Intransigents require no special theory, because they are assumed 
effectively to be signatories to the social contract. Dissenters can’t be 
treated this way, because they are not literally part of the group that 
has rational reason to sign the hypothetical contract. Contractarians 
would need to refer to some other class of theory to determine how 
many dissenters can be left out to justify state authority over them, to 
determine how to treat them, to determine how they are allowed to 
behave, and to explain why the state doesn’t have to extend mutual 
benefi t to them, even if it can. Many diffi cult questions would arise 
from any such effort.
We know of no contractarian theories that seriously attempt this 
strategy, hopefully for the good reason that a theory of advantages for 
some at the expense of others is nearly the opposite of mutual advantage 
theory. Hypothetical consent can get contractarianism out of the literal 
use of “consent,” but not out of the literal use of “everyone.” If we 
can’t soften the claim that “everyone benefi ts” by softening the meaning 
of “everyone,” maybe we can soften the meaning of “benefi ts.” 
B. Less-than-Literal Understandings of “Benefi t”
The most obvious less-than-literal use of the word “benefi t” would be 
to rely on ex ante (before the fact) rather than ex post (after the fact) 
benefi t. If the proviso is understood in terms of ex post benefi ts, it is 
violated for anyone who ends up worse off than they could reasonably 
expect to be in stateless society. If the proviso is understood in terms of 
ex ante benefi ts, a person has to consider not just their current welfare 
but also their life prospects from the relevant starting point. If those life 
prospects were better than they could have been in the state of nature, 
the proviso might not be violated even if they literally end up worse off.
To some extent, the benefi ts of the social contract have to be under-
stood in an ex ante sense. Otherwise, the contract device could not 
justify something as obviously useful as a speeding ambulance. Once 
in a while a speeding ambulance hits a pedestrian who never in her life 
would actually have needed an ambulance, making her worse off ex 
post, even if accurately assessing the availability of ambulances made 
her better off ex ante. 
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It is not easy to determine the relevant starting point or what 
should count as an ex ante benefi t, and the ramifi cations are enor-
mous. The case of the ambulance running over a healthy person is still 
ex ante for most people, because most people have not yet either used 
or been hit by an ambulance. But the ex ante benefi t argument is rarely 
employed on an ex ante basis. People who already have advantages 
use it against people who already are disadvantaged—asking them to 
endorse inequality ex post.
The simplest and most far-reaching conception of ex ante benefi t 
is also morally implausible. Average life prospects in contemporary 
capitalist states are probably much better than average life prospects 
in stateless society. Therefore, given a choice of being born a random 
baby in one of the two societies, one would choose the state. There-
fore, one might be tempted to say that, in this sense, everyone is ex 
ante better off in state society. The problem with this argument is 
that people are not born randomly into state society. To paraphrase 
Binmore (2005: 169), strategies like this amount to the advantaged 
telling the disadvantaged that they are bound by their imaginary 
choice of tails in the primordial toss of a coin now eternally frozen in 
the act of landing heads. The rules of society are not fi xed and immu-
table, nor do people usually think of them that way, except perhaps 
when they try to get disadvantaged people to accept their place in 
society. Advantaged people constantly tweak the rules (often to make 
things better for themselves), and thereby they are constantly making 
decisions either to perpetuate or reduce disadvantage. If it is possible 
to tweak the rules so that fewer people end up below the proviso ex 
post, it seems unreasonable to ask the disadvantaged to think of these 
rules as having been fi xed before they are born.
This random-baby conception of ex ante benefi ts seems to violate 
what Tom Sorell (2007: 150–1), quoting Hampton, calls “Hobbes’s 
‘central insight about ethics’, namely, that ‘ethics should not be under-
stood to require that we make ourselves prey for others’.” This insight 
is supposed to be contractarianism’s main advantage over utilitarian-
ism, which has no special provision for the disadvantaged, except 
in so far as their welfare affects average welfare (Scanlon 1998: 98; 
Ashford and Mulgan 2012). The random-baby conception of ex post 
benefi ts would seem to incorporate this highly unappealing aspect of 
utilitarianism simply to soften the implications of this central insight 
of contractarian theory. This strategy would require people to make 
5200_Widerquist.indd   62 25/11/16   10:32 AM
The Hobbesian Hypothesis 63
themselves prey. Depending on the numbers, the average-life-prospect 
conception could endorse a slave economy. Or consider a poor black 
woman born in a ghetto raised in an apartment with lead pipes. 
It must be unreasonable to tell her that her average-life-prospects 
include the possibility that she might have been a white man born 
in Beverly Hills to a wealthy family with stock in the company that 
supplied those pipes. 
Even with perfect equality of opportunity, if one wants to be sure 
to avoid the problems of slavery and exploitation, one has to set some 
minimum standard below which people are not allowed to fall even 
in an ex post sense. Contractarianism has one minimum standard. It’s 
called the Lockean proviso. 
When is it reasonable to refer to ex ante benefi ts? There is no easy 
answer. We don’t know of a thorough contractarian discussion of it, 
but Rawls (1971; 1993; 2001)—who is not a contractarian in the 
sense we use here—has a possible solution. He argues essentially that 
no one without a specifi c grievance of unfairness can complain about 
being in the least advantage group (someone ends up least advantaged 
in every system) but they can complain that the treatment of the least 
advantaged group is unreasonably low. Any such principle would 
seem to give a person the right to complain if they end up worse off 
than they could expect to be in a stateless society, assuming it is pos-
sible to bring them up. (Rawls suggests an even higher standard.) 
If the state makes a good faith effort to get as many people to the 
proviso level as possible, to minimize the harm to those below, and to 
share the risks equally, it can claim that in an ex ante sense, everyone 
is better off in state society. If so, the extraordinarily unlucky are 
extraordinary in their luck; they are not extraordinary in their expo-
sure to dangers to create advantages for others. Even a healthy per-
son hit by an ambulance might have a complaint if ambulances are 
riskier than they need to be; the benefi ts of ambulances are unequally 
shared; or people hit by them aren’t given suffi cient medical treat-
ment or compensation. Therefore, the consideration of ex ante ben-
efi t puts only a small limit on the application of the Lockean proviso 
and it seems to give no reason to refuse to bring everyone up to the 
proviso level ex post, if it is possible to do so without sacrifi cing the 
benefi ts of state society. Any imposed risks have to be both necessary 
and equally applied before their benefi ts can be considered to apply 
to everyone ex ante.
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9. CONCLUSION
This chapter has shown that the question that began this book mat-
ters to fi ve versions of the contractarian justifi cation of the state, two 
directly from Hobbes and three Hobbesian reformulations. Whether 
you call it the Lockean proviso, Paine’s fi rst principle of civilization, 
or something else, the only stated version of contractarianism that did 
not rely on this question was Hobbes’s widely unpopular yield-to-
superior-force version. We have conceptualized an extra-weak proviso 
that would not require the weak version of Hobbesian hypothesis, but 
the literature review below fails to show anyone consistently arguing 
for it. We are unsure whether the absence of a consistent argument for 
an extra-weak proviso results from the popularity of the weak proviso 
or from a lack of clarity generally. Contractarians seem to believe they 
don’t need to specify the criteria the state must satisfy to be justifi ed, 
because no matter what those criteria might be, they are obviously sat-
isfi ed. Yet, the Hobbesian hypothesis is an essential premise in the fi ve 
versions of the contractarian argument that are suffi ciently specifi ed 
to form a coherent justifi cation of the state. We now turn to the issue 
of how a very similar claim appears in modern property rights theory.
Note
 1 Throughout this book, P1, P2, C1, and C2 and so on stand for premise 
1, premise 2, conclusion 1, conclusion 2, and so on. 
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Chapter 4
JOHN LOCKE AND THE HOBBESIAN 
HYPOTHESIS: HOW A SIMILAR COLONIAL 
PREJUDICE BECAME AN ESSENTIAL PREMISE 
IN THE MOST POPULAR JUSTIFICATION OF 
PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS
Locke (1960: “Second Treatise,” §25–§511) had a more agreeable view 
of the state of nature than Hobbes, but Locke had his own version 
of the Hobbesian hypothesis. He agreed with the Hobbesian idea that 
even the most disadvantaged people in England in their century were 
better off than even the most advantaged people in societies that had 
neither sovereign governments nor private landownership (§37, §41). 
He gave most of the credit to the property rights system rather than to 
the state, but like Hobbes, he compared societies with both institutions 
against societies with neither. Unlike Hobbes, Locke separately justifi ed 
government and private property, using what we call a Lockean proviso 
and a Hobbesian hypothesis in both, thus introducing the hypothesis to 
a very different area of debate (Widerquist 2010b). 
Section 1 shows how Locke’s state of nature differs from Hobbes’s 
version. Section 2 explains Locke’s “appropriation theory” of pri-
vate property. Section 3 shows how the proviso works in this theory. 
Section 4 shows how Locke uses his version of the Hobbesian hypoth-
esis in that theory. Section 5 discusses the evidence he provided for 
that claim. Section 6 concludes with a summary of the relevant part 
of the Lockean argument.
1. LOCKE’S STATE OF NATURE
Unlike Hobbes, Locke used social contract theory to justify a limited 
government, constrained by natural rights including property rights. 
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This effort to create a hybrid theory requires a separate justifi cation 
of the rights that limit the contract and an explanation why people 
do not alienate those rights when they enter the state. Hobbes had 
no need for a separate justifi cation of property or any other rights, 
because people alienate all rights when they accept the social contract. 
His absolutist sovereign can make any law it wants, including laws 
defi ning or redefi ning property (Hobbes 1962 [1651]: 113–17, 201).
Unlike the Hobbesian state of nature’s moral free-for-all, the Lock-
ean state of nature had specifi c moral rights, including the right of self-
defense and the right to punish those who infringe one’s rights (§6–§8). 
Because people are bad judges in their own cases, self-enforcement of 
rights leads to confl icts (§13), but not to a Hobbesian war of all-against-
all. Confl ict and other inconveniences of the state of nature give people 
suffi cient reason to agree to a social contract (§13, §25–§44). There-
fore, his social contract relied on a version of the Hobbesian hypothesis 
(life outside of sovereign authority is inferior to life under a properly 
constituted government). However, Locke did not support his Hobbes-
ian hypothesis with a violence hypothesis. People rationally try to work 
out confl icts in the state of nature, just as they do in state society. The 
tolerability of Locke’s less violent state of nature is an important ele-
ment in his argument for a limited government. The state not only has 
to provide people with improved welfare; it also has to protect their 
natural rights better than they could themselves in the state of nature. 
No matter how much greater their welfare might be in state society, 
Locke believed people would only give up their right to protect their 
rights themselves if the government does it better (§87–§90, §131) 
(Baldwin 1982; Frye 2004; Kleinerman 2007).
This rights-respecting criterion in Locke’s justifi cation of the state 
is one that not all states will pass, and so Locke proposed right to rebel 
if the government does not protect their rights (§211–§243). Conceiv-
ably, this right also comes into effect when the proviso is unsatisfi ed in 
welfare terms. Locke’s belief in a more peaceful state of nature made 
him believe that welfare had to be higher to fulfi ll the proviso than 
Hobbes believed it had to be. But as this chapter argues below, Locke 
still believed the proviso was easily fulfi lled. Yet, Locke’s use of the 
proviso in his justifi cation of the state does not interest us as much as 
his use of it in private property theory. 
To argue for a natural right to private property, Locke employed 
a more complex state of nature than the Hobbesian undifferentiated 
mass of chaotic war. Although Locke’s state of nature has some confl ict 
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(§13), it is a period of gradual progress for the industrious. It begins 
with no government, no monetary economy, abundant resources, and 
no private property rights (at least not in terms of land). People appar-
ently live by hunting and gathering, but they can and do establish farms 
and “appropriate” property in the state of nature (§25–§34). Over 
time, land becomes scarce, and people institute a civil society with four 
conditions that differentiate it from the (initial) state of nature: a private 
property system, land scarcity, a monetary economy, and government 
sovereignty (§45–§51). See Widerquist (2010b) for further analysis. 
With Locke and Hobbes making such different pronouncements 
about the state of nature, it is easy to forget that it is not a hypothetical 
example. Both of them affi rm its reality, mention empirical examples 
to support their claims, and use their claims in theories that require 
the state of nature to be a real situation. Yet few philosophers seem 
interested in an empirical investigation to determine whether either of 
them was close to the truth.
2. APPROPRIATION THEORY
Like Hobbes, Locke wanted to justify the enormous economic inequal-
ity that existed in England in the seventeenth century, but he went 
about it in nearly the opposite way. Hobbes justifi ed inequality by 
arguing that property rights are a product of the state. Like all other 
rights, they are doled out arbitrarily by the sovereign, and unless it 
asks for input, anybody who complains about it violates the social 
contract (Hobbes 1962 [1651]: 186; 1998: xv). No matter how poor 
or rich you are, the same government that created arbitrary inequality 
saved you from that awful state of nature, and so you accept it.
Locke rejected absolutism, but he wanted to limit potential redistri-
bution of property by the legislature, and so he did not want to portray 
private property rights as a creation of the state. He proposed instead 
an “appropriation theory” that pushes the creation of property rights 
back into the state of nature. 
In Locke’s state of nature land and other resources initially “belong 
to Mankind in common” (§25–§27). Apparently, that is, the land is 
a “commons,” which is not quite the same as joint, public, or state 
ownership. In those forms of ownership, some central authority capa-
ble of making decisions for the group has full ownership rights over 
the resource, and they can build on it, alter it, divide it up, sell it, and 
so forth. A commons is closer to collective non-ownership than to 
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public ownership. In an open commons, anyone can use the resource 
but no one can take (or at least no one has taken) ownership of it. 
In a closed commons, the members of a group treat it as a commons 
among themselves, but assert exclusive rights over it against outsid-
ers. The atmosphere and the oceans remain, to a great extent, an open 
commons. Although a road system is usually offi cially owned by a 
government, it tends to be treated as a closed commons in the sense 
that everyone with the legal right to be in the government’s jurisdic-
tion can use it. Justifi cations of private property nearly always justify 
it against the starting point of common ownership rather than one of 
full public ownership.
Locke’s framing of the question in this way made his claims about 
the state of nature more obviously empirical than Hobbes’s claims 
about it. For Hobbesian theory, it does not matter whether the state 
of nature preceded the establishment of sovereign governments, only 
that it is the natural alternative. For propertarian theory, the order 
in which things happen is important. Locke’s appropriation theory 
recognized the rights of property owners against non-owners based 
on their prior, historical claim to their land, but he was aware that the 
land was a commons before any private owner established historical 
claims. The historical nature of Locke’s theory led him to the need 
to justify holdings against the property institutions (or lack thereof) 
that prevailed before private landownership. It also justifi ed property 
rights against the natural alternative in the sense that a commons is 
what would exist if neither government nor landlords asserted any 
authority over the resource in question.
As Chapters 9 and 10 argue, the historical claim that some form of 
commons came fi rst is more or less accurate. At some social scale and 
likely with some constructs of territoriality, all nomadic hunter-gath-
erers treated the lands as a commons. Sometimes they likely did so as 
an open commons, sometimes as a partly closed commons, rarely or 
never as a fully closed commons. Some settled hunter-gathers treat 
land more like private, public, or royal property, but nomadic hunter-
gatherers preceded settled peoples (including settled hunter-gatherers) 
to almost all of the earth’s land area.
In Locke’s theory, and in most propertarian theory, a commons 
is naturally available for appropriation (§26–32, §36, §48). How 
appropriators establish property rights and what gives them the moral 
authority to do so remains controversial even among propertarians 
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(Nozick 1974: 174–82; Narveson 1988: ch. 7; Waldron 1988: 161–2, 
168–74; Kirzner 1989: 18–19, 98–100; Epstein 1995: 60; Sreenivasan 
1995: 28–9; Otsuka 2003: 21). These aspects of the theory are inconse-
quential for the discussion here. But it is important that once property 
is established, it is a natural right that owners can trade, bequeath, or 
give to others. In propertarian theory, property titles are not mere legal 
creations as they are in Hobbesian theory. They are natural rights that 
exist prior to the state in time and/or in moral authority. Unless current 
property holders have violated some tenet of the theory, their property 
titles put ethical limits on the government’s power to tax, regulate, 
and redistribute property. The extent of these limits varies greatly from 
theorist to theorist, but for the issue at hand, it matters only that the 
proviso plays a part in justifying those limits—whatever they might be.
In Hobbesian contractarianism, everyone is protected by the proviso 
and only the proviso. The government could deny freedom of speech or 
any other basic right, but as long as, all things considered, you were bet-
ter off without those rights in a state than with those rights in the state of 
nature, the government was still justifi ed by consent. In Lockean theory, 
everyone is protected by both the proviso and by a somewhat vague list 
of basic rights. If any of those are violated, people are presumed not to 
consent even if, all things considered, they are better off in state soci-
ety. The most clearly specifi ed right on Locke’s list is the right to prop-
erty. This right is not to a specifi c share in the ownership of the earth’s 
resources; it is the right of people who already own property to keep it.
In Hobbesian theory, the only thing that protects anyone’s mate-
rial wellbeing is the proviso. In Lockean theory the only thing that 
protects a propertyless person’s material wellbeing is still the proviso, 
but property owners have both the proviso and their natural right to 
property to protect their wellbeing. This difference is substantial. 
The propertyless are allowed to compare their position only to an 
equally propertyless position in a (presumably poverty-ridden) state of 
natu re. The propertyless may not imagine entering some other social 
contract that secured higher wellbeing for them by granting them a 
greater share of the ownership of the earth’s resources because they 
have no natural right to those resources beyond the very minimum 
amount secured by the proviso.
Property owners, by contrast, are allowed to make two or more 
comparisons to protect their wellbeing. They can consider not only 
life as a propertyless person in the state of nature; they can imagine 
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holding their property in the state of nature. And perhaps, if they 
think that taxation, regulation, or redistribution is excessive, they are 
allowed to imagine entering some other social contract that had greater 
respect for their natural right to the property they have acquired. This 
comparison follows from the view of property as a natural right. Even 
if the property owners’ material wellbeing in state society far exceeds 
what they could expect to secure from their property in the state of 
nature, they have a natural right to exercise that property as they see 
fi t in state society as long as the proviso is fulfi lled and they are within 
whatever limits to property the theory affords.
In Hobbesian theory, everyone enters the contract as an equal, but 
the state is allowed to create arbitrary inequality. If the rich think 
that taxation, regulation, or redistribution is excessive, they have to 
imagine giving up all their property and going back to a (presumably 
horrible) state of nature where they are just as badly off as anyone else 
in the state of nature.
In Lockean theory, people do not enter the social contract as equals. 
At least some material differences between people are non-arbitrary, 
fl owing from the difference in their natural rights that are thought of as 
existing prior to the contract. This conception of property rights creates 
the possibility that the state could be too generous to the disadvantaged 
if doing so requires excessive taxation, regulation, or redistribution. 
This book does not question either theory; it only examines how 
the Lockean proviso and the Hobbesian hypothesis play similar roles 
in both theories.
3. LOCKE’S VERSION OF THE LOCKEAN PROVISO
Th e phrase, “the Lockean proviso,” was coined to describe a side 
constraint in Lockean appropriation theory (Nozick 1974: 178–82), 
sometimes called the “suffi ciency limitation” (Macpherson 1962: 211; 
Waldron 1988: 210). Yet, it plays a smaller role in Lockean property 
theory than it does in Hobbesian social contract theory. In Hobbes, 
the government has no natural right to sovereignty; it is sovereign 
only because people consent, and they consent only because the sov-
ereign fulfi lls the proviso. In Locke, property holders do have a right 
to be owners. The proviso is relevant only because the natural right 
to own land and other resources is subject to side constraints assuring 
that the establishment of ownership does no harm.
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Scholars disagree about the role the proviso played in Locke’s theory. 
Some identify as few as zero and some as many as three provisos in it 
(Widerquist 2010b). Rather than discuss the ins and outs of the potential 
proviso(s) (Locke 1960: “First Treatise,” §42, “Second Treatise,” §31, 
§38, §46–§50; 1993: 452), which have been well-discussed in the litera-
ture (Thomson 1976; Waldron 1979: 322, 327–8; Sanders 1987: 371–3; 
Waldron 1988: 161, 210–11; Dunn 1991 [1968]; Winfrew 1991 [1981]: 
398; Ashcraft 1994: 243; Waldron 2002: 172; Lamb and Thompson 
2009), we focus on what Chapter 2 defi ned as the weak Lockean proviso, 
which—whether Locke intended it or not—has been the most infl uential 
by far. For a more detailed discussion of the debate over the possible pro-
visos, see Widerquist (2010b).
A few extreme propertarians argue that natural property rights the-
ory is logically stronger without any provisos, claiming that people have 
no positive right to resources. Therefore, they are no worse off in terms 
of their rights, even if others appropriate everything (Rothbard 1982: 
244–5; Narveson 1988: 85, 100–1; Kirzner 1989: 98–100). This version 
of propertarianism eliminates the need for the empirical claim examined 
in this book, but it does so by building the theory on implausible norma-
tive premises. Under such a theory, no matter how many generations a 
people might hunt and gather on open land, they would never gain the 
right to be free to continue doing so or to be compensated if forced to 
stop. The aggressive interference of the privatizers is always justifi ed, 
even if it makes the hunter-gatherers worse off, and even if it will make 
some of their descendants worse off for thousands of years to come. 
Such a theory endorses colonial aggression against any society that treats 
land as a commons, although the freedom from aggression, the freedom 
from being forced to live someone else’s lifestyle, is what propertarian 
theory is supposed to be about. Any justifi cation of property is weak and 
unpersuasive if that institution can harm the propertyless without trig-
gering any responsibility on the part of owners to minimize or eliminate 
that harm. For more on ethical diffi culties with these kinds of theories, 
see Sreenivasan (1995: 40); Wenar (1998); Otsuka (2003); Widerquist 
(1999; 2006; 2009; 2010b; 2010c; 2013).
Locke stated the proviso, writing that appropriation is valid, “at 
least where there is enough, and as good left in common for others” 
(§27). He elaborated this idea in the following paragraphs (§27–§36). 
Locke argued, “He that leaves as much as another can make use of, 
does as good as take nothing at all” (§33), because non-appropriators 
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“would still have room, for as good, and as large a Possession . . . as 
before it was appropriated” (§36). In terms of raw resources avail-
able for appropriation, neither enough nor as good land is left for the 
propertyless either to use as a foraging commons or to appropriate 
for private uses. A proviso that must be fulfi lled in raw resources can 
never again be satisfi ed. But in most version of the theory, opportuni-
ties available in a market economy can fulfi ll the proviso (§37).
The weak version gives one answer to the question of how valu-
able these opportunities have to be to satisfy the proviso. It stipulates 
that non-appropriators must be at least as well-off as they would be 
(in overall welfare terms) if land remained a commons and people 
remained hunter-gatherers (Nozick 1974: 174–82). Eric Mack (2002: 
248) explains the logic behind this version of Locke’s proviso: “if 
the whole process of privatization leaves Sally with ‘enough and as 
good’ to use as she would have enjoyed (at a comparable cost) had 
all extra-personal resources remained in common, Sally will have no 
complaint.” Ryan (1991 [1965]: 433) writes, “since all men have prof-
ited by entering a market society, there is no cause for complaint if 
some men have done better than others.” If this proviso is fulfi lled, 
the system of private property ownership hurts no one, even though it 
makes natural resources unavailable to people who would otherwise 
have direct access to them.
Imagine a hunter-gatherer living in a commons. She has great 
resources available, but she has to work hard to make use of them, 
and what she can do with them is extremely limited. She can produce 
only very basic food, shelter, and clothing. Now imagine that appro-
priators replace the commons with a property system in which she 
owns nothing outside her body. She can no longer forage for what she 
wants, but she can get a job or seek charity. If these activities provide 
her higher overall welfare than was possible under the common prop-
erty regime, then she is better off in the capitalist economy even though 
she is (initially) propertyless. If propertyless people can obtain a more 
valuable bundle of resources by working than they could appropriate 
in the state of nature, in a sense capitalism increases their ability to 
appropriate resources. If the proviso were fulfi lled in this way, it might 
not be decisive, but it would be one strong reason to favor the private 
property system.
The fulfi llment of the proviso would give the propertyless reason to 
choose capitalism, but most propertarians do not stress the consent of 
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the propertyless as an element in the fulfi llment of the proviso. If the 
economy fulfi lls the proviso, natural rights theory (which we have not 
discussed in detail) justifi es the rights of landlords without regard to 
the preferences of the propertyless.
Not all contemporary political theorists are satisfi ed that the weak 
proviso is strong enough. Foraging is not the only thing people can 
do in the state of nature. They can also appropriate land and other 
resources. In this sense, the proviso should take into account not 
only the welfare level of hunter-gatherers, but also the welfare level 
of subsistence farmers, or perhaps even of someone who carries over 
appropriated land into state society. To take these possibilities into 
account, many property theorists have suggested stronger versions of 
the proviso (Tully 1980: 137–8; Waldron 1988: 214–15; Simmons 
1992; Steiner 1992; Sreenivasan 1995: 40; Otsuka 2003: 24–6; Steiner 
2009: 5–6; Widerquist 2010b)
Strong versions of the proviso do not make direct claims about 
people in stateless societies, but stronger principles cannot be fulfi lled 
without also fulfi lling the weak proviso. Following Paine (2000), we 
think of the weak proviso as the fi rst principle of government, and 
any stronger provisos as second or third principles, while limiting our 
analysis to this fi rst principle.
4. LOCKE’S ASSERTION OF THE HOBBESIAN HYPOTHESIS
Locke completed his justifi cation of the property system prevailing in 
seventeenth-century England by asserting that his proviso was fulfi lled:
[The] nations of the Americans . . ., who are rich in land, and 
poor in all the comforts of life; whom nature having furnished 
as liberally as any other people, with the materials of plenty, i.e. 
a fruitful soil, apt to produce in abundance, what might serve 
for food, raiment, and delight; yet for want of improving it by 
labour, have not one hundredth part of the conveniencies we 
enjoy: and a king of a large and fruitful territory there, feeds, 
lodges, and is clad worse than a day-labourer in England. (§41)
Although Locke did not rely on the violence hypothesis, the version 
of the Hobbesian hypothesis he developed in this quote is just as 
sweeping. The day laborer represents the least well-off person under 
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a private property system and the North American king represents 
the best-off person under a common property regime. Locke (§49) 
added, “in the beginning all the world was America,” emphasizing 
that his claim was not about only some common property regimes. 
The property rights system in England was better for its least advan-
taged people than any society with a common property regime. The 
proviso was fulfi lled. Locke asserted the Hobbesian hypothesis to say 
that nothing more needed to be done for the disadvantaged to oblige 
them—morally speaking—to respect the enormously unequal prop-
erty rights system prevailing in seventeenth-century England. If they 
had been worse off, they would have had a claim. But because even 
the most disadvantaged people were (supposedly) far better off than 
those savages, any demand for more would have violated the natural 
rights of propertied people.
Despite the enormous theoretical differences, the basic empiri-
cal claim in Locke and Hobbes was very similar: both agreed that 
everyone in seventeenth-century England was better off than every-
one in any society resembling those of unconquered Native Ameri-
cans. Locke attributed the benefi ts to the greater productivity of the 
private-property-based economy, and Hobbes attributed it to the 
rule-enforcing state; they drew on the same empirical comparison 
to affi rm their hypotheses. Propertarians today routinely repeat this 
same empirical claim in ways that only seem to makes sense if taken 
literally (see Chapters 5–7).
Locke supported his observation with an empirical argument about 
why the private property system is capable of benefi ting everyone 
including the propertyless:
he who appropriates land to himself by his labour, does not 
lessen, but increase the common stock of mankind: for the pro-
visions serving to the support of human life, produced by one 
acre of inclosed and cultivated land, are . . . ten times more than 
those which are yielded by an acre of land of an equal richness 
lying waste in common. And therefore he that incloses land, and 
has a greater plenty of the conveniencies of life from ten acres, 
than he could have from an hundred left to nature, may truly 
be said to give ninety acres to mankind: for his labour now sup-
plies him with provisions out of ten acres, which were but the 
product of an hundred lying in common. I have here rated the 
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improved land very low, in making its product but as ten to one, 
when it is much nearer an hundred to one. (§37)
Locke elaborates this idea further in §40–§43. This passage argues 
only for the possibility of fulfi lling the proviso, but it adds support 
for his observation that the proviso is fulfi lled. If a low-end worker’s 
productive capacity is a hundred times higher than the proviso level, 
it might be surprising to fi nd anyone for whom the proviso was unful-
fi lled. Of course, it would be the fallacy of composition to assume 
everyone did reach the proviso level just because it was possible. But 
it would be very affordable to bring everyone up to the proviso level 
if anyone was found below it.
Under those circumstances, Lockean or propertarian ethical theory 
as stated seems to give no reason to leave anyone out. Snyder writes:
Locke argues diligently that labored-on land is much more valu-
able to everyone than it would be otherwise. . . . he assumes 
that the increased wealth will be distributed to the benefi t of 
all. . . . Thus, although more land than leaves enough and as 
good for others may be appropriated, the greater productivity 
of the appropriated land more than makes up for the lack of 
land available to others. . . . Since all men benefi t from greater 
productivity of appropriated land, the law of nature is more 
completely fulfi lled if all land is appropriated. (Snyder 1991 
[1986]: 374)
No fact-independent interpretation seems reasonable. The propertar-
ian claim that the weak proviso is fulfi lled is an empirical assertion of 
the Hobbesian hypothesis.
5. LOCKE, LIKE HOBBES, RELIES ON A COMMON PREJUDICE
Neither Hobbes nor Locke can be faulted for a failure to understand 
the available empirical information. Locke read many accounts of 
travelers and contemporary histories of the peoples in Europe, North 
America, and other places (Shepperd et al. 2008). The problem was 
not a lack of interest in evidence but that the information he had was 
heavily tainted with colonial prejudice and the belief in an enormous 
gulf between “civilized man” and “savage man.” Whether Locke 
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can be faulted for not recognizing prejudice is unimportant. What is 
important is that the supporting evidence Locke and his successors 
have presented up to the present day amounts to no more than an 
appeal to that prejudice.
As mentioned above, Locke presents two pieces of evidence to 
support the hypothesis. One piece of evidence—the claim that farm-
ing and commerce can produce more for everyone—is certainly true 
today. It might not have been true for all private property regimes, but 
it is undeniable that contemporary capitalist economies produce far 
more goods per labor-hour out of the same resources than foraging 
economies. However, capitalism’s ability to produce more does not 
guarantee that it shares its benefi ts widely enough to make everyone 
better off.
That leaves Locke’s other piece of evidence—his day-laborer com-
parison—as the support he provides for his claim that those benefi ts 
are suffi ciently shared to make everyone better off. But he doesn’t say 
much about the day laborer or the North American king (§41). He 
presents neither data nor detailed description of exactly what con-
veniences seventeenth-century day laborers and unconquered Native 
Americans enjoy or what hardships they suffer to obtain those con-
veniences. But he expects this mere mention to convince his readers 
that the day laborer is better off. And as the following chapters show, 
most philosophers writing on this issue have agreed with his compara-
tive claim. Even opponents of Locke’s overall theory tend to accept it 
without evidence.
The truth-value of the Hobbesian hypothesis is not obvious. 
Although relevant research is available, it is not well-known, and few 
people writing on this issue have shown interest in the evidence. What 
could possibly motivate such lack of interest in verifying the claim that 
is central to the most infl uential justifi cations of both government and 
property rights? It must be a shared prejudice: people are confi dent 
that their belief on this issue is correct because so many other people 
believe it too. 
The difference between common experience and common preju-
dice is apparent in the difference between Locke’s appeal for read-
ers to accept the Hobbesian hypothesis and his appeal for readers to 
accept another empirical assertion. Locke writes, “I doubt not but it 
will be objected that it is unreasonable for men to be judges in their 
own cases, that self-love will make men partial to themselves” (§13). 
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He presents an empirical claim without presenting any evidence, but 
to verify it, he asks readers to draw on shared experience that they 
actually have. Modern scholarship backs him up with a great deal 
of research on what is now called “self-serving bias” (Shepperd et al. 
2008), but even if those sources had been available, Locke would not 
have needed to get bogged down citing them, because all people have 
experience with other people. Locke can rely on that shared experi-
ence to give them a good reason to accept his point.
But when Locke asks his upper-class, seventeenth-century readers 
to accept his claim that the proviso is fulfi lled, few if any of them 
would have direct experience that would allow them to compare 
the lives of English day laborers with those of unconquered Native 
Americans. If they think they know it despite that lack of experi-
ence, they must be drawing on a shared prejudice. The need for an 
investigation is clear.
6. SUMMARIZING THE ARGUMENT
The propertarian justifi cation of private property and the contracta-
rian justifi cation of the state are two very different arguments, built 
from very different philosophical perspectives, but hopefully, the dis-
cussion in this and the previous chapter reveals their important com-
monalities. Lockean property theory is one of the family of theories 
identifi ed in Section 3B of Chapter 3 employing a Lockean proviso, 
a Hobbesian hypothesis, and additional premises. Without specify-
ing the additional premises that aren’t at issue, we summarize it as 
follows:
P1: Lockean proviso: resource ownership can be justifi ed if it 
benefi ts everyone (or does not harm anyone).
P2: Hobbesian hypothesis: contemporary resource ownership 
does in fact benefi t everyone (or does not harm anyone).
P3 Additional premises.
C: Contemporary resource ownership is justifi ed.
Although contractarianism and propertarianism require two dif-
ferent Hobbesian hypotheses, the empirical comparison underlying 
them is the same. The contractarian version is that state sovereignty 
benefi ts everyone. The propertarian version is that land and resource 
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ownership benefi t everyone. But most state societies that have one 
of these institutions also have the other, so that the following claim 
provides evidence for or against either use of the weak Hobbesian 
hypothesis: Even the most disadvantaged people in contemporary 
capitalist states are better off than they could reasonably expect 
to be in a stateless society with common property rights regimes. 
Those few propertarians and contractarians who cite any evidence 
at all tend to cite evidence for this comparison. The following three 
chapters show that a large number of infl uential contractarians and 
propertarians assert and employ this hypothesis, most presenting 
less evidence than Hobbes or Locke did in the seventeenth century. 
Note
 1 Unless otherwise specifi ed, “§” refers hereafter to paragraph numbers in 
Locke (1960: “Second Treatise”).
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Chapter 5
THE HOBBESIAN HYPOTHESIS IN EIGHTEENTH-
CENTURY POLITICAL THEORY
Contractarianism gradually gained prominence in the century or so after 
Leviathan. As Jeffrie G. Murphy (1978: 65) writes, it became the “domi-
nant intellectual model which provided the structure of social and politi-
cal thought in the 18th Century.” It had important effects on practical 
politics, even receiving mention in the U.S. Declaration of Independence. 
Lockean property theory (not yet necessarily “propertarianism”) also 
increased in popularity. According to Gauthier (1979: 36), “the emer-
gence of possessive individualists from their wanderings in the wilder-
ness of the state of nature into the promised land of civil society is the 
great theme of moral and political thinkers in the developmental era of 
our capitalist society.”
The Hobbesian hypothesis rose in prominence as well. Adam Smith 
was clearly infl uenced by Locke’s day-laborer comparison, writing:
the accommodation of an European prince does not always so 
much exceed that of an industrious and frugal peasant, as the 
accommodation of the latter exceeds that of many an African 
king, the absolute masters of the lives and liberties of ten thou-
sand naked savages. (Smith 1976: 17)
See the online appendix for more on Adam Smith.
The Hobbesian hypothesis was probably more popular than 
either contractarianism or propertarianism. Edmund Burke (2014), 
for example, objected to contractarianism because it implies that 
individuals should have a choice whether to join their state, but his 
grounds for rejecting choice relied essentially on the same Hobbesian 
hypothesis. He argued, “without . . . civil society man could not by 
any possibility arrive at the perfection of which his nature is capable.” 
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Likewise, David Hume famously made several empirical criticisms of 
contractarianism. After he rejected actual consent as the justifi cation 
for government on the empirical grounds that it didn’t exist, he wrote, 
“If the reason be asked of that obedience, which we are bound to pay 
to government, I readily answer, Because society could not otherwise 
subsist” (Hume 2011: 435; original emphasis). But that is the Hobbes-
ian hypothesis—if presumably life without society would be bad for 
everyone. Hume skips the need for consent by going directly from the 
Hobbesian hypothesis to the justifi cation of government sovereignty 
by reason of necessity. 
These examples illustrate a wide acceptance of some form of the 
Hobbesian hypothesis despite considerable disagreement about the 
nature and reality of the social contract in the justifi cation of the state. 
One of the main reasons for the consensus is the fact that mutual 
advantage theorists, which most certainly include Hume, rely on a 
comparison between life under and life outside the authority of the 
state or other institutions. The Hobbesian hypothesis is, therefore, a 
necessary component in any use of this line of thinking to justify some 
aspect of the status quo. In addition, as we discuss further below, 
Hume was a mutual advantage theorist with few substantive differ-
ences from the currently popular Kantian version of contractarian the-
ory—despite his criticism of the more literal interpretation (Murphy 
1978; Gauthier 1979; Castiglione 1994: 108). See the online appendix 
for a more detailed discussion.
The climate of the time explains why so many political philoso-
phers felt free to assert both the Hobbesian hypothesis and the vio-
lence hypothesis without the need to provide evidence. During the 
colonial period, travelers tried to outdo each other with accounts of 
the world’s most wretched peoples in the belief that the most extreme 
savage was the truest to type—“natural man,” miserable and “deviant 
from all imaginable norms” (Ellingson 2001: 127). An encyclopedia 
published in 1765 defi ned “savages” as “barbaric peoples who live 
without laws, without government, without religion, & who have no 
fi xed habitation,” and asserted, “A great part of America is popu-
lated with savages, the majority of them ferocious, & who nourish 
themselves with human fl esh” (Ellingson 2001: 161). With Native 
Americans as a prominent example, William Falconer cataloged the 
supposed deleterious effects of savage life on character, morals, intel-
lectual development, customs, and government (Ellingson 2001: 164). 
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Much of the early criticism of state-of-nature theory was misdi-
rected. Bishop John Bramhall argued in 1655 that the war of all-
against-all never existed, but he argued that it did not exist because 
governments have always existed (Schochet 1967: 427–8). According 
to Gordon J. Schochet (1967: 428–9), Bramhall apparently made “the 
presumption that the Hobbesian state of nature was intended as an 
actual historical account of man’s prepolitical condition.” Bramhall 
didn’t seem interested in contradicting the counterfactual claim that 
statelessness would be terrible if it did happened. 
Hobbesian empirical claims had a few critics during the seven-
teenth and eighteenth centuries. Lord Shaftesbury (1900: 83) and the 
Baron de Montesquieu (2001: 20–1, 24n2) both voiced skepticism at 
least about the violence hypothesis (Gill 2011). But the skeptics were 
easily ignored. See the online appendix for more detailed discussions 
of Shaftesbury and Montesquieu.
Strangely, the literature over the Hobbesian hypothesis reveals 
virtually no debate. A large group asserts it. A smaller group denies 
it. Neither side seems interested in settling the dispute by examining 
empirical evidence. A third group is interested in the evidence without 
being interested in how the Hobbesian hypothesis is used in political 
philosophy. 
This chapter focuses on three philosophers. Section 1 shows how 
Immanuel Kant replaced Hobbes’s literal consent with rational con-
sent but relied heavily on the violence hypothesis. Section 2 shows that 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau—an opponent of Hobbes in many ways—was 
neither a supporter nor an opponent of the Hobbesian hypothesis. 
Section 3 shows that Thomas Paine made a strong argument against 
the hypothesis.
1. IMMANUEL KANT
Immanuel Kant (1996) is usually credited with originating the now-
dominant version of contractarianism, which uses hypothetical rather 
than actual consent as its basis. This modifi cation removed much of 
the empirical baggage that troubled Hume about Hobbesian contrac-
tarianism. Some writers, such as Howard Williams (1994: 135), have 
hoped that “Kant provides us with a social contract theory shorn of 
all its empirical trimmings,” but this section shows that Kant freed 
contractarianism from some but not all empirical claims. 
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Kant was clearer than Hobbes or Locke that the social contract is not 
a historical document, and he went farther, dropping actual consent from 
the theory (Riley 2006: 347; D’Agostino et al. 2011); and arguing that 
the existence of the contract cannot be verifi ed by observation (Williams 
1994: 134–5; Rauscher 2012). Patrick Riley (2006: 347; emphasis added) 
writes, “Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau said that people do consent to the 
state. Kant said laws must be such that rational men could consent to 
them.” And, “Kant, in short, makes contractarianism hypothetical: actual 
consent is not involved” (Riley 1973: 558). Gauthier (1979: 50) argues 
that recognition of the need for hypothetical consent refl ects the Kantian 
idea of the intrinsic value of each individual. Thus, hypothetical consent 
replaces actual consent in the role of protecting disadvantaged individu-
als from subservience and exploitation to powerful self-interested people 
(Hampton 1988: 95; Sorell 2007: 150–1).
As Chapter 3 argued, hypothetical-consent theory needs to pro-
vide something other than agreement to oblige people to obey the 
contract. In that role, Kant offered his “categorical imperative” (the 
responsibility to behave consistently with universalizable moral rules). 
The hypothetical contract device shows people what it is moral to do; 
the categorical imperative obliges them to do what is moral. While 
the laws are obliged to take a form that people could consent to, the 
reasons they are obliged to act as if they consented have nothing to do 
with willful agreement (Rauscher 2012).
The purely hypothetical agreement allowed Kant to imagine nego-
tiators motivated by a moral ethos to create public standards of ethics 
that are good for everyone (Cudd 2013). In Murphy’s words:
According to Kant, the only coercive social rules that are mor-
ally . . . justifi ed are those which a group of ideal rational beings 
could agree to adopt in the hypothetical position of having to 
pick social rules and practices to govern their relations with 
each other. (Murphy 1978: 73)
People are imagined to be equally placed with a veto over proposals 
before them (Gauthier 1991: 50), but they only exercise their veto 
if their objection is consistent with ethical rules that apply equally 
to everyone. Parasitic or arbitrarily self-interested objections are not 
imagined. In our terminology, intransigents can be coerced into join-
ing (Rauscher 2012).
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Many contemporary scholars describe this kind of contractarian-
ism as the effort to fi nd principles that can be justifi ed to all reason-
able people with a similar ethical motivation (Riley 1973; Scanlon 
1998: 4–5, 187; Cudd 2013). As D’Agostino et al. (2011) put it, 
“posing the problem of justifi cation in terms of a deliberative or a 
bargaining problem is a heuristic: the real issue is ‘the problem of 
justifi cation’—what principles can be justifi ed to all reasonable citi-
zens or persons.”
Kant differs from most of the later hypothetical contract theorists 
in that he used a different—and perhaps extra-weak—proviso. How-
ever, he bypassed the weak version of the Hobbesian hypothesis only 
by relying on another empirical claim that is so implausible that most 
contemporary philosophers reject it, even if they otherwise support 
Kantian contractarianism. Kant claimed that only a sovereign gov-
ernment is capable of establishing a moral society (Riley 1973: 558; 
Williams 1994: 133). Governments are not always moral, but without 
them to settle disputes there is no hope to create the moral system 
necessary for a moral society. The government is justifi ed by its poten-
tial rather than by its current treatment of individuals. Therefore, in 
a sense, Kant requires neither “reference to history nor to any actual 
conditions where a contract might be taken to be effective” (Williams 
1994: 135). Any empirical comparison between the welfare of people 
in state society and people in the state of nature is irrelevant. Even 
if you are worse off under the state, your only hope of entering a 
moral society is to obey the state and hope things improve. Therefore, 
you are morally obliged to obey even if you do not consent (Williams 
1994: 137–40), and even if it makes you worse off (Rauscher 2012). 
The state is obliged by the categorical imperative to improve, but even 
if it doesn’t, the people are still obliged to obey, because supposedly, 
their only hope of improvement is through the state.
Kant’s reliance on moral potential doesn’t get rid of the need for 
any empirical comparison; it merely changes the nature of the com-
parison from one about current treatment to one about moral poten-
tial. Essentially his version of the argument is:
P1: Lockean proviso: people are obliged to obey state authority, 
if only states have the potential to build a moral society.
P2: Hobbesian hypothesis: only states have this potential.
C: People are obliged to obey state authority.
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Yet, Kant presented little or no evidence that moral potential is absent 
in stateless societies. According to Williams (1994: 133), “Kant is 
less inclined to present the individual state of nature as an observed 
reality but . . . From the moral viewpoint the state of nature (wher-
ever it occurs) is an inferior condition and has to be surpassed.” This 
“inclination” is the kind of equivocation we have complained about 
throughout. The state of nature either is or is not observable reality. An 
argument based on a real state of nature is different from an argument 
based on a fi ctional state of nature. If Kant were to go beyond inclina-
tion to an outright denial that the state of nature has any observable 
reality, he would need an argument to explain why the comparison 
with a nonexistent alternative is more reasonable than the comparison 
with real statelessness. If he were simply to defi ne moral potential as 
something that only exists in state society, he would sink into tautol-
ogy, as discussed in Chapter 3. We do not think Kant intended either 
of these two erroneous strategies. 
Instead Kant presented very Hobbesian claims about the state of 
nature, implying that it is a part of observable reality. Without a sov-
ereign to settle disputes, the state of nature is a war of all-against-all 
(Baynes 1989: 446; Rauscher 2012), in which people cannot establish 
rights or moral rules (Williams 1994: 133), and cannot realize their 
freedom (Rauscher 2012). This argument relies heavily on the vio-
lence hypothesis and makes strong empirical predictions about people 
in stateless societies. If Kant’s version of the Hobbesian hypothesis is 
true, observations of people in stateless societies will show a war that 
makes it impossible for them to secure rights, freedom, or recognized 
moral rules. While Hobbes’s and Locke’s justifi cations of the state can 
be adequately sustained by the observation that people in state societ-
ies have higher welfare, Kant’s version seems to rest more heavily on 
the violence hypothesis, making his version more easily falsifi able than 
either of theirs. Perhaps there could be some other reason why stateless 
societies have no moral potential, but it would be a tricky business for 
a Kantian to prove the absence of moral potential without some clear 
impediment like the war of all-against-all. One would have to show 
not only that all stateless societies are inconsistent with any applica-
tion of the categorical imperative but also that they can never apply 
the categorical imperative. Kant apparently had racist views that made 
him ready to believe that many indigenous peoples were incapable of 
morality (Rauscher 2012), but it will not take much observation of 
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stateless peoples to falsify this belief. Although Kant’s hypothetical ver-
sion of contract theory is incredibly valuable, his attempt to revise the 
Hobbesian hypothesis is not worthy of further attention.
2. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU
Jean-Jacques Rousseau is often portrayed as the most extreme critic 
of the Hobbesian state of nature, but he was neither a supporter nor 
a critic of the Hobbesian hypothesis as we defi ne it. Rousseau’s and 
Hobbes’s defi nitions of the state of nature are so different that they are 
hardly comparable. The two did not identify the same situation and 
disagree about its characteristics. They identifi ed different situations 
and gave them the same name. 
Although government, morality, and society are absent in both ver-
sions of the state of nature, Hobbes (1962 [1651]: 98) defi ned it as the 
absence of government and argued that the other two characteristics 
follow. He did so to examine whether people inherently need govern-
ment. Society doesn’t exist in his state of nature only because war 
makes it impossible for people to maintain a stable society. Hobbes’s 
belief that “natural man” stripped of the gentility of “civilized man” 
appeared in the state of nature was incidental. It had no bearing on 
his argument at all.
Rousseau (1984: 67–71, 78, 81–3, 99–100) defi ned the state of 
nature as the absence of society and argued that the other two charac-
teristics followed. He did so to examine what he believed was a truly 
natural state—the absence not only of government but also of society, 
socialization, and social interaction—to bring out what he believed to 
be a true picture of “natural man.” He challenged Enlightenment-era 
beliefs about natural man by arguing that people living off the land 
without any social interaction would have little to fi ght over and little 
motivation to fi ght. According to Hoekstra (2007: 119), “Montesquieu 
and Rousseau mount the infl uential related criticism that the portrait 
Hobbes purports to provide of natural man instead represents social-
ized man, and that the miseries he describes are those of human soci-
ety rather than of the natural condition.” Hobbes portrayed people as 
naturally in confl ict and argued that social institutions were civilizing. 
Rousseau portrayed human nature as peaceful and argued that social 
institutions—at least the ones we have—are corrupting (Rousseau 
1984: 101–2; MacIntyre 1998: 117).
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Rousseau’s disagreement with Hobbes over human nature has lim-
ited relevance to Hobbes’s argument for the state. The primary cause 
of confl ict in the Hobbesian state of nature is not the violent nature 
of people, but the danger of unmediated confl ict. Both Macpherson 
(1962: 22) and Ryan (1996: 218) agree that Hobbes’s state of nature 
does not need to set aside the socially acquired aspects of human 
nature.
Rousseau (1994: 59–60) gives no special position to anarchy in his 
justifi cation of the state. All societies—with or without government—
have to be justifi ed against the complete absence of society. He does so 
by arguing that a properly constituted society can replace the “natural 
freedom” people experience in his state of nature with the “civil free-
dom” available in a properly constituted state. No state yet delivers 
his conception of civil freedom, and so no states are yet justifi ed in his 
terms. These arguments don’t concern us very much.
Despite Rousseau’s belief that human nature is peaceful in a nonso-
cial situation, he could and apparently did concede Hobbes’s violence 
hypothesis as it pertains to stateless societies:
As soon as men learned to value one another . . . revenge 
became terrible, and men grew bloodthirsty and cruel. This 
is precisely the stage reached by most of the savage peoples 
known to us; and it is for lack of having suffi ciently distin-
guished between different ideas and seen how far those peo-
ples already are from the fi rst state of nature that so many 
authors have hastened to conclude that man is naturally cruel 
and needs civil institutions to make him peaceable. (Rousseau 
1994: 114–15; emphasis added) 
This passage concedes that situations that are both stateless and social 
can be intolerably violent. Rousseau might have been unaware that 
even if these groups didn’t fi t his defi nition of the state of nature, they 
fi t Hobbes’s defi nition of the state of nature. But in any case, Rousseau 
could make this concession because his disagreement with Hobbes 
hinged not on the attributes of stateless societies but on the moral 
value of civil freedom. Because his criticism is not aimed directly at 
the Hobbesian hypothesis, we list him neither as a supporter nor as a 
critic of it. He and Hobbes had a strong disagreement about human 
nature, but not about the characteristics of stateless societies.
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Rousseau also concurred with Hobbes’s belief in the vast social 
and cultural superiority of state society. Rousseau (1994: 59) wrote 
that “man” in civil society has “his faculties exercised and improved, 
his ideas amplifi ed, his feelings ennobled, and his entire soul raised 
. . . which made him, not a limited and stupid animal, but an intel-
ligent being and a man.” He, like many early state-of-nature theorists 
(and some still today), gave government and/or landowners credit for 
creating society, and he seems to go farther, crediting them with sepa-
rating humans from animals.
With all of Rousseau’s negative beliefs about indigenous people, 
it’s worthwhile to consider why he became the target of Crawfurd’s 
noble savage allegation. Ter Ellingson (2001: 94–6) argues that the 
complexity of Rousseau’s understanding of native peoples and his 
unwillingness to go along with the one-dimensional treatment so pop-
ular during the colonial period made him the target of racist social sci-
entists. This claim might be true, but at least fi ve aspects of Rousseau’s 
work made him vulnerable. First, his writing could have been clearer. 
Second, he used Hobbes’s term “state of nature,” which contracta-
rians had applied to indigenous peoples. Third, although Rousseau 
might have been aware that the complete absence of society could 
not exist, he wrote about the state of nature as if it were our real past 
(MacIntyre 1998: 118; Ellingson 2001: 93). Fourth, although at times 
he made it clear that native peoples around the world do not live in 
his idyllic state of nature, he used them as examples of people close to 
it (Rousseau 1984: 82–3, 85, 87, 103, 125–6). Fifth, although his the-
ory could concede the Hobbesian hypothesis without losing any of its 
logical strength, and the statement above does so for some peoples, he 
(perhaps rightly) did not clearly concede the hypothesis for all state-
less peoples (Rousseau 1994: 114–15). And so, Crawfurd’s accusation 
stuck—and it continues to stick after 150 years. 
3. THOMAS PAINE
We have only been able to fi nd one Enlightenment-era philosopher who 
both accepted the contractarian approach and rejected the Hobbesian 
hypothesis. This person was Thomas Paine (2000), whose “fi rst prin-
ciple of civilization,” quoted in Chapter 1, puts the weak Lockean 
proviso in broad terms that fi t both propertarianism and contractari-
anism. It applies equally well to government, property rights, or other 
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social institutions one might want to justify with a mutual advantage 
principle. Paine doesn’t bother asking whether every rational, reason-
able person consents or what their history is. He asks only whether 
social institutions are mutually advantageous. If they make everyone 
better off, they pass the fi rst test toward justifi cation. If they don’t, 
they must be reformed to become justifi able.
Unlike most contractarians before and since, Paine did not use the 
weak Lockean proviso as a rubber stamp. He did not praise his society 
for the supposedly obvious fulfi llment of the proviso. He had no doubt 
that society could fulfi ll it, but he did not think that accomplishment 
was easy. The proviso was an important principle that could only be 
fulfi lled with effort. If society takes this principle seriously, it must 
examine the ways that it might fall short and remedy them. 
Paine (2000) used the proviso as a basis for social criticism, making 
specifi c allegations about how society came up short, writing, “The 
life of an Indian is a continual holiday, compared with the poor of 
Europe; and, on the other hand it appears to be abject when compared 
to the rich.” He argued that poverty is a product of “that which is 
called civilized life,” and that poverty does not exist among people 
who live outside of so-called civilization. That is, at least some state 
citizens work harder and have less to show for it than people in state-
less societies.
Thus, Paine denied the Hobbesian hypothesis that all people in 
capitalist states are better off than they would be in a society without 
government and/or private landownership. Stating his criticism in this 
way, he voiced no objection to the purely normative principles in con-
tractarian or propertarian theory; he only objected to empirical asser-
tions about the makeup of the world in which those principles apply. 
If he was right, he had a serious allegation. 
Paine didn’t present any more rigorous evidence than Hobbes 
or Locke. He referred only to casual observations about Native 
Americans and the poor in Europe. Living in a frontier society might 
have given him better information, but even if it did, he didn’t fi nd 
it necessary to cite specifi c information about them. He portrayed 
his assertions as obvious—an odd choice considering he contradicted 
150 years of nearly unanimous opinion among leading philosophers. 
Whatever the truth-value of the Hobbesian hypothesis is, it is not 
obvious. We have to look at evidence.
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4. CONCLUSION
The eighteenth-century non-debate over the Hobbesian hypothesis 
set the stage for future debates up to the present day. Hypotheti-
cal consent replaced actual consent, making contractarianism far 
more empirically plausible, without relieving it from reliance on the 
Hobbesian hypothesis. Many philosophers—even some who rejected 
contractarianism—continued to repeat the hypothesis without pro-
viding empirical support. The most discussed empirical criticisms of 
contractarianism were irrelevant questions, such as, what is the nature 
of man? And did the state originate by contract? Those few critics 
who did address the Hobbesian hypothesis were largely ignored.
Note
The online appendix includes more detailed discussions of the Hobbesian 
hypothesis in ancient political thought, Shaftesbury, Montesquieu, Smith, 
and Hume.
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Chapter 6
THE HOBBESIAN HYPOTHESIS IN NINETEENTH-
CENTURY POLITICAL THEORY
Contractarianism and propertarianism declined in prominence in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as utilitarianism became the 
dominant political theory, but assertions of the Hobbesian hypothesis 
did not go away. Skeptical empirical writers appeared now and then, 
especially toward the end of the nineteenth century. But neither the 
skeptics nor the new evidence had much apparent effect on philoso-
phers asserting the Hobbesian hypothesis.
Utilitarianism (and the broader concept, consequentialism) has 
many different forms but at the risk of oversimplifi cation, we sum-
marize it as the belief that the morality of an act or a rule depends 
entirely on whether it increases or decreases overall welfare, by mea-
suring the sum total of all of its positive and negative effects on well-
being (Kymlicka 2002: 10; Sinnott-Armstrong 2015). To summarize 
even further, the goal of utilitarianism is to maximize average well-
being. Utilitarianism, propertarianism, and contractarianism are not 
necessarily mutually exclusive, but utilitarianism can stand alone. If 
so, a justifi ed state maximizes average wellbeing, instituting whatever 
property rights system accomplishes that goal and altering it as neces-
sary to improve average welfare. 
Two features free utilitarianism from a need for a Hobbesian 
hypothesis. First, it has no natural starting point. The monistic goal of 
maximizing average wellbeing gives no special prominence to stateless 
societies. All social arrangements, including statelessness, have to be 
justifi ed against all other conceivable social arrangements by beating 
them at the goal of maximizing average utility. 
Second, utilitarianism has no proviso. It endorses unrestricted 
average utility maximization without concern for any minimum stan-
dard for particularly disadvantaged people (Kymlicka 2002: 10–52; 
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Sinnott-Armstrong 2015). Unlike contractarianism and most versions 
of propertarianism—both of which theoretically prohibit harming 
anyone—utilitarianism has no prohibition against harming some to 
further the goal of maximizing the average. Related theories, such as 
suffi cientarianism and prioritarianism, do have special concern for the 
disadvantaged, but we do not think it is accurate to consider them as 
forms of utilitarianism (Widerquist 2010a).
Critics correctly recognize that utilitarianism has an enormous 
informational problem (Kymlicka 2002: 46). Even assuming wellbe-
ing can be measured and compared interpersonally, how could one 
gather the evidence necessary to ensure the average person in arrange-
ment X is better off than the average person in all other conceivable 
arrangements? 
As common as it is to mention the informational diffi culty in utili-
tarianism, hardly anyone mentions that any theory involving a proviso 
has one too. How can we ever be sure that the least advantaged person 
is better off in arrangement X than they could be in any stateless soci-
ety? Utilitarianism’s informational diffi culty is the greater of the two, 
but at least utilitarians do not assume they’ve answered it. They call 
attention to it. They ask people to adopt the goal of maximizing aver-
age utility. Presumably anyone who accepted that goal would begin 
researching how to move toward its achievement. Contractarians and 
propertarians devote great effort to establishing the moral importance 
of the proviso, and then the vast majority of them effectively ask people 
to assume it away: the goal is already achieved; no one should demand 
evidence that it is achieved; no one should consider the informational 
diffi culties involved in achieving it. Utilitarianism is not clearly at the 
disadvantage in this informational issue. 
Many critics argue that the great moral shortcoming of utilitarian-
ism is that it ignores “the separateness of persons”; without a proviso, 
it lacks any moral limit to the sacrifi ces it might force onto some for 
the benefi t of the average (Rawls 1971: 178; Nozick 1974: 39–42; 
Cohen 2003: 239–43). Contractarianism supposedly refl ects the prin-
ciple that “morality should never demand of us that we make our-
selves ‘prey’ to others or risk the satisfaction of our desires for their 
good” (Hampton 1988: 4). And the protection against being prey is 
the proviso—at least it would be, if we took it seriously. But in the 
period up to 1800, we found only one philosopher, Thomas Paine, 
who took it as more than a rubber stamp.
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A rubber-stamp proviso—always and everywhere assumed ful-
fi lled, never in need of signifi cant evidence—can’t protect anyone 
from anything. Utilitarians have no moral prohibition against prey-
ing on people if it improves average wellbeing, but at least they call 
for an investigation of evidence to determine the effects of policy on 
everyone to determine what maximizes average wellbeing. Most pro-
viso-based theorists ostensibly have an overriding prohibition against 
preying on people, reject utilitarianism for lacking that prohibition, 
and deny any need to investigate the wellbeing of disadvantaged indi-
viduals to determine whether social arrangements do in fact prey on 
people in the relevant sense. Again, utilitarianism is not clearly at the 
disadvantage.
We do not endorse utilitarianism. Although it is relatively invul-
nerable to the subject of this narrowly focused book, other criti-
cisms of utilitarianism raise serious doubts about it as an overall 
theory of justice. However, we don’t need to discuss them here. 
The only issue for us is what utilitarianism says about statelessness. 
A utilitarian justifi cation of state society relative to statelessness 
would be a much easier requirement than the fulfi llment of the 
proviso. The utilitarian would only have to compare the average 
person in state society with the average person in a stateless society. 
At the time of Hobbes, Locke, and Kant, states might even have 
failed this test (see Chapter 10), but it is probably fulfi lled for all 
or most contemporary state societies. Utilitarianism’s dominance 
in the nineteenth century did not stop people from asserting the 
Hobbesian hypothesis. See the appendix for a more detailed discus-
sion of utilitarianism.
Although G. W. F. Hegel was neither a contractarian nor a prop-
ertarian, he asserted the Hobbesian hypothesis both in terms of the 
state and of the property rights system. For example, in the Hobbes-
ian sense, he wrote, “The characteristic of man as rational is to 
live in a state; if there is no state, reason claims that one should be 
founded. . . . it is absolutely necessary for every one to be in a state” 
(Hegel 2001: 78, §75). See the online appendix for more on Hegel.
Frédéric Bastiat (1996: xxxii, 4, 61, 201, 206, 212–16) was a 
French propertarian who repeatedly asserted the Hobbesian hypoth-
esis in the most explicit empirical terms as a comparison of the lives of 
the least advantaged people in a capitalist state with those of people 
in a stateless society. For example, Bastiat wrote:
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Workers, I promise to prove that you do enjoy the fruits of the 
land that you do not own, and with less pain and effort on your 
part than you could cultivate them by your own labor on land 
given you in its original state. (Bastiat 1996: xxxiii)
Unlike most people who have asserted the hypothesis, Bastiat dedicated 
several pages of empirical argument to support it. Building on Locke’s 
day-laborer example, he attempted to show that everyone could obtain 
more food, clothing, and transportation in nineteenth-century France 
than anyone could at the “dawn of civilization.” For example, using 
wage and price statistics, Bastiat argued:
humanity, as represented by its most backward element, the 
day laborer, obtains . . . three hundred liters of wheat . . . the 
value of his subsistence with forty-fi ve to sixty days out of 
his year’s labor. . . . to determine whether or not progress has 
been achieved and, if so, measure it, we must ask ourselves 
what this same ratio was on the day that men fi rst made their 
appearance. . . . [Imagining the laborer dropped into a virgin 
wood, Bastiat supposes] he would not raise one hundred liters 
of wheat every two years. (Bastiat 1996: 212–13)
Bastiat (1996: 212) might strike the reader as unfair for representing 
“the dawn of society” with a nineteenth-century city dweller thrust 
into the woods with no prior knowledge of hunting, gathering, or 
subsistence farming and without a band to work with. Bastiat made 
no effort at all to research the lifestyles of people who live without the 
property institutions he seeks to support. But he is valuable because 
he avoids the ambiguity that affects most propertarians and contrac-
tarians. His plain-language philosophy makes clear: the Hobbesian 
hypothesis is an empirical claim about the relative welfare of the least 
advantaged people in capitalist states and people in stateless societies, 
and it is subject to verifi cation or falsifi cation by empirical investi-
gation. He removes the suggestion that the Hobbesian hypothesis is 
either obviously true or somehow beyond empirical investigation. 
Henry David Thoreau’s (1971) book, Walden, was not aimed at 
contractarianism or propertarianism, but it certainly contradicted the 
Hobbesian hypothesis. It attempted to show by direct demonstration 
that people could live more simply and easily outside of contemporary 
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capitalism. Herbert Spencer (1960: 176) referred directly to Hobbes 
as he criticized the violence hypothesis: “there are some small uncivi-
lized societies in which, without any ‘common power to keep them all 
in awe,’ men maintain peace and harmony better than it is maintained 
in societies where such a power exists.” Spencer included a citation 
to verify his quote of Hobbes, but none to support his claims about 
uncivilized societies. Thus, Spencer provides another example of the 
lack of attention to evidence displayed by both sides on this issue. See 
the online appendix for more detailed discussions of Spencer.
Henry George’s (1879: §06) position was similar to Paine’s and 
Spencer’s with the added insight that the loss of independence was the 
main disadvantage for a worker in a capitalist state relative to some-
one in “a savage tribe.” Living in the post-Crawfurd world, George 
felt compelled to explain that he was not “romanticizing” the noble 
savage by writing, “I am no sentimental admirer of the savage state,” 
before he wrote:
there are in the heart of our civilization large classes with whom 
the veriest savage could not afford to exchange. . . . if, standing 
on the threshold of being, one were given the choice of enter-
ing life as a Tierra del Fuegan, a black fellow of Australia, an 
Esquimau in the Arctic Circle, or among the lowest classes in 
such a highly civilized country as Great Britain, he would make 
infi nitely the better choice in selecting the lot of the savage. 
For those classes who in the midst of wealth are condemned to 
want, suffer all the privations of the savage, without his sense 
of personal freedom; they are condemned to more than his nar-
rowness and littleness, without opportunity for the growth of 
his rude virtues; if their horizon is wider, it is but to reveal bless-
ings that they cannot enjoy. (George 1879: §08)
George presented detailed information about the lives of people in 
state societies and little about the lives of people on the other side of 
his comparison. But at least he did not portray his fi ndings as obvious, 
writing, “I challenge the production from any authentic accounts of 
savage life of such descriptions of degradation as are to be found in 
offi cial documents of highly civilized countries” (George 1879: §09). 
See the online appendix for more detailed discussions of George.
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Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels were far more engaged with anthro-
pology and other empirical sciences than most philosophers. Although 
their portrayal of stateless societies was unfl attering, their portrayal 
of life for many people in capitalist states was bleak (Marx 1887 
[1867]; Marx 1993; Marx and Engels 1994 [1848]; Engels 2005). 
They presented empirical evidence that poor people in capitalist states 
were often miserable (Marx and Engels 1994 [1848]; Engels 2005) 
and Marx’s (1959) theory of alienation added a theory of psychologi-
cal misery to their observations of material poverty. They also cited 
anthropological evidence that stateless peoples are not as miserable as 
usually assumed (Engels 2004 [1884]), but they never connected that 
information to an attack on the theoretical conclusions of contractari-
anism or propertarianism.
Putting these claims together, one can draw the inference that 
nineteenth-century capitalist society was mixed at best and perhaps 
substantially worse for some individuals relative to stateless societies. 
But Marx and Engels did not put the pieces together in this way. They 
were more interested in building up their own applied theories than 
in entering an existing abstract philosophical debate on its own terms, 
and apparently so were most of their successors. If any later Marxian 
philosopher criticized the Hobbesian hypothesis, it had little impact on 
the contractarian and propertarian literature reviewed below. See the 
online appendix for a more detailed discussion of Marx and Engels.
In the late nineteenth century, many non-Marxist political theorists 
also began moving away from abstract to empirical theory, eventually 
leading to the split between “political philosophy” and “political sci-
ence.” John Robert Seeley (1896: 1, 4), Henry Sidgwick (1966: 240), 
and Henry Sumner Maine (1861: 90–1, 114–19) all contradicted 
Hobbes and Locke at least partly on empirical grounds, but distanced 
themselves from abstract normative philosophy. Seeley (1896: 28) dis-
missed Hobbes and Locke as “political speculators,” but he did not 
address their specifi c claims about the state of nature.
Sidgwick’s (1966: xii, 348–72, especially 353–5, 365, 372) discus-
sion of Hobbes’s and Locke’s states of nature was more concerned 
with the irrelevant question of how the state originated than with 
the relevant claim we call the Hobbesian hypothesis. He described 
Hobbes’s view of the miserable state of nature as a “half truth,” but 
he did not present evidence against it. Like Seeley, his concern with 
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Hobbes and Locke was primarily with their abstract methodology 
rather than with the truth or falsity of their claims.
Of the three, Maine most clearly called out Hobbes and Locke for 
empirical errors. Referring to them, he wrote:
Their originators carefully observed the institutions of their own 
age . . ., but, when they turned their attention to archaic states 
of society which exhibited much superfi cial difference from their 
own, they uniformly ceased to observe and began guessing. . . . 
One does not certainly see why such a scientifi c solecism should 
be more defensible in jurisprudence than in any other region of 
thought. (Maine 1861: 119)
Maine called for an investigation, but he did not conduct one himself. 
Ultimately, all three of them attacked Hobbes and Locke for their 
abstract methodology rather than for their foray into empiricism with 
the Hobbesian hypothesis. In Maine’s (1861: 86–7) words, which 
Sidgwick (1903: 380) later quoted to endorse, their methodology was 
“that Historical Method before which the Law of Nature has never 
maintained its footing for an instant.” See the online appendix for a 
more detailed discussion of Seeley, Sidgwick, and Maine.
Peter Kropotkin was the one nineteenth-century philosopher who 
conducted a relevant empirical investigation and at least partly applied 
it to the debate in question. According to Alan Barnard (2004b: 5), 
“The fi rst thing Kropotkin does is to dispel the Hobbesian notion 
that primitive life was one of ‘war of each against all.’” Of course, 
Kropotkin (2011: 204–5) made the obligatory post-Crawfurdian dis-
claimer: “In the last century the ‘savage’ and his ‘life in the state of 
nature’ were idealized. But now men of science . . . began to charge 
the savage with all imaginable ‘bestial’ features. . . . this exaggeration 
is even more unscientifi c than Rousseau’s idealization.”
Drawing on a wide variety of sources from anthropology, history, and 
archaeology on contemporary stateless societies, historically observed 
stateless societies, and Paleolithic societies, Kropotkin remarked on 
how wrong Western characterizations of violent savages are: 
When fi rst meeting with primitive races, the Europeans usually 
make a caricature of their life; but when an intelligent man has 
stayed among them for a longer time, he generally describes 
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them as the “kindest” or “the gentlest” race on the earth. These 
very same words have been applied to the Ostyaks, the Samo-
yedes, the Eskimos, the Dayaks, the Aleoutes, the Papuas, and 
so on, by the highest authorities. I also remember having read 
them applied to the Tunguses, the Tchuktchis, the Sioux, and 
several others. The very frequency of that high commendation 
already speaks volumes in itself. (Kropotkin 2011: 175) 
Kropotkin added similar observations about the “Bushmen,” the 
“Hottentots,” and the natives of Australia. He did not connect his 
observations as closely with the Hobbesian hypothesis as he did with 
the violence hypothesis. He showed that many stateless societies suc-
ceeded in establishing cooperative society, maintaining peace, and 
providing mutual aid, but he made no welfare comparison between 
people in state and stateless societies. See the online appendix for a 
more detailed discussion of Kropotkin.
These nineteenth-century philosophers raised doubts about the 
Hobbesian hypothesis and the violence hypothesis. Although most 
of them did not apply their empirical fi ndings to the contractarian 
and propertarian arguments that rely on these claims, one might have 
expected some response. Yet, our search of the literature found none. 
The relevance of their fi ndings is simply ignored in debates over these 
theories.
The increasing specialization of the academic disciplines probably 
helps explain why. The empirical arguments of these theorists were 
taken up by the more empirical disciplines, such as anthropology, 
sociology, economics, and political science, none of which involved 
debates over the Lockean proviso. As disciplines became increasingly 
specialized, and there was less overlap between normative and posi-
tive theorists, it became easier for normative theorists to pass on the 
Hobbesian hypothesis even as empirical research uncovered more sub-
stantial evidence against it. 
Note
The online appendix has more detailed discussions of utilitarianism, Hegel, 
Friedrich Nietzsche, Thoreau, Spencer, George, Marx, Engels, Emile Durkheim, 
Maine, Seeley, Sidgwick, and Kropotkin.
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Chapter 7
THE HOBBESIAN HYPOTHESIS IN 
CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL THEORY
Contractarianism and propertarianism didn’t completely go away 
during the years that utilitarianism dominated political theory, and 
certainly the Hobbesian hypothesis and the violence hypothesis 
remained widely believed. But these topics gained renewed attention 
as utilitarianism declined in prominence starting in the mid-twentieth 
century. For simplicity, we use the word “contemporary” to refer to 
the period after about 1950. 
Contemporary political philosophy addresses a wide range of 
issues, but various versions of contractarianism and related theories 
dominate the discussion of political obligations, and arguments for 
and against propertarianism dominate discussions of property. There-
fore, theories relying on a Lockean proviso and an accompanying ver-
sion of the Hobbesian hypothesis play a large role in contemporary 
political philosophy.
This chapter shows that contemporary political theory has a wide 
but unexamined consensus in favor of the Hobbesian hypothesis. The-
orists tend to divide into two camps. One side believes that the weak 
version of the Lockean proviso is high enough to justify the institution 
in question and that it is fulfi lled. The other side believes that the pro-
viso is not high enough; a stronger standard is ethically required; and 
that standard (whatever it is) has not been fulfi lled. Therefore the dis-
agreement over the proviso occurs almost entirely in the area of pure 
normative theory (how high should the standard be?) and against the 
presumed empirical background that the weak proviso has been ful-
fi lled, while strong versions have not. Few on either side call attention 
to that tacit presumption or to the lack of evidence presented to affi rm 
that it refl ects reality.
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This chapter reveals that some of those affi rming the hypothesis 
clearly assert that their claims about the state of nature include possibil-
ities of people living by their own efforts as—say—a hunter-gatherer or 
a subsistence farmer. None clearly rules out that interpretation of their 
state of nature. None argues against that interpretation or the relevance 
of that comparison in favor of an extra-weak proviso or for a purely a 
priori justifi cation of the state without any empirical claims. 
The aura of an unspoken consensus around the weak Hobbesian 
hypothesis has allowed people asserting it to be less clear about its 
exact meaning and to present less supporting evidence than Bastiat, 
Locke, or Hobbes did centuries ago. We have found no empirical 
refutations of Paine, George, Kropotkin, or the other skeptics men-
tioned in this book. As critics are ignored, the Hobbesian hypothesis 
might gain credibility merely from how often and how long it has been 
repeated. As the available evidence on this issue has increased, philo-
sophical interest in that evidence has decreased. 
Section 1 discusses the role of the Hobbesian hypothesis in con-
temporary contractarian and related theories of political obligation. 
Section 2 discusses its role in propertarian theory. Section 3 discusses the 
few contemporary critics who address the empirical aspects of the weak 
Hobbesian hypothesis. Section 4 concludes by relating these several 
chapters of literature review to the need for an empirical investigation.
1. CONTEMPORARY CONTRACTARIANISM 
AND ITS OFFSHOOTS
The consensus view, in which the weak proviso is fulfi lled but stronger 
versions remain unfulfi lled, appears even in The Stanford Encyclopedia 
of Philosophy’s entry on “Contemporary Approaches to the Social Con-
tract.” The authors, Fred D’Agostino, Gerald Gaus, and John Thrasher 
(2011), drawing on Russell Hardin, write, “If the parties are simply 
considering whether government is better than anarchy, they will opt 
for just about any government, because ‘life under government’ is, from 
the perspective of everyone, better than ‘life under anarchy.’” That is, 
the weak proviso is fulfi lled, but why should it be enough? Why not 
demand the best out of all possible governments rather than just any 
government that beats anarchy? Hardin (2003: 43) criticizes Hobbes’s 
answer, writing, “Hobbes supposes that the transition from an extant 
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government to a new form of government would be too costly to justify 
any improvement it might bring. . . . Here, an unduly confi dent social-
scientifi c claim secures commitment to an actual government.” Thus, 
although they reject the social-scientifi c claim that it is too costly to 
move from one government to another, these four philosophers do not 
question the social-scientifi c claim that government really is better than 
anarchy—“from the perspective of everyone.” That is the pattern we 
see over and over again: some say the weak proviso is enough; some 
demand a stronger proviso; but few question the claim that the weak 
proviso is fulfi lled.
James Buchanan (1975: 8) draws on Crawfurd’s language in a clearly 
empirical assertion of the Hobbesian hypothesis, writing, “it is essen-
tial to examine carefully the properties of anarchy as an organizational 
system in the absence of the idealized individual behavior that is charac-
teristic in the utopias of anarchy’s romantic advocates.” But his analysis 
of the stability of anarchic equilibrium is purely a priori. He makes no 
effort to show that his model refl ects the reality of statelessness any bet-
ter than those of “anarchy’s romantic advocates” (1975: 5–9).
John Zvesper (1984; 1993), who is strictly neither a Hobbesian 
nor a Lockean, accepts the fulfi llment of the Lockean proviso as 
obvious, writing:
The most promising way to refute Locke’s account of the con-
straints on consent is not to argue that it is implausible because 
it results in material injustice (unless one is prepared to argue 
that the poorest workers in developed economies are not mate-
rially wealthier than the richest primitives). (Zvesper 1984: 60)
This quote takes for granted that the poorest workers are materially 
wealthier than the richest “primitives” and assumes no one would be 
prepared to argue against that hypothesis, but Zvesper presents no 
supporting evidence, apparently assuming even his opponents share 
this prejudice.
David Gauthier (1991: 25, 208) uses contract theory primarily to 
justify morality, but he also uses it to justify both state sovereignty and 
property rights. He is not interested in whether people actually agree 
to the social contract or even if they would under idealized circum-
stances, but his theory is contractarian in the sense that the state, the 
moral system, and/or the property rights regime must benefi t individu-
als enough that they could agree. Thus, the agreement to Gauthier’s 
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contract is hypothetical, but the conditions that motivate the agree-
ment are empirical, and the condition that motivates agreement is the 
supposed fulfi llment of the Lockean proviso.
Gauthier affi rms the Hobbesian hypothesis, writing:
Rousseau . . . ignores the positive and progressive benefi ts that 
even an unequal society can effect. Thus he represents the situation 
of the poor as being actually worsened as a consequence of the new 
power relationships that society institutes. But . . . Each person may 
reasonably expect to do better as a consequence of the benefi ts of 
the market and co-operative interaction, even if these benefi ts are 
not fairly or equitably distributed. (Gauthier 1986: 320) 
In the fi rst part of this passage Gauthier indicates that claims about the 
state of nature can be empirically right or wrong and that Rousseau 
was empirically wrong to suppose any people in his state were worse 
off. The second part states that people are better off even in societ-
ies that unfairly or inequitably distribute their benefi ts. The passage 
seems to be a straightforward empirical affi rmation of the Hobbesian 
hypothesis as a claim about people in real stateless societies. Societies 
do institute “new power relationships” and “the market.” There was 
a time before the relevant power relationships came into being. If it 
were a claim about a fi ctional statelessness and/or marketlessness, how 
could Rousseau be wrong about it? Certainly Rousseau has the same 
license to write fi ction as anyone else?
Gauthier’s (1969: 164) confi dence in this statement is closely 
related to his statement about how bad the state of nature must be: 
“The question is not whether civil society is unpleasant, but whether 
it is less pleasant than some possible alternative.” For Gauthier, that 
alternative is a society without property rights or sovereign govern-
ment. He provides no evidence of what life in such societies is actually 
like. He assumes readers will accept his premise without demanding 
any such evidence. That is, he assumes they share the prejudice that 
allowed Hobbes to assert the hypothesis 350 years ago.
Jean Hampton (1988: 4, 256) attempts to show how social con-
tract theory can justify the state without any literal contract, using 
an agreement that is “hypothetical and yet justifi cational.” As in 
Gauthier, the agreement is hypothetical, but the conditions that make 
it justifi cational are real, and one of those conditions is the Hobbesian 
hypothesis, which Hampton affi rms for very Hobbesian reasons:
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Primarily because too many of them reason badly, human beings 
are unable to cooperate in a state of nature, making it a state 
of virtual total war but they are not so contentious that if they 
were in a commonwealth they would be unable to agree on how 
well any ruler who might be governing them was doing . . . A 
ruler with great power is necessary to end the warfare in the 
state of nature. (Hampton 1988: 247) 
She adds, “one of the most important sources of chaos and violence 
in the state of nature is the failure of people in that state to keep con-
tractual promises” (Hampton 1988: 268).
Hampton (1988: 271–2) does not—as far as we are aware—
explicitly say that the state of nature she has in mind is or includes 
actual stateless societies, but she is logically committed to it. She 
makes a universal claim about a dichotomy: there is either a “ruler 
with great power” or “warfare in the state of nature.” Clearly she 
means this claim to be taken as a statement of empirical reality, or 
it could not support her conclusion that rational people have “a 
certain compelling reason” that “is (or should be) our reason either 
for creating government if one does not exist or for maintaining 
it in power if it does.” She offers only theoretical, not empirical, 
support for this statement, but it is a statement about the world 
that is capable of being true or false. If it is true, then all stateless 
situations will have unacceptable violence. Therefore, we conclude 
that Hampton is committed to the Hobbesian hypothesis as a literal, 
empirical claim about all stateless societies.
Gregory S. Kavka (1986: 24) endorses both the Hobbesian and 
Lockean versions of the proviso, and makes clear that they are empiri-
cal claims, writing, “the absence of reliable interpersonal cooperation 
is as important a negative feature of anarchy, for Hobbes and in fact, 
as is the presence of violent confl ict.” He admits that he uses a hypo-
thetical state of nature to reveal empirical truth, because he believes 
relevant observational evidence is diffi cult if not impossible to obtain. 
Therefore, although he uses an a priori method, Kavka (1986: 84) 
makes it clear that he has not used purely fact-independent reason-
ing, writing, “if the individuals of the theory resemble real persons in 
enough important respects, their interaction patterns in the state of 
nature might provide considerable insight concerning how real people 
would be likely to behave in similar circumstances.”
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With this awareness of the empirical implications of his reason, 
Kavka makes extensive theoretical arguments that violence must exist 
in the state of nature to support his conclusion that the state of nature 
forces people to agree to the social contract:
it could be suggested that the parties are compelled to reach 
agreement, since return to the state of nature is their alternative. 
And this is, in a sense, true. But . . . The parties are not unfree 
with respect to one another; none can coerce others to accept 
unfair or unreasonable terms of agreement. All are forced to 
compromise and accept less than they might wish because of the 
necessity to reach agreement. But this sort of pressure, when it 
applies equally (or approximately equally) to each, does not call 
the fairness or morality of the outcome into question; it simply 
refl ects a Hobbesian fact about the human condition—that the 
State and (a high risk of) insecurity and poverty are exhaustive 
alternatives. (Kavka 1986: 402–3) 
Kavka (1986: 24, 193) uses a “fair play” justifi cation to argue for 
a higher standard of treatment than that implied by the weak Lock-
ean proviso, but the above quote is an explicitly fact-based argument 
that the weak proviso is fulfi lled. See the online appendix for a more 
detailed discussion of Kavka.
George Klosko (2004: 4–5) sets out to ground political obligation 
on H. L. A. Hart’s principle of fairness, in which people are obliged to 
contribute to the state if they share its benefi ts, and if they specifi cally 
require a state to provide those benefi ts. Klosko affi rms the empirical 
nature of the Hobbesian hypothesis (see Chapter 3), and just as clearly 
asserts its truth: 
If someone fi nds life in a Hobbesian state of nature accept-
able, she will not choose to enter civil society and might not 
have political obligations. . . . One of my governing assump-
tions throughout this study is that the overwhelming majority 
of inhabitants of modern societies do not prefer to live in the 
woods or some remote outpost. (Klosko 2004: 8, 19)
This is about as clear a statement as one could make of the Hobbes-
ian hypothesis as an empirical claim comparing the welfare of people 
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in state societies with the welfare of people who live outside state 
authority by hunting, gathering, or some other means. It also it pro-
vides an empirical test of state legitimacy. If disadvantaged people are 
so much better off than they would be living in the woods in some 
remote outpost that none of them would choose to do so, the political 
obligations imposed by government are justifi ed—subject to the other 
principles of the theory, such as fair distribution. If not, the govern-
ment remains unjustifi ed. Klosko’s test has problems, but we discuss 
it further in Chapter 10. See the online appendix for more on Klosko.
Dudley Knowles argues that unanimous consent might not be pos-
sible, even though he assumes that the Hobbesian hypothesis is true:
There will be the citizens who will reject the arguments from 
fairness on the grounds that they do not seek any benefi ts from 
the state however many benefi ts are foisted upon them. . . . If 
this avowal is sincere, I do not see that they should feel grate-
ful for what they describe as a moral burden notwithstanding 
the truth of the claim that it derives from a material benefi t. 
(Knowles 2009: 144)
Knowles (2009: 144) recognizes that the lack of gratitude on the part 
of these individuals empirically limits political obligation, as he writes, 
“how far they extend is a matter of fact.” But he does not mention 
the possibility that people might not actually receive benefi ts from the 
state. This claim must be empirical as well. We don’t see a way that a 
claim about the “truth” of “material benefi t” can be anything other 
than an empirical claim. His seems to have such a strong presumption 
in favor of the Hobbesian hypothesis that he feels no need to consider 
whether the state might fail to foist benefi ts on people. See the online 
appendix for more on Knowles.
Christopher Heath Wellman (2001), writing in the journal Ethics, 
literally repeats the prejudices of Hobbes and Locke. Wellman rejects 
consent theory for what he calls “samaritanism,” but it too relies on the 
Hobbesian hypothesis, which he states in Hobbesian terms: “The advan-
tages of political society are so great because life in the state of nature is 
so horrible.” In support, Wellman (2001: 742) writes, “Hobbes, Locke, 
and Kant offered confl icting accounts of human nature, but all agreed 
that a stateless environment is a perilous environment devoid of secu-
rity.” In making this statement, Wellman provides more support for the 
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Hobbesian hypothesis than any of the contemporary philosophers dis-
cussed earlier in this chapter, but of course, all he does is admit to pass-
ing on a 350-year-old claim made by speculative anthropologists. This 
can’t be enough. Hobbes, Locke, and Kant did not have the information 
available to be taken as experts on the welfare of either disadvantaged 
people or people in non-state societies. If we take their word for it, we 
pass on their prejudices. We need evidence. See the online appendix for 
more on Wellman.
2. CONTEMPORARY PROPERTARIANISM
The Lockean hypothesis appears regularly and often very explicitly in 
propertarian literature, usually without any empirical support. Eric 
Mack (1995: 213) writes, “the development of liberal market order 
presents people with at least ‘as much’ (in transfi gured form) for their 
‘use’ as does the pre-property state of nature.” David Schmidtz’s (1990; 
1991: 17–24) justifi cation of property relies heavily on the assertion that 
societies without it inevitably suffer from a tragedy of the commons. 
Richard Epstein cites no empirical support when he writes:
the fi rst-possession rule imposes costs on those who are 
excluded. But . . . it provides compensating benefi ts . . . that jus-
tify its place in the social order. . . . the overall size of the gain is 
so large that we need not trouble ourselves over its distribution. 
(Epstein 1995: 62)
Tibor Machan writes:
It is true enough that if the world were such that the respect and 
protection of individual rights engendered general unhappiness, 
including poverty, then libertarianism would be kaput [Lockean 
proviso]. It is also true enough that if pigs had wings, perhaps 
they could fl y [Hobbesian hypothesis]. (Machan 2006: 296)
Machan uses metaphor to state his Hobbesian hypothesis, and his 
use is effective because the analog of his metaphor is clear. None of 
these propertarians attempt to verify their claims with observational 
evidence of people in stateless societies. See the online appendix for 
more on Schmidtz and Machan.
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The fi rst chapter of this book quoted Nozick as someone who 
states clearly that Paine’s fi rst principle of civilization matters. Nozick 
(1974: 182) just as clearly endorses the Hobbesian hypothesis, writ-
ing, “I believe that the free operation of a market system will not 
actually run afoul of the Lockean proviso.” For empirical support 
he mentions the presence of job opportunities under capitalism. He 
makes no reference to any studies of foragers’ lifestyles and makes 
no effort to compare hunter-gatherers’ welfare with that of disadvan-
taged people in capitalist states. Yet, Nozick goes so far as to say:
Indeed, were it not for the effects of previous illegitimate state 
action, people would not think the possibility of the proviso’s 
being violated as of more interest than any other logical possibil-
ity. (Here I make an empirical historical claim; as does someone 
who disagrees with this.) (Nozick 1974: 182)
No one could ask for a clearer admission of the empirical nature of 
the Hobbesian hypothesis, but yet, Nozick admits no responsibility 
to provide evidence for it, apparently expecting everyone to share his 
prejudice. See the online appendix for more on Nozick.
Loren Lomasky endorses the Lockean proviso in plain language:
Nothing should be acknowledged as a basic right unless it is the 
case that the vast majority of community members is rendered 
better off if they and all others respect that right than if no one 
were obliged to respect it. (Lomasky 1987: 83)
Lomasky (1987: 125) actually admits that the proviso might go unful-
fi lled, but he explains now often: “In a word, rarely.” So, he endorses 
the hypothesis only in tentative language: “It is not unreasonable to 
suggest, then, that persons within a liberal order would generally 
fi nd themselves able to secure what they urgently need, even if not 
all that they would like to have” (Lomasky 1987: 126). Like Nozick, 
Lomasky’s evidence is a non-comparative assertion that capitalism 
would provide more and better jobs with less government regulation. 
See the online appendix for more on Lomasky.
Jan Narveson (1988: 85–7) uses a form of propertarianism without 
any proviso, but nevertheless with no supporting evidence he asserts 
that this supposedly unnecessary standard is easily, obviously, and 
generously fulfi lled: “A beggar in Manhattan is enormously better off 
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than a primitive person in any state-of-nature situation short of the 
Garden of Eden” (Narveson 1988: 92). See the online appendix for a 
more detailed discussion of Narveson.
Murray Rothbard similarly denies any ethical need for a proviso, 
but can’t completely divorce himself from the Hobbesian hypothesis: 
adopting Locke’s unfortunate “proviso,” . . . Nozick declares 
that no one may appropriate unused land if the remaining popu-
lation who desire access to land are “worse off.” But again, how 
do we know if they are worse off or not? In fact, Locke’s proviso 
may lead to the outlawry of all private ownership of land, since 
one can always say that the reduction of available land leaves 
everyone else, who could have appropriated the land, worse off. 
In fact, there is no way of measuring or knowing when they are 
worse off or not. And even if they are, I submit that this, too, 
is their proper assumption of risk. . . . There is no longer a vast 
frontier in the United States, and there is no point in crying over 
the fact. In fact, we can generally achieve as much “access” as 
we want to these resources by paying a market price for them; 
but even if the owners refused to sell or rent, that should be their 
right in a free society. (Rothbard 1982: 244–5) 
This passage makes two admissions that few other propertarians and 
contractarians are willing to discuss: the proviso has enormous infor-
mational diffi culties, and it might not be fulfi lled. Murray here suggests 
only that the strong version might not be fulfi lled without mentioning 
the weak version, but when he suggests that people can access all the 
resources they want by paying the market price, he suggests that this 
immeasurable, unnecessary proviso might just be fulfi lled after all. See 
the online appendix for a more detailed discussion of Rothbard.
3. CRITICS
Many contemporary political philosophers use a stronger version of 
the Lockean proviso without stating whether the weak proviso is ful-
fi lled or not. Tentatively, in this group, we can place Ronald Dworkin 
(2000), Michael Otsuka (2003), John Rawls (1971), T. M. Scanlon 
(1998), Hillel Steiner (1994), Philippe Van Parijs (1995), and many 
others. We don’t need to discuss their theories. They have no respon-
sibility to address whether a standard they reject is fulfi lled or not. 
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However, a false appearance of consensus exists partly because of the 
large number of the people who reject theories relying on the Hobbes-
ian hypothesis without criticizing the hypothesis itself. See the online 
appendix for Rawls, Rawlsianism, Otsuka, and Steiner.
A few contemporary political philosophers do criticize the Hobbesian 
hypothesis. Alasdair MacIntyre mentions in passing that the Hobbesian 
hypothesis might not always be fulfi lled:
There are of course situations where the disappearance of the 
state’s power of repression may lead to the rise of anarchic vio-
lence. But there are and have been plenty of situations where an 
orderly social life continues without such a power being present. 
Indeed if one contrasts eighteenth-, nineteenth-, and twentieth-
century urban life, where the state’s repressive power is close 
at hand, with the moral life of those other periods where it is 
often absent or far away, one might draw the conclusion that 
the state’s presence is a demoralizing factor. This would be . . . 
as ill-founded, because as one-sided, a conclusion as Hobbes’. 
But it underlines Hobbes’ error. (MacIntyre 1998: 86)
MacIntyre goes on to say that the state of nature could be read as 
an extended metaphor. (Exactly what this metaphor represents is not 
clear to us.) But he argues, “it can only function, even as a metaphor, 
if it is an intelligible story, if it satisfi es certain elementary require-
ments of logical coherence. This it fails to do” (MacIntyre 1998: 87). 
See the online appendix for a more detailed discussion of MacIntyre.
Alan Ryan also briefl y criticizes the hypothesis:
There are many societies that anthropologists call acephalous. 
They have no stable leadership; there is nothing resembling 
law or politics in their daily life. Such societies persist for long 
periods. They have no apparent tendency to self-destruction, 
although they are easily wrecked by contact with more advanced 
societies. Hobbes seems to suggest that their existence is impos-
sible to explain. (Ryan 1996: 218) 
Technically, this passage only argues against the violence hypothesis. It 
does not address whether people in stateless societies might be worse 
off for other reasons.
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One contemporary political philosopher, Thomas Pogge (2002; 
2008), has made strong empirical arguments that the basic institu-
tions of contemporary society—such as the nation-state system and 
the property rights system—violate the basic principles of the theo-
ries meant to justify them. Pogge’s ultimate point (that the existing 
moral theories demand that people stop harming the disadvantaged 
people of the world) is very much the same as ours. But his argu-
ment is very different. He uses an “ecumenical strategy,” arguing that 
the empirical reality of poverty and destitution in the world today is 
so severe that it violates almost any reasonable conception of justice. 
This strategy frees his theoretical argument from the need to pin down 
the exact comparative claims in state-of-nature theory, and it allows 
his empirical argument to focus on disadvantaged people in capitalist 
states without much attention to what we see as the other side of the 
comparison: the wellbeing of people in stateless societies. 
Pogge (2005: 40) writes, “However one may want to imagine a 
state of nature among human beings on this planet, one could not 
realistically conceive it producing an enduring poverty death toll of 
18 million annually.” Building on Pogge, Peter Lindsay (2015: 948–9) 
writes, “there are in the world millions—possibly billions—of indi-
viduals who occupy social positions (created through systems of own-
ership) that no rational person would agree to occupy.”
Several modern critics of contractarianism use a priori reasoning 
against the Hobbesian hypothesis. Carole Pateman, Charles Mills, 
and Patricia Williams argue that one should not expect mutually ben-
efi cial sovereign states to appear in practice, because people with the 
power to construct social arrangements lack the incentive to construct 
them as if they were a contract including all citizens (Pateman 1988; 
Mills 1997; Pateman and Mills 2007; Cudd 2013). In our terminol-
ogy, the power structure has incentive to leave a group of dissenters 
outside of the proviso’s protection. 
The logic of the exclusive contract is simple and compelling. It is 
possible to craft a contract that includes everyone. But it is also pos-
sible to craft a contract that excludes a few people. If it is cheaper to 
subjugate than to accommodate the excluded group, an exclusive con-
tract might be even more attractive to those who sign it than an inclu-
sive contract. The prevailing power structure is then set up for the 
benefi t of the in-group, and it is indifferent to the welfare of the out-
group. The people left out could be differentiated by gender, ethnicity, 
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race, religion, class, or any one of many other characteristics. We think 
of them more broadly as the disadvantaged, and in our terminology 
they are “dissenters” whether silent or vocal. The investigation in the 
following chapter can be thought of as an empirical confi rmation of 
Pateman, Mills, Pogge, and Williams. It fi nds empirical evidence of 
the dissenters predicted by their theories. See the online appendix for 
a more detailed discussion of Pateman, Mills, and Williams.
4. CONCLUSION
Consider how the Hobbesian hypothesis can be used in response to crit-
ics like Pogge and Pateman. One might argue the in-group/out-group 
problem identifi es a theoretical reason why the proviso might go unful-
fi lled, but the supposed empirical truth of the Hobbesian hypothesis 
shows that this problem obviously does not exist in practice. Therefore, 
in-group/out-group problems might create unfairness issues in the dis-
tribution of the capitalist states’ benefi ts, but luckily such problems can-
not call into question the overall justifi cation of capitalism or the state, 
because supposedly we all know that everyone does in fact benefi t. 
In response to Pogge’s evidence about the reality of deprivation in 
the world, the Hobbesian can respond by imagining that deprivation 
is even worse in the state of nature. Gauthier (1969: 164) writes, “The 
question is not whether civil society is unpleasant, but whether it is 
less pleasant than some possible alternative.” Hopefully, the discus-
sion above reveals that it is not enough to imagine that the alternative 
is worse; the alternative actually has to be worse as a matter of empiri-
cal fact. The literature review over the last fi ve chapters shows dozens 
of political philosophers asserting just that. Other philosophers have 
implied the empirical interpretation without being completely clear, 
but no philosopher we have studied consistently defends the follow-
ing position: in reality the state harms people (in the way suggested 
by Paine, George, Pogge, Pateman, and others), but in my purely fi c-
tional mode the state protects people from the state of nature or the 
Giant Chicken or whatever, and the benefi t the state does in imagina-
tion somehow carries more ethical signifi cance than the harm the state 
does in reality. Contractarianism and propertarianism would need to 
defend a position like this if they were to rely on a proviso that was 
not subject to empirical verifi cation. 
In the absence of any such argument, we say that both theories 
require the empirical claim we call the Hobbesian hypothesis (if they 
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are to justify real institutions). They can use Wellman’s (2001: 742) 
words, but they have to take them as an empirical statement about 
the world we live in: “The advantages of political society are so great 
because life in the state of nature is so horrible.” This claim demands 
investigation.
Considering the Hobbesian hypothesis as a myth suggests how it 
can provide a psychological response to the situations that the work 
of Pateman, Pogge, and others reveals. It might be psychologically eas-
ier to effectively leave people out of the contract, if we tell ourselves 
that they are actually in. The myth helps us ignore suffering people, 
while we enjoy the advantages that social arrangements provide to 
us and deny to them. We think it is unfortunate and even unfair that 
they don’t benefi t as much as us, but we comfort ourselves because we 
have convinced ourselves that somehow they do benefi t. We comfort 
ourselves by believing the myth that the institutions that produced 
our advantages also saved them from a state of nature so horrible that 
even their meager existence is a major improvement. And so the myth 
helps maintain those institutions.
Most of us don’t even like to think of this claim as a hypothesis. It’s 
not the sort of thing that most people even question. It’s an unstated 
background assumption, beyond doubt, or somehow logically inca-
pable of being false. Everybody says it’s true. Our greatest philoso-
phers have been assuring us of its truth for centuries. Is that because 
it’s obviously true or because it’s a shared prejudice? No one can 
determine what social arrangements are possible by a priori reasoning 
alone. Our best reasoning about how people might live in certain cir-
cumstances is merely a hypothesis. Only a careful look at the evidence 
can determine whether the state or the property rights system meet 
the criteria put forward to justify them. We begin with a discussion of 
how the violence hypothesis and the Hobbesian hypothesis appeared 
in the history of anthropological thought.
Note
See the online appendix for detailed discussions of Will Durant, J. R. Lucas, 
Theodor W. Adorno, Jürgen Habermas, Kavka, Klosko, Knowles, Schmidtz, 
Machan, Nozick, Lomasky, Narveson, Rothbard, Rawls (and Rawlsianism), 
Steiner, Otsuka, Elias Canetti, MacIntyre, Pateman, Mills, and Williams.
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Chapter 8
THE HOBBESIAN HYPOTHESIS IN 
ANTHROPOLOGY
Anthropology coalesced as a distinct academic discipline in the nine-
teenth century when ethnocentric ideas were dominant in Western 
Europe. Most educated Westerners believed in the superiority of 
Western society, the dichotomy between natural man and civilized 
man, the inevitability of progress, and the inevitability of everyone 
sharing the benefi ts of that progress. Before anthropology became 
its own discipline, it was a branch of philosophy. Hobbesian ideas 
were not merely infl uential in anthropology; they were foundational. 
The history of anthropology is largely a history of how these ideas 
were overcome, but Hobbesian viewpoints of some kind have never 
entirely gone away. There is an on-going anthropological debate 
about violence levels and wellbeing in small-scale stateless societies, 
and there has been recently a fl ourish of “neo-Hobbesian” writing.
To characterize any contemporary anthropological research as 
Hobbesian is perhaps an exaggeration because philosophers and 
anthropologist ask different questions. Philosophers ask (or more 
accurately, claim to know) whether violence is intolerably high in 
stateless societies. Anthropologists have tended to focus on much 
simpler questions, such as, what levels of violence can be observed in 
stateless societies? And how do they compare with the levels of vio-
lence observed in state societies? In our terms, anthropologists tend 
to examine the weak violence hypothesis. No empirical scientist we 
know of has thought the strong violence hypothesis worthy of rigor-
ous investigation.
The same issue affects the Hobbesian hypothesis. Philosophers 
claim to know that everyone in state society is better off than everyone 
in stateless society. Few anthropologists have thought of that claim as 
worthy of investigation at all, but they have investigated issues that 
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are relevant to it, such as what the life expectancy is of people in state-
less society; how healthy they are; how much leisure time they have; 
and so on. So for the most part, Chapters 9 and 10 will attempt to 
translate literature investigating questions that interest anthropolo-
gists into answers that are relevant to very different questions posed by 
philosophers. To say that any anthropologist has a generally Hobbes-
ian view today is to say that they have negative opinions about the 
welfare and violence levels in stateless societies. It would be hard to 
fi nd one who thought stateless peoples were under “continuall feare, 
and danger of violent death” (Hobbes 1962 [1651]: 100) or that they 
were worse off than everyone in state society.
This chapter explores how Hobbesian ideas affected the devel-
opment of the discipline and how the two hypotheses in questions 
have appeared in the history of anthropological thought and in 
popular anthropology. To some extent, this discussion reveals how 
these ideas were overcome as understanding of small-scale societies 
improved. Finally, we discuss some anthropological terminology we 
use throughout the rest of the book. 
1. HOBBESIAN IDEAS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
ANTHROPOLOGY
Two competing ideas that are now associated (fairly) with Hobbes 
and (less fairly) with Rousseau, have dominated Western thinking 
about the deep human past since ancient Greece. One is a view of 
progress, in which contemporary civilization has given humanity the 
possibility to use intellect to overcome an inherently violent nature, 
which was much more prevalent in the past. The other is a view of 
degeneration, in which contemporary civilization is the result of the 
erosion of virtue since an earlier golden age (Keeley 1996: 4–5). The 
golden age view declined in popularity in the early modern period. It 
has now nearly disappeared from Western historical thinking. Hobbes 
was among the most infl uential thinkers on the subject of violence, 
progress, and human nature in the era when the progressive became 
the more prevalent of the two. 
Hobbes (1962 [1651]: 100) was serious when he described state-
lessness as the “Natural Condition of Mankind.” It connected with 
the progressive view of history and the belief in a dichotomy between 
“natural man” and “civilized man.” Many philosophers had long 
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believed that the higher creation of “civilization” developed out of 
the “natural,” “primitive,” and “savage” root of statelessness. The 
progressive view of history was not simply that progress can happen 
or has happened, but that it inevitably must happen. Hobbes’s ideas 
about sovereignty and Locke’s about property put this progressive 
view into a theoretical framework with causal explanations for prog-
ress. Their ideas not only infl uenced subsequent philosophy; they had 
a major infl uence over the development of anthropology and other 
social sciences. In the period before sociology and anthropology sep-
arated from philosophy as their own academic disciplines, philoso-
phers such as Hobbes, Locke, Montesquieu, Rousseau, and Kant were 
extremely infl uential over these nascent fi elds. Some of the theoretical 
frameworks we will use to debunk the Hobbesian hypothesis are the 
products of a long chain of intellectual thought that includes Hobbes 
as one of its founding fi gures. 
With scientifi c theories proposed to explain the mechanisms driv-
ing progress, philosophers began looking for a more detailed under-
standing of the path by which it occurs. Various prominent Western 
scholars propagated the idea of “socio-cultural evolution,” which 
supposed that all societies followed a single path of development and 
could be classifi ed as being at some stage in that evolution (Spencer 
1851; Tylor 1871). Adam Smith and some of his eighteenth-century 
colleagues proposed a four-stage theory of development: hunting and 
gathering, herding, agriculture, and commerce (Hont 2005: 101). 
Smith’s theory has a strong similarity with Marx’s (1887 [1867]; 
1972; 1994 [1848]) later and better-known theory of “historical 
materialism” in that changes in the technology of production drive 
changes in the political system.
Perhaps the most famous typology was the three-stage theory of 
savagery, barbarism, and civilization. Lewis Henry Morgan (1877) 
created a nine-stage theory by dividing savagery and barbarism into 
lower, middle, and upper stages, and by dividing civilization into 
ancient, medieval, and modern. Each of the stages was distinguished 
by specifi c inventions or discoveries, and (with the possible exception 
of medieval civilization) each new stage improved the human condi-
tion (Kelly 1995: 8). In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the 
prevailing theories of socio-cultural evolution were unilinear, with 
only one path of progress. Kuper (1994: 63–5) quotes Morgan stating 
the idea in unequivocal terms: “The history of the human race is one 
in course, one in experience, and in progress . . . the lines of social 
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development are predetermined and inevitable.” This theory made it 
possible to label societies as being ahead, behind, or at the same stage 
of cultural evolution.
Morgan was an enormous infl uence over Marx and Engels. They 
broke with previous socio-cultural evolutionists on one important 
issue: they did not see each new stage as necessarily good for each 
individual. But their model was still one of progress from a primitive 
(if not necessarily Hobbesian) root to a fi nal stage of Kantian per-
petual peace (Marx 1887 [1867]; Marx 1972; Marx and Engels 1994 
[1848]; Engels 2004 [1884]). Morgan’s anthropological infl uence is 
perhaps most obvious in Engels (2004 [1884]), who approached the 
issues of private property and the origin of the state from the perspec-
tive of unilinear cultural evolution. 
Views of inevitable stages of progress are clearly detectable in the 
writings of early social scientists, and they continue to hold a great 
deal of currency in many fi elds today. During the nineteenth century, 
cultural evolutionism became wedded with the sociological concept 
of functionalism, which was based on an analogy between societies 
and biological organisms. This view put a scientifi c take on an idea 
that had been popular in theology in the Middle Ages (Shapin and 
Barnes 1976: 232–5, 246; Huxley 1998; Béteille 2003: 79–80). In it, 
the various social structures present within organized societies func-
tion like organs to maintain the viability and health of that society as 
a whole. In the incipient fi elds of social science, the ubiquity of this 
functionalist view of society owes much to Comte (1868), who later 
became infl uential in the foundation of the functionalist schools of 
anthropological and sociological thought, infl uencing writers such as 
Emile Durkheim (1915), Bronislaw Malinowski (1972 [1922]), Alfred 
Radcliffe-Brown (1940), and Talcott Parsons (1951). Functionalism 
in the social sciences fundamentally depended on the Hobbesian 
hypothesis in the sense that Hobbes saw the various social structures 
of the state as functioning in order to mitigate the unacceptable quali-
ties of social life in stateless societies. 
Many anthropologists over the last fi fty years have criticized evo-
lutionary approaches based on the fallacy of functionalism, favoring 
instead critical approaches with their roots in Marx (Trigger 1989; 
Marcus and Fischer 1999). However, even Marxian political theory 
was founded upon the unilinear cultural evolutionism of its day and 
the emerging school of functionalist thought in the early fi eld of soci-
ology was never far in the background. Therefore, we might consider 
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the Hobbesian viewpoint on the role of social structures within states, 
which lies at the heart of both cultural evolutionism and functional-
ism, to be the “original sin” of social science. 
The effort to create these theories was not necessarily unscientifi c. 
The scientifi c method involves coming up with hypotheses and going 
into the fi eld to test them by application. Archaeologists, anthropolo-
gists, historians, and others went into their respective fi elds expecting 
to be able to group societies by their stage in development as the the-
ory predicted. Doing so is a scientifi c effort that both tests and applies 
the theory, but social science is diffi cult. Researchers’ interpretation of 
data can be clouded by what they expect to see. Whether this was the 
reason or not, it took centuries of anomalous fi ndings before the idea 
of inevitable stages of development was abandoned. For example, 
Native Americans of the Pacifi c Northwest had a hunting and gather-
ing economy that would have put them in the lower stages of Smith’s 
or Morgan’s typologies, but they had complex, centralized political 
institutions and higher populations (Kelly 1995: 293–4; Johnson and 
Earle 2000: 204–15), which would have put them at the higher stages 
closer to statehood. Eventually anthropologists found far greater vari-
ation than the theory could support, and it was abandoned. 
But unilinear socio-cultural evolution was replaced in the mid-
twentieth century by a “neo-evolutionary” theory, which no longer 
assumed a single path of inevitable progress, but did see trends over time 
as societies change in scale and technology. Elman Service (1962), who 
still used the concept of stages, proposed the typology of band, tribe, 
chiefdom, and state. Robert L. Carneiro (1967; 1970) refi ned it to band, 
autonomous village, chiefdom, and state, and dropped the concept of 
stages in favor of forms of socio-political organization, which don’t nec-
essarily have to come in the same order. If the prevailing understanding 
of the anthropological record is correct, each form made its fi rst appear-
ance on earth (but not its fi rst appearance in every area) in order from 
smallest to largest. The theory behind this typology is that some forms of 
socio-political organization are more adaptive to certain circumstances 
than others, so that societies at a similar scale with similar technologies 
tend to have similar political institutions. Adaptive does not mean bet-
ter for everyone. Some circumstances might favor society’s egalitarians 
while other circumstances favor society’s authoritarians.
The effort to classify and make generalizations about societies by their 
scale, economic activity, or other characteristics is still alive in anthro-
pology today, but it remains controversial and the idea of an inevitable 
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unilinear evolutionary path has long been abandoned. If it is to be use-
ful, it has to be separated from the pejorative and erroneous view of our 
surviving small-scale brethren as living fossils, stuck in the primitive and 
most natural fi rst stage of human existence. Kelly explains:
there is no reason to suppose that human nature will be drawn 
more clearly in modern foraging societies than among modern 
industrial societies. . . . Foragers, past and present, live under 
specifi c environmental and social conditions and within particu-
lar historical trajectories, as do all peoples. (Kelly 1995: 338) 
After two centuries of research on variability in terms of political 
systems, there is no evidence for linearity or inevitability in the ori-
gins and development of political complexity. Different societies are 
on their own path with no predetermined sequence or destination. 
Wengrow and Graeber (2015: 17) argue societies can and do jump 
from band-level to state-level on a seasonal basis if need be, and 
suggest, therefore, “our early ancestors were not just our cognitive 
equals, but our intellectual and philosophical peers too. Likely as 
not, our Palaeolithic forebears were aware, at least in a very broad 
sense, of many later social possibilities.”
In addition, it is also worth complaining that evolutionary cul-
tural typologies, such as the famous one offered by Service (1962), are 
based on the primitivist view that there was, in the deep past, a single 
hunter-gatherer cultural type that characterized all humanity; that more 
complex societies evolved from these hunter-gatherer roots; that the 
hunter-gatherers still alive in the world today are societies that remained, 
for whatever reason, unchanged from this original cultural type of the 
deep past; and that hunter-gatherer societies that do vary from this cul-
tural type do so because of contact with neighboring complex societ-
ies. Of course, as we have discussed in detail elsewhere (McCall and 
Widerquist 2015), it should now be obvious that the features of modern 
hunter-gatherers are not simply inherited from our earliest ancestors but 
are rather the result of historical processes, especially those within the 
last few thousand years, and that variability in modern hunter-gatherer 
lifeways is the result of adaptations to widely disparate environmental 
and historical contexts (see also Kelly 1995; Binford 2001). An African 
foraging society 100,000 years ago, which would have been comprised 
of humans every bit as modern as anyone today, would be unrecogniz-
ably different from the Ju/’hoansi or any other modern society.
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Given these problems, some researchers entirely drop the idea of 
categorizing stateless societies or generalizing about them by scale, 
but we feel that this goes too far. For one thing, like the spectrum of 
light, human societies over space and time have formed an incredibly 
diverse continuum of social possibilities and they have done so across 
many different axes of variation. While any effort to categorize such a 
wide array of social forms (or colors of the spectrum or anything else, 
for that matter) may be doomed to some degree of imperfection and 
ambiguity, any effort at systematic comparison needs such categories; 
if for no other reason, we need agreed-upon terms even to be able to 
talk to one another about the spectra of social diversity. In addition, 
as Binford (2001) has demonstrated for hunter-gatherers, there are 
organizational relationships between different classes of social and 
economic phenomena which covary in systematic and understandable 
ways. In a much broader view, a great many political, social, and eco-
nomic factors are correlated with scale, and we need to make some 
generalizations about stateless societies to investigate the truth-value 
of the Hobbesian hypothesis.
In this effort, we use Carneiro’s refi ned version of Service’s typol-
ogy, which uses a combination of factors to defi ne band, autonomous 
village, chiefdom, and state. However, we do so with a great deal 
of caution and disclaiming. Once again, any categorization of a con-
tinuous spectrum can be problematic and this is particularly true of 
a classifi cation scheme that combines so many troublesome histories 
of evolutionism and ethnocentrism. As Conrad Phillip Kottak (2008: 
180) suggests, “The four labels in Service’s typology are much too 
simple to account for the full range of political diversity and complex-
ity known to archeology and ethnography. . . . Nevertheless Service’s 
(1962) typology does highlight some signifi cant contrasts in political 
organization.” With these disclaimers and despite its historical bag-
gage, we use these names because they are the most common names 
to identify ranges on the continuum from smaller societies with less 
authority to large ones with more.
2. CONTEMPORARY CLASSIFICATIONS OF SMALL-SCALE 
STATELESS SOCIETIES
As mentioned above, we need some terminology to identify the soci-
eties that most closely fi t the contractarian defi nition of the state 
of nature. This section explains what terms we use and why, and it 
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argues that the smallest-scale stateless societies, as anthropologists 
understand them, fi t the defi nition of the state of nature used in the 
debate over contractarianism.
The philosophical debate over the social contract usually assumes, 
for simplicity, a dichotomy between the state and statelessness, 
between full sovereign authority and no authority at all, but political 
power exists on a continuum from no authority to full sovereignty. 
Contractarians usually describe the state of nature as the complete 
absence of authority, and contractarian logic would seem to require 
all authority, not just fully sovereign authority, to be justifi ed by con-
sent. Therefore, our investigation needs to address the societies that 
most lack authority. As Iain Hampsher-Monk writes: 
The state of nature is simply the condition of men without a 
sovereign power to compel order. Just as we may never have a 
perfect vacuum, perhaps we can never have a situation where 
there are no vestiges of the restraints that sovereignty pro-
vides, but inasmuch as sovereignty is absent, to that extent men 
will begin to exhibit behaviour typical of the state of nature. 
(Hampsher-Monk 1992: 27) 
Most important to our project in this book is the comparison of state 
societies with those at the opposite end of the spectrum of politi-
cal complexity: hunter-gatherer bands that have no form of politi-
cal authority and where political decision-making tends to be done 
through group consensus instead of by the authority of an individual, 
a group of individuals, or even through some other mechanism of 
political control. Here, the differences in the political systems of states 
and acephalous hunter-gatherer bands is clear, even though there is 
enormous variability in the political systems of both states and hunter-
gatherer bands.
The smallest and loosest observed form of socio-political organiza-
tion is the “hunter-gatherer band,” a nomadic group of about fi fteen to 
fi fty people (including children and elderly) who obtain all of their food 
from foraging (Kelly 1995: 258; Lee and Daly 1999: 3; Boehm 2001; 
Ames 2007: 490–1). Archaeologists have found evidence of nomadic 
foraging groups living at this scale tens or perhaps hundreds of thou-
sands of years ago. Ethnographers have documented nomadic foraging 
groups at this scale all over the world from the tropics to the Arctic, 
in all types of climate and terrain. Although any generalizations about 
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bands should be taken cautiously as tendencies drawn from limited 
data, ethnographers have recognized many similarities in the political 
and social practices of observed bands.
The statelessness of band society is uncontroversial. Observed 
bands have no fi xed membership, little or no corporate identity, no 
recognized leaders, no ranks, no institutional or power structures, and 
no specialization in production except minor differences along the lines 
of age and gender. All of their political actions are ad hoc. Although 
we use the term “band members,” it should be understood as nothing 
more than the people who happen to camp together at a particular 
time. Members commit neither to obey any authority within the band 
nor to remain with the band for any longer than they might wish to 
(Fried 1967; Redfi eld 1967: 21; Lee and DeVore 1968b; Turnbull 1968; 
Woodburn 1968b: 103; Woodburn 1982: 434; Bird-David 1994: 591, 
597; Leacock 1998: 143; Lee and Daly 1999: 4; Johnson and Earle 
2000: 32–3; Boehm 2001: 72–3; Renfrew 2007: 148).
To use Lucas’s (1966: 62) words, bands settle disputes “any old 
how.” If not everyone can agree, the group often splits up (temporarily 
or permanently) to avoid confl ict, creating two autonomous polities 
out of one in minutes. Even the scale of a society is not necessarily fi xed. 
Some bands assemble into larger groups, but usually not for more than 
a few weeks or months at a time. Some bands break up into groups as 
small as single nuclear families for part of the year. All observed bands 
treat land as a commons, sometimes as a fully open, sometimes as a 
partly closed commons (Turnbull 1968; Woodburn 1968b: 103; Bird-
David 1994; Leacock 1998: 142–3; Johnson and Earle 2000: 32–3; 
Boehm 2001: 72–3, 86–7; Wengrow and Graeber 2015). As the online 
appendix explains in greater detail, the power structures of both sover-
eignty and landownership are absent in band society. 
We have said that groups at this scale have existed since the appear-
ance of humans, and if “band” is defi ned as a nomadic foraging group of 
fewer than 100 people, we can say that bands have existed for 200,000 
years, but we cannot say with certainty that earlier bands share the 
political and social features described for historically observed bands. 
The farther back one goes, the less certain any such generalizations are.
Also relevant to this discussion are what have sometimes been called 
“middle-range” societies (see Jérôme Rousseau 2006 for review). 
These include what Service (1962) and Carneiro (1970) respectively 
called “tribes” and “autonomous villages,” and what both called 
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“chiefdoms.” While the characteristics of the opposing ends of the 
political spectrum are clearly distinct from one another, variabil-
ity among middle-range societies remains much more controversial. 
However, for the purposes of this book and from the perspective of 
political philosophy, the distinction between autonomous villages and 
more complex chiefdoms holds considerable importance. 
Larger-than-band-level societies of about 100–600 people, or what 
we call autonomous villages following Carneiro (1970), appear in the 
archaeological record within the last 20,000 years and only become 
common with the last 5,000–10,000 years. Such societies at this scale 
are extremely diverse, which is one of the sources of controversy in 
describing them. If we can make any generalizations about them, we 
can say that such societies often have some form of ranking but rank-
ing usually comes with little or no authority. Autonomous villages 
have little if any centralized power. They can split to settle disputes but 
not as quickly or easily as band societies. They usually have econo-
mies based on swidden (“slash-and-burn”) agriculture, but they can 
be herders or hunter-gatherers if the environment is particularly favor-
able. Hunter-gathering and agricultural groups at this scale tend to be 
sedentary, moving only occasionally. Autonomous villages typically 
treat land as a commons. For example, individuals might have the 
right to farm somewhere in the village but not to do so in any par-
ticular spot (Fried 1967: 113, 129–30; Carneiro 1970: 734–8; Wilson 
1988: 3; Lee 1990: 236; Johnson and Earle 2000: 179–80, 191–2; 
Boehm 2001: 3–4, 93; Roscoe 2002; Bandy 2004; Renfrew 2007: 
142; McCall 2009: 161). 
Although the nature of the contractarian debate requires a focus 
on band societies, there are three reasons not to leave autonomous 
villages out of the discussion: fi rst, they have been much better doc-
umented by ethnographers. Second, anthropological studies do not 
always draw a strong distinction between bands and villages (nor do 
they need to). Third, under any reasonable defi nition of sovereignty, 
they are stateless; they represent one of the alternatives to the state. 
However the fi eld of anthropology chooses to talk about societies at 
this level of political integration, it is clear that there are many societ-
ies with low-level individual authority and small-scale differences in 
status, power, and wealth.
Within the last 12,000 years, “chiefs” began establishing power over 
several villages at once, forming political units of populations ranging 
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between thousands and hundreds of thousands of people (or more), 
usually called “chiefdoms.” Many chiefdoms would actually qualify 
as sovereign according to the political philosophical defi nition of the 
state (but not according to the anthropological defi nition). Although 
the power of chiefs can be substantial in this sense, it is not always 
sovereign power, often fl uctuating within a group of chiefs (Bellwood 
1987: 31–3; Earle 1997; Thomas 1999: 229; Earle 2000; Earle 2002; 
Renfrew 2007: 152, 164, 173–6). Thus, chiefdoms range enormously in 
size and scale, and hence the utility of this term has been intensely chal-
lenged within the fi eld of anthropology (Pauketat 2007). We are quick 
to recognize the validity of these critiques and the fact that the term 
“chiefdom” has become a vacuous category into which a wide range of 
dissimilar cases end up being discarded. Therefore, and because chief-
doms have some (but not always all) of the characteristics of state-level 
society, we mostly leave them out of our discussion.
The online appendix includes a more detailed argument for readers 
who remain skeptical that most small-scale nomadic foragers have nei-
ther statehood nor landownership.
3. ETHNOGRAPHY AND THE VIOLENCE HYPOTHESIS
Although the three-stage evolutionary framework of savagery–
barbarism–civilization popular with early anthropologists was clearly 
built on the notion of the inevitability of human progress and the 
superiority of Western society, its adherents did not universally believe 
that the lowest level was the most violent stage. Many of them actu-
ally considered hunter-gatherers, which they called “savages,” to be 
less violent than barbarians and sometimes less than contemporary 
Westerners. For example, Morgan (1877) observed that cultures at the 
stage of “barbarism” (that is, subsistence agriculture) are rather more 
prone to violence and warfare than those at the stage of “savagery,” 
making no pretense about any trend towards decreasing violence over 
time or with increasing cultural complexity. Morgan elaborated that 
more complex societies have more at stake and also possess superior 
technology and tactics for making war on one another. Other early 
evolutionists echoed these sentiments. Augustus Pitt-Rivers (1867; 
1906), for example, in his discussion of “primitive warfare,” made 
it clear that more effective and sophisticated warfare, not pacifi sm, is 
actually the hallmark of civilization. 
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For example, the veneration of effective warfare as a distinc-
tive feature of civilization could be seen as successful European and 
American powers patting themselves on the back for their military 
successes and colonial conquests. In other words, they thought, their 
superiority to peoples living in small-scale societies stemmed from 
their intelligence, discipline, moral fortitude, and sophisticated tech-
nologies, all of which related directly to their military prowess. Thus, 
one’s capability and willingness to wipe out one’s adversaries was 
a mark of high civilization and the outcome of the process of cul-
tural evolution itself. In this area, the Hobbesian idea that civilization 
was good for everyone was perhaps more popular than his violence 
hypothesis or even his quite reasonable idea that less violence is good 
for people.
Some of the earliest ethnographers, who went into the fi eld to observe 
small-scale stateless societies, did not fi nd them to be prone to unaccept-
ably high violence. In our review of early ethnographic descriptions of 
hunter-gatherers from the New World, Africa, and Australia, we were 
unable to fi nd any clear-cut instances of extreme interpersonal violence. 
In fact, most early accounts of hunter-gatherer societies emphasize the 
opposite tendency toward peacefulness and social harmony (Kropotkin 
2011: 175). For example, Baldwin Spencer and Francis James Gillen, in 
their highly infl uential description of the hunter-gatherers of the Central 
Desert of Australia, offer the following account:
As a general rule the natives are kindly disposed to one 
another, that is of course within the limits of their own tribe, 
and, where two tribes come into contact with one another on 
the border land of their respective territories, there the same 
amicable feelings are maintained between the members of the 
two. There is no such thing as one tribe being in a constant 
state of enmity with another so far as these Central tribes are 
concerned. (Spencer and Gillen 1899: 32)
Although Spencer and Gillen’s ethnography is rather infamous for its 
unfl attering portrayals of Australian aborigines, they obviously did 
not consider their subjects to be particularly violent; and certainly 
not unacceptably violent, as required by the Hobbesian perspective. 
Furthermore, this view of hunter-gatherer societies appears to have 
been shared fairly broadly by evolutionary anthropologists at the turn 
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of the twentieth century. For other examples from Australia, Southern 
Africa, and around the world, see respectively Parker (1905) and Stow 
(1905), and Kropotkin (2011).
The fi rst major goal of American anthropology in the early twen-
tieth century was to overcome this inherent tendency towards eth-
nocentrism in conducting ethnographic research. To this end, Franz 
Boas, often considered the “father of American anthropology,” advo-
cated the principle of cultural relativism, or the belief that all forms of 
cultural diversity are equally valid and none is “better” than any other 
(Powell and Boas 1887). One of anthropology’s great contributions is 
the demonstration that all peoples are equal in terms of intelligence 
and other capabilities. Therefore, evident differences between human 
groups in terms of cultural behavior and social organization may be 
understood in external terms, such as historical patterns of interac-
tion, ecological adaptation, and so on. Cultural relativism, while 
obviously diffi cult to put into practice during the conduct of social 
scientifi c research, has formed the basis for modern anthropology and 
allied fi elds ever since.
Taken together, early ethnographic investigations contributed to a 
common view of hunter-gatherers as being relatively free from violence 
in both its interpersonal and intergroup forms. For example, Elizabeth 
Marshall Thomas (1959), translated the Ju/’hoansi people’s name as 
“the Harmless People,” and allowed the interpretation that they lived 
in social harmony without interpersonal violence or intergroup war-
fare. This description echoed through the popular culture of the later 
twentieth century. When combined with other aspects of egalitarian 
social systems, this fed a trend of golden-age-style depictions of the 
Ju/’hoansi as a utopian hunter-gatherer society replete with boundless 
personal dignity and rich social lives now lost to the alienation of mod-
ern society (Sahlins 1974). Thus, as Carol R. Ember (1978) observed 
in her well-known essay on myths about foraging societies, research of 
this type coalesced into a somewhat fanciful view of hunter-gatherer 
societies as being virtually free from violence.
In playing culture critic, Keeley (1996) argues that studies such as 
Thomas’s (1959) formed an element of a pacifi st tradition within the 
fi eld of anthropology which grew up during the 1960s in response 
to the Vietnam War—a sentiment strongly echoed more recently by 
Steven Pinker (2012). Indeed, beginning in the 1970s, skepticism 
about the nonviolent nature of hunter-gatherer societies began to 
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accumulate, in part forming the basis for the subsequent develop-
ment of current neo-Hobbesian social theory. One real problem 
recognized at this time concerning investigations such as those of 
Thomas (1959) was that they were largely anecdotal. Up until the 
1960s anthropology lacked any real data about the levels of violence 
in stateless societies, making it impossible to form comparisons with 
large-scale state societies. Finally, a generation of researchers sought 
to quantify just how violent hunter-gatherer societies actually are. 
When real data at last started to become available, levels of hunter-
gatherer violence seemed surprisingly high to many (see Chapter 9 
for discussion).
Some ethnographers went to the opposite extreme. For example, 
Napoleon Chagnon (1968) observed extraordinary levels of inter-
group violence among the Yanomamö and labeled them the “fi erce 
people,” in what would seem to be a self-conscious inversion of the 
descriptions of the Ju/’hoansi by Thomas (1959). Chagnon’s studies 
of the Yanomamö have achieved a degree of infamy for arguing that 
participation in intergroup aggression provided both functional ben-
efi ts for whole Yanomamö groups and evolutionary fi tness benefi ts 
for individuals. While we would strongly repudiate the evolutionary 
claims made by Chagnon, discussions of the Yanomamö have exposed 
the rather Hobbesian logic underlying the causes of “primitive war-
fare” within non-state societies. For example, in an early comment on 
Chagnon’s work, C. R. Hallpike observes:
The Yanomamo . . . and other acephalous societies, engage in 
warfare because among other reasons they cannot stop, not 
because they necessarily as a culture derive any benefi t from 
fi ghting. In the absence of any central authority they are con-
demned to fi ght for ever [sic], other conditions remaining the 
same, since for any one group to cease defending itself would be 
suicidal. (Hallpike 1973: 6)
Obviously, Hobbes would be sympathetic.
Hallpike is not alone in the return to the Hobbesian belief in 
an inherently violent human nature and the Kantian ideal of prog-
ress in Western society through humane rationality. A wide range 
of modern scholarship on violence and warfare across the diversity 
of social science fi elds shares this general philosophical orientation 
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(Goldstein 2011; Kegley and Raymond 2011; Tertrais 2012; Gat 
2013; Pagden 2013). This line of thinking has generally served as a 
justifi cation of a wide range of modern social institutions, as well 
as the overall structure of the modern world and the historical pro-
cesses that brought it about. 
This line of thought is allied with the “sociobiological perspective,” 
which attempts to apply Darwinian ideas of natural selection to social 
behaviors. Many evolutionists have employed an increasingly sophisti-
cated theory of the dynamics of biological evolution to suggest that the 
evolutionary processes responsible for the origins of humanity favor vio-
lence as a behavioral trait in humans or at least human males. Through 
Raymond Dart (1953: 209; 1957), Louis Leakey and Robert Ardrey 
(1971), and other researchers, this view of human nature entered the 
increasingly scientifi c evolutionary theory of its day (such as Washburn 
1959), which held that the biological and cultural evolutionary pro-
cesses responsible for the origins of humanity were driven by the hunt-
ing of large animals and, therefore, this innately violent predatory “killer 
instinct” (Sussman 1999). One infl uential outgrowth of an increasingly 
sophisticated view of the evolutionary process was E. O. Wilson’s (2000 
[1975]) Sociobiology: A New Synthesis, which argued for the evolu-
tionary basis of spousal infi delity, the division of human societies into 
classes, and the adoption of religion. Wilson (2000 [1975]: 573) also 
made a clear case for the evolutionary advantages of innate violence at 
the levels of both the individual and group. Margo Wilson and Martin 
Daly (1985) outlined what they refer to as the “young male syndrome,” 
in which patterns of risk-taking, violence, and other forms of aggressive 
behavior exist among males today because they conferred evolution-
ary benefi ts on males in our deep early hominin past. Such perspec-
tives within the fi eld of evolutionary psychology have infi ltrated what 
might be considered popular science in works such as Demonic Males, 
by Richard Wrangham and Dale Peterson (1996), which builds on this 
model of the evolutionary basis of male violence with a heavy emphasis 
on the role of male competition for mates. See the online appendix for a 
more detailed discussion of sociobiology.
It is also clear that such scholarly work straddles the line between 
social science and the history of political philosophy that inspired it. 
Its roots trace back directly to Hobbes. Therefore, we have chosen 
to assign to this line of scholarship the label of neo-Hobbesianism. 
By this, we mean that this body of literature shares the belief in a 
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fundamentally violent human nature, as well as the notion that sov-
ereign states function to mitigate this inherent tendency, but that 
label should not be taken to imply that these philosophers necessarily 
endorse the two hypotheses in question. 
4. POP ANTHROPOLOGY AND THE VIOLENCE HYPOTHESIS
Some recent popular science publications share this neo-Hobbesian 
orientation, giving social systems the role of moderating what research-
ers present as an inherently violent evolutionary past and an inherently 
violent human nature. Two recent publications by Jared Diamond 
(2012) and Steve Pinker (2012) exemplify this trend. Diamond argues 
(among other things) that the institutions and cultural values of mod-
ern Western society have effectively curbed the violence inherent to 
small-scale societies in both recent precolonial history and our deeper 
evolutionary past. While Diamond’s primary empirical basis for this 
argument is his personal experience conducting ecological research 
in New Guinea, he also synthesizes a range of comparative statistical 
data intended to show that violence in small-scale societies has tended 
to be perhaps an order of magnitude more prevalent than in modern 
Western societies. 
In short, Diamond (2012) argues, we are all far less likely to die violent 
deaths thanks to the social benefi ts imparted by modern social systems 
and cultural values. Diamond shares most of the neo-Hobbesian view-
point discussed in the previous section. For example, Diamond argues 
that rates of violent death in New Guinea were extremely high, espe-
cially prior to colonial “pacifi cation,” precisely because of the absence 
of any state authority with a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence 
capable of curbing the ubiquitous cycles of feuding and revenge killing 
that pervade the relationships between villages.
Pinker (2012) offers a more rigorous treatment of this subject, while 
making use of the same kinds of data as Diamond and making many 
of the same general points. Pinker more explicitly considers its philo-
sophical bases and makes a number of cogent sociological points in 
explaining modern variability in violent death rates. He recognizes his 
infl uences in both Hobbes and Kant, and he dismisses modern criticism 
of the Hobbesian view of human nature as essentially pacifi st wishful 
thinking. In addition, Pinker identifi es the humanism of the Enlighten-
ment as the key factor in reducing the ubiquity of brutality in Western 
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civilization. In particular, he follows Kant in arguing that the shifting 
ideals and laws that grew out of the humanism of the Enlightenment 
ultimately changed the nature of human attitudes towards violence 
and led to modern societies in which violence is extremely rare. Pink-
er’s empirical argumentation rests mostly on a synthesis of statistical 
data on violent death rates in modern and earlier state societies, but he 
also makes some use of archaeological, historical, and ethnographic 
evidence about stateless societies. Pinker observes in a more sociologi-
cal fashion that murder rates in modern societies correlate directly with 
the strength and perceived justness of state governments capable of 
controlling violent behavior and punishing criminals, thus removing 
the burden of retribution from individual actors.
At the same time, while Pinker (2012) makes the case that we are 
all better off within the social systems of the modern Western world, 
he spends much more time arguing that the modern world could be 
improved further through attention to the humanist social processes 
that have dramatically reduced violence up to this point. In contrast, 
Pinker spends relatively little time arguing that stateless society is nec-
essarily inferior to state society, or that human nature is necessarily 
violent. As with a great deal of the literature on this controversial set 
of topics, these points seem to be more like axiomatic assumptions 
than like points argued for directly.
Importantly, for our argument, the trend of declining violence 
described by Pinker only began about 500 years ago—long after state 
societies had expanded to dominate the human social world. For 
example, Pinker writes:
in the 14th and 15th Centuries, an astonishing 26% of male aris-
tocrats died from violence—about the same rate . . . as the aver-
age for preliterate tribes. The rate fell into the single digits by the 
turn of the 18th Century, and of course, today it is essentially 
zero. (Pinker 2012: 81–2)
In other words, Pinker does not present evidence that state societies 
are inherently less violent than stateless societies. His primary empiri-
cal argument is that most contemporary states are less violent than all 
past societies, whether states or not.
Although Pinker (2012) clearly thinks of himself as a Hobbesian, 
his theoretical argument is sometimes quite different. Hobbes argues 
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that authority is necessary to overcome the violence inherent to 
statelessness. Pinker argues that in a society of violence and insecu-
rity, people learn to be aggressive and violent, and that in a society 
of peace and security, people learn to abhor aggression and violence. 
Pinker makes a good case that insecurity and violence beget violence, 
that peace and security beget peace. He shows that over the last 
500 years state societies have become increasingly better at provid-
ing peace and security, which have in turn made people less likely 
to resort to violence to resolve confl icts. We take no issue with any 
of these arguments or with his argument that state societies could 
be improved further through attention to the humanist social pro-
cesses that have dramatically reduced violence up to this point. In 
his work, we take issue only with the beliefs that all states are nec-
essarily better at providing that peaceful society than all stateless 
societies. Given the similarity in violence he fi nds in early states and 
stateless societies, he does not argue this point. He seems to make 
an unwarranted extrapolation of the trend he so well documents 
over the last 500 years. His extrapolation is explicitly infl uenced by 
Hobbesian theory. 
5. THE HOBBESIAN HYPOTHESIS IN ANTHROPOLOGY
The overall Hobbesian hypothesis, or something close to it remained 
popular in anthropology through the mid-twentieth century as much 
for its presumed poverty as for its violence. For centuries most anthro-
pologists, like most Westerners, believed hunter-gatherers lived a pre-
carious existence, constantly on the verge of starvation with little time 
for anything but the continual quest to meet their basic needs. From 
that imagined starting point, human societies would follow a set path 
of development. Farming would always have been better for every-
one, but only after hundreds of thousands of years in which mod-
ern humans lived on this planet did a genius invent farming, which 
supposedly freed humanity from this precarious existence and made 
possible leisure, education, culture, and progress. This invention was 
the most important step on the path through an inevitable series of 
stages toward the fl ourishing of diverse human potential in contempo-
rary state society, especially the presumably highest Western societies 
(Harris 1977: 9; Hawkes et al. 1985: 3–4; Kuper 1994: 5–8, 65–7; 
Kelly 1995: 6–16). According to Kelly:
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the hunter-gatherer lifeway had been viewed as one of continual 
fear and starvation, a perpetual and barely adequate search for 
food . . . the moral development of people . . . was evidenced 
by the increasing subjugation of nature by people. . . . Allegedly 
unable to think rationally, members of less advanced societ-
ies were controlled by nature; thinking rationally, members of 
advanced societies controlled nature. (Kelly 1995: 6–7)
The last straightforward endorsement of Hobbes’s view of stateless peo-
ples we found in the anthropological literature was by J. H. Hutton in 
his presidential address to the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great 
Britain and Ireland 1944:
the entire elevation of man from an animal status must have 
been started in some form of concrete progress of a defi nitely 
material nature. It is generally admitted that the life of man is 
still “nasty, brutish and short” . . . It is after all in the material 
culture of a people that we can fi nd the only effective tests of the 
degree of civilization which that people possesses. And while the 
standard of material culture must be taken as indicating mental 
potentialities, so too the ability to take over and use the material 
culture of others must be taken as indicating the possibility of 
progress. (Hutton 1944: 3)
Here Hutton makes a direct positive reference to the Hobbesian 
hypothesis, and by connecting it with material culture, he connects it 
with ideas of Locke as well. This view was already under attack at the 
time he spoke (Fortes and Evans-Pritchard 1940: 4–5; Salzman 2004: 
47), and it is absent from the anthropological literature today.
This was never a scientifi c view because it was based on specu-
lation and prejudice rather than careful observation, but it was the 
starting point of the profession. Most early ethnographers went into 
the fi eld expecting to fi nd either inferior people or people living in 
highly inferior circumstances, and they took much of what they found 
as confi rmation. Nomadic hunter-gatherers’ failure to adopt farming, 
their lack of interest in Western conceptions of property, and their 
unconcern for the presumably imminent danger of starvation were all 
taken as signs of arrested intellectual development rather than as signs 
of confi dence in their lifestyle. It took decades of ethnographers and 
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archaeologists not fi nding what they expected before they began to 
revise this interpretation.
Evidence against the Hobbesian view had begun to accumulate in 
Europe at least since the early colonial period, but it took until the 
mid-twentieth century for enough evidence to accumulate to make the 
Hobbesian view untenable among serious anthropologists (Lee and 
DeVore 1968a). Once anthropologists began to rethink the idea, some 
researchers, such as Marshall Sahlins (1968; 1974), argued for nearly 
the opposite extreme (see Chapter 9), but this idea never dominated 
anthropological thought.
The pessimistic view that prevailed through the mid-twentieth cen-
tury has never returned. As Elizabeth Cashdan (1989: 26) explained, 
we can “demolish with confi dence the old stereotype that hunter-gath-
erers had to work all the time simply to get enough food to eat.” It is 
diffi cult or impossible to fi nd any anthropologist today who describes 
life in stateless societies as a perpetual and arduous food quest, leaving 
little or no time to enjoy leisure, society, or culture.
6. CONCLUSION
This chapter has shown that anthropology—with the infl uence of phi-
losophers such as Hobbes and Locke—began with great overconfi -
dence about the inherent superiority of people in state societies. These 
ideas were eventually overturned, and anthropologists are now rou-
tinely skeptical of characterization of any unfamiliar human lifeway 
as inherently inferior. There is still great disagreement within the fi eld 
between those who take optimistic and pessimistic views about the 
wellbeing of people in stateless societies, but as Chapters 9 and 10 
argue, this disagreement happens with a broad consensus on a large 
number of ideas that are inconsistent with either the strong violence 
hypothesis or the weak Hobbesian hypothesis.
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Chapter 9
NASTY AND BRUTISH? 
AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT OF 
THE VIOLENCE HYPOTHESIS
This chapter applies anthropological evidence of violence in small-
scale stateless societies, arguing that the strong violence hypothesis 
is clearly falsifi ed and that the verdict on the weak version is more 
complicated. These points require a complex discussion.
One issue complicating it is that the anthropologists researching 
the relevant evidence have been interested in a slightly different set of 
claims. Anthropological studies simply ask what the levels of violence 
in states and stateless societies are with less concern for comparative 
claims and no discussion of the tolerability issue that is central to 
the contractarian debate. Therefore, we have to draw from research 
primarily aimed at one set of questions to a discussion of slightly dif-
ferent questions. Another complication is the diffi culty of determining 
levels of violence in both prehistoric and modern stateless societies, 
neither of which has generally kept birth and death records. As we 
discuss below, the ethnographic and archaeological efforts to fi ll in 
that missing data are diffi cult and tentative.
With an eye to our goal, the fi rst three sections of this chapter exam-
ine the anthropological research on this issue more or less as anthro-
pologists do. Section 1 uses anthropological and historical evidence 
to examine violence in prehistoric stateless societies, early states, and 
contemporary states. Section 2 reviews evidence from modern state-
less societies. Section 3 collects what we take to be anthropologists’ 
consensus view of violence in stateless societies. The last three sections 
apply this information to the philosophical questions under discus-
sion. Section 4 evaluates the strong and weak hypotheses in light of 
this information, arguing that societies in which sovereignty is most 
absent maintain the ability to keep violence at tolerable levels. Because 
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this fi nding rejects 350 years of accumulated theory of sovereignty, 
Section 5 briefl y addresses that theory, discussing how bands are able 
to maintain peace without the institutions of state. Section 6 concludes 
and makes way for the broader discussion of the overall Hobbesian 
hypothesis in Chapter 10.
1. ARCHAEOLOGICAL AND HISTORICAL EVIDENCE 
OF VIOLENCE IN HUMAN PREHISTORY AND 
IN STATE SOCIETY
State-level civilizations are a new and unusual development in humans’ 
tenure on earth. Therefore, the question of how pervasive violence 
was in prehistoric stateless societies is, in reality, a much more general 
question concerning the frequency of violence outside of the excep-
tional conditions under which most people live today. Information 
about violence in prehistoric stateless societies is particularly useful in 
evaluating the violence hypothesis, because all or most ethnographi-
cally observed modern stateless societies have been infl uenced by state 
societies (by loss of territory, environmental change, and so on).
But of course, archaeological evidence about violence in human pre-
history has even greater ambiguity. The most direct way of recogniz-
ing lethal violence in prehistory is the observation of skeletal trauma 
that resulted from it. Thus, recognizing violence largely boils down to 
fi nding human skeletons in the archaeological record, in addition to 
the documentation of the presence of skeletal trauma resulting from 
violence. Vast periods of human prehistory are represented (at best) 
by a handful of skeletons, and violent behavior is represented only by 
skeletal trauma when obviously not all violence necessarily manifests 
itself in terms of permanent recognizable damage to bones.
With that caveat declared, some large-scale patterns are apparent in 
terms of prehistoric violence. To begin, it is worth considering our deep 
evolutionary past. For example, Grant S. McCall and Nancy Shields 
(2008) present a review focused on skeletal trauma in Neanderthals 
rather than humans. The study did so not because Neanderthals are 
necessarily the best stand-in for our evolutionary ancestors, who arose 
under rather different circumstances and exhibited different behavior 
patterns. Instead, the study focused on Neanderthals because they seem 
to be the only extinct species of hominin for which a large enough sam-
ple is available to say anything systematic about patterns of skeletal 
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trauma. By comparing patterns of Neanderthal injuries with the loca-
tions of injuries resulting from violence in modern populations, the 
study concluded that Neanderthals did indeed have fairly high frequen-
cies of interpersonal violence, which resulted in craniofacial trauma and 
what are referred to as “parry fractures” in their upper arms. Other 
studies have found instances of Neanderthal skeletons with evidence for 
violent deaths involving the use of weapons, such as Neanderthal skel-
etons from Saint-Césaire, France, and Shanidar, Iraq (Zollikofer et al. 
2002; Churchill et al. 2009). Furthermore, more detailed studies of the 
abundant but fragmentary Neanderthal remains from Krapina, Croa-
tia, have come to similar results as our initial review study (Estabrook 
and Frayer 2013). Thus, we feel fairly confi dent that Neanderthals, and 
perhaps other Pleistocene hominin species, lived within social systems 
that fostered fairly high frequencies of interpersonal violence. 
However, this evidence might not be easily transferable to human 
societies living in the same period. Some evidence indicates that 
Neanderthal and other archaic hominin species lived in harem mating 
structures, in which males physically compete for dominance and for 
the privilege of mating with a large number of females (Kelly 1995; 
Cieri et al. 2014). This mating structure, which often leads to lethal 
violence, is typical of our nearest ape relatives, but it has not been 
witnessed in biologically modern human societies. And so the high 
levels of violence in Neanderthals might have resulted from a social 
structure that is not mirrored in human societies.
A fairly different pattern becomes evident with the emergence of 
human hunter-gatherer populations in the Upper Pleistocene (about 
200,000–10,000 years ago). While we are hindered by a small sample 
size, there are few clear examples of skeletal trauma plausibly result-
ing from violence to be found among our Upper Pleistocene mod-
ern human ancestors. In a recent review, Estabrook (2014) fi nds only 
fi ve cases of major trauma associated with Upper Paleolithic mod-
ern humans in Europe, two of which come from the rather peculiar 
contexts of Dolní Věstonice in the Czech Republic. Two come from 
Italian archaeological sites excavated more than a century ago, and are 
actually post-Paleolithic in age. In addition, Estabrook fi nds another 
eleven instances of more minor trauma, of which four cases also 
come from Dolní Věstonice, including three from one single bizarre 
triple burial. These represent a small fraction of perhaps thousands of 
known Mesolithic and Upper Paleolithic skeletons.
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Based on this available information, it would seem that violent 
trauma was comparatively rare among early modern humans, or at 
least those known from the Upper Paleolithic of Europe. With so few 
skeletons available, it is not possible to calculate anything like a homi-
cide rate with any hope of accuracy. But although appropriate evidence 
is in extremely short supply, violence among Upper Paleolithic modern 
humans seems to have been on par with that known among the less 
violent modern human hunter-gatherer groups discussed below. Mark 
Nathan Cohen writes:
comparisons do not yet yield any clear trend in the frequency of 
trauma and violence. . . . In general, the skeletal evidence pro-
vides little support for the Hobbesian notion that hunter-gatherer 
life is particularly violent or for the assumption that hunting is 
particularly dangerous. But there is also no support for the prop-
osition recently debated in anthropology that hunter-gatherers 
are particularly nonviolent people. (Cohen 1989: 116)
Archaeologists regularly unearth Paleolithic skeletons, and so, hope 
exists that the available evidence will improve. Even if Paleolithic 
human foragers were more violent than what we have inferred from 
the scant skeletal evidence, another comparison is clearer: subsequent 
human societies were much more violent. This conclusion is implied 
by what is absent from the Paleolithic human skeletal record: evidence 
of warfare—group violence on a larger scale. This evidence begins to 
appear at just about the same time that the fi rst agricultural societies 
emerged, as the Paleolithic and Pleistocene eras end and the Neolithic 
and Holocene eras begin.
One terminal Paleolithic site seems to have been a kind of turn-
ing point in the history of human violence: Jebel Sahaba in Sudan 
(Wendorf 1968). Dating to approximately 13,000 years ago, Jebel 
Sahaba is a mass grave containing fi fty-nine skeletons, a high portion 
of which have projectile points embedded in their bones. Given that 
such injuries show no sign of healing and also given the likelihood 
that many of the other skeletons are from people who died from soft 
tissue injuries that left no marks on their bones, a picture emerges of 
a terminal Paleolithic village that was decimated by a violent attack, 
likely from some outside village. This pattern is consistent with inter-
group warfare. In the words of Beatrice Heuser (2008: 4), before this 
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period, “all archeological evidence of violent death . . . is limited to 
fi nds of single bodies.” She notes that, although inconclusive, such 
evidence, “does not point to warfare which by defi nition is a group 
activity.” Therefore, the pattern found at Jebel Sahaba is the earliest 
conclusive evidence yet found of human warfare—a behavior that 
sadly becomes common later. 
Similarly, Estabrook (2014) notes a signifi cant surge in lethal 
violence following the end of the Upper Paleolithic in Europe. 
For example, the approximately 10,000-year-old Mesolithic site of 
Vasilyevka in the Ukraine contains the remains of seven individuals 
with unhealed lethal wounds and a high frequency of projectile points 
embedded in their bones (Lillie 2004); the Mesolithic site of Ofnet 
in Germany, dating to around 7,500 years ago, contains the remains 
of sixteen skeletons with lethal blunt force trauma, again apparently 
killed in a single violent episode (Frayer 1997). It seems that later 
hunter-gatherer populations in places like the Nile Valley and the rich 
temperate ecosystems of Europe were susceptible to varieties of group 
violence that their Paleolithic ancestors were not. One of these new 
forms of violence was “the mass-killing of unarmed people of all ages 
and sexes” (Heuser 2008: 3).
While the prevalence of violence and warfare may be debated for 
the Paleolithic period, there is wide agreement that the origins of 
farming saw an enormous surge in killing during the Holocene. While 
not universally true of all times and places, the small-scale farming 
societies of the Neolithic in the Old World experienced some striking 
massacres. For example, a recent volume (Schulting and Fibiger 2012) 
reviews in detail the evidence for violence during the Neolithic period 
of Europe. Among the most striking sites reviewed in this volume is 
that of Talheim, Germany, in which the skeletons of thirty-four indi-
viduals covering all categories of age and sex were interred in a mass 
grave (Wahl and Trautmann 2012). This would then appear to have 
been the majority of a village wiped out in some episode of extreme 
violence, and the injuries present are even located on the backs of 
the murdered individuals, suggesting an unsuccessful attempt to fl ee. 
Once again, this sort of mass violence grew to be uncomfortably com-
mon among early small-scale farming societies.
This description, drawn on evidence from Eurasia and Africa, is 
equally true of the New World. For example, the small-scale farming 
societies located along the arid Pacifi c coast of South America show 
evidence of high rates of violence. This is true both in terms of skeletal 
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evidence, which shows extremely high rates of trauma in certain con-
texts, and also in terms of settlement systems and fortifi cations built 
in response to warfare. For example, a study by Torres-Rouff and 
Costa Junqueira (2006) at the site of San Pedro de Atacama, Chile, 
shows high rates of skeletal trauma among local farming populations 
over the course of the last two millennia. Furthermore, this sequence 
was apparently punctuated by a few episodes of extremely high rates 
of violence, which Torres-Rouff and Costa Junqueira correlated with 
major droughts and other environmental crises. Similarly, patterns of 
prehistoric change along the Pacifi c coast of South America are domi-
nated by shifting settlement patterns focused on increasingly defensi-
ble upland positions and by the construction of elaborate fortifi cations 
(Arkush and Stanish 2005). Evidently, the fear of violence and warfare 
was very much on the minds of the peoples in this region as they made 
decisions about where and how to live. Finally, this discussion also 
ignores the sometimes shocking instances of torture and sacrifi ce that 
also occurred with increasing frequency as South American farming 
societies grew in size and complexity (Verano 2001). 
To some extent a trend is recognizable: “the prevalence of war-
fare among foragers correlates strongly with sedentism, the storage of 
food, high population densities, perimeter defense territorial systems, 
social inequality, and relatively rich foraging environments” (McCall 
2009: 161). The increasingly packed populations common during the 
transition from the Pleistocene to the Holocene were concentrated 
into the world’s fi rst sedentary villages and therefore uniquely prone 
to food shortages and periods of starvation. This kind of situation 
appears to have been a recipe for violence in subsequent generations.
The same trend continues among non-state agricultural societies: 
as population density increases, violence and warfare tend to increase. 
The most violent stateless societies tend to be tightly packed communi-
ties with populations not quite dense enough to make a state likely to 
form. Johnson and Earle (2000: 34, 170) consider some explanations 
for this trend: once people can no longer avoid confl icts by moving 
elsewhere, they more often are forced to settle confl icts by violence. 
Aggressive men become a valuable asset rather than dangerous people 
to be around. Once chiefdoms or states form, an entirely new motiva-
tion for violence appears: territorial expansion. If this analysis is cor-
rect, the trend of decreasing violence Pinker documents is the reversal 
of an earlier trend of increasing violence that began long before the 
formation of the fi rst states. Although the declining-violence trend has 
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by now probably led to the least violent period in human history, the 
trend did not immediately appear as soon as the fi rst states were estab-
lished, nor does it extend into the period surrounding the establishment 
of states as Pinker implies. Once states are fi rmly established, they can 
and sometimes do reduce violence to very low levels. This statement 
is certainly true of most contemporary states but not of earlier states.
The most violently disruptive episodes in history tend to be asso-
ciated with the formation of states and the expansion of state-level 
forms of political organization into formerly stateless regions. Most 
other major violently disruptive episodes are associated with con-
fl icts between, the breakup of, and turmoil within states. Early states 
and empires are perhaps the most violent and warlike contexts in 
which humans have ever lived. The pervasiveness of violence among 
early states may, in fact, render any kind of meaningful review here 
futile. Archaeological evidence including mass graves, high frequen-
cies of skeletal trauma, the construction of defensive architecture, the 
destruction and burning of settlements, and the presence of special-
ized weapons of war is well-known for the primary states of ancient 
Egypt, Mesopotamia, the early civilizations of the Indus valley, and 
ancient China. This archaeological evidence is also supported by early 
historical accounts from subsequent ancient states, including roots of 
the Western tradition in Greece and Rome. Not only is the Trojan War 
the earliest story in Western literature, Troy is known archaeologically 
to have been the location of intense confl ict that recurred periodically 
over the course of centuries (Wood 1985); confl ict which included 
total confl agration and mass murder. Cohen writes:
There is no evidence either from ethnographic accounts or 
archaeological excavations to suggest that rates of accidental 
trauma or interpersonal violence declined substantially with the 
adoption of more civilized forms of political organization. In 
fact, some evidence from archaeological sites and from historical 
sources suggests the opposite. (Cohen 1989: 132)
This situation is no different in the New World, where the archaeology 
of early civilizations like the Maya city-states of Mesoamerica and the 
Wari empire of Peru clearly shows evidence for periods of extreme war-
fare (Webster 2000; Tung 2007). The extremely brutal violence of the 
Aztec empire is known from a wide range of sources including colonial 
historical documents, Aztec codices, architectural iconography, and 
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various aspects of the archaeological record. In the space of decades, it 
expanded through warfare, the conquest of neighboring territories, and 
the extraction of tribute. It sacrifi ced perhaps hundreds of thousands of 
human victims, many of whom were captured in the conquest of neigh-
boring territories, at least some of which had previously been stateless 
(Carrasco 2000). Although Hobbes might not have recognized the Aztec 
or Wari empires as civilized peoples, they fi t the defi nition he and most 
subsequent political theorists have used for sovereign states.
Historical and archaeological records of more recent states are also 
fi lled with some extreme instances of violence and warfare. Even the 
English Civil War, which Hobbes considered to be an instance of unac-
ceptable violence by virtue of the absence of a state authority, was not 
unprecedented in its barbarity relative to earlier periods of European 
history representing the normal operation of the state. 
In certain instances, murder rates can be calculated for such his-
torical contexts based on written crime records. Eisner (2001) esti-
mates regional murder rates for Western European countries during 
the thirteenth to fi fteenth centuries ranging between 23/100,000 and 
73/100,000 person-years. (Rates such as this are usually reported 
per 100,000 person-years because they are typical only a small frac-
tion of a percent. Hereafter we present rates in the following form: 
23/100,000.) This rate is much higher than any of the national murder 
rates for countries included in this region at present, though it is fairly 
similar to the murder rates for the most violent modern cities in the 
world today. It also parallels many of the relatively violent countries 
in the developing world. 
In addition to these statistics concerning what we might call 
“ordinary” crime, medieval Europe was frequently struck by grue-
some and brutal warfare. For example, Fiorato et al. (2007) describe 
archaeological excavations of a mass grave in the town of Towton in 
England. Their excavations revealed the bodies of forty-three individ-
uals with skeletal trauma resulting from lethal injuries incurred dur-
ing a particularly bloody battle in the War of the Roses in which as 
many as 28,000 people may have died. The study also showed vivid 
examples of the mutilations of corpses and other forms of brutality 
sadly familiar to more recent periods of genocidal war. The violence 
of the War of the Roses was not exceptional for its day. It was closer 
to the rule for pre-industrial Europe, which was pervaded by similar 
instances of wholesale confl ict. Furthermore, again for the sake of 
expediency, we will ignore many other similar examples too expansive 
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to review adequately here. To be brief, for the most part, Europe over 
the last two millennia, which has been dominated by sovereign states, 
has been a very dangerous place indeed.
Even as Pinker’s trend in declining violence fi nally began within 
Europe 500 or so years ago, many European nations began export-
ing violence through imperialism. The expansion of state-level forms 
of socio-political organization into formerly stateless environments 
is often associated with a demographic collapse of the indigenous 
peoples. The indigenous population of the Americas declined by at 
least 90 percent and perhaps as much as 98 percent following Euro-
pean conquest, and many entire communities disappeared (Stannard 
1993: 125). Cortez was no more a benefi t to the people living under 
Aztec rule than the Aztec rulers had been to the peoples they con-
quered. In colonial Africa hundreds of millions of people lost their 
lives to forced labor (Hochschild 1999). Hobbes, Locke, Kant, and 
Bastiat—and other writers affi rming the Hobbesian hypothesis dur-
ing European expansion—might have lived in states that were more 
violent overall than the stateless societies they were in the process of 
pacifying. We doubt that conclusive evidence exists but the relative 
violence of the colonial powers is well-established (Stannard 1993).
None of the evidence we present refutes the claim that states have the 
ability to create a zone of peace with very low levels of violence. Many 
contemporary states now establish peace very effectively. According 
to data from a recent study of global mortality by Rafael Lozano et al. 
(2012: 2109), the worldwide rate of death by interpersonal violence 
was 6.6/100,000. That is, the average community of 100,000 people 
will have 6.6 homicides in one year. The global suicide (self-harm) rate 
was 13.1/100,000, making for a rate of 19.7/100,000 for total vio-
lent deaths worldwide. Lozano (2012: 2109) also showed that inter-
personal violence declined by 1 percent and overall violence declined 
by 6.9 percent between 1990 and 2010. According to the United 
Nations Offi ce on Drugs and Crime (UNODC 2013), in the United 
States, the murder rate currently stands at around 4.5/100,000; in the 
other developed nations without easy access to fi rearms, this fi gure is 
considerably lower (for example, the murder rate for Japan in 2011 
was 0.3/100,000). The 500-year-old trend that Pinker recognizes (see 
Chapter 8) is real and continuing. But it is not the whole story.
Although states can, and lately most of them do, create zones of 
peace, they also create new dangers. One of the authors of this book 
elsewhere argues that the prevalence of interpersonal violence in so 
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many different kinds of societies from the deep past to the present 
indicates that there is an evolutionary psychological basis for aggres-
sive behavior. However, the manifestations of this innate tendency have 
radically transformed over time (McCall and Shields 2008; McCall 
2009: 162). As societies transition from bands to villages to chiefdoms 
to states, patterns of violence that are not a part of the human evolu-
tionary record come into existence. A tendency that had manifested as 
small-scale and relatively dispersed interpersonal violence, now some-
times becomes manifested as warfare, the targeting of unarmed people 
of both sexes and all ages, genocide, democide, terrorism, aerial bom-
bardment, drone strikes, and so on (Rummel 1994). 
And these new dangers have created zones of extreme violence 
within state society. Estimates indicate that more than 4 percent of the 
population of France died as the result of military engagements dur-
ing the four years of the First World War (Huber 1931). This works 
out to be a violent death rate of around 900/100,000. Furthermore, if 
only fi ghting-age men were considered (who constituted virtually all 
of the military deaths), the violent death rate would go up to a rate far 
exceeding any value known for even the most violent hunter-gatherer 
societies. And this says nothing of European states such as Serbia, 
where violent death rates during the First World War were probably 
many times greater than those known for France (Hersch 1927).
The First World War is a mild example compared with the geno-
cides that have become common in the last several centuries. The 
Holocaust, for example, resulted in the death of nearly two-thirds 
of the Jewish population of Europe; a violent death rate of easily 
more than 10,000/100,000 (Rummel 1994). Likewise, in a matter of 
months, the Rwandan genocide of 1994 resulted in the death of per-
haps 20 percent of the total Rwandan population (20,000/100,000), 
and 70 percent of the Tutsi population (70,000/100,000) (Kuperman 
2000). There are many more we could name. The Bengal famine at the 
end of the British colonial period was well-documented by Amartya 
Sen (1981: 53), but we could also add Cambodia under Pol Pot, China 
under Mao, the Soviet Union under Stalin, the Belgian Congo under 
Leopold II, England under Henry VIII, and so on.
In summary, a clear trend is diffi cult to prove. The preponderance of 
evidence indicates that violence levels gradually increased toward the 
end of the Pleistocene through the formation of the fi rst states as popu-
lations grew and polities increased their scale. They remained high for 
millennia and have greatly decreased in the last few centuries, probably 
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to levels lower than in the Pleistocene, but that peace is punctuated 
with particularly violent episodes.
However, even if we cannot establish a clear trend over time in 
the pervasiveness of violence, at a minimum, it is clear that there are 
contexts within both states and stateless societies that are extremely 
violent, and there are contexts within both states and stateless societ-
ies in which violence is much rarer. 
2. ETHNOGRAPHIC EVIDENCE OF VIOLENCE IN MODERN 
SMALL-SCALE, STATELESS SOCIETIES
About the time of the Man the Hunter conference in 1966, ethnogra-
phers fi nally started the diffi cult effort to systematically collect demo-
graphic information about hunter-gatherer societies. Ethnographers 
had to live with band societies for fairly long periods of time, and 
take account of the number of births and deaths. Some ethnographers 
extended the reach of their demographic accounts by asking the current 
members of the band about past members of the band, and from the 
answers, trying to piece together an account of when people were born, 
how long they lived, and how they died. For some bands, researchers 
using this method have collected very detailed data covering nearly a 
century (Hill and Hurtado 1996). For most bands, researchers have 
only been able to collect much more limited data. In some cases, statis-
tics are based on as little as a few years of observation.
This era has not been an easy time to collect such data. By the 1960s, 
the vast majority of band societies that had ever existed had long been 
incorporated into nation-states and had ceased to practice their tra-
ditional lifestyle or to function autonomously. Most of the remaining 
groups were under considerable demographic pressure and were disap-
pearing rapidly. The result is that only a few spotty records are avail-
able, and most of those records are of peoples in their last generation(s) 
as stateless societies or already in a gradual process of incorporation 
into state societies. Records of the last generation of a band might not 
be representative of a typical generation in that band or of a typical 
band society. But we don’t exactly know how they might differ. They 
might be experiencing the benefi ts of state institutions or the harm of 
state territorial encroachment. They might have changed over time in 
ways that have nothing to do with their proximity to states but that 
nevertheless make them signifi cantly different from earlier generations 
of nomadic foragers.
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Yet, these few spotty, potentially unrepresentative records are the 
only demographic records we have—and possibly the only demographic 
records that we will ever have. Very few stateless societies are left. Some 
of those that remain uncontacted are probably intentionally avoiding 
contact. Modern hunter-gatherers often maintain their economic status 
by virtue of their exclusion from more mainstream means of production 
(Wilmsen 1989). By the end of the twentieth century many anthropolo-
gists had begun to look at the ethnographic investigation of newly con-
tacted tribes as a potentially harmful step toward colonization. Little 
ethnography of band societies is still being conducted, and so there is 
little hope for a major improvement of our ethnographic records of this 
lifeway. Therefore, not only are the conclusions we draw from the evi-
dence presented below tentative, we can expect that conclusions about 
life in band societies might always be tentative.
One of the earliest and most famous of the post-Man the Hunter 
investigations was conducted by Richard Lee (1979). He found that the 
Ju/’hoansi, who had been labeled “the harmless people” by Thomas 
(1959), actually had a violent death rate of around 29.3/100,000 (see 
Chapter 8). Later, the East African Hadza, a group that Woodburn 
(1979) had found to be peaceful, were found by Blurton Jones et al. 
(2002: 196) to have a violent death rate of around 40/100,000. Find-
ings such as these surprised many hunter-gatherer researchers, because 
these two groups were often held up as exemplars of peaceful foraging 
communities. Two groups thought to be less violent than most con-
temporary Western states turned out to be substantially more violent. 
Not only were the Ju/’hoansi not “harmless people,” their homicide 
rate was nearly three times the rate for the United States as a whole at 
that time (10.7/100,000) and about the same as one of its most violent 
cities (Detroit with 58.2/100,000) (Knauft 1987: 464). 
Contrary observations notwithstanding, Lee’s (1979) study now 
seems to have been the tip of the iceberg for fi ndings of violence in 
small-scale stateless societies. Many modern hunter-gatherer and hor-
ticultural societies have been observed to have much higher levels of 
violence than the Ju/’Hoansi. Some small-scale societies have shock-
ingly high rates of violence. Such observations forever undermined the 
“harmless people” myth (Thomas 1959), which might actually have 
its roots in Enlightenment-era views about savagery and barbarism.
Kim Hill et al. (2007) estimate that the violent death rate for the 
Hiwi of Venezuela is around 1,018/100,000—more than thirty times 
higher than the violent death rate documented among the Ju/’hoansi 
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and far more violent than even the most violent cities in the world 
today. Furthermore, other similar studies among the Ache of Paraguay, 
the Yanomamö of Brazil, the Agta of the Philippines, and a number of 
highland horticultural groups of New Guinea have all yielded results 
comparable to those found for the Hiwi and many orders of magni-
tude greater than those of most modern states (Headland 1989; Hill 
and Hurtado 1996; Keeley 1996; Early and Headland 1998; Blurton 
Jones et al. 2002; Hill et al. 2007). Thus, some very violent stateless 
societies—both at the band level and at the autonomous village level 
of organization—have been observed through ethnographic research 
during the twentieth and twenty-fi rst centuries.
On top of this, there are also a number of hunter-gatherers and other 
small-scale societies that have high levels of what has sometimes been 
called “primitive warfare” (Pitt-Rivers 1867; Pitt-Rivers 1906; Turney-
High 1949; Hallpike 1973; Keeley 1996; Gat 1999; Ferguson 2000). 
This term, which basically refers to violence carried out between distinct 
social groups at more of a regional spatial scale, has frequently been 
invoked as the evolutionary ancestor of the forms of warfare known 
between nation-states in the modern world (Keeley 1996; Gat 1999; 
Ferguson 2000; Bowles 2009; Pinker 2012). In an early consideration 
of this issue, Ember (1978) found that, while some societies like the 
Ju/’hoansi basically lack intergroup aggression altogether, the majority 
of observed hunter-gatherer societies experience warfare events with 
considerable frequency (i.e. more than once every two years). Thus, this 
study and its subsequent counterparts demonstrated another signifi cant 
source of violent death among modern hunter-gatherers.
However, ethnographers have also observed band societies with low 
levels of violence. Although the quality of the evidence varies, band 
societies with little or no recorded violence and little or no evidence of 
violence have been observed in diverse climates and terrains all over the 
world. These include several neighboring and/or related groups in the 
Malay Peninsula, the Batek, the Chewong, the Semai, and the Semang; 
the Buid of the Philippines; the Paliyan of India; the G/wi of south-
west Africa; the Mbuti of central Africa; the Polar Inuit of northern 
Greenland; the Shoshone and the Paiute of the western United States; 
the Bakairi of Brazil; and the Mardudjara of Australia (Silberbauer 
1981: 174–5; Keeley 1996: 30–1; Bonta 1997: 317–20; Gardner 2000: 
93–9; Gurven and Kaplan 2007: 241; Endicott and Endicott 2008: 50; 
Kelly 2013: 202). The Chewong, for example, have no mythology of 
violence and no words for quarreling, fi ghting, aggression, or warfare 
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(Howell 1984: 34–7; Bonta 1997: 318). Their neighbors, the Batek, 
have similar norms. Kirk Endicott and Karen Endicott (2008: 50) 
described hearing from a Batek man how his ancestors had fl ed from 
rather than confronted slave-raiders in their territory years earlier. Kirk 
Endicott asked why their ancestors had not shot the attackers with 
poisoned blowpipe darts. Endicott wrote, “The man looked shocked 
at the question, ‘Because it would kill them!’”
With caution we reproduce data from two tables summarizing 
violence estimates for small-scale stateless societies. Table 9.1 uses 
data from Robert L. Kelly’s (1995: 203) synthesis of hunter-gatherer 
cultural variability. It compiles homicide rates from the fi ndings of 
several different ethnographic studies of violence in hunter-gatherer 
societies. Kelly reports very different fi gures for the Hadza and the 
Ju/’Hoansi than we mention above. He explains the difference in each 
case. His fi gure for the Ju/’Hoansi (42/100,000) is higher than Lee’s 
fi gure for that group (29.3/100,000), because Lee (1979) counts the 
period both before and after murders virtually ceased because of the 


















Source: Adapted from Table 7-8: Hunter-gatherer homicide 
rates (Kelly 1995: 203)
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infl uence of an outside police force, while Kelly reports fi gures only 
before that change. Kelly’s fi gure for the Hadza (6.6/100,000) is far 
lower than Blurton Jones’s fi gure (40/100,000) because Kelly chose to 
exclude while Blurton Jones (2002) chose to include three murders of 
Hadza committed by outsiders—the Datoga people, who were a rela-
tively larger-scale society with closer ties to the state. Only four Hadza 
homicides were reported during the study period, but because of the 
small population size, the decision to include or exclude three murders 
committed by outsiders accounts for the enormous jump from 6.6 to 
40 when extrapolated to a rate per 100,000 person-years (Lee 1979; 
Kelly 1995: 203; Blurton Jones et al. 2002: 196).
Kelly does not make a similar adjustment for the Hiwi or the 
Ache, even though these fi gures include suicide, infanticide, and mur-
ders by Venezuelans (Hiwi) or by Paraguayans (Ache). Of course, 
Venezuelans and Paraguayans are people from state societies. Accord-
ing to Hill and Hurtado (1996: 159), who conducted the study of the 
Ache, only 40 percent of Ache violence was attributed to internal 
violence and that included infanticide; 60 percent was attributable to 
external confl ict with Paraguayans or non-Ache indigenous people. 
Excluding outsider confl icts would, therefore, drop the Ache fi gure 
from 500/100,000 to 200/100,000. Of course, one cannot say what 
would have happened to the Ache without the encroachment of Para-
guayans. Perhaps the confl icts with Paraguayans would have been 
replaced by equally violent confl icts with other stateless peoples; or 
perhaps those confl icts would have disappeared. Perhaps their con-
fl icts with other indigenous people would have increased with the 
indirect infl uence of state power, or perhaps they would have reduced 
without the pressure of state encroachment.
Territorial encroachment is not the only state infl uence that might 
increase violence. For example, consider alcohol, which is absent 
in almost all hunter-gatherer societies without signifi cant ties to a 
state society. According to Kelly (1995: 203), alcohol was a signifi -
cant contributing factor in fi ve of the eleven murders among the 
San Ildefonso Agta. If we could imagine that these murders simply 
would not have happened without the alcohol, their homicide rate 
of 129/100,000 would drop to roughly 70/100,000. If we further 
subtracted two murders by outsiders, the rate would drop again to 
roughly 55/100,000. But, of course, we cannot know what would 
have happened in the absence of the alcohol introduced by outsiders 
5200_Widerquist.indd   146 25/11/16   10:32 AM
Empirical Assessment of the Violence Hypothesis 147
or the murders committed by outsiders. Ethnography has accumu-
lated only limited information about life in societies outside of direct 
state authority, and since all ethnographers are from state societies, 
ethnography is inherently incapable of observing societies beyond all 
state infl uence.
Michael Gurven and Hillard Kaplan (2007: 341) use a different sort 
of statistic to compare violence rates in Table 9.2. They report homi-
cides as a percentage of all deaths rather than in relation to person-
years. Their study uses a different sample of stateless societies, some 
of which are horticulturalists living at a slightly larger scale than the 
hunter-gatherer bands in Kelly’s table, but all (except the settled Ache 
added for reference) lived essentially in stateless conditions. Despite 
these differences, a similar pattern is evident in both tables. There is 
a wide range of violence from very low to very high levels. In Table 
9.2, the percentage of deaths from violence ranges from 0 to more 
than 50 percent. The typical group in Gurven and Kaplan’s study com-
pares unfavorably with typical state societies today. A contemporary 
study of the causes of death in state societies found that there were 
456,300 deaths from interpersonal violence out of 52,769,700 total 
deaths worldwide in the year 2010. Simple division gives 0.8 percent 
of deaths from interpersonal violence for the world as a whole in 
2010. Adding the 1,340,000 deaths from self-harm (i.e. suicide) to the 
number of deaths from interpersonal violence gives 2.54 percent of all 
deaths from violence. Suicide tends to be very low or even negligible in 
stateless societies, and as mentioned above, it is often included in vio-
lence statistics of hunter-gatherer societies. Even including suicide as 
violence for state societies, the levels of violence in all but one of these 
stateless societies is higher than the global average of state societies 
(Lozano 2012: 2105–9). 
Table 9.2 suffers from the same diffi culty with the Hiwi and Ache 
data as Kelly’s table (Table 9.1). The fi gures include suicide, infanticide, 
and murders by outsiders. Although violence of one form or another 
accounts for 30.2 percent of all Hiwi deaths, murders by the Hiwi 
themselves account for only 7 percent of all deaths (Kelly 2013: 204).
Gurven and Kaplan’s (2007: 341) table reports an average of 12.5 
percent of deaths from violence, nearly fi ve times as high as the global 
average including suicides for state societies in 2010. Readers should 
be cautious about interpreting the table’s average. As Gurven and 
Kaplan point out, it is only the “percent of all deaths in study.” The 
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study does not contain a statistically representative group of all state-
less society, and so the average is highly infl uenced by the groups that 
happen to be in the study.
Kelly does not even report an average for his table, probably 
because it would be so highly infl uenced by the particular societies 
that happen to be included. As we have said, the observed stateless 
societies are likely to differ from typical stateless societies in ways 
we do not understand. Notice that both studies include one society 
with very low levels of violence, but each study includes a different 
low-violence society. Kelly (1995) includes the Batek from Malaysia; 
Gurven and Kaplan (2007) include the Bakairi of Brazil. Had both of 
these studies included both of these groups, they would have given 
an impression that stateless societies with extremely low levels of 
violence were twice as common. As mentioned above, several other 
observed stateless societies also have extremely low levels of violence. 
Had some of these been included in either study, it would have given 
an impression of much lower “typical” rates of violence. But, there are 
also other violent societies that might have been included.
This issue also affects the interpretation of a study by Wrangham 
et al. (2006: 19), who calculate the “median annual mortality from 
Table 9.2 Percentage of deaths from violence
Group







Northern Territory Aborigines 5.7
Tsimane 7.5




Number of violent deaths in study 354
Source: Adapted from Table 5: Causes of death among study popu-
lations (in percent) (Gurven and Kaplan 2007: 341)
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intergroup aggression [for thirteen foraging societies] at 164 deaths 
per 100,000.” This study includes only two stateless societies with lit-
tle or no intergroup aggression. According to Kelly (2013: 206), there 
are at least thirteen documented societies with little or no intergroup 
aggression. Adding eleven societies without warfare from Kelly’s study 
into Wrangham et al.’s study would cause the median to drop from 
164/100,000 to 20/100,000. Thus, selective sampling can clearly infl u-
ence the outcome of this sort of study. Likewise, Bruce Knauft (1987: 
464) lists several (mostly horticulturalist) stateless societies that have 
high rates of violence and that do not appear in the aforementioned 
studies. Including some of these would have driven the median at least 
partly back up. We do not mean to imply that 20/100,000 is the “right” 
fi gure. There are not enough good demographic studies of representa-
tive groups to draw many fi rm conclusions about rates of violence.
Two simplifi cations that we have made so far might well exagger-
ate the relative violence of stateless societies. We have used homicides 
as our only measure of violence, and we have lumped all homicides 
together. We have done so partly because homicides are fairly easy to 
count in stateless societies, but we should consider some of the prob-
lems of this focus.
Bands’ homicide levels tend to be higher than their levels of 
most other crimes and other forms of violence. They have virtually 
no property crime, and nonlethal violence tends to be low. Some 
researchers argue that rape and other forms of violence targeting 
women are relatively low in band societies (Leacock 1998; Boehm 
2001). Lee (1982) argues that women in band society have high 
political equality and personal autonomy, which might account for 
low rates of violence. Among the Ju/’hoansi, for example, a woman 
being targeted by a man (including a spouse) can ask the group for 
protection, and women and men will join equally in the discussion 
of what to do (Draper 1975; Lee 1979; Lee 1982; Howell 2010). 
Many state societies have not given this level of resource to women, 
even today. Larger and more complex societies tend to have propor-
tionately greater gender inequality, apparently in proportion to their 
level of hierarchy (Barnard and Woodburn 1988: 19; Kelly 1995: 
298–300; Leacock 1998: 139, 141, 147; Woodburn 1998: 61; Lee 
and Daly 1999: 5; Boehm 2001: 93; Endicott and Endicott 2008: 50, 
59, 63). One possible reason is that violent males become a valued 
asset in the context of intergroup confl ict, which is more common 
among complex agricultural societies. 
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Lumping all homicides together ignores the moral distinctions 
that most state societies make between many different categories of 
homicide such as murder, manslaughter, justifi able homicide, negli-
gent homicide, non-negligent homicide, wrongful death, accidental 
death, suicide, death in war, and executions. Band societies have not 
historically operated within legal systems that make these distinctions. 
Ethnographers are understandably cautious about making the moral 
judgments needed to disaggregate existing information on homicides 
in stateless societies into all these categories to make for fully compa-
rable fi gures. 
One aspect of the homicide issue makes them harder to count in 
state societies. Although in bands, it is often very easy to tell whether 
a death (even an accidental death) is a homicide, it is not as easy in 
state society. Poisonings that pass for illness and murders that pass as 
accidents are obvious examples. But perhaps the largest example is the 
policy-related death by seemingly natural causes. Deaths from famine, 
starvation, and severe malnutrition are rare among hunter-gatherer 
societies. Within states, such deaths are usually attributable to policy 
decisions, often those that make food unaffordable to some rather 
than unavailable to all (Sen 1981). In modern states, famines often 
stem from disregard of policy effects (more akin to negligent homicide 
than murder), but they have also been used intentionally as large-scale 
weapons of war (Snyder 2012). The inherent preventability of many 
poverty-related deaths in state society is a good reason to consider 
them to be akin to violence.
Similarly, cancer and other diseases are often caused by toxins that 
only appear as the byproducts of state societies, but statistics seldom, 
if ever, classify cancer deaths as “homicides”—or even “accidental 
homicides.” If they did, the homicide rate in state societies would be 
much higher than what is common reported. By comparison, in band 
societies, most deaths from negligence are easily recognizable. All of 
these issues make statistics very hard to compare between band and 
state societies. 
Many homicides in stateless societies are essentially executions. 
Band societies have few punishment options available and few ways 
to protect themselves from a truly dangerous individual. They can-
not imprison criminals. The main punishments available to bands are: 
ridicule, criticism, abandonment, and execution (Boehm 2001: 84). 
One might expect corporal punishment, but it seems to be absent from 
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ethnographic reports. We suspect the reason is explained by some-
thing Hobbes (1962 [1651]: 98) got right. He argued that people are 
suffi ciently equal in strength that even the weakest are capable of kill-
ing the strongest either by conspiracy or by waiting until the stronger 
person is sleeping or otherwise vulnerable. In a small-scale society, 
corporal punishment might foster lingering resentments and the cycles 
of retaliation that Hobbes so feared.
Criticism and ridicule obviously have limits against a truly dan-
gerous person. Abandonment works in some circumstances, but if 
the group suspects that a dangerous person will follow them if they 
attempt to abandon that person, the only remaining way they have to 
protect themselves is execution. Some bands, such as the Batek and 
the Chewong, claim never to have executed anyone, and ethnogra-
phers have reported no evidence of homicides among them (Howell 
1984: 37; Endicott 1988; Bonta 1997: 317–18; Endicott and Endicott 
2008: 50). But most observed bands, despite their ethic of nonvio-
lence, will kill a person they judge to be truly dangerous. We should 
expect a higher execution rate among nomadic foragers because they 
lack alternatives. 
Another diffi cult ethical issue appears because much of the vio-
lence in small-scale stateless societies is infanticide (Lee 1990; Hill and 
Hurtado 1996: 159–66, 467–8; Lee and Daly 1999: 1, 5). The issue 
of infanticide has been controversial since the time of Man the Hunter 
and it remains a diffi cult one today. While once considered virtually 
universal among hunter-gatherer societies, we now know that infan-
ticide is not uniformly high, and it is rare in a number of key cases 
(Gurven and Kaplan 2007: 342). Yet, it is a large contributing factor 
to the high homicide rates reported above. Obviously, there are many 
explanations that might account for this variability in infanticide 
rates, spanning a broad range of controversial potential demographic 
and cultural causes. What we can say is that infanticide does infl uence 
the murder rates of some of the key ethnographic cases at the extreme 
end of the violence spectrum and that infanticide is not a form of 
violence that relates very directly with the violence hypothesis as an 
element of the Hobbesian hypothesis. The motivation for signing the 
social contract for both Hobbes and Kant relies on a climate of fear 
that develops when people who are equally able to kill each other (i.e. 
adults) are continually at war with each other (Hobbes 1962 [1651]: 
98). Infanticide simply doesn’t fi t that model of violence. It seems 
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capable of contributing only to the weak violence hypothesis but not 
the strong violence hypothesis.
We know of no anthropologists who have formally tried to disag-
gregate the data, but Hill and Hurtado (1996) have looked at the 
issue informally. Their study of the Ache showed revealed a very high 
overall homicide rate (see above), but Hill and Hurtado (1996: 163) 
write, “Only four cases of ‘adult’ homicide (unsanctioned by the social 
group) took place in the past century.” That is, taking out deaths in 
warfare (much of which was with people from state society), child 
homicide, infanticide, and the band’s equivalent of execution, only 
four intra-group adult homicides remain in a 100-year period. Ache 
life might be violent, but it is far from the war of all-against-all pre-
dicted by Hobbesian theory. 
3. THE CONSENSUS VIEW OF VIOLENCE IN 
STATELESS SOCIETIES
Although disagreements on some issues remain, we believe that in 
recent decades anthropologists have settled into a broad consensus 
about the level of violence in stateless society, and we believe that rec-
ognition of how little we know is central to it. A claim of consensus is 
somewhat forward, but we make it with six simple statements:
1 Levels of violence in observed small-scale stateless societies vary 
considerably, with recorded homicide rates ranging from less 
than 1/100,000 to more than 1,000/100,000.
2 Although some observed small-scale stateless societies have had 
lower incidences of violence than contemporary state societies, 
most observed small-scale stateless societies have had substan-
tially higher rates of violence than contemporary states but not 
necessarily higher than all or most past state societies.
3 Ethnographic observations are insuffi cient to say that we know 
what the typical level of violence in small-scale stateless societ-
ies is in general, because (a) few good observations exist, and 
because (b) observed small-scale stateless societies are not a 
representative sample of all stateless societies that have existed 
since the appearance of modern humans 200,000 years ago 
or even of those that have existed since the beginning of the 
Holocene 12,000 years ago.
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4 Archaeological and historical evidence is insuffi cient either 
alone or in combination with ethnographic evidence to say that 
we know what the typical level of violence in small-scale state-
less societies is in general.
5 Available evidence is suffi cient to reject the claim that small-
scale stateless societies are always or almost always essentially 
peaceful.
6 Available evidence is suffi cient to reject the claim that small-
scale stateless societies are always or almost always excessively 
violent.
The fi rst of these statements is probably the most controversial, as 
some researchers might suggest that the very low homicide rates in 
certain societies would have been higher had they been observed for 
longer periods or had modern state policing not been present. In con-
trast, we doubt that any contemporary anthropologist would reject 
this or any of the other fi ve statements outright, and while there is 
controversy about the specifi c details of each of these points, there is 
a broader consensus about their generalities.
Of course, this is primarily a consensus about how little, rather 
than how much, we know. It is a consensus over some very tentative 
statements, but that is what the evidence allows, and we fi nd that all 
or most contemporary anthropologists are willing to live within the 
limits of the available evidence. It seems that only philosophers, politi-
cal theorists, and political practitioners—who do not study stateless 
societies—cling to the belief that several strong, broad claims about 
statelessness are obvious. 
One issue is an illusion of disagreement created by anthropologists’ 
efforts to debunk the extreme views such as either Thomas’s (1959) 
“harmless people” or Chagnon’s (1968) “fi erce people.” Social scien-
tists, such as Hill (1996), Knauft (1987), and Keeley (1996: 29–31) 
have set out to debunk the idea that all or most foragers live in a 
peaceful utopia. Others, such as Woodburn (1982), Endicott (2008: 
66–7), and McCall and Shields (McCall and Shields 2008; McCall 
2009), have set out to debunk the idea that all or most foragers live 
in extreme violence. But all of them have done so by arguing that the 
truth is in the middle. No social scientist we are aware of would con-
tinue to argue for either of the extreme views we reject in statements 
5 and 6. Hill and Hurtado (1996: 151), for example, identify two 
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views: “The pessimists have viewed primitive life as essentially ‘nasty, 
brutish, and short’ (as Hobbes wrote in 1651), while the romantics 
have suggested that primitive peoples can often be characterized as 
living in an ‘original affl uent society.’” Although they recognize the 
original affl uent society as the idea most in need of debunking, they 
state plainly, “Neither view is accurate.”
Even Marshall Sahlins (1968; 1974) was primarily interested in 
debunking the idea that life in foraging societies was intolerably bad. 
He coined the phrase, “the original affl uent society,” which gave many 
people the impression that anthropologists viewed foraging life as a 
utopia or workers’ paradise (largely in terms of leisure but also in 
terms of peacefulness). But according to Kelly:
Sahlins’ primary purpose . . . was to counter the prevailing argu-
ment in anthropology that hunter-gatherers did not have “elabo-
rate culture” because they did not have the time to develop it. . . . 
To overturn this deeply held misconception, Sahlins felt it neces-
sary to use the “most shocking terms possible”—thus the over-
statement of the original affl uent society. (Kelly 1995: 17)
Kelly’s interpretation of Sahlins might be generous, but if the utopian 
view ever became standard in anthropology, it was extremely short-
lived. It had already begun to unravel with Lee’s (1979) monograph 
on the Ju/’hoansi, which was in many ways a modifi cation of his ear-
lier utopian views of Kalahari forager societies. By the 1990s, anthro-
pologists had settled into the cautious and conservative consensus that 
we believe prevails today, even if they are yet to agree which of the 
extreme views still held by laypersons needs more debunking. 
For example, the book you’re reading now and Keeley’s (1996) 
book, War Before Civilization, might seem like polar opposites, like 
Thomas’s (1959) and Chagnon’s (1968) respective “harmless” and 
“fi erce” peoples, but our work and Keeley’s have more in common 
with each other than with either of those. Although we have some 
substantive disagreements with Keeley, the primary difference between 
our book and his is in which extreme view they debunk. While Keeley 
(1996: 31) argues that war—or some scale-analogous form of inter-
group violence—can exist in small-scale societies, his ultimate point is, 
“there is nothing inherently peaceful about hunting-gathering or band 
society.” We agree. Although we have tended to emphasize that band 
societies are not as violent as contractarians claim them to be, we just 
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as strongly oppose the idea that they are inherently or innately peace-
ful. We have no need or desire to claim that they are. Although Keeley 
(1996: 29–31) emphasizes that band societies are more violent than 
what was once believed in a utopian view, he seems to have no need or 
desire to say that they are excessively violent. In fact, he admits to the 
existence of at least six mostly or entirely nonviolent foraging societ-
ies. His position appears to be fully consistent with the six consensus 
issues we mention above.
The second problem that clouds this consensus is that social sci-
entists do disagree substantially about issues for which the evidence 
is less conclusive. One such area of disagreement is worth discussing. 
We have argued that there is strong reason to believe that prehistoric 
band societies had levels of violence comparable to those at the lower 
end of the range in Table 9.1: if not as low as the Chewong and the 
Bakairi, perhaps as low as the Ju/’hoansi or the Hadza. Other hunter-
gatherer researchers tend to think that typical levels of violence must 
have been higher. 
Keeley (1996: 29–31), for example, claims that these few peaceful 
groups identifi ed around the world are exceptional. Likewise, Hill and 
Hurtado (1996: xiv, 165–6, 476–8) are inclined to believe that higher 
homicide rates have tended to be the norm in pre-contact forager soci-
eties, effectively discounting the role that state encroachment and other 
state infl uences might have in increasing violence. Both viewpoints, in 
part, rest on the observation that the prevalence of observed violence 
in small-scale societies before incorporation into a state was usually 
greater than that observed among small-scale societies after inclusion 
into a state. Diamond (2012) makes a similar argument based on the 
differences between small-scale societies in New Guinea before and 
after colonial “pacifi cation,” and he also extends this argument into a 
broader neo-Hobbesian justifi cation of modern states as peacemakers.
We see several fl aws with this argument for the prevalence of vio-
lence among forager societies prior to contact and inclusion in colonial 
states. For one thing, we are actually inclined to believe that homicide 
rates, in fact, tend to spike in the decades just before indigenous societ-
ies come under state authority, both because of violence directly from 
people in state societies and because of an increase of inter-ethnic vio-
lence brought on by territorial pressure and related problems. Rather 
than being inhibited by the presence of the police, murder rates among 
peoples have at times been amplifi ed by dynamics of colonialism and 
the various vagaries of the postcolonial world. 
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Next, inclusion in modern states has likely increased violence in 
other less direct ways. For example, the majority of violent incidents 
in George McCall and Patricia Resick’s (2003) study of the Ju/’hoansi 
occurred under the infl uence of alcohol and happened among popu-
lations that had been resettled in government housing in an urban-
ized setting largely without access to traditional means of economic 
production. From Greenland to Australia, hunter-gatherer societies 
have struggled with these kinds of problems as larger-scale societies 
introduced alcohol into their social context. Drug abuse, poverty, and 
other similar factors have obviously caused enormous social problems 
and we see no reason to think that this situation did anything but 
increase the prevalence of interpersonal violence. Finally, it would be 
both absurd and insulting to suggest that the forcible colonial incor-
poration of small-scale indigenous societies into modern states was 
somehow doing them a favor by reducing violence. 
No one can go back and do ethnographic studies of stateless societ-
ies prior to any territorial pressure from state societies to settle these 
issues defi nitively. We believe that all sides in this debate accept the 
limits of existing knowledge. This disagreement is small relative to 
the more major issues of agreement, especially as they pertain to the 
violence hypothesis in question here. 
4. APPLYING THE ANTHROPOLOGICAL DISCUSSION 
TO THE PHILOSOPHICAL QUESTION
We have so far addressed the violence issue, as social scientists do, by 
asking, what are the levels violence in stateless societies? How do they 
compare with the levels of violence in state societies? We now apply 
the fi ndings above directly to the questions at hand, addressing the 
weak hypothesis in 4A, the strong hypothesis in 4B, and another way 
of reframing the strong hypothesis with reference to the precautionary 
principle in 4C. 
A. The Weak Violence Hypothesis
The complexity of the data reveals how simplifi ed our defi nition of 
the weak violence hypothesis is: violence is lower under the state than 
in stateless society. Consider fi ve examples of what this might mean. 
First, the average of the violence rates of all state societies is lower 
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than the average of all stateless societies. Second, the average of all 
contemporary state societies is lower than the average of all state-
less societies. Third, the average violence rate in the one state being 
justifi ed is lower than the average of all stateless societies. Fourth, 
the violence rates for every recognizable population within the state 
being justifi ed are lower than the average of all state societies. Fifth, 
the violence rates for every recognizable population within the state 
being justifi ed are lower than the lowest violence rate recorded for any 
stateless society.
We suspect that contractarians would initially gravitate to the sec-
ond or third formulation, and in this formulation the weak violence 
hypothesis is likely to be true. But a fairer comparison, more consis-
tent with contractarian logic, would seem to be the fi rst, fourth, or 
perhaps even the fi fth formulation. The fourth formulation might be 
true for most states, but the fi rst and fi fth formulations are much less 
likely to be true. In light of the evidence presented above showing 
a trend of increasing violence along with increasing scale from the 
Pleistocene to the formation of states and showing how long violence 
remained high after the formulation of states, the average state can-
not claim lower violence than the average stateless society. The fi fth 
formulation is probably the most consistent with the idea of justifying 
the state to every rational, reasonable individual, but this is one that 
perhaps no states can pass, not even Japan (see above). 
We have seen that current murder rates in the United States and 
other Western nations are very low by historical standards and that 
some observed hunter-gatherer societies have extremely high violent 
death rates. Even when all of the catastrophic wars and genocides of 
the twentieth and twenty-fi rst centuries are considered and included 
in the calculation of violent death rates, the average person in a 
modern nation-state is probably considerably less likely to die a vio-
lent death than the average person in a small-scale stateless society. 
Although not conclusively proven, this statement is supported by the 
preponderance of the archaeological, historical, and ethnographic 
evidence reviewed above. This is an important advantage of contem-
porary states on average, but to ignore that it doesn’t apply to all 
stateless societies or all states is to employ the fallacy of composition. 
And even taken at face value, this claim can’t play the decisive role 
that Hobbesian claims about violence usually do in the justifi cation 
of the state. 
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B. The Strong Violence Hypothesis
It’s important to remember that the strong violence is the violence 
hypothesis, certainly in Hobbes and Kant and also in many contem-
porary contractarian theories (see Chapters 3–7), and it’s important to 
remember how strong that hypothesis is. In Hobbes’s (1962 [1651]: 100) 
version, it has to be strong enough to give “continual fear [of] the danger 
of violent death.” In Wellman’s (2001: 742) version (350 years later), 
“a stateless environment is a perilous environment devoid of security.” 
It is so high that other benefi ts of social cooperation are impossible and 
the relief from that fear is enough to justify the state even to someone 
who is otherwise very disadvantaged. The strong version requires not 
only that violence in stateless societies is higher or even a lot higher, but 
also that it is beyond some threshold of intolerability. We can rephrase 
this hypothesis in terms of the state: only a sovereign government can 
prevent confl icts from escalating to intolerable violence. 
This claim is so strong that despite the limitation of the data, the 
strong violence hypothesis is clearly disproven. One might be tempted 
to say that in most observed stateless societies violence is not only 
higher, but substantially higher, but even if this is true, a simple differ-
ence—even a substantial difference—in homicide rates is insuffi cient 
to ensure stateless societies have the intolerable violence the hypothe-
sis supposes. Consider the following comparison. In 2011, the murder 
rate in the United States (4.7/100,000) (Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion 2013) was more than fi fteen times as high as the murder rate 
for Japan (0.3/100,000) (UNODC 2013). That’s an enormous and 
inscrutably documented disparity. In relative terms, it is greater than 
the difference between the United States and the Ju/’hoansi. However, 
this disparity is certainly not enough to say that everyone in Japan, 
no matter how poor or underprivileged, is better off than everyone in 
the United States, no matter how wealthy or privileged. It is certainly 
not enough to say that every rational or reasonable person prefers 
life in any position in Japanese society to life in any position in U.S. 
society. Over 300 million people live in the United States. Very few, if 
any, Americans would be willing to give up everything that they have 
in the United States to become—say—a day laborer in Japan just to 
escape the relative danger of America. Even a fi fteen-fold difference in 
homicide rates is just one factor among many. It would be an enor-
mous bait-and-switch to put forward a Hobbesian argument in which 
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the choice is inherently between the state and a war of all-against-all, 
and then accept a simple difference in homicide rates as confi rmation. 
Our objection is not the existence of a threshold of intolerability, 
but we argue that the difference in violence—even taking observed 
levels at face value—is nowhere near the intolerable levels needed to 
sustain the claim that stateless societies are beyond it. 
The fi rst problem is that if most stateless societies are beyond the 
threshold of intolerable violence, so are many subpopulations in pros-
perous states today. It would be extremely diffi cult to argue that all 
contemporary states and all recognizable subgroups within contem-
porary states are above it and that all or most observed small-scale 
stateless societies are below it. Few states have low violence for every 
conceivable population so that they could pass this test. For example, 
in 2013, the murder rate for East St. Louis was around 86/100,000 
(Federal Bureau of Investigation 2013). Therefore, residents of East 
St. Louis, citizens of one of the most affl uent state societies in human 
history, actually have a much greater probability of violent death than 
the Ju/’hoansi, the Hadza, and several other observed hunter-gatherer 
societies. No serious political theorists argue that every resident of 
East St. Louis is necessarily worse off than every resident of some 
lower-crime community in the greater St. Louis metropolitan area, or 
that all remaining people in St. Louis are irrational for not fl eeing to 
one of those communities. 
There are also many modern states with national murder rates that 
exceed those known among the lesser violent non-state societies. For 
example, in 2012, the national murder rate for Honduras exceeded 
90/100,000 (UNODC 2013). San Pedro Sula, Honduras’s second-
largest city, has the ignominious distinction of having the world’s 
highest murder rate of around 169/100,000 (UNODC 2013), a rate 
higher than six of the fourteen stateless societies in Table 9.1 above. 
Raw murder rates for whole nations like Honduras, or even for spe-
cifi c cities like East St. Louis and San Pedro Sula, obscure particularly 
violent contexts within those areas. In other words, we suspect that 
the specifi c violent death rates for the residents of the worst slums of 
San Pedro Sula may indeed approach those of even the most violent 
modern hunter-gatherer societies. 
According to Knauft (1987), the homicide rate among the 
Yanomamö was 165.9/100,000 in the period 1970–4. The overall 
U.S. rate in 1970 was 7.9/100,000. With a violent death rate more 
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than twenty times the U.S. average, Chagnon’s (1968) “fi erce people” 
were held up as an example of Hobbesian state of nature. A contrac-
tarian might argue that there was some threshold between the U.S. 
and Yanomamö levels of violence such that whatever other problems 
the United States had, its greater safety justifi ed the state even to its 
least advantaged individuals. Knauft (1987: 464), however, included a 
statistic that devastates any such argument: the homicide rate among 
black males in Cleveland during the same approximate period (1969–
74) was 142.1/100,000, just a little less than the Yanomamö. The 
Yanomamö could not be sent to jail or to Vietnam (as many black 
males in Cleveland were during this period), and they would be much 
less likely to commit suicide. If the Yanomamö were over the thresh-
old, black males in Cleveland were too. In fact, given the risks other 
than homicide, the black male might fi nd Cleveland more dangerous 
than the Yanomamö—to say nothing of the more peaceful Batek, the 
Paliyan, the Ju/’hoansi, or the Hadza.
The second problem with the strong violence hypothesis is that 
people in stateless societies don’t act the way one would expect people 
to behave in conditions of intolerable violence. Hobbes argued that 
people facing such violence would be unable to develop knowledge of 
the earth, arts, or even “society.” As Chapter 10 will show, people in 
stateless societies—even those with the highest rates of violence—have 
a deep understanding of the land they live on and rich social lives 
with deep cultures involving art, storytelling, music, dance, and so on. 
According to Hill and Hurtado (1996: xii), even among the relatively 
violent Ache, “Joking and happy-go-lucky demeanor were universal.” 
Either they were all irrational, or the level of violence in their society 
was well within tolerable limits. In the racist climate that existed in the 
colonial era, Hobbes, Kant, and other political theorists might have 
been ready to believe that whole races of people were irrational, but 
no reasonable researcher would today.
A similar piece of evidence comes from the behavior of ethnogra-
phers. If violence rates in stateless societies were truly intolerable, eth-
nography would be impossible. Ethnographers do not work in death 
camps or inside cities under siege. When violence reaches intolerable 
levels, they fl ee if they can. They would be irrational to do otherwise. 
The large amount of ethnographic studies of stateless societies attests 
that rational people with experience of state society can and do choose 
to live in stateless societies.
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The Agta, the Ju/’Hoansi, the Hadza, the hunter-gatherer groups 
of the Malay Peninsula, the Bakairi, G/wi, the Polar Inuit, and several 
other societies mentioned above have done what 350 years of a priori 
political theory says is impossible: they have kept violence within tol-
erable limits without a sovereign authority to mediate disputes and 
enforce rules. Therefore, there is a fundamental fl aw in Hobbesian 
reasoning. There is no inherent need for a sovereign government to 
keep the peace. A sovereign is not necessary to keep the peace at all 
times and in all places, as Hobbes’s behavioral model was supposed 
to show. The strong violence hypothesis is simply false. The following 
section considers saving it by revising it to include a precautionary 
principle.
C. The Violence Hypotheses and the Precautionary Principle
One might try to soften the strong hypothesis without resorting to 
the weak hypothesis by changing only the following claim from 
“a stateless environment is a perilous environment devoid of security” 
to “a stateless environment can be a perilous environment devoid of 
security.” One could point to the most violent stateless societies, such 
as the Piegan and the Hiwi (with homicide rates of 1,000/100,000), 
and argue that a precautionary principle prohibits risking the possibil-
ity of ending up like them by accepting life in any stateless society. In 
other words, life is unacceptable in stateless society not because vio-
lence always spirals out of control, but because without a sovereign, 
there is always the chance it might. 
This use of these societies is diffi cult on the face of it, because as 
mentioned above, the stateless societies with the highest homicide rates 
tend to be in close proximity to states; many of their homicides occur 
in the context of attacks by people from the state; and they don’t act 
as if their environments are intolerable. But even accepting them as a 
horrifi c worst-case scenario among band-level stateless societies and 
ignoring any normative problems with this condescending application 
of the precautionary principle, the comparison does not hold up when 
weighed against the dangers of state society.
As Section 1 mentioned, state societies present dangers, such as large-
scale warfare and genocide, which do not exist in small-scale state-
less societies. A contractarian might point out that, although violent 
catastrophes are associated with states, they are often associated with 
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the formation and breakup of states. The essential idea of Hobbesian 
theory was the advice to avoid civil wars by obeying the sovereign. 
There are two problems with this argument. First, there are many cases 
in which massive disobedience to the sovereign does not lead to a spike 
in violence. Many actual instances of civil unrest ultimately lead to posi-
tive change without a concomitant descent into a war of all-against-all.
Second, many of the worst wars, genocides, and famines began not 
with any signifi cant disobedience on the part of subjects but with the 
actions of fully sovereign governments. Consider the three examples 
of high state death rates from Section 1. In France during the First 
World War, the death rate for the nation as a whole was comparable 
to that of the most violent observed stateless societies, the Piegan or 
the Hiwi, and for fi ghting-age males it must have been many times 
higher. The death rate for Jews during the holocaust was roughly ten 
times that for the Hiwi. The death rate among the Rwandan popula-
tion as a whole was twenty times the Hiwi death rate, and the death 
rate among the Tutsi population was seventy times the Hiwi death 
rate (see above). Many genocides happened at a time when the sover-
eign government was at war or under a perceived threat, but in these 
three cases, as in many cases, the sovereign was fi rmly in control over 
the victim population. Hobbes’s advice to obey the sovereign brought 
the opposite of the peace and safety he claimed it would bring.
Again these new dangers do not reverse the trend toward decreas-
ing average violence, but they have created a new risk that never 
existed before. Most likely no individual in the Pleistocene had to live 
through years of sustained fear and violence, as did someone who 
lived in Aleppo during the Syrian Civil War. Perhaps the precaution-
ary principle favors stateless society. States with their monopoly on 
the sanctioned use of force are themselves capable of killing at an 
otherwise unimaginable scale. If you want to create a climate of the 
continual fear of violent death, as Hobbes imagined, you might need 
the power of the state to do it.
5. HOW DO THEY DO IT?
This chapter has presented evidence directly contradicting the prevailing 
theory of sovereignty and statelessness. Contractarian theory incorrectly 
predicts that stateless societies are inherently incapable of maintain-
ing peace. Although we have not specifi cally addressed the behavioral 
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assumptions contractarians use to support that conclusion, any argu-
ment that supports a false conclusion is unsound. However, it’s probably 
worthwhile asking, what’s wrong with the arguments for a perilous state 
of nature? Why don’t stateless societies all erupt into unacceptable vio-
lence? How do real stateless societies maintain peace when 350 years of 
the best available a priori theory of statelessness predicts the impossibil-
ity of suppressing violence with the strategies available to them?
These are immense questions that relate closely to issues that have 
been at the heart of the fi eld of anthropology since the nineteenth cen-
tury, but the anthropological and philosophical discussions have been 
increasingly isolated from each other since about that time. We think 
it is useful to apply ethnographic observations to the contractarian 
theoretical structure, but we can only offer here some brief thoughts 
relative to the enormity of the anthropological literature on this issue.
Recall from Chapter 3 that Hobbes conjectured the advantage in 
confl ict tends to be to the attacker and people are equal enough that 
anyone is able to kill anyone else if they get a signifi cant advantage. 
He considered three motives for attack: (1) gain, (2) fear, and (3) repu-
tation. Later contractarians have added (4) the inability to enforce 
contracts. These motives are plausible, but they don’t seem to be the 
source of many confl icts in the smallest-scale societies.
To understand why, recall some of the features of bands mentioned 
in Chapter 8. Bands are small-scale nomadic societies with no leaders 
or power structure. All of their consumption comes from foraging, 
which they tend to do individually or in small groups, bringing back 
most of it to camp. They do not store food. They habitually underuti-
lize their environments. Under these conditions, the durable goods a 
person can accumulate are limited to what they can carry from camp 
to camp, and anyone who camps with the band is pressured to share 
their durable goods if they are not using them. Nomadic foragers 
insure against hunger by sharing their food with the other foragers in 
camp, so that, hopefully, on the days when one person is unsuccessful 
others will be (McCall and Widerquist 2015). 
In this context, contractual promises (A delivers now; B holds up 
their end of the bargain later) do not exist. If you explained the idea of 
an enforceable contract to a nomadic hunter-gatherer, we suspect they 
would have a hard time understanding why anyone would do such a 
thing. The inability to enforce contracts is neutralized by a society that 
just does not make forward-looking contracts.
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Gain provides very little motive for attack in band society. The 
potential victim doesn’t have much to steal. The entire group can’t 
be expected to have any more food than they can eat before they go 
to bed. Their durable goods (i.e. tools) aren’t terribly valuable and 
everyone in the context knows how to make the tools out of readily 
available materials. Attacking and killing a nearby group of people 
to get tools that you could easily make yourself is absurd, especially 
given that the tools you’ll need to kill them are the same multipurpose 
hunting tools you would presumably be trying to steal. You can only 
carry so many durable goods. And no one is going to want to camp 
with you unless you share the goods you have. The most plausible 
gain one might be able to make from attacking a hunter-gatherer band 
is land, but with habitually underutilized land available, land theft 
isn’t likely to motivate violence between bands. In fact, mobile hunter-
gatherers often maintain territorial systems that are based on complex 
principles of reciprocity and that guarantee mutual access to patches 
of land, especially during times of economic stress (Kelly 1995). Bands 
do fi ght, but ethnographic and historical records reveal few if any 
instances in which they fi ght over food, durable goods, or land.
Is this a conscious strategy? Do bands intentionally try to neu-
tralize the gain motive by not having anything worth stealing? Some 
anthropologists view just about everything stateless societies do as a 
conscious strategy to avoid attack from, incorporation by, or devel-
oping into large-scale, more hierarchical societies (Scott 2009). We 
don’t know whether their behavior is intentionally motivated to pro-
duce this effect, but it does produce this effect, discouraging attacks 
from other bands and from larger-scale groups. Although states have 
gradually encroached on stateless territory for thousands of years, 
many small-scale societies were able to thrive in peripheral, unappeal-
ing lands until the last few centuries when state societies decided to 
conquer the last remaining bits.
How did Hobbes (1962 [1651]) and so many contractarians get 
the role of gain so wrong? Hobbes lived in a context in which the 
accumulation of wealth was a major cultural motivator. He did not 
mention this context as an explicit assumption of his theory, probably 
because he thought it was universal. Of course, he could not have 
made his cultural context an explicit assumption of his model with-
out either rigging the test in Hampton’s (1988: 271) sense or relying 
on the false dichotomy between “natural man” and “civilized man.” 
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He simply might have failed to envision that there are, or could be, 
whole societies in which people make no attempt to accumulate 
wealth. The biggest problem in Hobbes’s theory of the state of nature 
is not in any of his stated assumptions but in the context he took 
for granted. He assumed motivations for attack that are simply not 
operable among egalitarian hunter-gatherers, and many other forms 
of small-scale society for that matter.
By neutralizing gain, bands are also largely free of what Rousseau 
(1984; 1994), Marx (1972), and Engels (2004 [1884]) thought was 
the source of most confl icts in state society: the corrupting infl uence 
of inegalitarian institutions (see the online appendix). It is impossible 
to say whether the egalitarian institutions of band society are any less 
corrupting than the inegalitarian institutions of most state society, but 
these institutions certainly have not made confl ict disappear in band 
society as some enthusiasts of the nonviolent view of human nature 
have implied (Boehm 2001: 256–7).
Reputation plays very much the opposite role in band society as 
Hobbes supposed. For reasons we discuss in greater detail below, 
band societies tend to cultivate an ethos of nonviolence. They don’t 
always live up to it, but anyone clearly seen to be an aggressor faces 
a signifi cant loss of acceptance and approval from the group and usu-
ally from nearby groups as well. The ethos does not merely neutralize 
the reputational motive; it reverses the role of reputation. Contrary 
to hundreds of years of widely shared prejudice against “savages,” 
people in the smallest-scale nomadic, foraging societies do not seek 
a reputation for toughness, aggression, or ruthlessness—all common 
concerns in historical Western societies. They much more often seek a 
reputation for peacefulness and agreeableness. They do not cultivate 
this reputation because it is any more natural; they do it because their 
society effectively incentivizes it.
Fear is signifi cantly reduced as a motivation for attack in this con-
text. Neutralizing the gain motive and effectively reversing the repu-
tational motive gives individuals less reason to fear attack. Violence 
does exist, and as long as violence exists, fear exists. But, even if one 
does fear attack from another band member, in the context we have 
described above, that fear is much less likely to motivate a preemp-
tive strike, because the advantage is not as clearly to the attacker as 
Hobbesian theory assumes. The attacker will lose reputation, and 
they will invite counter-attack from the victim’s band and from the 
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victim’s family and friends who might be spread out between many 
nearby bands. If they are clearly seen to initiate violence, their band, 
family, and friends will be less likely to support them against the vic-
tim (more on this below). Without that advantage, even someone who 
fears attack is much less likely to initiate violence. With the motiva-
tion for a preemptive strike effectively defused, the reason that confl ict 
was supposed to escalate into a war of all-against-all disappears.
Band societies have considered and largely neutralized gain, fear, 
reputation, and the advantage to the attacker—everything that moti-
vates attack in Hobbesian theory. One might ask, why is there any 
confl ict at all? One might suspect that we have naively exaggerated 
how well band societies have neutralized “the” causes of confl ict. But 
one should consider that Hobbesian psychological theory is weak in 
ways that importantly affect his recommended strategy. The things he 
recognized as sources of confl ict are surprisingly easy to counteract, 
and he missed the things that are more diffi cult to counteract. These 
include but are not limited to jealousy (especially sexual jealousy), fi ts 
of rage, mental instability, and perhaps most importantly, the common 
human desire to dominate others. All observed hunter-gatherer bands 
have a well-developed (but obviously unwritten) political theory to 
deal with these problems, which in their context, seems to be much 
more relevant than the motivators of confl ict recognized by Hobbes. 
And of course, any Rousseauian or Marxian hope that egalitarianism 
would eventually eliminate these motives has been brought into seri-
ous doubt by thousands of years of experience in band society. Appar-
ently these problems are ever-present. Bands’ efforts to keep confl icts 
down in the presence of these motivators are imperfect, but we have 
seen that they do keep violence from escalating to intolerable levels. 
How do their strategies compare with large-scale societies’ strategies?
Although the dominance motive is conspicuously absent from 
Hobbes’s list of motivations for confl ict, the absolutist monarchical 
system he advocated has a built-in strategy to break the link between 
the dominance motive and confl ict by prescribing succession through 
fi xed rules, leaving nothing to fi ght over. However, this strategy has 
had limited success as thousands of years of wars of succession attest. 
Capitalist democracies attempt to break the link between dominance 
and violence by channeling potential dominators into nonviolent com-
petitions for money in the market, for votes in politics, or for other 
forms of honor.
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Rather than trying to break the link between dominance and vio-
lence, bands try not to let anyone dominate anyone else. They take 
strong action to prevent any hierarchical structure from developing. 
Boehm (2001) describes the strategy as a “reverse dominance hierar-
chy,” in which the would-be subordinate individuals join together to 
prevent any would-be dominant individuals from establishing them-
selves. The band lifestyle seems designed to make any form of domi-
nance impossible. Considering the characteristics of bands explained 
above, put yourself in the place of a physically exceptional person 
who wanted to dominate a band. How would you do it? One morn-
ing, you could physically intimidate everyone in camp, but that after-
noon you would need them to split up to hunt, gather, and bring 
back whatever they found to share with you. Considering your casual 
everyday experience of human psychology, what do you think they’d 
do? They would probably leave camp and never come back unless it 
was to gang up and attack you.
Band members aspiring to dominance could try to chase down their 
would-be band mates, but because they can only be in one place at a 
time, they would not likely fi nd all of them. Dominators would run 
into a problem that Hobbes (1962 [1651]: 98) correctly recognized: 
“The weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest, either by secret 
machination, or by confederacy with others.” This kind of violence 
happens, but very often before it gets to that point, “People in band 
societies tend to ‘vote with their feet,’ moving away rather than sub-
mitting to the will of an unpopular leader” (Lee and Daly 1999: 4). 
Rousseau also correctly recognized this issue, writing:
it is impossible to enslave a man without fi rst putting him in a 
situation where he cannot do without another man, and since 
such a situation does not exist in the state of nature, each man 
there is free of this yoke, and the law of the strongest is rendered 
vain. (Rousseau 1994: 106) 
Imagine how free from domination the poor and underprivileged 
could be today if they were free to live by their own rules with any 
small like-minded group as people in band society are.
The ability of bands to split up, almost at a moment’s notice, is an 
extremely important social mechanism for avoiding all confl icts, not 
just confl icts motivated by dominance. Turnbull (1968: 137) writes, 
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“the major function of fl ux is not ecological adaptation but what 
could be called political adaptation.” There is always somewhere else 
to go if one does not like camping and foraging with the band and 
leaving is not a drastic move. People routinely split from the camp 
for any number of mundane reasons. Someone might want to camp 
with other friends or another part of their extended family for a while. 
A nuclear family might want to camp alone for a while. Or people 
might simply disagree about where to camp next. Bird-David describes 
the constant fl ux of band societies: 
the person in a hunter-gatherer band . . . is like a drop of oil 
fl oating on the surface of a pool of water. When these drops 
come together, they coalesce into a larger drop. But drops can 
also split up into small ones that may then coalesce with others. 
Likewise persons, “throughout their lives perpetually coalesce 
with and depart from, each other.” (Bird-David 1994: 597)
Whatever its other uses, fl ux is extremely useful to avoid confl ict. If 
two people can’t get along for any reason, one of them can simply go 
camp with another band a few miles away. If two groups within the 
band can’t get along, they can break into two bands. 
Although individuals attempting to dominate an entire band in the 
way described above may be rare, bands regularly have to deal with 
one-on-one bullying. They have a host of other strategies to employ 
before desertion becomes necessary. All or most observed bands culti-
vate an ethos of nonviolence, humility, equality, freedom, and auton-
omy. According to Boehm (2001: 74), “A cardinal act of political 
deviance is to attempt to set oneself above another person in a way 
that is belittling, or, worse, to try to give direct orders to one’s peers.” 
There is a wide debate about how and why foragers maintain such 
individualistic norms (Gardner 1991), but it seems that when one can-
not stop people from walking away, one must build a community that 
respects individuality and disparages would-be dominators. 
Anyone who violates a band’s ethos will be subject to criticism, rid-
icule, and disobedience hopefully long before the problem reaches the 
point of desertion or violence (Boehm 2001: 84, 112–22). Although 
bands have no single individual authority fi gure to arbitrate disputes, 
anyone and everyone in the group might give their opinion. For exam-
ple, the Batek typically demand that disputing parties talk it over, and 
the whole group can get involved. This might end with a compromise 
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or with public opinion siding against one person, who might acquiesce 
to social pressure, resist and endure the criticism, or camp elsewhere 
(Endicott and Endicott 2008: 66–7).
Contemporary political theory seems to have developed little under-
standing of the social strategies underlying fl ux derived from both 
mobility and fl exible group membership. Indeed, the very idea of fl ux 
is quite foreign to most of us living in the states of the modern world, 
where group membership and residency are tightly controlled. It is 
therefore not surprising that, as far as we can tell, none of the state-of-
nature theorists described above so much as considers the possibility 
that people might attempt to use fl ux or any of the other strategies 
mentioned to mitigate the danger of the war of all-against-all. Yet, fl ux 
represents a very different strategy from the social contract. Under the 
contract, the polity declares that the individual has made a commitment 
to a nearly permanent political obligation. Emigration is costly and dif-
fi cult. People are generally expected to enter the social contract by birth 
and exit by death. By assumption, they have agreed to be subject to 
whatever force the sovereign deems necessary to keep the peace. There 
is no backing out from that commitment. Band society’s respect for 
individual autonomy is incompatible with any notion of commitment 
to anything but the most ephemeral political obligations. Rather than 
keeping the peace by stressing commitment and obligation, they main-
tain peace by respecting each other’s freedom from political obligation.
The fi nal strategy we discuss for preventing violence in band soci-
eties has to do with an important aspect of their egalitarian social 
structure: their elaborate networks of social ties between individuals. 
A Ju/’hoansi person, for example, is likely to have friends and rela-
tives across all or most of the nearby camps, and friends of friends 
and relatives of relatives even farther. These networks are egalitarian 
and informal. They have no head and no structure. But they have clear 
functions far beyond the prevention of violence. Social networks are 
instrumental in hedging against economic risk and uncertainty about 
the future (McCall and Widerquist 2015). The possibility of droughts, 
blights, and other forms of environmental crisis is ever-present; so also 
is the possibility of breaking a leg or suffering some other malady that 
might prevent an individual from foraging effectively. These social 
networks can be life-savers during periods of crisis, such as a drought 
or an injury, as has actually been well-observed over the long history 
of ethnographic research in the Kalahari (Wiessner 1977; Lee 1979; 
McCall 2000; Wiessner 2002; McCall and Widerquist 2015).
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A political theorist might instantly connect these social networks 
with the possibility of a revenge cycle. For example, Diamond (2012) 
includes lengthy discussion of cycles of revenge among the indigenous 
people of New Guinea. Although revenge is not necessarily a very 
important role for social networks in egalitarian societies, it is worth 
imagining what effects it might have. The revenge motive can increase 
violence by creating a cycle of attack and counter-attack, turning a 
single homicide into a series of homicides. Cycles of revenge killings 
are well-known in many stateless societies and many areas where 
states are weak. Such a cycle can explain why some stateless groups 
have constant tension with neighbors, but such cycles fall far short of 
the war of all-against-all, and they do not occur in all stateless societ-
ies. Many bands have no observed intergroup violence at all. These 
groups seem to be free from revenge cycles. 
Even among the groups that have revenge cycles, they do not usu-
ally escalate as theory predicts in the absence of a defi nitive, enforced 
resolution by a sovereign authority. Practice shows that even a costly 
cycle of revenge killings is not a war of all-against-all, nor is it likely to 
spark such a war. A cycle of confl ict often settles down into a standoff, 
which can become an effective peace. The possibility of a standoff 
rather than a sovereign or active confl ict is under-theorized in conven-
tional state-of-nature theory. It is known to exist among international 
states, but it is usually deemed impossible at a smaller scale because of 
the presumed advantage to the attacker (Lucas 1966: 65–6).
In some ways the revenge motive deters violence, especially in the 
context of a complex social network. The existence of these networks 
might remove the presumed advantage to the attacker that was so 
important to Hobbes’s argument for violence in the state of nature. 
The network is acephalous. No one can decapitate it. The network is 
geographically dispersed. No one can sneak up behind its back. With 
the advantage of surprise, one could conceivably wipe out every per-
son in a camp. Neither ethnographers nor archaeologists have found 
evidence of it happening among small-scale nomadic foragers, but it 
is conceivable. However, one could not wipe out an entire social net-
work. This attack would then invite response from all of the many 
camps in the area with ties to the victims—a signifi cant disadvantage 
to the attacker. It is diffi cult to know how valuable this deterrent effect 
is and whether the deterrence effect of the fear of revenge reduces vio-
lence more than the revenge cycle increases violence. But it does have 
some mitigating effect. 
5200_Widerquist.indd   170 25/11/16   10:32 AM
Empirical Assessment of the Violence Hypothesis 171
But the threat of revenge is not the most important way that social 
networks help to maintain peace. The way they reinforce the social 
ethos of equality, sympathy, and nonviolence is far more important. 
In such contexts, violent behavior risks the alienation of these all-
important social connections, which (as explained above) provide a 
form of economic security in the face of uncertainty. To be excluded 
from this social system would be a terrible fate—or perhaps a terrible 
punishment—indeed. 
A study by George McCall and Patricia Resick (2003) speaks to 
this point further. They examined individual manifestations of post-
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) experienced by Ju/’hoansi individu-
als following instances of violent physical confl ict. Here, victims of 
violence felt profoundly the symptoms of PTSD in the same way as 
soldiers or victims of terrorist attacks. However, their levels of stress 
seemed disproportionate to the level of violence. The majority of these 
attacks lacked weapons and were normally not even potentially lethal. 
They were often little more than fi stfi ghts or wrestling matches. Later, 
Grant McCall (coauthor of this book) interviewed some of the same 
victims experiencing PTSD and it became clear to him what exactly 
was so frightening. The stress was not directly a result of the violence 
but of the possibility of being alienated or ostracized from his net-
work of social connections. This threat has such profound emotional 
consequences that they are experienced in terms of physical pain and 
ultimately manifested as PTSD. 
In other words, the social network multiplies the power of reputa-
tional strategies discussed above. The social ethos is not merely some-
thing people say; it is backed by a powerful mechanism with real force 
even though it has no sovereign at the head. This theory of the social 
network implies not only that bands are able to reverse the reputational 
motive, but also that they have given it great power. Someone who initi-
ates violence risks their reputation, which is an extremely valuable asset.
We must warn readers against any unwarranted extrapolation of 
the trends we just explained. The strategies we have just discussed 
have proven successful for groups at this scale in very different envi-
ronments around the globe (Boehm 2001; 2012). Archaeological 
evidence shows that most people in the Pleistocene lived in similar-
scale nomadic groups with apparently similar foraging strategies. It is 
tempting to extrapolate the generalizations we have made about mod-
ern bands around the world to bands living 10,000 or 200,000 years 
ago. Although there is some reason to believe that these mechanisms 
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worked similarly, the circumstances of Pleistocene foragers were very 
different. For one thing, they had more plentiful foraging environ-
ments that might have made them less dependent on social networks. 
Probably these circumstances favored the reverse-dominance hierar-
chy, but we cannot be sure of the extent to which they did. One might 
look at the scale and foraging strategies of hominins and imagine these 
violence-mitigating strategies and other aspects of observed band life-
ways extending back two million years. Although some well-trained 
anthropologists have succumbed to this kind of temptation, it is 
unwarranted. These were different species; we must be cautious about 
drawing conclusions about their behavior that cannot be observed.
Looking at where these strategies tend to fail can help understand 
how they work. Recall from previous sections that levels of violence 
signifi cantly increase as stateless societies become sedentary and 
increase in scale and population density. Looking at these trends dis-
cussed in Section 1 in light of the theoretical discussion in this section 
can help us understand them. 
Gain emerges as a motive in any society that stores food, accu-
mulates signifi cant durable goods, or attempts to maintain exclusive 
control over a valuable resource. That valuable resource might be 
something like a salmon run, and it could simply be arable land in an 
area too densely populated to allow the luxury of the underutilization 
of resources. Any society that chooses any such subsistence strategy 
will have to deal with neighbors who have a greater motive to attack.
The fi rst permanently sedentary populations were late hunter-
gatherers who had experienced signifi cant population increase and 
shrinking territory sizes, and who had settled into villages in order 
to focus their economies on labor-intensive annually replenishing 
food resources. Similarly, these populations began to deal with eco-
nomic risk through storage instead of through the sharing strategies 
of groups like the Ju/’hoansi. Storage, it appears, was a recipe for eco-
nomic crisis and resulting violent confrontation. As mentioned above, 
the earliest known manifestation of this kind of confl ict is the mass 
grave at Jebel Sahaba. They were terminal Paleolithic hunter-gather-
ers, who had settled into a permanent village on the fl anks of the Nile. 
They were probably in the grips of a drought when attacked (Wendorf 
1968). The people of Ofnet, also mentioned above, were among the 
late hunter-gatherers of Europe and had begun to occupy increasingly 
sedentary villages in the alluvial drainages of the Danube after the end 
of the Pleistocene (Frayer 1997). Similar increases in violence have 
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also been documented among early sedentary hunter-gatherer popula-
tions around the world (McCall 2009).
In these circumstances, people begin to seek the kind of reputation 
Hobbes supposed. According to Johnson and Earle (2000: 170), once 
communities reach a certain population density, “They can no longer 
avoid resource competition simply by moving elsewhere, and brave, 
aggressive men are now treated as valuable allies rather than as dan-
gerous outcasts.” Many modern, small-scale horticultural communi-
ties live in tightly circumscribed areas. The Yanomamö, for example, 
live at only a slightly larger residential scale than hunter-gatherers, 
in villages of about 100–200 people. They are still prone to fi ssion, 
but they cannot get far from adversaries. The Yanomamö remain 
acephalous like band societies, but they value aggressive men. Perhaps 
consequently, they lack the gender equality common to many band 
societies. Men often dominate and abuse their wives without any loss 
of reputation (Boehm 2001: 93).
The highlands of central New Guinea have extremely tightly packed 
autonomous villages that are more or less dependent on horticulture 
and have predictably high levels of violence. Johnson and Earle (2000: 
179–80, 191–2) describe one such people, the Tsembaga, who for 
defense live in groups of several hundred occupying an area of land 
only a mile or so across, surrounded by enemies, all of whom jealously 
defend their territories. Pinker (2012) and Diamond (2012) take the 
Yanomamö and the New Guinea highlands as the norm among state-
less societies, when in fact they live in conditions far more conducive 
to violence than most hunter-gatherer peoples.
One might be tempted to suppose that stateless societies are on an 
inevitable trend toward higher populations that will eventually bring 
confl ict and make the state a necessity. But, those few late-Pleistocene 
examples notwithstanding, it is usually agriculturalists rather than 
hunter-gatherers who are prone to population explosions. Before 
state societies decided to use their numbers to conquer the world, a 
very large portion of the earth’s land area was populated by hunter-
gatherers living at population densities probably not much different 
than those that prevailed during the late Pleistocene. They had a well-
developed political theory for how to maintain stable, stateless societ-
ies over the very long term. They did not need state societies to rescue 
them from some distant, hypothetical population explosion.
In seems that Hobbes’s theory of statelessness isn’t very sophisti-
cated. He discusses only a few possible causes for confl ict in the state 
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of nature, some of which basically don’t exist in the societies that are 
most completely devoid of state institutions. He ignores other causes 
of confl ict that are much more important to people actually living 
under the conditions he attempted to examine. He discusses only one 
possible solution—the establishment of full sovereignty whether in a 
person or in an assembly—and he makes no attempt to compare that 
strategy against other possible strategies. He and his recent successors 
have no discussion of social networks, building a social ethos, criti-
cism, ridicule, fl ux, desertion, or execution. Although Hobbes is most 
often criticized for attempting pure a priori theory, his state of nature 
could perhaps better be criticized for being a poor a priori theory of 
statelessness. With a few paragraphs of apparently off-the-cuff rea-
soning, he convinced centuries of uncritical philosophers that only 
one outcome is possible in a stateless situation. Only a few of his suc-
cessors have deepened his analysis and only in minor ways. Most of 
those reviewed above have just retold the old story of the three moti-
vations and the advantage of attack. They then affi rm the inevitable 
connection between these factors and the war of all-against-all. That’s 
not a priori theory; that’s mythmaking. 
The a priori portions of Pinker’s (2012) book seem to be more 
sophisticated. He argues that people become brutalized in violent 
environments. Murder rates are high where social protections against 
violence are weak. Individuals feel that they must protect themselves 
unilaterally and that disputes must be settled by violence rather than 
legal intervention. He argues that this tends to happen in state societies 
where segments of the population are under-served by their govern-
ments in protecting them from crime and in punishing criminal acts. 
This idea is reasonable, and we agree with most of the empirical evi-
dence he presents to support it. East St. Louis certainly seems to be 
a context in the modern United States where government institutions 
are at their weakest and where a large community of people have 
insuffi cient protection or recourse to the law. Pinker correctly points 
out (1) states where protection is strong, (2) states where it is weak, 
and (3) stateless societies where it is weak, but he does not search for 
examples of the fourth possibility to complete the matrix: (4) stateless 
societies where social protections are strong. Of course, standard polit-
ical theory (which he cites) tells him such a situation can never exist.
This section has explained how that fourth possibility can work in 
stateless societies. The Batek, the Chewang, the Semang, the Buid, the 
Bakairi and other groups with extremely low violence—whether or 
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not they represent the norm among stateless societies—demonstrate 
that stateless societies can provide strong enough social protections 
against violence to avoid the brutalization that Pinker recognizes in 
other situations. Our discussion also suggests that groups with moder-
ate levels of violence suffi ciently avoid much of the brutalization that 
worries Pinker. If a Ju/’hoansi person can show signs of PTSD from a 
fi st fi ght that had no threat of becoming lethal, he seems to be very far 
from the brutalized individual Pinker’s theory warns against. 
6. CONCLUSION
The strong violence hypothesis is false. Violence in stateless societ-
ies does not degenerate into a war of all-against-all or anything like 
it. The idea that statelessness always leads to unacceptable levels of 
violence is unfounded. Many stateless societies effectively constrain 
violence. They create environments in which people can comfortably 
and rationally feel at peace. We have good reason to believe that our 
ancestors were able to create somewhat similar environments for per-
haps the last 200,000 years. The weak violence hypothesis may well 
be true, but the refutation of the violence hypothesis is an extremely 
damaging argument against Hobbesian versions of contractarianism. 
Hobbes and Kant both argue that intolerable violence is the causal 
factor behind just about every other diffi culty of the state of nature, 
and it is the constant fear of the danger of violent death that makes 
them so confi dent that everyone is better off in state society than in 
any stateless situation. Anyone who wants to make the case that peo-
ple are better off in state society is forced to use a Lockean strategy 
in which the possibility of higher violence is only one of many factors 
determining overall welfare. Chapter 10 examines that issue.
The refutation of the strong violence hypothesis has profound 
implications for contractarian theory beyond weakening support for 
the overall Hobbesian hypothesis. The long-revered claim that people 
inherently need a sovereign state to prevent unacceptable levels of 
violence that must otherwise prevail is unfounded. The automatic 
human need for a state to keep people from each other’s throats is a 
self-serving myth to justify ill-treatment of the disadvantaged. Twenty-
fi rst-century political theorists can still assert this claim in leading 
journals and expect to be believed without evidence (Wellman 2001: 
742), but it is weak in theory and refuted by observation.
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Chapter 10
ARE YOU BETTER OFF NOW THAN YOU WERE 
12,000 YEARS AGO? AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT 
OF THE HOBBESIAN HYPOTHESIS
With the violence hypothesis strongly refuted by Chapter 9, an argu-
ment for the Hobbesian hypothesis needs to discuss overall welfare, 
as Locke did in the seventeenth century. But assessing overall welfare 
is much more diffi cult than assessing whether people are under the 
constant fear of violent death. Contractarians and propertarians need 
to show that everyone in one situation is better off than they could 
reasonably expect to be in another situation. Yet, none of the contrac-
tarian and propertarian literature reviewed in Chapters 3–7 provides 
signifi cant evidence for it or even suggests any rigorous methodology 
to examine the question. Most of this literature is satisfi ed to imply 
that the Hobbesian hypothesis is somehow obvious. We are unable to 
provide a rigorous methodology for contractarians, and so we use an 
ad hoc comparison of whether people seem to be better off in several 
important ways that they have good reason to care about. 
Hobbes’s (1962 [1651]: 100) famous phrase, “the life of man, 
solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short,” helpfully identifi es four 
broad categories of wellbeing. Nasty and brutish are synonymous for 
violence, which was addressed by Chapter 9. That leaves three other 
categories: solitary (social and cultural satisfaction), poor (material 
wellbeing), and short (health and longevity). The fi rst part of this 
chapter addresses these three categories in turn, and the following 
sections address two others. The end of this chapter discusses the 
issue of freedom, which is particularly important to propertarianism. 
We also offer a discussion of observed choice, which is the most direct 
evidence of consent, the ultimate category for contractarianism. 
This chapter concludes with an overall assessment, and the results 
are tragic. In all or most of the fi ve categories, it is reasonable to say 
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that the average person is better off in most contemporary state soci-
eties (although not in most past state societies). But contemporary 
states allow so much inequality—with a bottom so low in absolute 
terms—that signifi cant numbers of people are worse off in capital-
ist state societies than they would be even in a small-scale stateless 
society.
1. SOCIAL AND CULTURAL SATISFACTION
The claim that stateless peoples are nonsocial is perhaps the most 
outlandish of any prehistoric myth. Although humans existed for a 
long period before they fi rst came together to form states or claimed 
land as “property,” there is no period in human existence before they 
came together to form communities, groups, or societies. Some animal 
species are nonsocial, but good evidence in the archaeological record 
indicates that humans and our hominin ancestors have been social 
animals throughout the six to eight million years that separate us from 
our nearest primate relatives. Frans de Waal (2006: 4–5) describes 
humans as “obligatorily gregarious,” meaning that they need other 
people either to survive physically or to thrive emotionally. The credit 
for our sociality, de Waal explains, goes to our nature, not to the insti-
tutional structures that philosophers want to justify.
Far from solitary, overwhelming ethnographic evidence shows that 
life in band societies is very communal; their members even appear 
far more socially content than most people in contemporary capital-
ist states. Band societies often engage in group activities. They make 
group decisions collectively (Leacock 1998: 144). They can count on 
each other to share food even if they are unable to produce food to 
share in return (Bird-David 1990; Bird-David 1992; Hawkes et al. 
2001). Many ethnographers have remarked on the excessively social 
nature of band societies. People camp close together and give each 
other very little privacy. Camps don’t have walls. People in bands pay 
attention to each other’s business in much greater detail than people 
from capitalist states are used to (Hill and Hurtado 1996: xii). The 
concept of what is and is not one person’s business varies considerably 
across culture and especially between large- and small-scale societ-
ies. If a person from an industrialized capitalist state tried to adjust 
to band society, their neighbors’ nosiness might be a diffi cult social 
adjustment. But they would not lack human interaction.
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The observation that people don’t need the state to create society 
does not contradict the contractarian understanding of social institu-
tions as artifi cial creations in the sense required (see Chapters 2 and 
3), but it does contradict the belief that a sovereign government can 
take credit for making society possible. Without the violence hypoth-
esis, the belief that society is impossible outside of state authority is 
untenable, but one could argue that state authority (and/or a private 
property rights system) makes a better society possible. One could 
argue that, perhaps because of cultural opportunities, all people in 
state societies have deeper, richer, more satisfying, or meaningful social 
environments. This claim sounds diffi cult to measure and perhaps like 
ethnocentric arrogance, but we will try to evaluate it.
On Hobbes’s (1962 [1651]: 100) long list of things people in the 
state of nature supposedly lack, the items of cultural and social signifi -
cance include knowledge of geography, architecture, arts, letters, and 
society. Hobbes was right that most small-scale societies lack many 
of these things. Today few people are ethnocentric enough to assume 
that people in those societies are necessarily worse off for not having 
them, but they have to count. Contemporary capitalist states arguably 
provide more varied cultural opportunities.
People in small-scale nomadic societies could not have expressed 
themselves as symphonic composers or novelists, nor could they have 
enjoyed the products of those who do (without aid from a larger-scale 
society), but they can express themselves in other ways. Ethnographic 
and historical accounts report that all indigenous communities have 
rich cultural lives with art, music, dance, storytelling, and so on. People 
in band societies have many opportunities for social interaction in a 
community that often makes them feel like an integral part (Bird-David 
1994; Marshall III 2002; Marshall III 2005). State society offers people 
many opportunities that band society cannot, but band societies tend 
to offer something that state society has diffi culty matching—an inclu-
sive and apparently satisfying cultural environment.
Perhaps the biggest problem with cultural and social opportunities 
in state society is that states often do not share them with everyone. 
Some people in state societies can see others enjoying opportunities 
that they cannot access. Perhaps partly for this reason, along with 
some satisfi ed people, contemporary state society produces a substan-
tial group of discontents, people who feel either left out or unsatisfi ed 
by their social environment. Marx (1959), of course, identifi ed this 
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problem as one of alienation (see Chapter 6). Many people spend their 
lives serving the goals of others to get money merely to consume, but 
they lack time and autonomy to build a meaningful social and cultural 
life. Many of the opportunities offered to them are ultimately unsatis-
fying prospects for material consumption.
One cannot measure alienation or social satisfaction, but some 
indication is given by vocalizations of discontent and by mental health 
issues. Ethnographers report a distinct lack of a discontented minor-
ity in band societies. Suicide rates are low (see below). The common-
place misery of discontented people in state society seems to have no 
equivalent in band society. A very large volume of historical and eth-
nographic accounts of nomadic foragers attests to their being surpris-
ingly content. Such accounts stretch back at least as far as the fi rst 
century ce when Publius Cornelius Tacitus wrote about a Germanic 
hunter-gatherer society:
Such a condition they judge more happy than the painful occu-
pation of cultivating the ground, than the labour of rearing 
horses, than the agitations of hope and fear attending the defence 
of their own property or the seizing that of others. Secure 
against the designs of men, secure against the malignity of the 
Gods, they have accomplished a thing of infi nite diffi culty; that 
to them nothing remains even to be wished. (Tacitus 1996)
Contemporary ethnographic accounts—of the smallest-scale societies—
almost universally confi rm positive attitudes among group members. 
Hill and Hurtado (1996: xii) write, “Among the Ache, there were no 
revolutionaries, no visionaries, and no rebels. Joking and happy-go-
lucky demeanor were universal.”
The evidence in this section indicates that people can and do live 
happy, contented lives in foraging bands. None of this should tempt 
anyone to believe band society is some kind of utopia. They have 
confl icts, anger, and violence like everyone else, but they are not 
miserable as so many political theorists claim. Despite their limited 
opportunities, they seem to be able to provide a more satisfying social 
and cultural environment for the least socially and culturally adept 
individuals within their groups. This ability is a remarkable achieve-
ment when compared against the great discontent of so many socially 
isolated people in capitalist states today. Hopefully, there is a way to 
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have the culturally varied opportunities of industrial states without 
also creating a disconnected minority, but apparently, our states have 
yet to fi nd it.
2. MATERIAL WELLBEING
The apparent obviousness of the superior material wellbeing of people 
in capitalist states is easy to understand. Our economies produce so 
many more goods and use labor so much more effi ciently that we 
must all work far less and consume far more than everyone who lives 
without access to our technology. The problem with this view stems 
both from the over-identifi cation of material income with material 
wellbeing (Kenny 2006) and from the fallacy of composition. The 
enormous productivity of contemporary state societies makes it pos-
sible for everyone to consume far more and work far less, but it does 
not ensure that everyone actually does consume more and work less. 
Nor does it ensure that the mix of goods available to them is suffi cient 
to secure higher material wellbeing even if it includes items that band 
societies can’t possibly produce.
This section considers three issues of material wellbeing: the pro-
vision of luxuries, the availability of leisure time, and the meeting 
of basic needs. To make the comparison, we have to take a realistic 
look at abilities of state and stateless societies to turn their material 
resources into material wellbeing, and at the extent to which the mate-
rial benefi ts of contemporary states are shared by their least advan-
taged group of individuals. 
A. Luxuries
The capitalist state’s ability to turn labor and resources into massive 
amounts of luxuries counts in its favor, but it alone cannot auto-
matically ensure that all people in state society have greater material 
wellbeing, as so many philosophers have implied for so many cen-
turies. J. H. Hutton’s (1944: 4) speech quoted in Chapter 8 equat-
ing material culture with “the degree of civilization” provides an 
example of the over-identifi cation of material income with material 
wellbeing—and indeed with overall wellbeing. Most anthropologists 
today would dismiss this position out of hand, but it is still an infl u-
ential attitude about contemporary material culture. The term “the 
degree of civilization” is vague, but we take Hutton to mean that 
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societies with a more complex material culture, with more tangible 
cultural output, provide richer, deeper, and more enlightened cul-
tural and social lives for their people.
Capitalist states clearly have far more complex material culture. 
Hunter-gatherer bands don’t produce the things modern people recog-
nize as tangible cultural output: novels, written histories, symphonies, 
computer games, reality TV, and so on. Early anthropologists often 
explained the absence of what they recognized to be cultural output in 
small-scale societies by the inherent diffi culty of their lifestyle typifi ed 
by an all-consuming food quest. Therefore, they took the absence of 
extensive material culture as evidence for low wellbeing. 
However, an all-consuming food quest is not the only explana-
tion why equally intelligent people might not produce as much of 
the things we recognize as cultural output. The same observation 
can be explained by the scale and mobility of band societies. Most 
hunter-gatherer bands do not have enough members to fi ll out a sym-
phony orchestra, much less to sit in the audience. It would not pay 
nomads to develop writing without the ability to carry a library with 
them from camp to camp. Even if band life is “a continual holiday” 
compared with the life of industrial workers as Paine (2000) sup-
posed, we should not expect band societies to produce symphonies 
and novels. If band societies have a satisfying material culture, we 
should expect them to have a rich culture in things that are portable, 
such as storytelling, music, and dance. As the previous section argued, 
ethnographers do see rich and varied cultures among all small-scale 
societies. Therefore, we cannot take the lack of what we might recog-
nize as tangible cultural products to be evidence that their lives were 
poor, diffi cult, arduous, uncultured, or lacking in achievement.
A public library in the United States gives people access to read-
ing Leo Tolstoy or Stephen King, to watching a Shakespeare play or 
reality TV. People consuming these luxuries make use of many more 
human and natural resources than does a whole group of foragers sit-
ting around a fi re, singing, dancing, and exchanging stories. Do they 
have a better time? How much better? For the contractarian argument 
to work, the experiences of the person in the capitalist state must be so 
much richer that it would be irrational or unreasonable to prefer the 
forager’s entertainment. This claim seems diffi cult to sustain without 
falling into ethnocentric arrogance. No matter how great the capitalist 
state’s output of luxuries is, it is diffi cult to connect it with what the 
proviso requires: the benefi t of state society must be so great that no 
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rational or reasonable person would refuse. Luxuries are by their very 
nature something that people can refuse.
A supporter of the Hobbesian hypothesis might be tempted to 
avoid ethnocentrism by entirely dropping the global economy’s abil-
ity to produce luxuries from the argument. But dropping luxuries 
from the argument has an enormous drawback: the production of 
luxuries is the one advantage of the capitalist state that actually is 
obvious. No reasonable person could deny that capitalist states pro-
duce far more and a much wider variety of luxuries than any stateless 
society that has existed in the last 200,000 years. Capitalist states 
produce goods embodying the labor of millions of people and accu-
mulated ideas from hundreds of generations. They produce an incred-
ible variety of items for subcultures from high to low, from folk to 
postmodern. Some groups might have meticulously researched some 
indigenous people’s traditions of art, music, dance, or storytelling 
and attempt to keep the practices alive at a local community center. 
Certainly, the capitalist state’s ability to produce consumer goods is 
a primary motivation for the belief in the Hobbesian hypothesis. It 
would be diffi cult to give up its potential value in the justifi cation 
of contemporary states, but it is diffi cult to connect this inherently 
declinable thing with the conclusion that no rational or reasonable 
person could refuse.
One might think luxuries are relevant on the supposition that 
because so many luxury goods are so widely available, basic necessi-
ties must be abundant for everyone. This conclusion, of course, does 
not follow. It seems to be related to the fallacy of composition. Not 
only is it false to assume that everyone has access to luxuries just 
because a state produces many of them; it is equally false to assume 
that an individual has access to all the necessities they require just 
because they have access to some signifi cant luxuries. For example, 
consider a homeless person in the United States. At a public library 
or a homeless shelter they probably have access to luxuries, such as 
books, computers, and media. Even people in shantytowns in lesser-
developed countries often have televisions and cell phones, as well as 
a range of other luxury goods. But these same people might lack a 
private place to sleep, an adequate diet, safe drinking water, and so 
on. One tragedy of the contemporary economy is that—for whatever 
reason—it distributes some luxuries more widely than many neces-
sities. A person in deep poverty cannot save enough money to meet 
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their needs by swearing off all luxuries. Specifi cs of the distribution 
system have made many once-unimaginable luxuries cheap while 
making some necessities more expensive and harder to obtain by far 
than they were in the Pleistocene (see Section 2C below).
One way to make luxuries relevant would be to argue that a larger 
set of (positive) options is always preferable to a smaller set. A greater 
availability of options certainly counts in favor of state society, but it 
has limited value for contractarian theory because all contracts involve 
sacrifi ce. A person might not have a strong desire for the additional 
options, and they might have a strong preference against the sacrifi ces 
required to get them.
The claim that the larger set is preferable to a smaller one is neces-
sarily true only if the larger set dominates the smaller set (containing all 
the options in the smaller set and more). Strictly speaking, societies are 
so diverse that one society will always have something another doesn’t, 
and one might value the few options lost more than the many options 
gained. But this claim might be approximately true. If the difference 
is large enough, and if options in the larger set are similar enough to 
those available in the smaller set, no reasonable person is likely to pre-
fer the smaller set. Does this statement describe the comparison of the 
luxuries available to disadvantaged people in hunter-gatherer bands 
and capitalist states?
People have good reason to value many of the luxuries produced 
by capitalist states. But these luxuries are not shared well, and band 
societies do have signifi cant luxuries that state societies do not. As 
Marvin Harris writes:
As for amenities such as good food, entertainment, and aes-
thetic pleasures, early hunters and plant collectors enjoyed luxu-
ries that only the richest of today’s Americans can afford. For 
two days’ worth of trees, lakes, and clear air, the modern-day 
executive works fi ve. Nowadays, whole families toil and save 
for thirty years to gain the privilege of seeing a few square feet 
of grass outside their windows. And they are the privileged few. 
Americans say, “Meat makes the meal,” . . . but two-thirds of 
the people alive today are involuntary vegetarians. In the Stone 
Age, everyone maintained a high-protein, low-starch diet. And 
the meat wasn’t frozen or pumped full of antibiotics and artifi -
cial colors. (Harris 1977: x)
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Although the set of luxuries available in band society is small, its 
advantages are signifi cant, especially when we consider what people 
tend to value luxuries for: to facilitate social interaction and satis-
faction. For some people the social system in state societies makes 
the luxuries available more isolating than facilitating. The cultural 
effects of the inequality of luxuries in state society can be a source of 
the alienation discussed above. People are often humiliated, stigma-
tized, and isolated for failing to display the right quantity or quality 
of luxuries. There is no time when one group of band members does 
something that another group cannot afford. A band member is never 
humiliated, stigmatized, or isolated for lacking luxuries. Because the 
relevant comparison is with the least advantaged group of people, it is 
questionable whether the tremendous availability of luxuries is a net 
advantage toward fulfi lling the Lockean proviso.
Still, the sheer size and variety of luxuries available in capitalist 
states is an advantage. This advantage is probably very signifi cant for 
people toward the middle and upper end of the income distribution. 
But even if it is a net advantage for everyone, it is not a terribly impor-
tant advantage to people who are socially alienated or lacking in their 
basic needs. To make their advantage in this area potentially decisive, 
state societies would have to do a better job of providing basic needs 
and reducing alienation and discontent.
B. Leisure and Work Effort
Hunter-gatherers live neither a constantly harried existence nor an 
affl uent life of leisure. This section will show that leisure is one area in 
which even the average person today has no particular advantage over 
people in band societies, and the least advantaged group of people in 
capitalist states today have signifi cantly less leisure than their ances-
tors did more than 12,000 years ago.
By the 1960s, anthropologists had dismissed the misconception 
that hunter-gatherers lived a constantly harried existence (see Chap-
ter 8). Since then, the debate over hunter-gatherer leisure seems to 
have divided into groups we can call “optimists,” who believe hunter-
gatherers have more leisure than people in capitalist states, and “pes-
simists” who believe hunter-gatherers have about the same or less. 
These views sometimes go along with pessimistic or optimistic views 
of overall hunter-gatherer welfare. 
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One of the more optimistic hunter-gatherer ethnographers is Lee 
(1979). His study of the Ju/’hoansi fi nds:
The number of days of work per adult per week varied from a 
low of 1.2 to a high of 3.2, a range of fi gures that represents only 
24 to 64 percent of the 5-day weekly work load of an industrial 
worker. (Lee 1979: 256)
Including housework (but not child care), Lee fi nds men and women 
work an average of 42.3 hours per week—far less than most people 
in capitalist states. Lee’s time-allocation study found a much shorter 
hunter-gatherer workweek than most subsequent studies. Critics have 
argued that studies like his have not paid suffi cient attention to the 
time hunter-gatherers take on domestic chores, such as preparing 
goods for use or to the benefi t his subjects received from industrial 
tools they have managed to acquire (Colchester 1984; Hawkes et al. 
1985; Altman 1987: 94; Bettinger 1991: 99–100). One theoretical 
reason to believe that the food quest should be diffi cult is the observa-
tion that food availability was the primary limit on all hunter-gatherer 
populations as it is typically for animals in the wild (Washburn and 
Lancaster 1968: 303). Animal populations tend to expand until they 
reach the limits of available food sources. The expansion of hunter-
gatherers onto all six habitable continents implies that humans are no 
exception to this rule. Presumably they were driven more by the need 
to fi nd new food sources than the desire to explore. If humans expand 
until they approach the limits of available food sources, we should 
expect the food quest to be diffi cult for most hunter-gatherers and 
food stress to be a signifi cant check on population. 
Using a much broader defi nition of work (including, for example, 
food preparation, childcare, and walking), Hill et al. (1985) fi nd that 
male members of the Ache band work an average of 7 hours per day 
or 49 hours per week. The widest summary of studies we have found is 
that of Clark (2007: 64), who presents a table summarizing the work 
time estimates of thirteen hunter-gatherer bands and agricultural vil-
lages, ranging from 2.8 (19.6 hours per week) to 7.6 hours per day 
(53.2 hours per week) with a median of 5.9 hours per day (41.4 hours 
per week). While this median hunter-gatherer workweek value is strik-
ingly similar to the modern 40-hour workweek, there are reasons for 
questioning the implication that foragers are somehow overworked. 
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For one thing, there are reasons to doubt that this median workweek 
value for forager societies is a good modal representation of all for-
ager groups over space and time. For another, our modern conception 
of the workweek includes only the time when individuals are physi-
cally present at their workplace and not all of the domestic labor they 
do away from the workplace. Yet, the equivalent of domestic labor 
is included in the more expansive considerations of hunter-gatherer 
time allocation.
Consider one of the more pessimistic fi gures: Hill et al.’s (1985) 
study fi nding a 49-hour workweek. That amount is 9 hours more than 
the U.S. standard 40-hour workweek, but remember that Hill et al.’s 
broad defi nition of work includes many things people in state society 
do in their leisure hours (including walking). If we wanted to make 
their fi gures comparable to work time for the typical American, we 
would have to increase the 40-hour workweek by the time people 
spend commuting, shopping, cooking, caring for children, maintaining 
a household, and so on. In 2003, according to a study in the Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, the sum of the time the average American spent 
in market work, nonmarket work, and childcare was 54.94 hours per 
week—nearly six hours more than the Ache. This fi gure was down 
from 60.91 hours per week in 1965—nearly 12 hours more than the 
Ache (Aguiar and Hurst 2007: 976). Therefore, even the more pessi-
mistic fi gures imply that governments and property rights have failed 
to deliver as much more leisure to the average American than the Ache 
band delivered to its members. And of course, the Ache are one of the 
harder-working bands. Comparing the U.S. fi gure with the median in 
Clark’s study shows that Americans work 13 hours per week more 
than the median of observed hunter-gatherers.
All the above fi gures compare “work” in an expansive sense of put-
ting forth effort to achieve a goal, such as obtaining dinner or having 
a well-cared-for child. This, of course, is not how Americans usually 
defi ne work. Unless you own your own business, typically, work is a 
job. Work means following the orders of a boss or a client 40 hours 
per week. In this sense, people in band society do not work at all. 
People in band society spend no time at all following other people’s 
orders. Although bands typically share what they obtain, they work 
for themselves, under their own direction, at their own pace. No single 
individual commands foraging expeditions in band society. Individuals 
hunt, gather, and fi sh where and when they please. In this sense, Paine’s 
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(2000) “continual holiday” account of Native American life seems to 
us not to be much exaggerated and there is nothing trivial about this 
observation. “Being your own” boss is a widely pursued ambition that 
few in state society achieve, and even most business owners have cli-
ents to please. The freedom from having to satisfy a boss or a client 
probably must make foraging “work” seem much more leisurely than 
the “work” of someone with a job in an industrial state. Subordination 
hurts and the feelings that workers in capitalist societies hold about 
their relationship to their own labor get at the heart of the concept of 
alienation. Foragers’ work must not only seem more leisurely; it must 
also feel signifi cantly freer (see Section 4 below).
There is nothing irrational or unreasonable about someone who 
would rather go fi shing than punch a time clock, if they are free to 
make their living this way, as our foraging ancestors were and we are 
not. There is nothing wrong with working for others if one chooses to, 
and we are sure that employers could offer employees positions that 
they would prefer to working independently. However, as long as we 
leave people with no other choice but to take the jobs on offer, we will 
never be sure that they really prefer those jobs.
C. Basic Needs
Perhaps the most tragic fact of contemporary capitalist states is that, 
despite their enormous productivity, they are probably less capable of 
satisfying the basic needs of disadvantaged members than were our 
Pleistocene ancestors. This section argues that point.
Although anthropologists disagree about how well-off people in 
band societies are, they widely agree that nomadic hunter-gatherers 
maintain a reasonable minimum for all members more effectively 
than modern states do. The movement from band to modern society 
eliminated both a ceiling to the accumulation of wealth and also a 
signifi cant fl oor (Lee 1990: 244–5). As long as food was available in 
camp, no one in the camp would go hungry (Lee 1988: 267). While 
all hunter-gatherers ate a varied and healthy diet full of many foods 
that would be considered luxuries in a modern market, many people 
in contemporary states struggle with various forms of malnutrition, 
and as mentioned above, the majority of people today are involuntary 
vegetarians (Harris 1977: x). Since the fi rst development of large-scale 
agriculture, perhaps 5,000 years ago, the dependence of people on a 
5200_Widerquist.indd   187 25/11/16   10:32 AM
188 Prehistoric Myths in Modern Political Philosophy
few staple crops has made them far more vulnerable to famines than 
are hunter-gatherers, and with far less nutritional variety.
According to the United Nations Human Development Report 
2010:
About 1.75 billion people in the 104 countries covered by the 
MPI [Multidimensional Poverty Index]—a third of their popu-
lation—live in multidimensional poverty—that is, with at least 
30 percent of the indicators refl ecting acute deprivation in 
health, education and standard of living. (Klugman 2010: 8)
And those fi gures might be overly optimistic. According to Jason 
Hickel (2016: 754), 680 million people in India alone lack the means 
to meet their essential needs. That fi gure is more than double what the 
World Bank’s numbers suggest for India. 
If we think of poverty as low income or low wealth, it is a concept 
that does not exist in a common property regime. An impoverished 
person lives in a community with abundant resources, but they are 
not entitled to use enough of those resources to thrive. Government-
enforced rules of access (called “property rights”) forbid it. In a com-
mon property regime, no rules of access come between individuals 
and the environment. People in state societies regularly die because 
they lack entitlement; that is, from poverty and the complications of 
poverty, such as malnutrition, exposure, and poverty-related diseases. 
Famines tend to be caused not by a lack of food availability, but by a 
collapse of entitlement (Sen 1981). By creating poverty and famines, 
state societies create forms of economic risk that simply don’t exist in 
societies with a common property regime.
The poorest workers in the world today are not simply impov-
erished; they are in economic distress, as Mohammed Sharif (2003) 
confi rms with evidence from the lowest-wage workers in the Indian 
subcontinent. He writes, “workers are found to engage in unusually 
long hours—an average of 72 hours a week—in physically exerting 
jobs.” This amount of work is more than 30 hours per week greater 
than the average of all observed hunter-gatherer bands, and more 
than 20 hours per week greater than the band with the highest mea-
sured level of work effort. The incredibly high levels of work effort 
in Sharif’s study are accompanied by fewer hours of rest and reduced 
food consumption. When workers with such jobs get a pay increase, 
they usually work fewer hours so that they can catch up on rest. 
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Their economic distress is clear. Their wages are so low that they 
must push themselves to the point of exhaustion to get by; often they 
also need to press their very young children into the labor market 
as well (Sharif 2003). There is little or no reason to think that any 
nomadic hunter-gatherers experienced such demanding work. Per-
haps it happened during a brief crisis, but even that is unlikely for the 
vast majority of hunter-gatherers. 
In developing countries today, 250 million children between fi ve 
and fourteen years old toil in economic activity (not including domes-
tic labor). Nearly half of them work full-time (Ashagrie 1998), sacrifi c-
ing their education—and possibly their growth and future health—to 
obtain short-term bare subsistence. According to Lee (1968: 39), “The 
Bushmen do not have to press their youngsters into the service of the 
food quest, nor do they have to dispose of the oldsters after they have 
ceased to be productive.” Furthermore, child labor in other hunter-
gatherer societies tends to be isolated to group economic activities or 
in the context of learning.
Today, according to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations (2008), 963 million people across the world are hun-
gry, and their data might again be overly optimistic. Hickel (2016: 
761) writes, “In reality between 1.5 and 2.5 billion people do not 
have access to adequate food, and between 3.5 and 4.3 billion remain 
in poverty.” Almost 16,000 children die from hunger-related causes 
every day (Black et al. 2003). Yet, according to Woodburn (1968a: 
51), “For a Hadza to die of hunger, or even to fail to satisfy his hunger 
for more than a day or two, is almost inconceivable.” Sahlins (1974: 
36–8) argues that poverty makes people in modern societies more sus-
ceptible to starvation and death from complications of deprivation 
than hunter-gatherers in the Arctic in winter.
Safe drinking water is inaccessible to about 1.1 billion people in the 
world. About 3.5 million children under fi ve die from drinking unsafe 
water every year (Gadgil 1998). This situation is entirely caused by 
human activity in the forms of pollution and faulty infrastructure. It is 
safe to say that no human being (including those in arid regions) regu-
larly lacked access to potable water before the rise of state societies, 
privatized resources, and the pollution of almost every river system 
in the world. Small-scale stateless societies do not produce pollut-
ants in large enough numbers to have a signifi cant negative impact 
on the watershed. If the water is bad in one area, they simply move to 
another. Over a billion people in the world today are unfree to move 
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to an area with safe water, and water pollution is so widespread that 
many of the world’s rivers and lakes are no longer potable.
Extreme poverty is not limited to lesser-developed nations. It 
appears in smaller, but signifi cant, numbers in very wealthy countries. 
In the United States, 3.55 million children live in households with 
extreme poverty (defi ned as an income of less than $2 per day). This 
level of poverty extends to 4.3 percent of all nonelderly households 
with children (Shaefer and Edin 2013). Food insecurity affects 14.5 
percent of American families, and 5.4 percent have insuffi cient food 
intake for some family members because of poverty. Similar numbers 
are affected by housing insecurity and inadequate childcare, which 
are unheard of in band societies. On any given night about 640,000 
Americans are homeless (Iceland 2013: 44–5). Homeless people face 
many diffi culties that do not exist in band societies. These include 
being reduced to eating other people’s garbage and having no legal 
place to eat, sleep, or urinate (Waldron 1993)—not to mention a place 
to hunt, gather, fi sh, or farm. Levels of stress among the poor and the 
precarious are high to the point at which they have serious negative 
effects on mental health. 
Hunter-gatherers seem to have no fear of deprivation at all. Many 
European explorers and ethnographers (going back as far as Tacitus, 
mentioned above) observed hunter-gatherers had an optimistic, devil-
may-care attitude toward the future (Kelly 1995: 16). Sahlins sum-
marizes these accounts:
Harassment is not implied in the descriptions of their noncha-
lant movements from camp to camp, nor indeed is the famil-
iar condemnations of their laziness. A certain issue is posed by 
exasperated comments on the prodigality of hunters, their incli-
nation to make a feast of everything on hand; as if, one Jesuit 
said of the Montagnais, “the game they were to hunt was shut 
up in a stable. . . . Not the slightest thought of, or care for, what 
the morrow may bring forth”. . . . Two interpretations of this 
supposed lack of foresight are possible: either they are fools, or 
they are not worried—that is, as far as they are concerned, the 
morrow will bring more of the same. (Sahlins 1974: 89) 
Sahlins, as mentioned above, is controversial. His claims about “the 
original affl uence society” were exaggerated, but Nurit Bird-David 
(1992) argues that anthropologists never dismissed him entirely, 
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because on this issue he “had a point.” She fi nds that hunter-gatherers 
are confi dent that nature is abundant and that it will share its fruits 
with them in normal circumstances, even though they know they will 
face occasional hard times. This confi dence is deep and refl ected in a 
widely held view among foragers of the earth as a “giving environ-
ment” which seems to always allow the certainty of at least a suf-
fi cient amount of food, if not for maximum health, then at least for 
survival (Turnbull 1968: 136; Bird-David 1992; Lee and Daly 1999: 
4). Few people in the slums around the world today working 70-hour 
workweeks or foraging in the garbage of others view their environ-
ment as giving. Neither do the poor, the homeless, or the people with 
precarious jobs in some of the wealthiest states—despite a great deal 
of propaganda from property owners and governments encouraging 
them to view the market that way. 
Expressions of contentment and confi dence are found throughout 
ethnographic accounts of band societies. Even Hill and Hurtado (1996: 
78–9), who have worked so hard to debunk the perception of forag-
ing life as “affl uent,” make similar observations on this issue, writing 
“Although the Ache are one of the poorest groups of people in the 
Americas they are generally content as long as their children are healthy 
and they maintain good relations with their neighbors.” Richard Lee 
(1979: 204) asked one Ju/’hoansi man why they don’t plant crops, and 
quoted him as replying, “why should we plant when there are so many 
mongongos in the world?”
We have no doubt that capitalist states could allow every citizen to 
share the confi dence the hunter-gatherers have in their environment. 
Instead, most of them choose to instill in workers the very real fear of 
being unable to meet their basic needs.
3. HEALTH AND LONGEVITY
Perhaps the central achievement of capitalist state society has been 
the doubling of life expectancy that has occurred in most states since 
1800. Overall health measures indicate people in industrial state 
societies are signifi cantly healthier on average than people in band 
societies. Modern medicine has cured many of the diseases that killed 
hunter-gatherers for thousands of years. Many of the dangers faced 
by hunter-gatherers (infectious diseases, animal attacks, exposure, and 
so on) have been or can be eliminated by modern society. There is 
little doubt that, on average, hunter-gatherers are less healthy and live 
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shorter lives than people in modern industrial societies. Do these facts 
indicate that, at least in the area of life and health, the Hobbesian 
hypothesis is confi rmed? Whatever other mixed results government 
and private property have delivered, is it fair to say that these institu-
tions have delivered a longer, healthier life to everyone? We strongly 
doubt it.
Although the average person in modern, industrialized society does 
in fact live a longer, healthier life than the average person in a hunter-
gatherer band society, as in the categories discussed above, increases 
for the average have not been shared by everyone. Some people live 
shorter, less healthy lives. Once again, the problem is not simply a 
matter of failing to help everyone. Contemporary state societies have 
done avoidable things that cause signifi cant numbers of people to be 
less healthy than their foraging cousins.
This section uses two arguments to show that the Hobbesian 
hypothesis is unfulfi lled in terms of life and health. First, although 
modern societies have made the average person better off in terms 
of life and health by eliminating many of the diseases and other risks 
faced by people in small-scale societies, they have also introduced new 
diseases and risks that have made signifi cant numbers of people worse 
off in these same terms. Second, many societies throughout history—
including the societies in which Hobbes and Locke lived—failed to 
deliver signifi cantly better life and health on average than hunting and 
gathering societies do. Most state societies from 3,000 bce through 
1800 ce at least, and perhaps through 1900, probably had worse life 
and health on average than their stateless predecessors. To make these 
arguments, we need to take a closer look at some of the data.
Reliable knowledge of the lifespans of typical hunter-gatherers 
does not exist. Only about fi ve hunter-gatherer bands (the Ju/’hoansi, 
Ache, Agta, Hadza, and Hiwi) have been studied closely enough even 
to estimate the complex statistic, life expectancy at birth (Penning-
ton 2001; Gurven and Kaplan 2007). We cannot assume the infor-
mation about life expectancies in these bands is representative of all 
hunter-gatherers even of recent times (much less of the distant past). 
These bands all lived in diffi cult, out-of-the-way environments that 
colonialists had largely ignored, and all of them were being affected 
by encroachment of modern societies at the time they were studied; 
all were in the early stages of integration into the nation-state system. 
If one sees fi rst contact and the appearance of ethnographers as steps 
5200_Widerquist.indd   192 25/11/16   10:32 AM
Empirical Assessment of the Hobbesian Hypothesis 193
in the process of integration, hunter-gatherers can be observed only 
while going through transition. It is possible that the marginal envi-
ronments of modern hunter-gatherers, loss of territory, introduction 
of diseases, and other factors could cause ethnographically observed 
hunter-gatherers to have poorer health than unobserved hunter-
gatherers, but it is also possible that the beginning of state protection, 
the loss of competitors, trade with agricultural peoples, and other fac-
tors gave observed groups a higher life expectancy than unobserved 
hunter-gatherers. We cannot be sure which effects are greater. Yet, 
studies of these groups provide some of the best evidence available, 
and some generalization is possible by comparing these results with 
evidence from other fi elds, such as archaeology. 
Life expectancy has increased greatly around the world in the last cen-
tury or two. By the early 2000s, life expectancy in modern nation-states 
averaged sixty-six years, ranging from thirty-nine years in Zambia to 
eighty-two years in Japan (Pennington 2001; Gurven and Kaplan 2007). 
According to Michael Gurven and Hillard Kaplan (2007), life expec-
tancy among the fi ve hunter-gatherer bands mentioned above ranged 
from twenty-one years among the Agta to thirty-seven years among the 
Ache. A simple average of those fi ve is thirty-one years. According to 
another study of the same data by Renee Pennington (2001), life expec-
tancy among these groups ranged from twenty-four years among the 
Agta to thirty-seven years among the Ache. The Agta were an outlier 
in both studies. The quality of the data for the Agta was not as good as 
for the others, and the Agta lived in extremely diffi cult circumstances, 
facing loss of territory, declining population, and attacks by outsiders. 
In fact, after assimilating into peasant life in the Philippines, Agta life 
expectancy remained twenty-one years in the Gurven and Kaplan study 
and declined from twenty-four to twenty-two years in the Pennington 
study. As low as their life expectancy was on their own, integration into 
the global market has yet to deliver an improvement. But even leaving 
the Agta out entirely would increase the range only to twenty-seven to 
thirty-seven years and the average only to 33.5 years. Any way you inter-
pret this data, the life expectancy of hunter-gatherer bands compares 
very poorly with that of the nation-states of the world today. 
However, Western perceptions of differences in lifespan are exag-
gerated. People often interpret life expectancy of thirty or thirty-fi ve 
years to mean that people are expected to grow old and die at that age. 
It is easy to forget that life expectancy at birth is an average of all the 
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times at which a person could die from all different causes. Imagine 
a society in which half the people died in infancy and half the people 
died at about seventy years. Average life expectancy in that society 
would be about thirty-fi ve years, but someone who was thirty-fi ve 
years old would not think of herself as an old woman or expect to be 
near death. She would expect to have thirty-fi ve more years to live. 
A similar effect is evident in hunter-gatherer bands. High infant and 
child mortality greatly brings down average life expectancy in band 
societies, but once that period is past, people’s expectations for how 
long they can live, barring unforeseen events, are only slightly shorter 
than in modern state societies. 
According to Gurven and Kaplan (2007: 339), “Infant mortality is 
over 30 times greater among hunter-gatherers, and early child mortal-
ity is over 100 times greater than encountered in the United States.” 
Two-thirds of people who reach age fi fteen in a hunter-gatherer society 
live to be grandparents, and they live as grandparents for an average of 
twenty years (Gurven and Kaplan 2007: 348). According to Hill and 
Hurtado (1996: 194), an Ache woman “who survived to age twenty 
could expect on average to live until age sixty.” Evidence from several 
hunter-gatherer peoples “does not support the widely-held belief that 
few people lived beyond 45–50 years in distant past human societies 
or more recent aboriginal societies . . . No living human population 
has ever been observed with such high adult mortality rates” (Hill and 
Hurtado 1996: 193).
Some researchers examine how long adults can expect to live by 
looking at the age of senescence (the onset of physical decline associ-
ated with aging) and the modal age at death (the age at which the 
largest number of people die). Gurven and Kaplan’s sample shows 
an average modal age at death of about seventy-two years, with a 
range of sixty-eight to seventy-eight years. Senescence and modal 
age at death are only slightly higher in contemporary state society. 
For example, modal age at death in the United States today is eighty-
fi ve years. However, modal age at death is much higher for hunter-
gatherers than for other primates. Modal age at death is fi fteen years 
for wild chimpanzees and forty-two years for captive chimpanzees. 
Something must have happened deep in the hominin evolutionary past 
to cause our ancestors to obtain a potential healthy lifespan reaching 
into their seventies and stretching twenty to thirty years beyond nor-
mal human reproductive age (Caspari et al. 2004; Gurven and Kaplan 
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2007). Therefore, a signifi cant portion of the earliest human foragers, 
living perhaps 200,000 years ago, must have reached the age of sixty 
or seventy. There must have been many of them, and they must have 
had a signifi cant positive effect on the reproductive success of their 
children and grandchildren, or these unusual genes would not have 
become common.
The doubling of life expectancy has come primarily by increasing the 
percentage of people who live to the age of senescence. Contemporary 
states have had much less success mitigating the effects or increasing 
the age of senescence, which is only 10–15 percent higher than it was in 
1800 or most likely in the Pleistocene. Given the right circumstances, a 
hunter-gatherer who reached age fi fteen could expect to live into her sev-
enties, to meet her grandchildren and possibly her great-grandchildren, 
but she could also expect tragedy in her life, with the early death of some 
of her children, relatives, and friends. 
In addition, while hunter-gatherers may lack the benefi ts of modern 
medicine in extending life expectancy through the curing and preven-
tion of infectious diseases and injuries, they may actually be healthier 
than the residents of states in some surprising ways. A study by S. Boyd 
Eaton and Stanley B. Eaton III (1999: 455) fi nds that hunter-gather-
ers “are largely immune to the chronic degenerative diseases which 
produce the greater part of all mortality in affl uent nations.” Obe-
sity is rare. Many of the diseases associated with high-stress sedentary 
urban living are absent. Diabetes, heart disease, and stroke are almost 
unknown. “Blood pressure does not increase with age among hunter-
gatherers. . . . Cholesterol level of hunter-gatherers . . . is much below 
that of urban industrial people” (Eaton and Eaton 1999: 451–2). It 
seems that most of what hunter-gatherers die of we have cured or pre-
vented, but most of what we die of did not affl ict them at all. Along 
with the cure to many diseases, modern society has delivered new life-
threatening diseases.
One might suspect that these fi ndings are simply the result of peo-
ple dying before these diseases tend to appear. But Eaton and Eaton’s 
studies take age into account, and as the discussion above indicates, 
there is a reasonably large population of older people in hunter-
gatherer societies to observe. Hunter-gatherers’ low exposure to toxins 
and their diet (low starch, low fat, no processed foods, no additives, 
high fi ber, high protein, and high in fruits and vegetables) account for 
their extremely low cancer rates; “One forager woman in 800 develops 
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breast cancer, while in the United States it is more like one in eight” 
(Eaton and Eaton 1999: 454). A person who suffers from one of these 
diseases, especially at a young age, is quite possibly less healthy and 
shorter-lived than she would have been as a hunter-gatherer.
While modern states have failed to completely fulfi ll the promise of 
the Hobbesian hypothesis despite their enormous progress in improv-
ing average life and health, most states in human history failed even 
to improve average life and health. Unwarranted extrapolation prob-
ably tempts people to assume that our most distant ancestors must 
have had the shortest lifespans. We see a solid trend of lifespans get-
ting shorter as we look back to 1800, and we tend to think they were 
even shorter in 1700 and far shorter in 10,000 bce. But that is a very 
bad assumption. The trend toward rising lifespans and living stan-
dards began only after 1800 (Clark 2007: 1). Evidence indicates that 
life expectancy declined slightly with the invention of agriculture and 
again with the formation of the fi rst states, and fl uctuated thereafter, 
sometimes higher and sometimes lower, until the trend toward rising 
living standards began in the 1800s (Angel 1975: 179).
From the origin of the fi rst states 5,000 years ago until that trend 
began in the 1800s, the introduction of government and landowner-
ship appears to have reduced health and life expectancy. Studies of 
skeletal remains show that adults who died 30,000 years ago were 
taller and died with fewer missing teeth than modern humans living 
in the United States (Angel 1975: 179; Harris 1977: 14). Tahitians 
who were living a hunting and gathering existence were taller than the 
British who fi rst came upon them in the 1760s (Kenny 2006; Clark 
2007: 60). Gurven and Kaplan (2007) present data for Sweden in 
the 1750s in their article about hunter-gatherer life expectancy. Their 
comparison reveals that the average life expectancy and mortality 
rates of eighteenth-century Swedes was right in the middle of the rates 
experienced by observed band societies. By 1800, life expectancy in 
advanced nations was no higher than that of hunter-gatherers—about 
thirty to thirty-fi ve years—and after that it began to increase only very 
slowly (Eaton and Eaton 1999: 452; Kenny 2006: 14; Clark 2007: 1, 
ch. 5). Life expectancy in France in the second half of the eighteenth 
century was only 27.9 years, well below that of the simple average 
of band societies mentioned above (Livi-Bacci 2007: 106). Hobbes 
(1962 [1651]: 100) lived to be ninety-one, but he lived in a society 
in which the lower class almost certainly had a life expectancy below 
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that of the Native Americans he accused of having lives that were 
“nasty, brutish, and short.” Hobbes simply did not know enough 
about stateless peoples or his less-advantaged compatriots to make 
any meaningful comparison of their health or longevity, nor do many 
of the philosophers who continued to take his word for it.
One might wonder, if societies with government and private land-
ownership didn’t initially deliver longer, healthier lives, why did 
almost everyone gradually switch? States seem to have simply out-
competed hunter-gatherer bands in the competition for territory, only 
because they could sustain a much larger population on the same area 
of land—not because they sustained a longer, healthier, or happier life 
for members of the population.
The trend toward rising life expectancy has reached the poorer 
nations of the world only in the last few decades, and it has yet to 
reach the poorest populations within the poorest countries. As late 
as 1900, life expectancy for non-white males in the United States 
was 32.5 years (Harris 1977: 14). Consider that: placed on what was 
then the pinnacle of thousands of years of technological progress, in 
a largely unregulated capitalist state, parents of the average non-white 
male in the United States would have improved his chances of living 
to see his grandchildren if they somehow could have had him adopted 
at birth by the Ache, who maintained a life expectancy of only thirty-
seven years in a foraging economy in the highlands of Paraguay on 
poor land that nobody else wanted.
All of this evidence shows that rising life expectancy is a very recent 
development attributable to improvements in medicine and nutrition, 
not to the development of states or property rights. It is inappropri-
ate to justify states and private landownership based on a trend that 
began several millennia after those institutions were fi rst created (and 
150 years after Hobbes claimed increased life expectancy was already 
accomplished). It is even less appropriate to claim the fulfi llment of a 
proviso designed to protect the least-advantaged group of people based 
on a trend that has yet to reach the least-advantaged group of people. 
4. FREEDOM
This section considers whether people are freer in contemporary state 
societies than in band societies. Using “freedom” and “liberty” inter-
changeably, we assume (but do not argue) that freedom benefi ts people. 
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We do not assume that freedom necessarily is (or is not) an overriding 
concern that trumps all other values. We consider the relative freedom 
of people in state and stateless societies in terms of fi ve different concep-
tions of freedom: (A) political freedom, (B) positive freedom, (C) nega-
tive freedom, (D) status freedom, and (E) sexual freedom and freedom 
from gender- and group-based oppression. These are only a few of the 
many conceptions of freedom in the political and philosophical litera-
ture. We do not argue that these are the most important conceptions 
of freedom. We distinguish them using a simplifi ed version of MacCal-
lum’s (1967: 314) formula: the freedom of agent x, from constraint y, to 
do action z. In each case, we use individual freedom for x, distinguish-
ing the fi ve concepts by identifying the constraint and the action.
Although freedom is a much different issue than the presence of luxu-
ries, the same measurement problem applies. When comparing two sets 
of things a person is free to do, the value of those liberties is far more 
important than the number of them.1 But of course, the relative values 
of different liberties is subjective, and any effort to come up with a rank 
order of the importance of specifi c liberties is bound to be controversial. 
We deal with this problem on an ad hoc basis. Our general solution is 
that we can only be sure that one person is freer in one circumstance 
than another if the set of liberties in situation A dominates the set of the 
liberties available in situation B. That is, B is a subset of A. 
A. Political Freedom
We use the term “political freedom” for the freedom from all con-
straints for individuals who live under the law to participate equally 
in the making of it. As discussed above, bands have very few laws, 
they make political decisions collectively, and anyone who doesn’t 
want to live by the rules is free to camp on their own or start a new 
group. This would seem to be the maximum possible political free-
dom. We do not see how political decision-making could have wider 
participation. Some people might be more persuasive than others, but 
that would happen in any society. Political freedom decreases steadily 
as scale increases. Slightly larger-scale societies, or what were once 
called “big man” societies (Sahlins 1963) have recognized leaders who 
usually hold relatively little actually power. Chiefdoms, which may 
include tens of thousands of people, are characterized by the pres-
ence of leaders who sometimes have fairly limited authority, but may 
in some cases hold fairly extreme political power—even sometimes 
5200_Widerquist.indd   198 25/11/16   10:32 AM
Empirical Assessment of the Hobbesian Hypothesis 199
including the power of life and death over subjects (Earle 1991). And 
fi nally, even the earliest states in places like Mesopotamia, Egypt, and 
China were characterized by extremely powerful kings, who sat at 
the heads of both extensive bureaucratic governments and religious 
establishments (Trigger 2003).
The recent trend toward political democratization could be con-
ceived of as a revival of some of the political freedom that band 
societies have had, perhaps, for a very long time. But even the most 
democratic nations cannot claim to share infl uence over the politi-
cal process as widely or evenly as band societies. The infl uence of 
privileged people, corporations, and lobbyists is undeniable. And even 
apart from systemic unfairness, the size of most states inherently cre-
ates a gap between citizens and leaders. Hopefully, democracies will 
continue to improve, but they will have a hard time matching the 
political freedom of band societies.
B. Positive Freedom
Like freedom itself, “positive freedom” has many conceptions. We 
focus on one that equates it with opportunity: the freedom of an indi-
vidual from all constraints to do more of the things they might want 
to do. In this sense, the more (potentially worthwhile) opportunities a 
person has, the freer they are. We do not deal with another conception 
of positive freedom: the freedom of the will from constraints within 
one’s own mind (Berlin 1969).
Freedom as opportunity is the conception of freedom for which 
the capitalist state has the best chance of beating band society, but the 
problem here is revealed by the pattern displayed above in the sections 
on luxuries, leisure, and basic needs. The wealthy in state societies 
have long had enormous opportunities that are unavailable in state-
less societies; in the last century or two most countries have gotten to 
the point where the average person has great opportunities, but the 
most disadvantaged people have opportunities that leave them worse 
off than people in hunter-gatherer bands. Capitalist states would have 
to fi nd a way to share their many opportunities more widely to have 
hope of fulfi lling this proviso in these terms.
One might be tempted to argue that opportunities are available to 
everyone in capitalist states; some people simply fail to take advan-
tage of them. In a complex economy it is diffi cult to tell exactly what 
opportunities are genuinely available to any particular individual. 
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But the claim that opportunities are always universally available is 
rather strange. It would mean that disadvantaged people in state soci-
ety have the opportunity to consume more and work less than people 
in stateless society. But they choose to consume less and work more. 
Why would they do that? The obvious answer is that disadvantaged 
people in state society don’t actually have the opportunity to work less 
and consume more.
Great educational opportunities are available to most people in 
state societies, but they also create the situation in which people need 
more education to function in their society, and they sometimes fail to 
educate people up to that level. Thus, they create the negative oppor-
tunity of under-education. Everyone in band society grows up with 
the opportunity to learn all the skills they need to survive and thrive 
in their community. Not everyone in state society does.
People in stateless societies have very few work opportunities. Gen-
erally speaking, they have opportunities to hunt, gather, fi sh, farm, 
or scavenge—all at very little better than a subsistence level. Those 
are extremely poor work opportunities. But they have one attractive 
aspect that capitalist states only offer to the wealthy few: the opportu-
nity to be one’s own boss.
C. Negative Freedom
We use a broad defi nition of “negative freedom”: the freedom of an 
individual from constraints caused by other people, to do whatever. 
Negative freedom also has many conceptions, depending mostly on 
further specifying what one is free to do—the “whatever” in our broad 
defi nition. The condition that makes all of them “negative” is the focus 
on constraints caused by other people. Negative freedom is the free-
dom from coercion, aggression, interference, or involuntarily imposed 
obligations. Negative freedom has nothing necessarily to do with the 
presence of opportunity. For example, a person trapped in a crevasse 
has very low opportunity. If she was pushed into the crevasse, she also 
has low negative freedom, but if she fell into the crevasse, she has very 
high negative freedom, because other people are not constraining her 
at all. Negative freedom is particularly important to propertarians, 
who often argue that its moral value is overriding, such that society 
should not sacrifi ce the negative freedom of one person either for their 
own good (in terms of opportunities) or for someone else’s (even some-
one with few opportunities). Propertarians often argue that capitalism 
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(with or without a “state”) has greater negative liberty than any other 
system (Nozick 1974: ix, 149–50, 160–4, 163, 169, 235, and 273–4; 
Rothbard 1982: 41–3, 52, 162; Boaz 1997: 59: 291; Murray 1997; 
Mack 2002: 254–5; Mack 2006: 110–12). Even many non-propertari-
ans concede that negative freedom is important and that it has a strong 
connection with capitalism (Berlin 1969: 124–5; Nagel 1983; Arneson 
2003: 139; Peter 2004: 7).
The problem with this belief is that it usually pits the capitalist 
state against the socialist state, the communist state, the feudal state, 
or some theoretical alternative. People making such claims rarely if 
ever ask whether capitalism delivers more negative freedom than a 
stateless society with a common property regime. This section argues 
that people in band society have greater negative freedom than dis-
advantaged people in contemporary capitalist state society. Although 
freedom is diffi cult to measure, freedom in band society dominates 
the freedom of disadvantaged people in state society. The negative 
liberties extended to propertyless people in state society are a subset 
of the negative liberties extended to people in band society, so that our 
conclusion is fi rm despite the diffi culty in measurement.
The extensive negative freedom of nomadic hunter-gatherers is 
well-documented and uncontroversial (Redfi eld 1967: 21; Lee and 
DeVore 1968b; Turnbull 1968; Woodburn 1968a: 52; Woodburn 
1968b: 103; Woodburn 1982: 434; Bird-David 1994: 591, 597; Lee 
and Daly 1999: 4; Boehm 2001: 72–3; Renfrew 2007: 148). For 
example, Eleanor Leacock (1998: 143) writes, “What is hard to grasp 
about the structure of the egalitarian band is that leadership as we 
conceive it is not merely ‘weak’ or ‘incipient,’ as is commonly stated, 
but irrelevant.” Morton Fried has the most vivid description:
It is diffi cult, in ethnographies of simple egalitarian societies, to 
fi nd cases in which one individual tells one or more others, “Do 
this!” or some command equivalent. The literature is replete with 
examples of individuals, saying the equivalent of “If this is done, 
it will be good,” possibly or possibly not followed by somebody 
else doing it. More usually the person who initiates the idea also 
performs the activity. (Fried 1967: 8)
To the extent that people within the band have obligations to the 
group or each other, virtually all of them—aside from the obliga-
tion to respect other people’s negative freedom—can be understood 
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as voluntarily accepted because they all have the option to camp a 
kilometer or two away and be free of any obligation to the group. 
But even the obligations within the band tend not to be enforced by 
coercion. We have said that people in the band are “obliged” to share 
what they have, but the enforcement mechanism is almost entirely 
criticism and ridicule, not coercion or interference.
The extensive freedom of people in hunter-gatherer band societies 
is uncontroversial not only among anthropologists, but also among 
propertarians. In an article entitled “Hunter-Gatherers: The Original 
Libertarians,” Thomas Mayor (2012: 491) writes, bands had “a level 
of individual autonomy in decision making that far exceeded any-
thing experienced since the introduction of extensive agriculture.” 
Importantly, Mayor (2012: 498) correctly recognizes one reason band 
members are so free: “Hunter-gatherer societies were free primarily 
because each individual possessed effective economic mobility. In the 
face of attempted political or economic exploitation, the hunter-gath-
erer always had the opportunity to pick up and move without paying 
a signifi cant price for doing so.”
This economic mobility is apparent in ethnographic descriptions. 
Woodburn (Woodburn 1968a: 52) writes, “Hunting is not a coordi-
nated activity. Men hunt individually and decide for themselves where 
and when they will go hunting.” According to Harris (1977: 69), 
band members, “decided for themselves how long they would work 
on a particular day, what they would work at—or if they would work 
at all. . . . Neither rent, taxes, nor tribute kept people from doing what 
they wanted to do.” This ability to work for oneself, and bands’ use 
of fl ux or fi ssion (discussed in Chapter 9), affords them the “effective 
economic mobility” that Mayor wrote about.
The comparative lack of effective economic mobility in most state 
societies today is incredible. As mentioned above, propertyless people 
cannot work for themselves. If they attempt to hunt, gather, fi sh, farm, 
scavenge, or build a shelter, someone will interfere with them and force 
them to stop. The propertyless earn the right to their necessities by 
accepting a subordinate position for a property owner. Jeremy Waldron 
(1993) discussed the unfreedom of the homeless to do some of the most 
basic human functions, such as to sleep unmolested, to have sex in a pri-
vate place, and to have a legal place to eat or to urinate. Waldron (1993) 
argues that the homeless are not unable to do these things (which would 
imply a lack of positive freedom); they are unfree to do them in the most 
negative sense of the word.
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One might argue that the homeless can get all of these things if they 
accept a job opportunity. Maybe so, but opportunity is not negative 
freedom; opportunity is positive freedom. As Waldron (1988: 41, 132, 
172, 411) argues, “an opportunity to become free is not freedom. . . . 
So long as the opportunity remains unconsummated, the person who 
possesses it and who is even actively pursuing it, remains in a negative 
sense unfree.” Daniel Attas (2005: 7), G. A. Cohen (1988; 1995: 57; 
1998; 2011a), Jeffery Friedman (1997: 428), Allan Gibbard (2000), 
Alan Haworth (1994: 45–6), and Michael Otsuka (2003: 19) make 
similar arguments about the loss of negative freedom a property rights 
system imposes on propertyless people.
The important difference is that bands have common property 
regimes, meaning that everyone can use the land and consume its 
products, but no one can establish ownership of the land. In state 
society, virtually all of the land is owned (either privately or publicly). 
Very few state societies still have a commons where people are free 
to work for themselves or to pitch a tent and live as they please. A 
property right is the legal right to coerce. If land is owned, the govern-
ment uses coercion to establish and enforce the owner’s legal right to 
interfere with anyone else who might want to use that land without 
the owner’s approval. In a negative sense, a person who owns land is 
free to do some things a person who lives on a commons does not, and 
vice versa. So, one cannot say that a private property regime necessar-
ily reduces freedom, but one only gains the new freedoms associated 
with property if one owns property. If everyone owned property, then 
all would have some of these new freedoms, but state society today 
has propertyless people. If common resources are privatized to others 
but not you, you get no new liberties, only new forms of coercion.
Most propertarians do recognize that the move from a common 
property regime to a private property regime causes people to lose 
liberty. As Chapter 4 discussed, the term “the Lockean proviso” was 
coined to ensure that this loss of freedom would not be harmful to 
anyone (Nozick 1974: 178–82). But propertarians using the proviso 
almost universally resort to positive freedom arguments (Mack 2002: 
246–8). For example, Nozick (1974: 175) writes, “the things I do 
with the grain of sand I appropriate might improve the position of 
others, counterbalancing their loss of the liberty to use that grain.” 
The opportunity to fi nd a job and buy Nozick’s improved grain of 
sand might well be valuable, but it is not a negative liberty. Therefore, 
propertyless people in capitalist states today are unequivocally less 
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free than people in band society. If propertarians are serious about 
the absolute priority of negative freedom, they either have to become 
advocates of the nomadic hunter-gatherer economy or they have to 
fi nd a way to relieve some of the coercion imposed on propertyless 
people under capitalism.
D. Status Freedom
One of us has elsewhere argued that the negative freedom issues dis-
cussed above put propertyless people in a position that threatens their 
status as free individuals. Widerquist (2009; 2010c; 2013) defi nes sta-
tus freedom as “effective control self-ownership,” or the freedom of 
an individual from constraints (directly or indirectly) created by other 
people to exercise the effective power to accept or refuse active coop-
eration with other willing people. This defi nition is negative because 
it is limited to constraints caused by other people. The “effective eco-
nomic mobility” (Mayor 2012: 498) of people in a common property 
regime protects their status freedom. But states coercively enforce a 
property rights system in which owners or the police will interfere 
with any propertyless people who try to work only for themselves. 
Directly, coercion is applied only to people’s use of external assets 
(resources and the things people make out of them). But indirectly this 
coercion makes people unfree to live unless they work for someone 
else, because people are animals who die without certain resources. 
They have a choice of employers, but they are still forced to work for 
someone who owns property. 
Freely chosen employment does not threaten status freedom, but 
forced work does, even if the force is indirect and the group for which 
one is forced to work contains many employment options (Widerquist 
2009; 2010c; 2013). A nomadic hunter-gatherer is free to live and work 
on their own as long as they feel comfortable. A propertyless person in 
state society is unfree to do so at all. Fewer than ten hunter-gatherers 
can start a viable band. A group of one million propertyless people in 
state society are legally unfree to form a group and work only for each 
other in any way that will keep them alive. This loss of freedom is sig-
nifi cant. Many people today have little freedom to do anything but fol-
low orders 40 hours a week all of their adult lives, and as argued above, 
following those orders often leaves them and their children in deeper 
poverty than their foraging ancestors experienced 12,000 years ago.
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E. Sexual Freedom and Freedom from Gender- and 
Group-Based Oppression
Grouping these forms of freedom together makes them diffi cult to 
defi ne in terms of MacCallum’s formula, but in the interest of space, 
we accept the risk of vagueness in our attempt. The freedom from 
gender-, sexual-, and group-based oppression is the freedom of an 
individual from constraints created by other people to live as an 
equal, control their private interactions, and exercise their identity in 
a group. These freedoms are negative because it is diffi cult to oppress 
someone without interfering with them in some way. Most forms of 
group-based oppression are rare in band society. Their small-scale and 
fl exible membership forces them to accept people with different back-
grounds. As Chapter 9 discussed, observed band societies tend to have 
at least relative gender equality; a level that was probably unmatched 
by any state society until the twentieth century and that is still lacking 
in many state societies today. In most observed bands, women take 
full part in decision-making and have the same freedom from author-
ity and effective economic mobility as any man. But signifi cant gender 
oppression has been observed in some small-scale stateless societies, 
such as the Yanomamö, who live in communities only about two to 
four times the size of bands.
In a society in which no person is thought to have the right to tell 
another what to do, sexual freedom tends to be high. For example, 
many Native American societies recognized “two-spirit people” who 
were essentially transgendered. Two-spirit people could marry any 
one-spirit person, achieving a form of same-sex marriage (Flannery 
and Marcus 2012: 70–1). This system was not full marriage equality, 
but it was closer than most states have today, and it came without 
social stigma or any loss of status.
5. CONSENT
All of the previous sections addressed quality-of-life measures, but 
the contractarian argument ultimately rests on preferences. Contrac-
tarian theorizing about the state of nature is only a substitute for the 
unavailable option to choose statelessness. But that option has not 
always been unavailable. States and stateless societies existed side by 
side or one after the other for most of the last 5,000 years. Historical 
accounts of those situations provide two kinds of relevant evidence: 
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expressed preference and observed choice. Chapter 7 calls the effort 
to actually give people the choice, “Klosko’s test,” because Klosko 
(2004: 19) claims to know what the test results would be, writing, 
“One of my governing assumptions . . . is that the overwhelming 
majority of inhabitants of modern societies do not prefer to live in the 
woods or some remote outpost.” Evidence of expressed preferences 
and observed choices can test that assumption. Section 5A discusses 
methodological issues with this test. Section 5B discusses expressed 
preference. Section 5C discusses observed choice.
A. Problems with Klosko’s Test
This test has four problems, most of which are likely to bias the test in 
favor of justifying the state. First, the most fundamental problem with 
this test is that it assumes the political obligation it attempts to justify. 
The idea of contractarian theory is that sovereign authority over any 
particular territory comes from the consent of all the people in that 
territory. If all the people who don’t consent are obliged to leave the 
territory, then the state has sovereignty over that territory despite a 
lack of agreement—not because of agreement. Therefore, this author-
ity would have to come from something other than the unanimous 
agreement that contractarian theory requires. Despite this issue, the 
test can tell us something about consent. If peripheral stateless areas 
exist, and no one wants to go there, we could take their behavior as 
an indication of consent.
Second, even just as an indicator, this test is a biased indicator, 
because it exaggerates the cost of dissenting from the agreement. It 
interprets the costs of moving out of state authority as costs of being 
outside state authority. Because individuals develop personal attach-
ments to people and place, the moving-away test exaggerates the 
costs of actually living outside state authority. Additionally, the test 
misidentifi es some benefi ts of location as benefi ts of the state. If the 
person in question is a native of Los Angeles (where subsistence by 
fi shing was once very easy) and Klosko’s remote woods is in northern 
Alaska (where subsistence is much more diffi cult), the exaggeration 
could be enormous. 
Third, Klosko’s test has a potential problem recognized by Hamp-
ton (1988: 271), in which “choice is essentially ‘rigged’ by a political 
society that creates in us the very reason we use to choose it and that 
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appears to justify its existence.” Klosko (2004: 5; emphasis added) 
recognizes the same issue, arguing that if the benefi ts of state soci-
ety are to justify political objections, “the subject . . . must require 
them from the state.” People are afraid to go live in Klosko’s woods 
partly because they have never done so, because they have never been 
taught the skills necessary to do so, and possibly because the state 
has grabbed so much territory and altered the natural environment so 
much that life in the woods is much more diffi cult today than it was 
in Thoreau’s times or in prehistoric times. The use of historical data 
involving people with experience both with state and stateless society 
can at least help with this bias.
Fourth, to reduce the above biases the state would have to make 
the periphery extremely accessible and take whatever action is nec-
essary to reduce people’s dependence on the state. It might be hard 
to fi gure out how to do that, and it would then create the problem 
that unreasonable, irrational, or ill-informed people would choose 
statelessness, possibly to use it as a base to do unreasonable things to 
others. This fourth problem is less likely the less accessible stateless 
regions are, and stateless regions have long been remote, so we can 
expect the test to be greatly biased in favor of undercounting dissent, 
but it can provide some indication of people’s preferences.
B. Expressed Preference
The above discussion shows that many ethnographers and others have 
observed strong expressions of contentment by people in band soci-
ety (Turnbull 1968: 136; Bird-David 1992; Kelly 1995: 16; Hill and 
Hurtado 1996: 78–9; Tacitus 1996 ; Lee and Daly 1999: 4). Unwill-
ingness to be incorporated into larger-scale societies is a running 
theme among stateless peoples (Marshall III 2002; Marshall III 2005; 
Brown 2007; Scott 2009).
At least one aspect of the behavior of people in band and other 
stateless societies might signal discontentment. Ethnographers, mis-
sionaries, and others who have recorded contact with people in small-
scale societies have often noticed (or complained) that members of 
small-scale societies constantly protest about not having enough to 
eat and harass visitors with request for gifts of food or tools or any-
thing else they have that might be useful (Lee 1979: 458–60; Peterson 
1993; Kelly 1995: 22; Hill and Hurtado 1996: 319–20; McCall 2000). 
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Even Charles Darwin complained about natives begging in Tierra del 
Fuego in 1839:
Young and old, men and children, never ceased repeating the 
word yammer-schooner, which means “give me.” After pointing 
to almost every object, one after the other, even to the buttons 
on our coats, and saying their favorite word in as many intona-
tions as possible, they would then use it in a neuter sense, and 
vacantly repeat “yammer-schooner.” After yammerschoonering 
for any article very eagerly, they would by a simple artifi ce 
point to their young women or little children, as much as to say, 
“If you will not give it me, surely you will to such as these.” 
(Darwin 1909: 234)
Although Darwin’s description is pejorative and judgmental, the situ-
ation he describes is typical of something ethnographers have reported 
around the world. Such observations might make people think that 
nomadic hunter-gatherers are discontented with their own lots and 
envious of people from larger-scale societies. Early explorers read-
ily attributed the apparent contradiction between this behavior and 
natives’ unwillingness to work for Europeans to their being lazy, 
greedy, or dumb, but modern ethnography indicates that any such 
interpretations come from a lack of understanding of the role that 
sharing plays in many small-scale societies. 
Many ethnographers have observed that hunter-gatherer bands 
(and some slightly larger-scale societies) throughout the world use a 
social mechanism anthropologists call “demand sharing” (Lee 1979: 
458–60; Bird-David 1990: 195; Peterson 1993; Kelly 1995: 22; 
McCall 2000; Barnard 2004a: 12). The norm in band societies from 
the Arctic to the tropics appears to be: if you camp with us, you share 
what you have—at least when asked. If you have two spears when 
someone who has none asks for one, you must give it. If you have 
only one spear but you are not using it when someone asks, you must 
give it. And whether it is to be given back later is often unclear. This 
norm causes friction between individuals, but it also allows band soci-
eties to maintain social and economic equality. No one fl aunts their 
wealth, and if there is food in camp, no one goes hungry (Leacock and 
Lee 1982: 8). The encounter between Darwin and the Fuegians was 
between two groups of people who didn’t understand each other’s 
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very different norms of material culture. The Fuegians were telling 
Darwin that he was violating norms that didn’t exist in his society, 
and Darwin was judging the Fuegians for violating norms that didn’t 
exist in their society.
If this understanding of demand sharing is correct, hunter-gatherers’ 
requests for gifts of all kinds are not a sign of discontentment, but merely 
efforts to enforce a norm of equality. It doesn’t necessarily imply that 
they view a capitalist state as inherently more desirable or that they are 
willing to make the sacrifi ces a capitalist state would demand of them to 
get those goods as anything other than gifts. It certainly does not imply 
that they would welcome the destruction of their foraging territory in 
favor of opportunities to work in the capitalist economy’s fast-food sec-
tor. Although stateless peoples have hardships that give them good rea-
son to complain (Hill and Hurtado 1996), the well-observed expressions 
of contentment have to be taken seriously.
C. Observed Choice
The one piece of evidence that most clearly contradicts consent theory is 
observed choice. There is an enormous amount of evidence supporting 
the conclusion that states do not have unanimous consent. Although 
philosophers confi dently assert that everyone given the choice would 
choose the state, anthropologists and archaeologists have found that 
states and chiefdoms tend to form only when it becomes diffi cult for 
people to escape state authority for stateless regions (Carneiro 1970). 
In other words, so many people choose to leave state authority that 
state society becomes nonviable when people are genuinely free to 
choose. This section reveals a pattern of observations that strongly 
contradict the Hobbesian hypothesis: stateless people usually resist 
territorial incorporation into states; people in stateless regions often 
choose to remain when they could move into states; people from states 
often choose to move to stateless societies (Scott 2009).
The fi rst place to look for such evidence is in theory of state forma-
tion, which explains why states form when and where they do, and 
why they have not formed in other times and places. Any evidence 
from this fi eld has to be used cautiously, because, as Chapter 3 argues, 
contractarian theory is not about the formation of the state. Contrac-
tarian stories about state formation are useful only to illustrate claims 
about the difference between life under state authority and life outside 
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it. The theory of state formation is useful to contractarianism only to 
the extent that it provides evidence about the choices people make 
who are in the position to compare those situations.
A classic explanation for why states form when and where they do 
is that of Robert Carneiro’s (1970) circumscription theory, which sup-
poses that states form only when the population density reaches a point 
at which individuals cannot escape to form stateless communities. 
Circumscription could happen when a fertile plain becomes crowded 
with villages, when arable land becomes suddenly scarce owing to 
climate change, or when a large-scale irrigation project makes a small 
area capable of supporting more people than the surrounding lands. 
Archaeological evidence appears to indicate that circumscription 
can partly but not fully explain state formation, which can happen for 
a variety of reasons (Lee 1990: 241; Trigger 2003: 283–4). Charles 
Keith Maisels (1990: 214–16, 302) argues that early city-states in the 
Middle East attracted people as much as they hemmed them in, imply-
ing that they are not completely circumscribed but not that they are 
free from dissent. However, Maisels does mention that states require 
a threshold of population density. Population density makes fi ssion-
ing more diffi cult, increasing the cost of moving. And so it seems that 
increasing the diffi culty of moving, if not making it impossible, is a 
necessary condition for state formation. If the formation of the state 
requires making it diffi cult to get away from state authority, people 
must have a strong tendency to try to get away from state authority, 
and that is a strong indicator of preference.
Maisels (1990: 215) also remarks, “Even after millennia of city-
states in Mesopotamia there were always signifi cant numbers ‘vot-
ing with their feet’ as they alternate between and around cities and 
fl uxed from agrarian villages to nomadic niches and back again.” 
This evidence shows that some people might voluntarily accept the 
authority of a government or a landowner at least for a time, but 
not everyone is willing to commit to it permanently. This evidence 
indicates too much consent to support pure circumscription theory 
but not enough consent to support the contractarian unanimous 
agreement. 
Further evidence against consent comes from the many anthro-
pologists, archaeologists, and historians who have observed that 
the emergence of the state appears always to involve conquest of 
territory (Renfrew 2007: 176). According to Carneiro (1970: 734), 
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“Force, and not enlightened self-interest, is the mechanism by which 
political evolution has led, step by step, from autonomous villages to 
the state.” David Hume (1960) made very much the same observa-
tion in his eighteenth-century criticism of social contract theory. A 
violent origin to the state does not necessarily contradict contractar-
ian theory, which predicts violent chaos before the formation of the 
state. Presumably the fi rst state would be established by a warlord 
who fi nally solidifi ed control over a population that had been per-
petually at war. Rather than the existence of war in the process of 
state formation, it is the pattern of resistance that contradicts the 
Hobbesian hypothesis. Warlords are not the only ones who resist 
the conquest of states. People in very small-scale egalitarian societ-
ies, even acephalous societies, have a long history of resisting state 
expansion (Marshall III 2002; Marshall III 2005; Brown 2007; Scott 
2009). Some of the smallest-scale societies do not fi ght each other 
(Kelly 2013: 206), but do resist state encroachment—just the oppo-
site of what the theory predicts. Good evidence indicates that most 
stateless societies in the last few thousand years (and perhaps lon-
ger) were well aware that states, chiefs, and landlords existed but 
were consciously trying to avoid coming under their authority (Scott 
2009; Wengrow and Graeber 2015: 12). This fact is extremely hard 
to reconcile with the Hobbesian hypothesis. 
This pattern of signifi cant numbers of people choosing to avoid 
incorporation into states has continued for the last 5,000 years, as 
James C. Scott (2009: especially 132–3 and 208–11) documents. He 
focuses on a large highland Asian region that has lately come to be 
called Zomia. Until very recently, states rarely managed to extend 
their power into that region. Individuals from states such as India, 
China, and Vietnam fl ed to Zomia where they created or integrated 
into stateless societies. He also documents similar cases in places as 
diverse as the Philippines, Indonesia, the Middle East, central and 
eastern Europe, Brazil, Colombia, Florida, North Carolina, Virginia, 
the Great Lakes region of North America, and many more.
The existence of people who fl ed societies with governments and 
landownership for societies with neither of those institutions is a 
worldwide historical pattern. We can’t say people only moved one 
way (they moved both into and out of states), but we can say that 
enough people chose stateless societies to keep them going as long 
as land was available. The demise of such societies also exhibits a 
5200_Widerquist.indd   211 25/11/16   10:32 AM
212 Prehistoric Myths in Modern Political Philosophy
worldwide pattern: they tend to integrate into states when forced—
either directly through conquest or indirectly through degradation of 
territory (Scott 2009).
Prosperous countries, such as the United States, are no exception 
to this pattern. Stateless societies covered most of the land area of 
the Americas at the outset of the European conquest, and for at 
least 400 years states and stateless areas existed side by side. The 
history of the period does not show large numbers of indigenous 
stateless peoples seeking to join states but repeated, violent annexa-
tion of indigenous bands, villages, and chiefdoms against strong 
popular resistance (Marshall III 2002; Marshall III 2005; Brown 
2007; Scott 2009). 
U.S. history, in fact, shows signifi cant numbers of people moving 
in the opposite direction, from state society into areas beyond state 
control. Some people who moved into stateless regions in the United 
States intended to be the vanguard of state expansion, but others 
did so to evade state authority. For example, for decades a mix of 
native and non-native people lived in the “Great Dismal Swamp” 
on the Virginia–North Carolina border because they did not want 
to submit to state authority. Settlement of the swamp ended not 
when swamp life got too dismal, but when the state drained the 
swamp to get the people out. When that opportunity to escape from 
state authority was cut off, other pockets developed in the west, 
ending for good only when the United States government solidifi ed 
control of its remote regions, giving people nowhere else to fl ee 
(Scott 2009: 169–72).
This pattern of observation tells us two important things about 
consent. First, the people of stateless regions do not generally consent 
to join states en masse. Individuals do, but force is apparently neces-
sary to fully incorporate any stateless region. Second, people from 
state societies do not all eventually choose to remain in the state; the 
fl ow of people to stateless regions typically ends when the stateless 
region is incorporated rather than when people stop seeking the state-
less periphery. The existence of people who choose life in swamps and 
high mountain slopes indicates that at least some people are willing 
to endure signifi cant hardships to be free from the forced subordina-
tion to states and landowners. If so, there are likely many more people 
who dissent from their society’s institutions but are unable to fl ee for 
other reasons.
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This evidence is devastating for consent theory, which requires the 
amazingly strong claim that people would not fl ee even if moving was 
costless. If after millennia of experience with state authority, there 
were still people who preferred to leave for areas without states, it is 
hard to claim that stateless society is unacceptable by comparison. A 
signifi cant number of people choose stateless societies, far too many 
people to support the claim that everyone prefers life in societies with 
landownership and/or government. That is, the Hobbesian hypothesis 
fails a test that is heavily biased in its favor.
We consider three replies. First, one might use the observation that 
almost no one fl ees today to support the claim that they don’t want 
to. This argument is easily refuted. Almost no one fl ees to stateless 
areas today because the periphery is now closed to almost everyone in 
the world. Very few places like old Zomia remain. Vast nearly empty 
regions exist, but people are not free to fl ee to them. Try leaving your 
ghetto or your shantytown to start your own band in most empty 
places from the central Australian desert to the boreal forest, and you 
are likely to be arrested on trespassing or some other charge. The pat-
tern observed throughout history strongly indicates that a persistent 
minority of people would leave state authority if they could. Dissent-
ers are real.
Second, one might be tempted to say that people fl ed to the periph-
ery of state society in the past because states in the past were terrible 
and therefore unjustifi ed, but we have now reached a point where no 
one would fl ee even if they could. At least no one would fl ee from 
whatever state one wants to justify. This argument relies on a large 
and convenient coincidence. The opportunity to fl ee has only been 
closed off in the last century or so after having been available for 
5,000 years in some areas, but one would have to believe that in that 
short amount of time, states fi nally became so benefi cial to their dis-
advantaged individuals that no one would fl ee even if they could. 
There is little or no evidence to support this theory. It would seem to 
be merely an excuse to ignore 5,000 years of evidence. Sections 1–4 
would seem to indicate that the poorest people today are no less ratio-
nal to fl ee than people throughout history. Until human deprivation 
becomes much less severe, it is far more reasonable to believe that at 
least some people would fl ee if they could.
Third, one might be tempted to respond that all people who fl ed 
the state or resisted incorporation into it throughout history were 
5200_Widerquist.indd   213 25/11/16   10:32 AM
214 Prehistoric Myths in Modern Political Philosophy
unreasonable, irrational, or insuffi ciently informed. They would have 
preferred life in societies with governments and landlords if they fully 
understood the tradeoffs involved and weren’t unreasonably seeking 
selfi sh benefi ts at others’ expense. It is certainly possible that some 
people who fl ed fi t into this category. But consider three arguments 
that it is unreasonable to say everyone on the periphery fi ts into this 
category. 
First, if one admits that someone could hold a strong but mis-
taken opinion about the truth-value of the Hobbesian hypothesis, one 
should consider whether philosophers might be more vulnerable to 
this problem than the people involved, who have direct experience. 
This argument dismisses the considered actions of a large number of 
people over an incredibly long period of time. Some people originally 
from states moved permanently to stateless regions; others moved 
back and forth; and some people originally from stateless regions 
resisted the advancement of states. Some of these communities must 
have had high collective knowledge of both sides of the comparison. 
Early chapters have shown that the hypothesis was created by people 
with deep prejudices against—and little direct experience with—either 
stateless people or disadvantaged people in state societies. And we 
have shown that contemporary philosophers have simply passed on 
the Hobbesian hypothesis without asking for evidence. The academic 
literature in support of the Hobbesian hypothesis is almost entirely 
free of supporting empirical evidence. If anybody’s mistaken here, it 
seems much more likely to be the philosophers. 
Second, although stateless peoples are not always guiltless and 
bandits do occasionally escape to the hills to do unreasonable things 
again, larger-scale societies have overwhelmingly dominated the 
unreasonable behavior. From the fi rst state in Mesopotamia to the 
fi nal closing of the periphery, states have aggressively expanded their 
territory. They seldom conquered stateless areas because it was essen-
tial to their defense. They did not do it out of an unselfi sh regard for 
the welfare of indigenous peoples. Stateless communities were not on 
some inevitable path toward statehood. In the vast majority of cases, 
states conquered stateless regions because they wanted more territory 
or more people.
Third, to say that it was irrational to resist such an unreasonable 
entity is a dangerous road. It implies that the theorist or the politician 
knows better than the people themselves do about what they should 
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and should not consent to. Whether intended or not, it fi ts in with a 
long line of philosophical and social scientifi c thought that has served 
to justify the colonial process. The claim that the Lockean proviso 
is fulfi lled is designed as a reason to tell the disadvantaged people 
and the victims of colonialism to shut up. The disadvantaged in state 
society are irrational to complain because they are so much better off 
than those savages. And those savages are irrational to resist because 
they will be so much better off with any position in state society than 
they are when living as they choose. If they only knew what was 
good for them, they would be happy even to be a seventeenth-century 
English day laborer, to use Locke’s example (see Chapter 4). Your 
betters know your needs better than you. Such reasoning, even if cor-
rect today, would be cold comfort to the millions who died during the 
European colonization of the Americas, Africa, Asia, and Australia or 
during the subsequent decades of postcolonial wars. 
6. THE VERDICT
After these last two chapters, our overall evaluation of the Hobbesian 
hypothesis should be obvious. Is everyone better off in a contempo-
rary capitalist state than in a stateless society?
No.
In fact, if one phrase from all of political philosophy has penetrated 
the fi eld of anthropology, it is Hobbes’s famous phrase, “nasty, brutish, 
and short,”2 and it has done so because so many anthropologists have 
tried to debunk it. Dozens of leading anthropologists—cutting across 
the spectrum of contemporary opinion about life in small-scale societ-
ies—have made reference to Hobbes’s description of life outside of the 
state only to debunk it in whole or in part. This list includes Robert G. 
Aykroyd, David Lucy, A. Mark Pollard, and Charlotte A. Roberts 
(1999: 55), Mark Nathan Cohen (1989), Frans de Waal (2006: 52), 
Edward E. Evans-Pritchard (2013), Morton Fried (1967: 51, 70–1), 
Ernest Gellner (1995: 178), Michael Gurven and Hillard Kaplan (2007: 
349), Kim Hill and A. Magdalena Hurtado (1996: 151, 194), Mark 
R. Jenike (2001), Lawrence Keeley (1996: 4–5), Robert L. Kelly (1995: 
337–8; 2013: 1, 114), Adam Kuper (1994: 209–10), Richard Lee (1968: 
43; 1979: 437–8), Richard Lee and Richard Daly (1999: 1), Martha 
Binford Morris (1977: 188), Catherine Panter-Brick, Robert H. Layton, 
and Peter Rowley-Conwy (2001: 4–5), Philip Carl Salzman (2004: 47), 
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James C. Scott (2009: 7), Leften Stavros Stavrianos (1987), and prob-
ably many more we are not aware of. Ernest Gellner best sums up the 
anthropological consensus:
Thomas Hobbes [is] wrong: the life of pre-state man is not soli-
tary, poor, nasty, brutish and short. Rather, it is gregarious and 
cohesive, relatively well-off, human and participatory, and with 
about as good a chance of longevity as that of his [Hobbes’s] 
centrally governed contemporary. (Gellner 1995: 209)
Many of these scholars also debunk the misconception that small-
scale, stateless communities are some kind of utopia, but the two are 
not exhaustive of all the possibilities. Most anthropologists now view 
life in small-scale societies neither cynically nor romantically, and the 
emphasis is on the diversity of lifestyles and circumstances. As Kelly 
(1995: 202) puts it, “life in foraging societies is not all sweetness and 
light but neither is it a Hobbesian hell.”
To deny that everyone is better off in state society is not to say that 
everyone is better off in stateless society, nor is it to say that the aver-
age person is better off in stateless society. In fact, to deny the Hobbes-
ian hypothesis is not to say that life in stateless society is very good 
at all. It is only to say that as diffi cult as stateless life is, states today 
make life worse for a signifi cant number of people.
Of all the a priori speculators discussed in Chapters 3–7, the closest 
to the mark appears to have been Paine (2000), who thought Native 
American life was abject poverty compared with the rich and a con-
tinual holiday compared with the poor. More than two centuries later, 
his generalization has largely been confi rmed by a range of anthropo-
logical research on small-scale societies. As Clark (2007: 3) puts it, 
“the average person in the world of 1800 was no better off than the 
average person of 100,000 bc. Indeed in 1800 the bulk of the world’s 
population was poorer than their remote ancestors.” While the mod-
ern capitalist state has provided almost unimaginable luxury to great 
numbers of people living today, it is simply untrue that all people who 
have lived in stateless society have enjoyed a poorer quality of life 
than all people living in nation-states today.
Neither Hobbes’s nor Locke’s version of the proviso fares well after 
several centuries of empirical evidence has accumulated. While societ-
ies with government and/or landownership have attained enormous 
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affl uence for a large number of people, those institutions have come 
at a cost to others. If what we have argued is correct, the Hobbesian 
hypothesis was most widely believed when there was the least amount 
of truth in it—during the hubris of the early colonial expansion, when 
the ordinary people of Europe were no better off, and quite possibly 
worse off, than many of the hunting and gathering peoples being colo-
nized by European states at the time (Clark 2007: 1). Furthermore, 
the reasons so many seventeenth- and eighteenth-century philosophers 
thought the Hobbesian hypothesis was obvious are beliefs that few if 
any people hold today. Hobbes, Locke, Kant, and others believed the 
Hobbesian hypothesis because they believed indigenous peoples were 
savage, violent, uncultured, and engaged in an all-consuming food 
quest that left them no time to develop into truly mature and moral 
adults. The Hobbesian hypothesis was never more than a colonial 
prejudice.
Civilization—as we call it—is a mixed bag. Even Kim Hill, whose 
ethnographic work stresses the hardships of foraging life, agrees:
I don’t think you can say that everyone today is better off than 
everyone was in the hunter-gatherer period. . . . People in modern 
societies have better health on average and longer lifespans, but 
there is more to life than longevity. Hunter-gatherers often have 
more satisfying social environments in my opinion (I have lived 
more than 30 years with different groups of hunter-gatherers). 
Modern societies are plagued by emotional, physical and mental 
problems that probably weren’t very common in the past. . . . 
hunter-gatherers seem to have less depression, anxiety, bipolar 
disorder, suicide, feelings of alienation, etc. There are no “cam-
pus massacres” in the hunter-gatherer ethnographic literature for 
example. All these observations and many more suggest that the 
advances of modern societies have also come with costs. . . . there 
were no homeless, or unemployed hunter-gatherers, and probably 
fewer that endured forms of blatant exploitation and slavery than 
we see in modern contexts. (Kim Hill, personal correspondence)
This passage is written by a person who when living in a band society 
“heard children crying from hunger and saw the deaths of some good 
friends—events that reminded us again not to romanticize this way 
of life that we had learned to respect” (Hill and Hurtado 1996: xiv). 
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The Hobbesian hypothesis is false not because life in small-scale soci-
eties is great; it is untrue despite the extreme diffi culty of that life.
The failure of contemporary society to fulfi ll the Lockean proviso 
is tragic not only because capitalist states are so wealthy, but also 
because the proviso is an incredibly unambitious goal. Establishing 
hunter-gatherer quality of life as the baseline for comparison sets an 
extremely low bar. The tragedy of state societies today is that for all 
their wealth and achievement, they have so consistently failed to sur-
pass that bar. The hypothesis is false because the quality of life for 
disadvantaged people in industrial capitalist states is so low. It is low 
not from technical diffi culties, but mostly out of lack of concern. 
Almost every comparison considered above displays a similar pat-
tern: the wealthy and the average are so much better off that it seems 
easy to make everyone better off, but our societies have consistently 
failed to do so. The promise of the Lockean proviso remains unful-
fi lled for the poor, the discontented, political dissenters, the homeless 
of developed countries, the shantytown residents of lesser developed 
countries, people who die young of cancer and other modern diseases, 
families who need support from child labor, the victims and perpe-
trators of campus massacres, and the urban foragers who must fi nd 
food in other people’s garbage. The hypothesis is false. The proviso 
is unfulfi lled. Mutual advantage is not in effect. The fi rst principle of 
civilization is violated. Our societies horribly mistreat their most dis-
advantaged members, and our myth that everything was even worse 
in prehistory makes it easier for us to do it.
Notes
 1 Most people would prefer a fi nite number of things they can do outside 
of prison to an infi nite variety of paintings to choose from to hang on the 
wall of their cell.
 2 Sometimes with, sometimes without the opening items, “the life of man 
solitary, poore,. . . .”




The Hobbesian hypothesis has survived for more than 350 years 
without even acquiring a name. It has existed in the background, 
present but unspoken, free from scrutiny because it is obvious, or 
obvious because it is free from scrutiny. Or perhaps, it is free from 
scrutiny because it is, in some inexplicable sense, not even an empiri-
cal claim at all. And few contractarians see the need to clarify any of 
these issues. This, perhaps, is the power of an unargued premise. 
This book has argued that the Hobbesian hypothesis is an empirical 
claim, that it is a claim involving small-scale stateless societies, and that 
it is not only dubious but probably false. The Lockean proviso—even 
in Nozick’s “weak” version—remains unfulfi lled. Mutual advantage 
is not in effect in all or most state societies today. World governments 
and the property rights system violate Paine’s (2000) “fi rst principle of 
civilization.” In our terms, capitalist states have dissenters. In contrac-
tarian terms, capitalist states have rational, reasonable, well-informed 
people who have good reason not to consent to state authority, because 
states make them worse off than they could reasonably expect to be in 
a stateless society. Under contractarian and propertarian theories, as 
we have understood and explained them, the state and the property 
rights system are unjust as long as these institutions continue to harm 
dissenters.
This chapter considers the implications of these fi ndings for con-
tractarianism and propertarianism. It does not discuss the option 
of abandoning these theories. This book is solely an internal cri-
tique of these theories. It does not reject the Lockean proviso as a 
moral principle; it argues only that the proviso remains unfulfi lled in 
the existing empirical setting. Therefore, this chapter only considers 
implications broadly within the moral frameworks of contractarian-
ism and propertarianism.
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A contractarian or propertarian response to this work requires two 
choices: (1) accept or reject our empirical fi ndings, and (2) accept or 
reject our argument for their relevance. We discuss several possible 
responses based on these two choices, but we believe contractarians 
and propertarians should make one response regardless of either 
choice: they need to clarify their arguments. Remove the sloppy allu-
sions to what might or might not be empirical claims. Section 1 dis-
cusses this issue. 
Section 2 welcomes empirical arguments to refute our empirical 
fi ndings. Section 3 discusses a response open only to propertarians: 
concede our empirical fi ndings, but blame the government. Section 
4 considers the strategy to deny the moral relevance of our empirical 
fi ndings by arguing that we have entirely misidentifi ed the state of 
nature. It could be a purely metaphorical device in a fact-independent 
justifi cation of the state or a synthetic device that illustrates the empir-
ical standards the state must meet to be justifi ed. 
Section 5 considers the ought-implies-can principle and the 
“bracketing strategy,” which admits that observed stateless societies 
fi nd the defi nition of the state of nature, but argues that they are not 
the relevant forms of statelessness today (the most likely reason being 
that civil war is the only existing alternative to the state).
After Sections 1–5 argue that all of the above responses involve 
dubious empirical claims, uncomfortable admissions, or implausible 
moral arguments, Section 6 discusses the implications for contractar-
ian and propertarian theory of accepting both our empirical fi ndings 
and our argument for their relevance. Several responses are possible, 
but it argues that the best response is to fulfi ll the Lockean proviso by 
taking action to improve the lives of disadvantaged people. 
1. CLARIFY THE ARGUMENT
Even if contractarians and propertarians ultimately reject the two cen-
tral claims of this book (our empirical fi ndings and their relevance), we 
hope that this book can help clarify the discussion of these theories. 
The clarity issue mostly affects contractarianism, because (although 
propertarianism has other clarity issues we intend to address in a 
later work) most propertarians clearly state the empirical role that the 
Lockean proviso plays in their theories. This section discusses several 
important issues that need to be clarifi ed.
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A. Does It Matter?
The most important issue contractarians need to clarify is the ques-
tion that began this book: does it matter whether you or your fellow 
citizens are at least as well-off as your ancestors were 12,000 years 
ago, before the rise of sovereign governments and the modern prop-
erty rights system? Is Paine’s fi rst principle of civilization—the weak 
Lockean proviso—necessary for the contractarian justifi cation of the 
state? If not, is it completely irrelevant or is it merely overridden in 
present circumstances by other factors? 
Most contractarians imply that the state can take credit for fulfi ll-
ing Paine’s fi rst principle of government. Few seriously consider the 
possibility that people in state societies might not automatically have 
much higher welfare than stateless peoples. They tend to retreat from 
these suppositions only when asked to provide empirical evidence. 
Contractarians seem to want the state to be inherently better than 
statelessness but only in the way Wellman (2001: 742) described: “The 
advantages of political society are so great because life in the state of 
nature is so horrible.” If anyone suggests that statelessness is not hor-
rible enough to justify the horrible conditions of disadvantaged people 
in state society today, then the Hobbesian hypothesis isn’t about real 
statelessness, or it somehow isn’t an empirical claim after all. 
And so they equivocate between two incompatible implications: one 
denying the relevance of the weak proviso, the other affi rming its rel-
evance while asserting its supposedly obvious fulfi llment. Equivocation 
conceals arguments that need to be made. If the arguer implies their 
theory does not require fulfi llment of the weak proviso, they avoid the 
need to provide evidence that they have fulfi lled it. If at the same time, 
they also imply that it does entail the weak proviso, they avoid the need 
to argue that the weak proviso is too strong. The diffi culty of these 
arguments might make equivocation tempting, but one or the other of 
them needs to be made.
The need to provide additional arguments is not the only motiva-
tion for equivocation. The simple assertion that the weak proviso is too 
strong involves several bullet-biting admissions. Gradually over the last 
5,000 years, state societies have interfered with, established authority 
over, and demanded labor from the disadvantaged people against their 
will. These actions by the state have caused the following situation to 
come about: disadvantaged people are worse off than their stateless 
ancestors; advantaged people are far better off; it is possible to change 
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social arrangements so that everyone in state society actually is better off 
than their stateless ancestors. Suppose a group of disadvantaged people 
use these facts and the weak Lockean proviso to argue that the state 
and the property rights system are unjust until they make the changes 
necessary to ensure everyone is better off than their stateless ancestors.
A contractarian who believes the weak proviso is irrelevant must 
concede all of those empirical observations but deny that their truth 
calls into question the justness of current social arrangements. State 
authority is justifi ed no matter how many people are worse off by this 
comparison, no matter how much worse off they are (assuming the 
extra-weak proviso is fulfi lled), and no matter how low the cost might 
be of bringing them up to that standard. The state doesn’t even have 
to look into the evidence. It’s irrelevant. One can believe that the weak 
proviso is too strong, but one needs to say so in clear, unequivocal 
language and examine the entailments of that position. Equivocation, 
whether direct or only implied, does not belong in philosophical debate.
B. If It Doesn’t Matter, Why Not?
Any contractarian theory with an extra-weak proviso requires an 
argument that the weak proviso is too strong. And it has to be an 
extremely good argument, because contractarianism claims to have 
justifi ed the state’s power over you on the grounds that it benefi ts you 
(not because it benefi ts a great many other people at your expense), 
and it claims that this justifi cation will be accepted by all rational, rea-
sonable, and well-informed people. This argument must explain why, 
even though the state makes disadvantaged people worse off than 
people in observed stateless societies, they are unreasonable to think 
of the state as anything other than a fully justifi ed, mutually benefi cial 
association. This argument has to convince any rational person that 
the disadvantaged group’s position is unreasonable. Few if any con-
tractarians have attempted to make such an argument.
If the relevant state of nature is some but not all stateless situations 
(such as a civil war but not a band society), contractarians need to 
explain convincingly why only some stateless situations are relevant. 
If the state of nature is pure fi ction, contractarians need to explain 
why a Lockean proviso based on a fi ctional state of nature is more 
relevant than a reality-based proviso. They need to explain why the 
fi ctional state of nature is unlike the Giant Chicken scenario laid out 
5200_Widerquist.indd   222 25/11/16   10:32 AM
Implications 223
in Chapter 3. If contractarians want to show that the weak proviso 
is too strong, they can’t ignore these issues. We discuss possible argu-
ments against the weak proviso further below.
C. Is There a Protective Argument for the State?
Hobbesian and Lockean arguments justify the state and/or the prop-
erty rights system on the grounds that they protect people from the 
violence and poverty that are supposedly inherent to the absence of 
these institutions. It is diffi cult to say that the protective argument is 
relevant, while dismissing as irrelevant the question of whether capi-
talist states actually succeed in protecting the less advantaged people 
in their society from violence and poverty as well as stateless people 
protect themselves. In what way could a protective argument justify 
the government causing people to face worse poverty than real people 
in actual stateless societies? Contractarians should clarify whether 
they use these kinds of protective arguments, which facts are relevant 
to their arguments, and if they dismiss the relevance of the factual 
nature of the state’s protective role. And if so, they should explain 
what non-factual protection is and why it matters.
D. Is There an Inherent Need for the State?
Contractarians usually argue for the inherent need for the state: a just 
state is better than all forms of statelessness. All people in statelessness 
“naturally” have reason to desire a state like the one being justifi ed 
(Hampton 1988: 271). It seems impossible to say that people natu-
rally need a thing that makes them worse off than real people who live 
without it. Therefore, giving up the Hobbesian hypothesis gives up the 
argument that people have an inherent need for the state.
Contractarians could make a contingent argument for the state: a 
just state is better than all currently available forms of statelessness. 
This might seem like a small concession, and it might allow contrac-
tarians to bracket fi ndings about small-scale stateless societies. But we 
seldom if ever fi nd contractarians arguing it explicitly, and it contra-
dicts the explicit contentions of 350 years of contractarianism. Only 
one response to our fi ndings preserves intact the contractarian argu-
ment based on humans’ inherent need for the state. That response is 
to reject our empirical fi ndings.
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The contingent argument does not free contractarianism from the 
need for an empirical argument. It requires a new empirical argu-
ment to establish the truth of the claim that stateless societies of the 
type that have existed continuously for 200,000 years and that are 
still observed in a few pockets today are no longer viable. In addi-
tion, the contingent justifi cation would require a normative argument 
connecting the present unavailability of small-scale stateless societ-
ies with a lack of responsibility on the part of advantaged people to 
allow disadvantaged people to live as well as their ancestors did for 
all of those years. These arguments are largely or entirely absent from 
contractarian literature. 
E. If It Does Matter, What Happens When the 
Proviso Is Unfulfi lled?
Contractarians devote pages and pages of normative argument to 
support the apparently strong criteria that the state is only justifi ed if 
it makes everyone better off than they would be in its absence. Yet, 
with little or no argument, they usually conclude that that criterion 
is fulfi lled, and they seldom even address the question of what to do 
when the criterion is unfulfi lled. This lack of attention implies that 
they do not offer the Lockean proviso as a serious political principle 
at all. It’s as if the Lockean proviso is no more than an excuse to say 
the state is justifi ed and to pick a bar so low that the state cannot pos-
sibly fail to surpass it. Yet, still it fails.
If contractarians admit that the weak Lockean proviso matters, it 
is appropriate to consider evidence for and against it, and to discuss 
what happens when it is unfulfi lled. What responsibilities come into 
play (on the part of the state or the more advantaged people or who-
ever) when the treatment of disadvantage people is so poor that it 
violates the basic principle proposed to justify the state? 
2. CHALLENGE OUR EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
As Section 1 argues, a challenge to our empirical fi ndings is the only 
response capable of preserving the contractarian notion that states 
today satisfy an inherent human need. We welcome this response. It 
would amount to an agreement with our most important points: the 
Hobbesian hypothesis is an essential premise in most contractarian 
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justifi cations of sovereignty, and its truth-value can only be established 
by empirical investigation. Contractarians and propertarians have 
placed such enormous importance on this hypothesis that it demands 
thorough empirical attention.
Anyone who wants to affi rm the empirical truth of the Hobbesian 
hypothesis has to confront how bad the reasons given by Hobbes, 
Locke, and Kant were. They thought it was obvious because they 
thought all indigenous peoples were violent savages whose days 
were consumed by an arduous food quest that left them no time to 
develop meaningful culture or even to become fully mature, ethical 
adults. Only racial supremacists and other holdovers from the colo-
nial era would believe these things today. But many people cling to 
the idea that the hypothesis is obvious in spite of its racist origins. If 
you believe that it is obvious after rejecting all the reasons given by 
the people who popularized the idea, why do you believe it is obvi-
ous? The answer is particularly important because the discrediting of 
nearly all the reasons Hobbes, Locke, and Kant offered to support 
the hypothesis has not inspired any philosophical reassessment of the 
supposed obviousness of the Hobbesian hypothesis. The ubiquitous, 
unnamed hypothesis exists as an unnoticed part of the landscape of 
contemporary theory. 
Anyone choosing this response should avoid appealing to common 
prejudice. They should conduct a study at least as thorough as ours. 
We are happy to share our notes with critics. This book’s job is to 
raise doubt about the Hobbesian hypothesis. The person who uses 
the Hobbesian hypothesis to justify putting everyone under a duty of 
obedience has the job of proving it. To do so, one has to give up any 
notion that this claim is obvious. A proof would show that the least 
well-off group of people in capitalist states actually are better off than 
they could reasonably expect to be in any stateless society. This com-
parison requires deep knowledge of the most disadvantaged people in 
state society and of the people most remote from state society. 
3. CONCEDE OUR EMPIRICAL FINDINGS AND 
BLAME THE GOVERNMENT
One strategy is available only to propertarians: they can concede 
that the Lockean proviso is unfulfi lled, but blame the government 
(Lomasky 1987: 125–6; Pollock 1996: 109; Machan 2006: 170, 196). 
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As Chapter 7 mentioned, Nozick makes this argument explicitly 
empirical, writing:
were it not for the effects of previous illegitimate state action, 
people would not think the possibility of the proviso’s being 
violated as of more interest than any other logical possibility. 
(Here I make an empirical historical claim; as does someone 
who disagrees with this.) (Nozick 1974: 182)
Contractarians can’t make a reciprocal allegation blaming property 
rights, because sovereign government has ultimate power over the 
property rights regime and is, therefore, responsible for it.
This argument replaces the falsifi ed claim (that the proviso is ful-
fi lled) with another claim that is harder to investigate empirically 
(that it would be fulfi lled if everyone else did everything accord-
ing to some idealized economic plan that has never been realized). 
This position sounds like one taken by Tolstoy’s (2007: 642–3) 
character, General Pfuel, who blamed every battlefi eld failure on the 
failure to fully implement his enormously complex plan to defeat 
Napoleon. Thus, failure only reinforced his belief in his idealized 
plan. One cannot falsify claims that some idealized version of capi-
talism would have no poverty without implementing all proposed 
idealized systems under all conditions. Until all have been tried, 
propertarian Pfuels can attribute failure to something other than the 
failure of their ideal. 
Casual evidence gives good reason to doubt that moving toward 
that ideal (as compared with moving toward social democracy) 
reduces poverty, but testability problems aside, such an argument 
fails to do what propertarians most want it to do: justify all or most 
property rights in the here and now. Even if the claim about idealized 
capitalism is correct, it justifi es property rights only once that ideal is 
reached. In the meantime, the proviso remains unfulfi lled, and there-
fore, the conditions do not yet exist for an individual to justly take 
ownership of resources under the theory. All landownership remains 
unjustifi ed by theories employing the weak Lockean proviso until 
those with property and privilege under the existing system pay for 
interfering with the propertyless without fulfi lling the proviso. The 
disadvantaged don’t have to wait for propertarian experimentation. 
The debt to them is past due and growing.
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4. IF THE STATE OF NATURE IS NOT REAL 
STATELESSNESS, WHAT IS IT?
Contractarians can concede our empirical fi ndings but argue that the 
state of nature actually has nothing to do with statelessness. Here, 
we consider whether the state of nature can be used as a pure fi ction 
or a metaphor in a fact-independent argument that can justify the 
state with no empirical claims whatsoever. We also examine whether 
the state of nature can be used as a pure counterfactual—a synthetic 
device illustrating the criteria by which a state is justifi ed but having 
nothing to do with real statelessness.
A. The State of Nature as Pure Fiction or a Metaphor
We have found no purely fact-independent justifi cation of the state in 
the literature we reviewed, and Chapter 3 endorsed Kavka’s (1983; 
1986: 8) argument that the quest for one is hopeless. But anyone who 
believes Kavka is wrong should put forward an argument that does 
not leave itself open to an empirical interpretation. They should also 
consider whether it is actually useful to have a story about the state of 
nature in such a theory. All metaphors have to stand for something. 
Anyone using the state of nature as a metaphor should clearly state 
what it stands for, and why it is relevant. A metaphorical state of 
nature with a clearly explained and relevant analog might be helpful; 
a sloppily presented, unclear state-of-nature story that might or might 
not be a metaphor is unhelpful. And of course a purely metaphorical 
state of nature needs to be explained in a way that is more relevant 
than the Giant Chicken scenario described in Chapter 3. We have not 
seen any such argument in contractarian literature, perhaps for the 
good reason that it isn’t very promising.
B. The State of Nature as Synthetic Device
The state of nature can be used a synthetic device meant to illustrate 
the criteria by which a state is justifi ed but having nothing to do with 
what actually happens in statelessness. Rawls’s (1971) closest equiva-
lent of a state of nature, which is people sitting around a table behind 
a veil of ignorance negotiating what kind of state they want to live 
in—clearly fi ts into this category. It’s less likely that Hobbesian and 
Lockean theorists intend their state of nature this way. If so, why 
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include any arguments at all to explain the presence of confl ict and 
poverty in the state of nature? Since these would become just assump-
tions of a synthetic device with no relationship to empirical reality, 
there is no reason to argue that they are plausible only to explain why 
they are assumed.
Setting this problem aside and assuming a synthetic state of nature 
is intended, such an argument is free from empirical claims about the 
state of nature but not from empirical claims about the state. Either 
the state meets the criteria or it does not. Anyone proposing the syn-
thetic state of nature has to explain exactly what conditions it estab-
lishes, whether these conditions are met, and why these conditions are 
the relevant standard. The justifi catory conditions and the evidence 
that they are met need to be much clearer than they usually are in con-
tractarian literature, but probably the most diffi cult question with the 
synthetic state of nature is the normative argument for the relevance 
of the baseline. 
If the synthetic standard is higher than the reality-based standard, 
as it arguably is in Rawls (1971), no problem exists here, but usually 
the hypothetical standard is not only lower than the reality-based stan-
dard, but a worst-case scenario: continual fear of the danger of violent 
death. As Chapter 3 argued, a person buying a car usually compares 
it with not buying a car. Buying a car is better than a fi ctional story 
of a war of all-against-all, but if that story is pure fi ction, what does 
it tell me about buying a car, obeying the state, or anything else for 
that matter? Any proviso lower than the reality-based weak proviso 
sounds like a cooked-up excuse for the state to claim justifi cation no 
matter how badly it treats people. A contractarian needs an argument 
to overcome this obvious impression, and doing so runs into all the 
diffi cult questions discussed in Section 1. 
5. BRACKETING: “OUGHT IMPLIES CAN” AND 
THE WORLDWIDE CIVIL WAR
The “bracketing” strategy concedes that stateless societies meet the 
defi nition of the state of nature, but argues that they are not the most 
relevant example of it. As with a synthetic state of nature strategy, the 
bracketing strategy requires an explanation of why one stateless situ-
ation is more relevant than another, exactly what conditions that state 
of nature establishes, and whether these conditions are met.
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The most promising bracketing arguments rely on the ought-
implies-can principle, also called the principle of alternative possibili-
ties, which means that no one can be held responsible for failing to do 
the impossible (Frankfurt 1969). This principle explains why a train 
engineer’s failure to swerve to avoid hitting someone is not blame-
worthy, even if an automobile driver’s failure to swerve is blame-
worthy in an otherwise identical situation. This section discusses two 
ways that the ought-implies-can principle might be used to bracket 
our fi ndings. It argues that the “ought implies can” might provide 
reasons for partial limits on the fulfi llment of the weak proviso in 
some circumstances, but it is extremely diffi cult for any bracketing 
strategy to demonstrate that only the extra-weak version of the pro-
viso is relevant in any circumstances.
A. The Impossibility of Fulfi lling the Proviso
One could argue that it is impossible to get everyone up to the stan-
dard implied by the weak version of the Lockean proviso, and there-
fore, the state cannot be held responsible for failing to do so. Although 
this argument is reasonable, it has only limited use in reducing the 
signifi cance of the proviso. 
Most importantly, if the only reason the state does not have to ben-
efi t everyone is that it cannot benefi t everyone, it would have to benefi t 
as many people as possible and minimize the harm to those it doesn’t 
benefi t. That is, if the ought-implies-can principle is the only reason 
to leave the proviso unfulfi lled, the proviso remains relevant; the evi-
dence we presented about it remains relevant; and it still motivates 
much more help for the disadvantaged than states currently provide. 
The effort to override the proviso with the ought-implies-can prin-
ciple demands more, not less empirical argumentation. It requires evi-
dence that (1) the state can’t possibly get everyone to the standard, (2) 
it has gotten as many people as possible to the standard, and (3) it has 
gotten everyone below the standard as close to it as possible. 
A literal reading of contractarian theory has a problem with the 
ought-implies-can principle because it gives the state only two pos-
sible justifi ed courses of action: either it benefi ts everyone, or it dis-
appears. It might be impossible for the state to benefi t everyone, but 
it is not impossible for the state to disappear. The concept of ex ante 
benefi ts (discussed in Chapter 3) provides a reasonable solution to 
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this problem. If everyone below the proviso level is like the healthy 
person hit by an ambulance in the morally relevant sense, they do 
benefi t from the state in a signifi cant sense. As Chapter 3 argues, this 
argument on its own cannot successfully be used to argue that the 
state is allowed to bring fewer people than it can to the proviso level 
or that the state has no need to ensure the risks equally affect differ-
ent groups in society. But it can explain why the state creates some 
risks of harm, as long as they are equally shared and truly necessary 
to create the advantages of state society.
B. The Failed State as the Only Alternative to 
the Contemporary State
The ought-implies-can principle can be used to argue not that the 
weak version of the Lockean proviso is unfulfi llable but that an even 
weaker proviso is appropriate. One could argue that the population 
of the earth today is so large that the small-scale stateless societies 
considered throughout this book are no longer viable. The billions of 
people alive today cannot all simultaneously live in hunter-gatherer 
bands. Given the current population, the disappearance of the state(s) 
would inevitably create a failed state or a worldwide Hobbesian civil 
war. If the state protects everyone from the present danger of world-
wide civil war, it benefi ts everyone in a signifi cant sense. One could 
argue that that understanding of benefi t is the only morally relevant 
one in the world today; the prevention of civil war justifi es the state 
regardless of its failure to benefi t everyone relative to other stateless 
situations that are possible under some empirical conditions.
This version specifi es the (presumably) extra-weak version of the 
Lockean proviso as a “civil-war proviso” with a correspondingly 
extra-weak Hobbesian hypothesis. We have been dealing with the 
weak hypothesis that everyone in a capitalist state is better off than 
they could reasonably expect to be in an observed, small-scale state-
less society. Hobbes thought he had no need to distinguish between a 
stateless-society proviso and a civil-war proviso, because he believed 
he had proven that statelessness in all circumstances necessarily degen-
erated into a war of all-against-all. For Hobbes, it was not the size of 
the population but human nature that made stateless life intolerable. 
Chapter 9 demonstrated this claim is false. Therefore, a proviso based 
solely on the civil war alternative is much lower and easier to fulfi ll 
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than the weak proviso. That feature seems to be exactly why people 
bring it up. 
The civil-war proviso sounds initially appealing. It satisfi es the 
desire for a proviso that is automatically fulfi lled—no need to show 
that disadvantaged people reach a certain welfare level and no need 
to take action if their welfare is “too low.” It revives the protective 
argument for the state on a contingent basis. It is probably a central 
motivation for belief in the obviousness of the Hobbesian hypothesis 
and for the irrelevance of actual stateless societies. But we doubt that 
one can construct a plausible argument based on the appeal to current 
population size suffi cient to make the weak proviso normatively irrel-
evant. It does not free contractarianism from the need for an empirical 
argument. It only changes the nature of the empirical question. If one 
takes the contingent nature of the extra-weak proviso seriously, one 
has to make several diffi cult arguments to show that it is empirically 
and normatively relevant. We don’t know of any contractarian who 
has done so, and we will discuss several diffi culties with this strategy.
1. The empirical truth and normative relevance of 
civil-war hypothesis require support
The civil-war proviso might free the contractarian argument from any 
claims about the welfare level of disadvantaged people, but it can-
not free the argument from empirical claims. It requires an empirical 
argument demonstrating that statelessness in present circumstances 
always leads to civil war (presumably because of the population size). 
It also requires a new normative argument that this issue overrides all 
concern with whether the state project is mutually benefi cial relative 
to the social arrangements that were in place for 200,000 years prior 
to its existence. 
This strategy resembles Lodovico delle Colombe’s response to 
Galileo’s observation that the moon was not a perfect sphere as 
prevailing Aristotelian theory held. Colombe asserted that the cra-
ters and valleys of the moon were covered with a perfect sphere of 
invisible crystal (Bamford 1999: 377). In so doing, he replaced a 
falsifi ed hypothesis with a more diffi cult to investigate hypothesis. 
The civil-war proviso does not create a fact-independent argument 
built from defi nitions and fi rst-best moral principles. Like Colombe’s 
response, the extra-weak Hobbesian hypothesis replaces the falsifi ed 
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Hobbesian hypothesis with a new empirical premise that is harder 
to falsify. Good philosophers support their conclusions with well-
demonstrated premises. They do not shop for the most diffi cult to 
investigate premises to put in their arguments.
The allegation of “premise shopping” would be greatly reduced 
if the civil-war hypothesis could be proven. It is plausible, given the 
prevalence of failed states in the world. But it is by no means certain, 
and we offer four reasons to doubt that it is true in the way contracta-
rian theory would require for it to supersede the weak proviso. 
First, a large amount of anarchist literature argues that peaceful 
anarchy is possible on a large scale (Goldman 1969; Bakunin 1972; 
Ward 2004; White 2006; Chartier 2013). If they are correct, then the 
extra-weak proviso isn’t very weak at all. It could even be stronger 
than the weak proviso. We are not optimistic about creating a large-
scale stable society that is truly stateless, but it’s the contractarian’s 
job to demonstrate that these ideas are unworkable.
Second, contractarians don’t just need a worldwide civil war; 
they need it to be worse for everyone everywhere like the mythical 
war of all-against-all. But civil wars don’t actually become wars of 
all-against-all, nor do they usually have fi ghting in all areas and at 
all times. The civil war might be better for stateless people living in 
remote areas, freeing them from territorial encroachment. A civil war 
might open up opportunities for people in ghettos and shantytowns 
around the world to fl ee to the periphery as disadvantaged people 
have whenever that possibility has been open. One might argue that 
it would be unreasonable for such people to seek that advantage of 
statelessness while so many other people suffer. But that approach 
rejects the basic contractarian principle that the state has to be better 
for everyone than the alternative.
Third, civil wars are temporary. A highly disadvantaged person 
who believes the state is unjust, because of its failure to fulfi ll the 
weak proviso, is not necessarily demanding the immediate dissolu-
tion of the state. They are demanding better treatment from the state. 
They are not necessarily irrational to risk a temporary civil war to 
get that treatment. Contractarianism, therefore, requires a normative 
argument that such behavior is morally unreasonable. Sections 5B2 
and 5B3 discuss different aspects of this issue.
Fourth, civil war is not the only temporary alternative to the state. 
Sometimes nonviolent action against the state leads to better treatment 
from the state or to a new and better state. This fact makes it even 
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more likely that acts of rebellion are rational. Hobbes thought he had 
a good response, which was that any act of disobedience to any state 
invited the war of all-against-all. If we all feel free to disobey the state 
when we feel mistreated, he thought, we’d have nothing but civil wars 
(see Chapter 3). Hardin (2003: 43) calls this “an unduly confi dent 
social-scientifi c claim.” Many nonviolent movements of the last hun-
dred years support Hardin’s criticism. Therefore, the argument for the 
civil-war proviso will have to show that the state’s protection of people 
from a temporary, not always real threat justifi es the state’s existence 
and obviates any other concern about how well the state treats people, 
even though those concerns are relevant in other empirical circum-
stances less conducive to the temporary civil war. We have not seen 
such an argument.
Even if the immediate dissolution of the nation-state system would 
cause a worldwide civil war, it is not true that the state can only be dis-
solved immediately or that state authority has to be dissolved every-
where at once. Consider the two following alternatives:
First, the state can introduce birth control policies and dissolve 
itself after a period of intentional population decline suffi cient to 
make small-scale stateless societies viable again. The disadvantaged 
can, therefore, rationally argue that the state must either fulfi ll the 
weak proviso or begin that process. So, contractarians need a norma-
tive argument showing that this request is unreasonable even if made 
by people who are in such deep poverty that they would be better off 
under small-scale statelessness and all they are asking is for the state 
to share enough of its advantages so that this request is no longer 
rational. We know of no contractarians who have attempted such an 
argument, but Section 5B2 considers the possibility.
Second, although small-scale stateless societies are nonviable for 
the whole of the world’s population at once, it is undeniable that, for 
any small group of people, these forms of political organization are as 
viable now as they have been at any time in human existence. Much 
of the history of the nineteenth through twenty-fi rst centuries has been 
the systematic closing of environmental peripheries used by peoples in 
small-scale societies outside of the political control of states. On the 
one hand, this history has been horrendous for indigenous peoples 
forcibly brought into state societies. On the other hand, it has also 
foreclosed on the possibility of dissenters within states escaping to the 
peripheries beyond state control. Life outside of state control on that 
periphery is no longer allowed, but it is still possible. The desire to live 
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outside of a nation-state is not always irrational; once again, contrac-
tarians need to show that it is normatively unreasonable. We consider 
the possibility in Section 5B3.
2. The moral relevance of the population size
The disadvantaged group has a strong case against the moral rele-
vance of the civil-war proviso, even if they concede that civil war is 
the only currently available alternative to the state. The disadvantaged 
can begin with a series of thought experiments in which inequality is 
impossible. No matter whether state or stateless society is in place, 
everyone experiences the same level of welfare. Suppose everyone was 
worse off in state society than they were before state society came into 
existence. We would think of the 5,000-year trend that circumscribed 
the earth with state societies as a mistake. Even if there were no way to 
get back to small-scale stateless societies, and states were permanently 
necessary to prevent civil war, we would regret the commitment to 
state society because it was not advantageous. The disadvantaged can 
say that if a society in which no one is better off by comparison with 
statelessness is not advantageous, then a society in which some are 
better off and others are worse off by that comparison is not mutually 
advantageous. Therefore, the state fails the basic test of contractar-
ian reasoning. If this regret-based understanding of mutual benefi t is 
sound, Paine’s fi rst principle is always part of the discussion. It can be 
overridden in some circumstances but not rendered irrelevant. 
The disadvantaged extend their thought experiment about a soci-
ety in which inequality is impossible. They suppose a welfare policy 
becomes available to increase everyone’s welfare so that they are all 
better off than they were in stateless societies. Society would do it, not 
because it made them better off relative to stateless societies, but just 
because higher welfare is always better than lower welfare. But this 
policy would remove the collective regret at having established the 
state system. For the fi rst time, people would view the state system 
as advantageous. Therefore, the disadvantaged could say, we should 
view an unequal state as mutually advantageous only if it does for all 
what a state without inequality would have to do for all to qualify 
as advantageous.
Next, the disadvantaged could suppose that the welfare policy 
above is permanently unavailable but birth control policies are avail-
able to restore small-scale society eventually. Most philosophers fi nd 
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“repugnant” the idea that a higher population with lower welfare 
could be considered morally superior to a lower population with 
higher welfare (Parfi t 1984; Arrhenius et al. 2006).1 Most laypeople 
would prefer fewer but happier descendants to more but miserable 
descendants. Maintaining the higher population is clearly not advanta-
geous if it makes everyone worse off. Therefore, the disadvantaged can 
argue, maintaining the current population size is not mutually advan-
tageous if it makes some people worse off. Therefore, they can claim 
that dissolving the state after a period of negative population growth is 
a reasonable alternative that must be considered in establishing mutual 
advantage. That is, the weak Lockean proviso is relevant.
In a fi nal thought experiment about a state in which inequality is 
impossible, the disadvantaged suppose that both welfare and birth 
control policies are possible. If both will improve everyone’s welfare, 
which will society choose? They will choose whichever policy is most 
advantageous. They will either introduce the welfare policy, maintain 
the state, and maintain the current population size, or they will restore 
statelessness after negative population growth. But one thing they will 
not do is to maintain the state and the population size without intro-
ducing the policies necessary to make everyone better off. That course 
of action would not be advantageous for anyone. Therefore, the dis-
advantaged argue, it would not be mutually advantageous to main-
tain the current state and population size while refusing to introduce 
policies that could ensure that everyone shared in the benefi t of the 
population size.
Beyond the thought experiment, the disadvantaged group can 
argue that the appeal to current population size is “rigged” in Hamp-
ton’s (1988: 271) sense. The population size is fi xed at any given point 
in time, but over time, the state has enormous infl uence—perhaps to 
the point of control—over the population size. Current population 
size has been affected by past policies, and future population size will 
be affected by today’s policies. One of the policies causing today’s 
high population is the aggression of states in conquering most of 
the world’s stateless societies. Societies living at the smallest scale—
hunter-gatherer bands—in some areas lived at population densities 
that had increased very little over the last 10,000 years, right up until 
the time they were forcibly incorporated into state society. Neither 
they nor the world’s least advantaged and least powerful people can 
be held responsible for the population explosion that happened under 
large-scale agricultural societies.
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The civil-war proviso is rigged in Hampton’s (1988: 271) sense: 
people are dependent on the state to protect them from the possibility 
of war that the state has itself created. Powerful people simultaneously 
pursue population policies that maintain the threat of civil war into 
the future and use the threat of civil war as an excuse to benefi t the 
advantaged at the expense of the disadvantaged in the present. There 
might be other good reasons to maintain a high population, but if so, 
it seems reasonable for people whose current living standards are too 
low to fulfi ll the weak proviso to ask for compensation so that they 
too can share in the benefi ts of higher population. 
The appeal to current population size leads to two implausible 
normative conclusions: 
First, the larger the population, the lower the country’s responsibility 
is to its disadvantaged, regardless of the wealth of the society. It might 
imply that advantaged people have a greater responsibility to share with 
the disadvantaged people in Mongolia (which has a very low popula-
tion density, making statelessness more viable) than advantaged people 
do in Denmark (which has a high population density). Consider the fi rst 
state that ever came into existence (presumably in Mesopotamia about 
5,000 years ago). It was very poor, but it was surrounded by stateless 
regions. Its fall would not have caused a worldwide civil war. Therefore, 
the argument under consideration required Mesopotamia to fulfi ll the 
weak proviso, but it requires the United States only to fulfi ll the civil-
war proviso. Ancient Mesopotamia had to deliver a higher absolute 
level of wellbeing to its people to fulfi ll its relevant proviso than the 
United States does today to meet its relevant proviso. The enormously 
greater wealth available in the United States is irrelevant because of 
non-viability of small-scale stateless societies today. 
Second, these moral rules create a substantial confl ict of inter-
est about basic principles. The disadvantaged have a strong interest 
in birth control policies that would allow them a greater right to 
share in society’s benefi ts once population is low enough to make 
the higher proviso relevant again. But the advantaged have an inter-
est in keeping the population high to increase both the share and the 
absolute size of the social advantages they are allowed to take while 
still being able to claim that social arrangements are, in some sense, 
“mutually benefi cial.” No social contract can resolve all confl icts of 
interest, but it is not supposed to have a confl ict on an issue as basic 
as the calculation of mutual benefi t. It was proposed to resolve that 
issue. If mutual advantage is meaningfully achieved, either everyone 
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or no one would have an interest in dissolving the state either imme-
diately or after a period of negative population growth. And either 
everyone or no one regrets that the state is now necessary given cur-
rent population size.
Contractarians wishing to stick with the civil-war proviso need to 
refute all of these arguments. As always, it’s not enough for them to 
present an equally reasonable argument; they need one so strong that 
any rational observer will fi nd the disadvantaged group’s argument 
for the weak proviso to be unreasonable. At the very least it requires 
an explicit defense. Yet, we fi nd in contractarian literature neither 
an argument defending the civil-war proviso against the weak pro-
viso, nor an explanation clearly differentiating between the two. The 
unpromising nature of arguments for the extra-weak proviso against 
the weak proviso could be one reason. The overall argument appears 
stronger if no one notices that the civil-war proviso is weaker than 
the weak proviso and no one calls attention to the need to defend its 
extra-weakness. 
3. The moral relevance of state societies’ circumscription of the earth
The claim connecting the sudden disappearance of all states with a 
civil war is plausible, but the presumed moral relevance of that com-
parison relies not only on taking the current population as given, but 
also on taking as given the circumscription of the earth by 200 or so 
sovereign states, and supposing those governments have the right to 
demand an all-or-nothing comparison throughout a large (and effec-
tively worldwide) territory. Where does this right come from? How 
does the hypothetical worldwide civil war give states the right to close 
off the periphery without making their disadvantaged people better 
off than they would be if they lived in a peripheral area that had 
never been incorporated into a state? Contractarians committed to the 
extra-weak proviso need an argument that any small group’s request 
to live on the periphery is either irrational or unreasonable given the 
current demographic reality. Clearly, at least a few people could live 
a stateless lifestyle. A few still do. The population of the earth would 
have to be tremendously large before statelessness would become non-
viable in every conceivable region. What argument—using contractar-
ian methodology—gives the state the right to refuse any one person 
who would be better off if they were allowed to live as people have in 
stateless areas before forced incorporation? 
5200_Widerquist.indd   237 25/11/16   10:32 AM
238 Prehistoric Myths in Modern Political Philosophy
We will consider several possible contractarian responses to that 
request, but fi rst, we need to make clear that we do not argue for the 
moral necessity of restoring the periphery. We argue only that the state 
must fulfi ll the proviso to give disadvantaged people reason not to 
demand the restoration of the periphery. We address the periphery not 
as a likely policy response to the problems we have presented in this 
book but because we believe that any effort to establish the civil-war 
proviso as more relevant than the weak proviso relies on several dif-
fi cult arguments about the empirical viability and normative relevance 
of establishing stateless societies in peripheral regions. The civil-war 
proviso, in the calculation of mutual advantage, allows the disadvan-
taged to consider the alternative of being in a civil war. The weak pro-
viso, in the calculation of mutual advantage, allows them to imagine 
fl eeing to the periphery and living like the Batek, the Ju/’hoansi, or one 
of many other observed stateless groups. To look at this, we consider a 
small group of disadvantaged people demanding either that the weak 
proviso be fulfi lled or that they be allowed to live that lifestyle outside 
of state authority. A proponent of the civil-war proviso wants to say 
that the state doesn’t have to do either. To do so consistently, they have 
to show that the request to reopen the periphery is either normatively 
unreasonable or empirically irrational. Therefore, we examine the pos-
sibility of the periphery not because we advocate it, but because the 
argument for the civil-war proviso requires claims about it.
The most obvious response to the disadvantaged person’s request 
is misdirected. One might say the state cannot carve out territory for 
any person or group who might have some conceivable advantage from 
making other arrangements. There would be overlapping potential 
mini-states and no way to give everyone the territory they want without 
starting wars over all the disputed overlapping regions. This response 
is misdirected because it drops hypothetical-consent contractarianism’s 
concern only with people who have rational and reasonable objections 
under the relevant proviso. Hypothetical-agreement contractarianism 
does not allow anyone to live under other arrangements—only those for 
whom the proviso is unfulfi lled. The idea is not about billionaires taking 
the resource rights the state enforces for them and buying a kingdom, or 
about any intransigent subgroup carving out their own state. It’s only 
about people who actually are worse off than the peoples who used to 
live on the periphery. What do they owe to the state that simultaneously 
keeps the periphery closed and chooses to make them worse off than 
they would be if it were open? 
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Another misdirected response is to argue that the disadvantaged 
group’s request is unfair because they would require a dispropor-
tionate share of land to form small-scale stateless communities. This 
response abandons contractarianism for some justifi cation of the 
state on its ability to enforce preexisting principles of fair shares of 
resources. It also abandons the propertarian argument that landown-
ership is justifi ed only when everyone is better off than they could be 
living on a commons. The contractarian justifi cation for the state and 
for the norms it enforces is supposed to be that that institution and 
those norms benefi t everyone. 
The advantaged could argue that the disadvantaged group’s request 
is unsustainable because not enough land is available for everyone who 
would want to live in a stateless society, even if emigration is limited 
to people for whom the weak proviso is unfulfi lled. This response is at 
least potentially consistent with contractarian theory. Statelessness is 
viable in one sense: people can live in stateless societies if their num-
bers are kept low enough. But it is nonviable in another sense: states 
produce miserable people in such large numbers that the opportunity 
to live as their ancestors did 12,000 years ago would be so attrac-
tive that every conceivable stateless area would be overrun. With that 
many people clamoring for the periphery, one could argue, everyone 
has a rational interest in state circumscription of the earth to prevent 
a Hobbesian civil war. There are three problems with this response:
First, it’s an amazing empirical reversal for contractarianism. In the 
argument as stated, stateless life is so bad that no one will choose it. 
However, in the argument as intended, stateless life is so good (if you 
can get it) that too many people will choose it to make it sustainable 
for all of them. This approach seems to admit that state society is a 
failed project, as discussed in Section 5B2. That’s very nearly the oppo-
site of contractarianism’s 350-year-old claims of universal consent and 
the inherent need for sovereignty. This approach doesn’t simply soften 
those claims, it abandons them for nearly the opposite position—giving 
off the appearance of Colombe-style “premise shopping.” 
Second, the appearance of “premise shopping” is not necessarily 
a problem if the premise is true, but the person wishing to support 
the civil-war proviso on the strength of this claim needs to provide 
evidence for it. There are a lot of empty areas in northern regions, 
deserts, mountains, rainforests, and so on. Even China, with over a 
billion people, has vast nearly empty regions in the western half of the 
country. How do we know that enough of the world’s poor would fl ee 
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to make stateless society untenable? It didn’t happen in Zomia during 
periods when many millions of people were being treated very badly in 
nearby countries (Scott 2009). A person who actually wanted to sup-
port the civil-war proviso would have to research the areas that could 
be available and the misery of the poor to show that enough of them 
are miserable enough and able enough to fl ee to make stateless areas 
nonviable. In the absence of such evidence, people in the disadvantaged 
group can rationally say, let us try, or give us reason not to want to try.
Third, if there are so many poor and miserable people that they 
would overrun all the world’s potentially stateless regions, it is not 
solely because of the population size, but also because of the treatment 
of disadvantaged people. Remember, the only reason for a civil-war 
proviso is to justify that the state does not have to fulfi ll the weak 
proviso even if it can. By treating people worse than the weak proviso 
demands, the state causes the potential chaos on the periphery. If there 
were fewer people at that level of disadvantage, the periphery would 
be viable, then the weak proviso would come into effect, and the state 
would have to treat everyone better. But state institutions make so 
many people disadvantaged that overcrowding makes the stateless 
periphery nonviable, and therefore, the extra-weak proviso comes 
into effect. This argument seems to be circular: the bad treatment of 
the disadvantaged justifi es the bad treatment of the disadvantaged. 
This issue not only creates a confl ict of interest; it falsifi es the claim 
that the periphery is simply nonviable. Any disadvantaged person 
who wants to fl ee can say that it is possible to fl ee by a combination 
of policies, one allowing him to fl ee and another treating other people 
well enough that they don’t want to fl ee. The argument that stateless 
life is unsustainable is simply not true.
Another response to the disadvantaged person’s request is to argue 
that, even if people could rationally want to be outside the state’s 
economic system and much of its authority, they cannot rationally 
want to be fully free from its protection, because regardless of who 
has the right to fl ee to the periphery, dissenters won’t be the only ones 
who do. Intransigents, opportunists, and sadists will as well. People 
trying to revive band or autonomous village lifeways will be unable 
to defend themselves from such people. If their areas are fully out-
side state authority, the sheer size of today’s population will attract 
enough unreasonable people to turn those regions into Hobbesian 
chaos, at least until people in that region establish a new state capable 
of defending itself. Therefore, one might argue, no one can rationally 
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desire to be free from state authority, even if it only fulfi lls the civil-
war proviso. 
Even if this empirical claim is true, it has two fatal problems:
First, you could say the same thing about Canadians or people in any 
small state next to a big state. Canadians cannot rationally want to be 
entirely outside the protection of the United States, because that would 
expose them to cross-border raids from opportunists and sadists who 
would be free from reprisals as soon as they crossed back over the bor-
der if the United States used none of its authority to protect Canadian 
territory. Assume, for the sake of argument, that the cost of Canadian 
self-protection without U.S. cooperation is prohibitively expensive. As 
the argument under discussion goes, people who accept the need for 
United States government protection must accept U.S. sovereignty.
Contractarians seldom argue that everyone has to accept the same 
sovereign. Canadians are legally entitled to accept some protection 
from the United States without accepting United States sovereignty, 
because the two states recognize each other and their boundaries. 
Why can’t states also recognize the boundaries of stateless regions? If 
your answer is that only sovereign states are entitled to mutual recog-
nition, your argument has become circular: people consent to the state 
because the state won’t recognize their right not to consent unless they 
fi rst consent to a state. States can and do recognize stateless peoples. 
It is just as rational for a stateless group to want the United States 
to recognize their boundaries as it is for Canadians. As Chapter 9 
argues, stateless peoples have used fl ux to maintain peace probably 
for hundreds of thousands of years. To deny they have the right to 
do so would be to uphold that states have an automatic right to stop 
them before any social contract can be considered. Not only does that 
contradict social contract reasoning; it also implies that the primary 
mechanism people used to keep the peace for the last 200,000 years 
was something they had no right to do.
Second, this reasonable-sounding argument is a sanitized version 
of what has been talked about as “the white man’s burden,” one of 
many reasons given for the racist justifi cation of colonialism. Indig-
enous peoples with all forms of socio-political organization were 
deemed to be incapable of defending themselves, and therefore, states 
claimed to be entitled to force them to accept the status of a protector-
ate or even full incorporation. It was all for their own good, suppos-
edly. But it seldom worked out that way. This claim is as likely to be a 
self-serving excuse for forcible incorporation now as it was then. Any 
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stateless people being forcibly incorporated into a state that promises 
no better treatment than warranted by the civil-war proviso should 
not expect it is really for their own good.
6. FULFILL THE PROVISO
The remaining option for contractarians and propertarians is to accept 
our fi ndings and their full moral relevance. To do so is to accept that 
the government and the property rights system have failed to fulfi ll the 
Lockean proviso, and therefore, contractarian and propertarian moral 
theories imply that neither of these institutions is ethically justifi ed as 
currently constituted. States today don’t simply neglect some of their 
number; they take from them in harmful ways. The legal system forces 
disadvantaged people to obey rules and to contribute their labor to the 
maintenance of institutions that benefi t others enormously but that 
provide no net benefi t to them relative to how well they could reason-
ably expect to be if they were allowed to live outside state authority. 
The proper phrase for a society that is not based on mutual advan-
tage is a parasitic society. To us, our fi ndings have an obvious implica-
tion: stop being parasitic. Follow Paine’s recommendation and take 
mutual advantage seriously. Fulfi ll the promise of the Lockean proviso. 
Use redistributive and any other necessary policies to earn the alle-
giance of every rational, reasonable individual rather than just assum-
ing reasonable consent where there is no reason to believe it exists.
We discuss the theoretical possibility that the state could restore 
the periphery and allow dissenters to move into stateless regions, 
although we think that it would be an inadequate response, and few 
people today take them seriously as policy alternatives. Restoring the 
periphery is not as crazy as it might sound. The periphery is gone only 
because states have invaded it. Many of those invasions are recent; 
some are still ongoing. Our societies still haven’t paid the indigenous 
peoples for what they’ve taken, and our economies have used con-
quered land wastefully. 
Imagine an environment so healthy and accessible that anyone who 
didn’t like their position in society could go hunt, gather, fi sh, or farm 
as long as they wanted to. Imagine a society that taught people the skills 
they would need to live off the land. Perhaps more importantly, imagine 
a society that felt it had failed if more than a few people ever chose that 
option. That society would be forced to give the disadvantaged a much 
better deal than most states today. But capitalist states are so hungry 
5200_Widerquist.indd   242 25/11/16   10:32 AM
Implications 243
for resources and so good at turning them into consumptive goods that 
redistributive policies are likely to be cheaper and more effective.
Restoring the periphery would be inadequate, for reasons dis-
cussed in Chapter 10, but as a thought experiment, it suggests how 
high a bar the weak proviso is. If these options were easily accessible 
right outside of town, how well-off would the disadvantaged have to 
be to ensure that not one rational person would choose one of them? 
We suspect the disadvantaged would have to be a lot better off than 
people in poverty today.
To us, one response to our fi ndings is obvious: states or property 
rights systems that fail to fulfi ll Paine’s fi rst principle of civilization 
need to take whatever steps necessary to raise the welfare level of the 
poor and disadvantaged at least up to the proviso level. We are sure 
there are good reasons to raise it more, but the strong proviso is not 
the subject of this book. This book is about the 350-year-old unful-
fi lled promise of the weak Lockean proviso. Fulfi ll the promise, so 
that the state and the property rights systems will become mutually 
advantageous for the fi rst time in history. Fulfi ll the promise, so that 
these institutions will have some claim to meet the minimum ethical 
standard proposed by the prevailing theories used to justify them. 
How? That’s not the subject of this book either, but we close with 
a few words about it. Our societies need safer food, water, air, and soil 
to free people from the new diseases that have come as side effects of 
the modern world. People need education appropriate for their socio-
economic environment. As Pinker (2012) suggests for other reasons, 
most states need to extend greater freedom from violence to people 
who live in disadvantaged communities. Perhaps the most diffi cult 
thing for our societies to fi gure out is how to provide a socio-economic 
environment more favorable to good mental health and less conducive 
to feelings of fear and alienation. 
Probably the easiest thing that states need to do is to redistribute 
property and promote opportunity to raise the material wellbeing of 
the most disadvantaged group of people. The prospects are encourag-
ing. Few if any states are putting as much effort as they reasonably 
could into improving the living standards of the disadvantaged. People 
need access to enough food to meet their physical needs, clothing and 
shelter appropriate for their physical environment, and resources to 
build a life that they fi nd meaningful (Widerquist 2010c).
There are many ways to raise the material wellbeing of the least 
advantaged. The solution could be as simple as the guaranteed minimum 
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living standard suggested by some contractarians, such as Rawls (1971), 
Kavka (1986: 197–8), or Van Parijs (1995). Policymakers would actu-
ally have to show evidence that their policies fulfi lled the proviso. Per-
haps the method most consistent with the high level of negative freedom 
experienced by our few remaining stateless cousins is the unconditional 
basic income, ensuring everyone a regular cash income, high enough to 
meet their basic needs, without holding them to any conditions such 
as a work requirement (Van Parijs 1995; Widerquist and Lewis 2006; 
Sheahen 2012; Widerquist 2013). Before authority was imposed over the 
land, every individual was free to work with resources as they pleased, 
and virtually everyone chose not to have bosses and not to have hier-
archies, either political or economic. Legal authorities have taken away 
that freedom, and unless the law recognizes you as the owner of a suf-
fi cient amount of resources, it provides you only with the opportunity to 
work in a hierarchical system, serving someone else’s goals. The political 
environment has made this kind of work so common that most of us 
have forgotten that for most of history, people were free to work without 
bosses, chiefs, or landlords. Paid work in a hierarchy is fi ne if people 
choose it. But if people are going to be as negatively free as our stateless 
ancestors, governments and landlords need to restore people’s freedom to 
choose not to work in a hierarchical system. 
This much we get just from taking the weak proviso seriously. 
Political philosophers have asserted this minimum condition to justify 
the state for more than 350 years, but they have never seriously exam-
ined their ramifi cations. Maybe Pateman (1989: 71) is right: “The 
history of . . . consent theory of the last three centuries largely consists 
of attempts by theorists to suppress the radical and subversive impli-
cations of their own arguments.”
Maybe Graeber (2011: 387) is right as well: “Perhaps the world 
really does owe you a living.” States and landowners have asserted 
authority over nearly all the resources of the earth—resources that 
you need to survive and that every single human was free to use for 
the fi rst 200,000 years humans have lived on this planet. States and 
resource owners promised they only asserted that authority because 
ultimately it was good for everyone. They were wrong. They owe it to 
you to make good on that promise.
Note
 1 There is controversy about how to make this claim consistent with other 
moral principles, but not usually about its repugnance.
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